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How should we then live? This has been the guiding question throughout the 
study. In a world that offers a myriad of answers to this one question, I have sought the 
answer in the Bible, more specifically in the Hebrew part of the Bible. Instead of asking 
the straightforward question as to how the Bible can function as norm for contemporary 
ethics, the following discussion is based on the assumption that an authentic reading and 
appropriation of the text needs both to understand and to emulate the ways in which the 
biblical authors read the Bible. While scholars have examined separately biblical law, 




combine these three areas in an attempt to clarify how biblical authors read normative 
texts. 
This study is divided into three parts: in the first part, I argue that Torah is best 
characterized as normative covenantal instruction, and that Torah and the Latter Prophets 
(hereafter Prophets) participated in a scribal culture that did not conform to our standards 
of literary exactness. In the second part, I have selected four cases where we find 
parallels between Torah and the Prophets: (1) Divorce and Remarriage in Deut 24:1–4 
and Jer 3:1–10, (2) Sabbath Instructions in Exod 20:8–11; Deut 5:12–15 and Jer 17:19–
27, (3) Manumission Instructions in Exod 21:2–11; Lev 25:10, 39–46; Deut 15:12–18; 
and Jer 34:8–22, and (4) Fasting in Lev 16; 23; 25 and Isa 58:1–14. Finally, I discuss Jer 
7 and Ezek 18 as these cases display a different type of reuse than the preceding four. I 
have limited myself to cases where reuse and direction of dependence can be 
demonstrated with reasonable confidence, in order to give an adequate basis for a 
discussion of how normative texts were appropriated in each of the specific cases. In the 
third part, I include a hermeneutical and philosophical reflection on reading as a 
disclosure of the thoughts of the heart. 
Repetition with variation is typical in texts that reuse a normative text. Neither 
conflict nor harmony can adequately explain this phenomena. In the borrowing text, we 
rather see a close reading that reads its source(s) expansionistically. There is an 
interpretative response interwoven with the reading along with various trajectories the 
borrowing author would have viewed as indicated in the very source(s) themselves. We 
find a challenge both to a literalistic reading that confines meaning to the plain sense of 
the text on the one hand, and to a more free or creative reading not fully responsible to 
 
 
the text on the other. The cases studied attest to the importance of an immersion into the 
normative texts in order to clarify how we should live; these cases also demonstrate the 
need for finding new life through texts and forms of life that creatively reuse the biblical 
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ֲאֶׁשר ֹהִליֲכָך ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֶהיָך ֶזה ַאְרָּבִעים ָׁשָנה ַּבִּמְדָּבר ְלַמַען ַעֹּנְתָך ְלַנֹּסְתָך ָלַדַעת ֶאת־ ְוָזַכְרָּת ֶאת־ָּכל־ַהֶּדֶרְך
ַוְיַעְּנָך ַוַּיְרִעֶבָך ַוַּיֲאִכְלָך ֶאת ַהָּמן ֲאֶׁשר לֹא־ָיַדְעָּת ְולֹא ָיְדעּון ֲאֹבֶתיָך  ֲאֶׁשר ִּבְלָבְבָך ֲהִתְׁשֹמר ִמְצֹוָתו ִאם־לֹא׃
ִׂשְמָלְתָך לֹא  ָך ִּכי לֹא ַעל־ַהֶּלֶחם ְלַבּדֹו ִיְחֶיה ָהָאָדם ִּכי ַעל־ָּכל־מֹוָצא ִפי־ְיהָוה ִיְחֶיה ָהָאָדם׃ְלַמַען הֹוִדעֲ 
ְוָיַדְעָּת ִעם־ְלָבֶבָך ִּכי ַּכֲאֶׁשר ְיַיֵּסר ִאיׁש ֶאת־ְּבנֹו ְיהָוה  ָבְלָתה ֵמָעֶליָך ְוַרְגְלָך לֹא ָבֵצָקה ֶזה ַאְרָּבִעים ָׁשָנה׃
 ׃ֱאֹלֶהיָך ְמַיְּסֶרּךָ 
 
Remember the entire way which YHWH your God made you walk these forty years in 
the desert, in order that he might humble you and test you to know what was in your 
heart, whether you would keep his commandments or not. He humbled and starved you, 
and fed you manna, which neither you or your fathers knew, in order to make you know 
that man does not live by bread alone, but man lives by all that proceeds from the mouth 
of YHWH. Your clothing upon you did not wear out and your foot did not swell these 
forty years. Know then in your heart that as a man disciplines his son so YHWH your 
God disciplines you (Deut 8:2–5; cf. Exod 15:25; 16:4; Deut 8:16). 
 
 ָׁשָמְעִּתי ְׁשַּתִים־זּוֱאֹלִהים  ִּדֶּבר ַאַחת
 
One thing God spoke, two things I heard (Ps 62:12). 
 
ὁ δὲ εἶπεν αὐτοῖς· διὰ τοῦτο πᾶς γραμματεὺς μαθητευθεὶς τῇ βασιλείᾳ τῶν οὐρανῶν 
ὅμοιός ἐστιν ἀνθρώπῳ οἰκοδεσπότῃ, ὅστις ἐκβάλλει ἐκ τοῦ θησαυροῦ αὐτοῦ καινὰ καὶ 
παλαιά. 
And he said to them: “Therefore every scribe who has been trained by the kingdom of 
heaven is like the owner of a house, who brings out of his treasure what is new and old” 
(Matt 13:52; cf. 5:17). 
 
How then shall we live? This basic question has driven the following study. But I 
have not attempted to answer it by setting forth a moral theory or code of conduct. The 
course I will pursue is more indirect. If there is a normative standard for how life ought to 
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be lived in a meaningful way, this standard needs to come from outside of ourselves, 
outside of human communities, and outside of this world. Otherwise normativity will 
only be relative to these temporal and thus changeable entities. Experiences, convictions, 
and choices might lead us to searching in conflicting directions for the desired 
normativity. In what follows I have tried to clarify how such normativity might look if we 
search for it in the Hebrew part of the Bible (hereafter HB). More precisely, I have not 
simply asked what answers it may provide for specific questions on conduct. Rather, I 
have placed a main focus upon how the various authors responsible for the HB read and 
appropriated other normative texts. Wittgenstein famously wrote: “We feel that even if 
all possible scientific questions be answered, the problems of life have still not been 
touched at all.”1 Maybe we are entitled to paraphrase Wittgenstein, and say that we feel 
that even if all possible moral and exegetical questions could be answered when 
approached objectively, the problems of life have still not been touched upon at all. It 
follows that we can approach HB as either a spectator or a participant.2 Objectivist 
analysis tends to leave the problems of life untouched even when it discusses morality 
and theology. The aim in the following is to seek an alternative to this objectivist 
tendency to remain distant from life; and, instead, to let life itself be touched—my life, 
and hopefully the reader’s as well. 
Further, I have no pretentions of setting forth a theory about normativity in the 
HB. This study is not meant to be comprehensive. Even if I had constraints neither on 
                                               
1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C. K. Ogden (London: Routledge, 
1922), 187 (6.52). 
2 Cf. Hans Skjervheim, Deltakar og tilskodar og andre essays (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1996), 71–87. 
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time nor space, I would choose to place the emphasis differently. It is more important to 
immerse ourselves in the texts in order to clarify how we should live, and let them, in 
turn, penetrate our life, my life. The aim is not a theory, but a way of life. The study 
therefore does not conclude as a theory does; instead, it can only be brought to an end 
within life itself. 
This study is divided into three parts. In the first part I address the phenomenon of 
repetition with variation in reuse between Torah and the Latter Prophets (hereafter 
Prophets).3 This first part consists of three chapters, reviewing and reflecting on three 
issues that have a particular bearing when analyzing the evidence for reuse and 
attempting to conceptualize the appropriation of normative texts in the HB. The first part, 
and the topic of the first chapter, is a brief survey of the scholarly debate on the question 
of reuse between Torah and the Prophets. The second chapter raises the question as to 
how Torah itself is to be characterized. The third chapter asks how the scribal culture 
Torah and the Prophets participate in may help us understand the reuse of texts. I argue 
                                               
3 In the following I will use ‘Torah’ with particular reference to the instructive material in the 
Pentateuch, and ‘Pentateuch’ as a reference to the books of Genesis—Deuteronomy. Even if both 
‘Pentateuch’ and ‘Torah’ can be said to be anachronistic designations of the instructive material, since ֹוָרהּת  
is used within the Pentateuch to designate parts of its material, as I will show later, ‘Torah’ used for the 
collection of instructive material in the Pentateuch is at least biblically anachronistic, in the sense that it is 
what later biblical authors call the collection. By speaking of the instructive material in the Pentateuch, an 
objection may be that all of the Pentateuch was intended to be instructive (cf. 2 Tim 3:16). While this is 
true, I should therefore specify that by speaking of “the instructive material of Torah” I mean the material 
having an imperative or jussive function in Torah, the material often designated as the ‘law’. So this is a 
reference to a specific body of text, even if later generations also viewed other parts of Torah, if not the 
entire corpus as “instructive material.” 
While it is common to speak of ‘legal discrepancy’ or ‘apparent legal discrepancy’ between the 
different instructions in Torah, the first postulates an actual discord between the legal corpora of Torah 
while the second postulates that behind its appearance there is really an accord. In order to suspend such 
judgments of the textual material, acknowledging the limitations of our understanding, I rather prefer more 
neutral phenomenological descriptions like legal ‘dissimilarity,’ ‘dissimilitude,’ ‘differences,’ ‘diversity,’ 
‘variation,’ ‘inconsistency,’ and ‘tension.’ 
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that this reuse seems to be part of a text-supported memorized reuse, where memorization 
and embodiment of the revered texts constitute a cultural backbone. Chapter two and 
three both begin with a survey of the debates on the Ancient Near East (ANE) material, 
before moving on to a discussion of how to understand the biblical passages in light of 
this comparative background. The intention here is neither to enter into the discussion of 
ANE sources, nor be exhaustive regarding the biblical material, but simply to situate the 
analysis of proto-halakhic reuse relative to its cognitive milieu;4 highlighting key issues 
that, hopefully, will help us to be more attentive readers when we encounter the textual 
phenomena in the concrete cases in the second part of this study. 
I argue that the characterization of Torah as covenantal instruction, and the 
acknowledgment of the scribal culture of memorized reuse both help us to understand 
why reuse of normative texts between Torah and the Prophets does not conform to our 
standards of literary exactness. It is therefore a call for caution before entering the 
discussion of the concrete cases in this study. 
In the second part, I have selected four cases of parallels between Torah and the 
Prophets: (1) Divorce and Remarriage in Deut 24:1–4 and Jer 3:1–10, (2) Sabbath 
Instructions in Exod 20:8–11; Deut 5:12–15 and Jer 17:19–27, (3) Manumission 
Instructions in Exod 21:2–11; Lev 25:10, 39–46; Deut 15:12–18; and Jer 34:8–22, and 
(4) Fasting in Lev 16; 23; 25 and Isa 58:1–14. To me these appear to be relatively clear 
cases of reuse between the Torah and the Prophets where the direction of dependence can 
be established satisfactorily. In my view, they illustrate well the phenomena of repetition 
                                               
4 I speak of proto-halakhic in contrast to halakhic reuse, where the former refers to biblical reuse 
and the latter to later Jewish reuse. 
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with variation in proto-halakhic reuse and appropriation. Having provided textual 
arguments for a case of reuse and direction of dependence, I proceed to an analysis of 
how the normative text is appropriated by the later biblical author in the specific case. 
The procedure for selecting the above mentioned passages proceeded as follows: 
First, since the delimitation between so-called ‘ethical’ and ‘cultuc’ instructions is not 
actually as clear as it is often presented (something I will discuss further in chapter two) I 
chose instead to limit my discussion to the instructive material of Torah as follows: the 
Decalogue and the Book of the Covenant (BC) in Exodus (Exod 20:1–17; 21:2–23:19), 
the Holiness Code (Lev 18:1–26:2), and the Decalogue and collection of specific 
instructions in Deuteronomy (Deut 5:6–18; 12:1–26:19).5 Second, I proceeded by asking 
what passages in the Prophets had such strong parallels that a case of reuse can be 
established between the Torah and Prophets.6 If such evidence could be provided, I then 
proceeded to a discussion of the indicators of a direction of dependence. Finally, if I felt 
that both a case for reuse and the direction of dependence could be established with a 
satisfactory degree of confidence, I then proceeded to the question of appropriation. Since 
this latter step is at the heart of the present study, with the other two as preliminary steps, 
I chose to raise the bar both for determining what cases could be considered as cases of 
reuse and for identifying the direction of dependence. Beginning, initially, from a longer 
                                               
5 I will not include the admonitions, blessings and curses as part of the primary textual material 
(Exod 23:20–33; Lev 26:3–46; Deut 27–28). While my selection of texts could be said to belong to the 
ethical category, in my first chapter I will discuss the textual basis for differentiating ethical from cultic 
material. 
6 My focus will not be upon assigning absolute dates to the various biblical passages under study, 
but rather clarify the relative chronology between individual passages on the basis of internal textual 
evidence. Cf. Benjamin Kilchör, Mosetora und Jahwetora: Das Verhältnis von Deuteronomium 12–16 zu 
Exodus, Levitikus und Numeri, ed. Eckart Otto. BZAR 21 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2015), 3. 
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list, this was reduced to the above four cases. These are discussed in chapters four to 
seven. Building from the four most clear cases of reuse, in chapter eight, I will use Jer 
7:1–15 and Ezek 18 in order to reflect upon cases of more elusive reuse between Torah 
and the Prophets. Given the phenomena of repetition with variation as found in the four 
cases, how should we relate to parallels between Torah and the Prophets where the 
evidence for reuse and a clear direction of dependence is less available? Some scholars 
are confident that there is evidence for literary dependence in cases of elusive reuse while 
others deny that adequate evidence does exist in such cases for identifying reuse. I will 
offer a middle position where I show that both views need to be somewhat modified. 
Given that I have limited myself to the instructive material in Torah and the 
Prophets, it was therefore the degree of confidence as to reuse and direction of 
dependence that guided me to select these cases. While the cases cover a certain spectrum 
of moral themes, how a normative text was appropriated was emphasized rather than a 
range of possible topics. Having selected the six cases I allowed myself to organize them 
according to the most natural sequence: the cases including passages from Jeremiah are 
given in synchronic jeremianic order; the case including Isa 58 follows as it fits well the 
case involving Jer 34 and, finally, I discuss Jer 7 and Exek 18 last as these display a 
different type of reuse than the preceding four. 
The third part of this study, is a hermeneutical reflection upon reading as a 
disclosure of the thoughts of the heart. I am here drawing on more contemporary authors, 
Søren Kierkegaard and Ludwig Wittgenstein in particular, to uncover resonances with the 
reflections in the previous chapters. 
The Masoretic text (MT) will form the basis of the following study, including 
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discussions of other manuscripts where relevant. This should not be understood as a 
claim to the chronological priority of the version reflected in MT, but rather a pragmatic 
choice as a starting point of the discussion.7 When referring to parts of verses, I will 
follow the practice of placing divisions between clauses, instead of on the basis of the 
cantillation marks. The advantage of this is that it relates more to the ancient consonantal 
text.  
 
                                               
7 I find myself agreeing with Cassuto and Greenberg as they emphasize that the role of the 
commentator is to explain the present composition as we have it, even if this does not exclude a pre-history 
of the text (Moshe Greenberg, Ezekiel 1–20: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, 
Anchor Bible (AB) 22 (New York: Doubleday, 1983), 18–27; Umberto Cassuto, A Commentary on the 
Book of Exodus, trans. Israel Abrahams (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1997), 186). Cf. also Pakkala’s study 
showing how the phenomena of omission complicates source critical approaches (Juha Pakkala, God's 
Word Omitted: Omissions in the Transmission of the Hebrew Bible, Forschungen zur Religion und 










A HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE DEBATE ON  
THE RELATIVE PRIORITY OF TORAH  
AND THE PROPHETS 
 
The following is not a study of the question of reuse within Torah itself.1 Nor is it 
                                               
1 For studies on reuse within Torah see for example Bernard M. Levinson, Deuteronomy and the 
Hermeneutics of Legal Innovation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Bernard M. Levinson, 
Legal Revision and Religious Renewal in Ancient Israel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); 
Jeffrey Stackert, Rewriting the Torah: Literary Revision in Deuteronomy and the Holiness Legislation, eds. 
Bernd Janowski, Mark S. Smith and Hermann Spieckermann. Forschungen zum Alten Testament (FAT) 52 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007); Kilchör, Mosetora und Jahwetora. 
A key question in the present scholarly debate is the direction of dependence between the BC, 
Holiness Instruction (HI), and Deuteronomy—especially the relation between the two latter. The scholarly 
consensus is that the BC is the oldest law, with the exception of Van Seters arguing it is the youngest (John 
Van Seters, A Law Book for the Diaspora: Revision in the Study of the Covenant Code (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003)). Further, the majority of scholars also see a reuse of at least the BC in 
Deuteronomy. For authors who have more recently argued for a direct literary dependence of Deuteronomy 
upon the BC, see Norbert Lohfink, “Zur deuteronomischen Zentralisationsformel,” Bib 65 (1984): 297–
329; Eckart Otto, “Aspects of Legal Reforms and Reformulations in Ancient Cuneiform and Israelite Law,” 
in Theory and Method in Biblical and Cuneiform Law: Revision, Interpolation and Development, ed. 
Bernard M. Levinson (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1994), 160–96; Norbert Lohfink, “Fortschreibung? 
Zur Technik von Rechtsrevisionen im deuteronomischen Bereich, erörtert an Deuteronomium 12, Ex 21,2–
11 und Dtn 15,12–18,” in Das Deteronomium und seine Querbeziehungen, Schriften der Finnischen 
Exegetischen Gesellschaft 62 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1996), 127–71; Levinson, 
Deuteronomy. 
There are some dissenting voices like Kaufmann not seeing any literary influence at all between 
the legal corpora (Yehezkel Kaufmann, The Religion of Israel: From Its Beginnings to the Babylnian Exile, 
trans. Moshe Greenberg (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), 153–211). See esp- pp. 166–71, 
208–9. He wrote: “Each of the three codes of the Torah is to be regarded as an independent crystallization 
of Israel’s ancient juristic-moral literature. The evolutionary sequence and literary dependence assumed by 
Wellhausen has no foundation” (Kaufmann, The Religion of Israel, 170). And again, “not a single 
peculiarity of one legal corpus has insinuated itself into either of the others” (Kaufmann, The Religion of 
Israel, 171). For him the similarities between the legal corpora of the Torah should not be understood as 
influence between them, but each should be understood as an “independent development . . . immediately 
linked to the ancient Near Eastern tradition; each is a primary Israelite formulation of elements of that 
common tradition” (Kaufmann, The Religion of Israel, 171). On the question of chronological priority of P 
over D see Kaufmann, The Religion of Israel, 153–211. Weinfeld expressed a related view, arguing in 
relation to P and D “that the divergencies between the two schools stem from a difference in their 
sociological background rather than from a difference in their chronological setting. The problem at hand 
concerns two different ideologies arising from two different circles but not necessarily from two distinct 
historical periods” (Moshe Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School (Winona Lake, IN: 
Eisenbrauns, 1992), 180). He tries to show that “the law of P, and the theological conception underlying it, 
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are much older than those of D. D changes and reworks the traditional institutions and attitudes of P” 
(Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School, 180n). Again, the similarities are explained as 
rooted in a common tradition, rather than literary influence between the two compositions. Other authors 
who see no dependence between D and HI, and may also dispute a dependence between BC and HI as well, 
are L. E. Elliott-Binns, “Some Problems of the Holiness Code,” Zeitschrift für die Alttestamentliche 
Wissenschaft [ZAW] 67 (1955): 29–30; Rosario Pius Merendino, Das deuteronomische Gesetz: Eine 
literarkritische, gattungs- und überlieferungsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zu Dt 12–26, Bonner Biblische 
Beiträge (BBB) 31 (Bonn: P. Hanstein, 1969), 401–2; Jan Joosten, People and Land in the Holiness Code: 
An Exegetical Study of the Ideational Framework of the Law in Leviticus 17–26 (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 159; 
Baruch J. Schwartz, “‘Profane’ Slaughter and the Integrity of the Priestly Code,” Hebrew Union College 
Annual (HUCA) 67 (1996): 38–42; John S. Bergsma, The Jubilee from Leviticus to Qumran: A History of 
Interpretation (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 41, 51, 137–47, 163n–64n. Rofé argues for at least three stages in the 
development of D, with a later stage trying “to reconcile the contradictions between D’s laws and those of 
the Pentateuch’s other legal compilations” (Alexander Rofé, “The Book of Deuteronomy. A Summary,” in 
Deuteronomy: Issues and Interpretations, Old Testament Studies [OTS]  (London: T&T Clark, 2002), 8). 
Bettenzoli argues for seeing the development of HI and D as a mutual influence over time (Gisueppe 
Bettenzoli, “Deuteronomium und Heiligkeitsgesetz,” Vetus Testamentum [VT] 34 (1984): 397–98). 
The major scholarly discussion is written on the reuse between the so-called Priestly source and/or 
the HI on one side and Deuteronomy on the other side. The scholarly default position has been 
Wellhausen’s, namely that the so-called priestly material (P) was written after Deuteronomy (D), and that 
the direction of dependence therefore goes from D to H. Since Baentsch many have seen the direction of 
dependence as going from Deuteronomy to the HI (Bruno Baentsch, Das Heligkeits-Gesetz Lev XVII–XXVI 
(Erfurt: Hugo Günther, 1893), 76–80). Scholars who see the HI as reusing Deuteronomy are Alfred 
Cholewiński, Heiligkeitsgesetz und Deuteronomium, Analecta Biblica 66 (Rome: Biblical Institute, 1976); 
Stephen A. Kaufman, “Deuteronomy 15 and Recent Research on the Dating of P,” in Das Deuteronomium: 
Entstehung, Gestalt und Botschaft, ed. Norbert Lohfink (Leuven: University Press, 1985), 276; Eckart Otto, 
Theologische Ethik des Alten Testaments (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1994), 234–53; Eckart Otto, “Das 
Heligkeitsgesetz Leviticus 17–26 in der Pentateuchredaktion,” in Altes Testament, Forschung und 
Wirkung: Festschrift für Henning Graf Reventlow, eds. Peter Mommer and Winfried Thiel (Frankfurt am 
Main: Peter Lang, 1994), 65–80; Eckart Otto, “Innerbiblische Exegese im Heiligkeitsgesetz Levitikus 17–
26,” in Levitikus als Buch, eds. Heinz-Josef Fabry and Hans-Winfried Jüngling (Berlin: Philo, 1999), 125–
96; Eckart Otto, “Das Heiligkeitsgesetz zwischen Priesterschrift und Deuteronomium,” Zeitschrift für 
Altorientalische und Biblische Rectsgeschichte [ZABR] 6 (2000): 330–40; Klaus Grünwaldt, Das 
Heiligkeitsgesetz Leviticus 17–26: Ursprüngliche Gestalt, Tradition und Theologie (Berlin: De Gruyter, 
1999), 376; Christophe Nihan, “The Holiness Code between D and P. Some Comments on the Function and 
Significance of Leviticus 17–26 in the Composition of the Torah,” in Das Deuteronomium zwischen 
Pentateuch und Deuteronomistischem Geschichtswerk, eds. Eckart Otto and Reinhard Achenbach 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2004), 523–35, 554n; Bernard M. Levinson, “The Birth of the 
Lemma: The Restrictice Reinterpretation of the Covenant Code’s Manumission Law by the Holiness Code 
(Leviticus 24:44–46),” Journal of Biblical Literature (JBL) 124 (2005): 630; Stackert, Rewriting the Torah, 
16, cf. 69–70. 
Some are more influenced by Kaufmann’s claim that Deuteronomy was composed after Leviticus. 
Scholars who see Deuteronomy as reusing the HI are Sara Japhet, “The Relationship between the Legal 
Corpora in the Pentateuch in Light of Manumission Laws,” in Studies in the Bible, ed. Sara Japhet, ScrHier  
(Jerusalem: Magnes, 1986), ; Michael Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1988); Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School, 180–83; Georg Braulik, 
“Die dekalogische Redaktion der deuteronomischen Gesetze. Ihre Abhängigkeit von Leviticus 19 am 
Beispiel von Deuteronomium 22,1–12; 24,10–22; 25,13–16,” in Bundesdokument und Gesetz: Studien zum 
Deuteronomium (Freiburg: Herder, 1995), 1–25; Georg Braulik, “Weitere Beobachtungen zur Beziehung 
zwischen dem Heiligkeitsgesetz und Deuteronomium 19–25,” in Das Deuteronomium und seine 
Querbeziehungen, ed. Timo Veijola (Helsinki: Finnische Exegetische Gesellschaft, 1996), 23–55; Jacob 
Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB (New York: 
Doubleday, 1991), 8–9; Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22: A New Translation with Introduction and 
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a study of reuse between the different prophetic books and passages.2 My focus will 
rather be upon reuse, direction of dependence, and appropriation between Torah and the 
Prophets. 
Many studies on the relation and reuse between parallel passages within Torah 
and between Torah and other books of the HB have been undertaken in order to clarify 
source critical issues.3 Julius Wellhausen famously argued in his Prologomena (1885) 
that the prophets preceded the law. He writes: 
The prophets have notoriously no father (1 Sam. 10:12), their importance rests on the 
individuals; it is characteristic that only names and sketches of their lives have 
reached us. . . . The representative men are always single, resting on nothing outside 
themselves. . . . They do not preach on set texts; they speak out of the spirit which 
judges all things and itself is judged of no man. Where do they ever lean on any other 
authority than the truth of what they say; where do they rest on any other foundation 
than their own certainty? . . . This gives rise to a synthesis of apparent contradictions: 
the subjective in the highest sense, which is exalted above all ordinances, is the truly 
objective, the divine. . . . But their creed is not to be found in any book. It is 
barbarism, in dealing with such a phenomenon, to distort its physiognomy by 
introducing the law.4 
                                               
Commentary, AB (New York: Doubleday, 2000), 1357–61; Kilchör, Mosetora und Jahwetora. 
2 For studies on reuse between the prophetic books see for example James D. Nogalski, Literary 
Precursors to the Book of the Twelve, ed. Otto Kaiser. Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für Altorientalische und 
Biblische Rechtsgeschichte (BZABR) 217 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1993); Nogalski, Redactional 
Processes in the Book of the Twelve; Patricia Kathleen Tull Willey, “'Remember the Former Things': The 
Recollection of Previous Texts in Isaiah 40–55” (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas, 1996); Benjamin D. 
Sommer, A Prophet Reads Scripture: Allusion in Isaiah 40-66 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1998); Richard L. Schultz, Search for Quotation: Verbal Parallels in the Prophets, Journal for the Study of 
the Old Testament Supplement Seires [JSOTSup] 180 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999); James 
D. Nogalski et al., Two Sides of a Coin: Juxtaposing Views on Interpreting the Book of the Twelve/the 
Twelve Prophetic Books (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias, 2009). 
3 For an overview of the source-critical debates see Walther Zimmerli, The Law and the Prophets: 
A Study of the Meaning of the Old Testament, trans. R. E. Clements (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 31–
45; Levinson, Legal Revision, 89–181. 
4 Julius Wellhausen, Prolegomena to the History of Israel, trans. J. Sutherland Black and Allan 
Menzies (Edinburgh: Adam & Charles Black, 1885), 397–99. Fishbane writes: “A primary factor in 
Wellhausen’s multi-levelled argument was that if in fact the law came first, one would hardly expect the 
occurrence of prophecy at all” (Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 292). 
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Wellhausen criticized attempts to defend a traditional understanding of biblical 
chronology by referring to a few instances indicating the precedence of the law to the 
prophets.5 As is well known, Wellhausen’s thesis has dominated the scholarly world ever 
since. In this way, the prophets were proclaimed to be the founders of the religion of 
Israel.6 
Those arguing for the precedence of the prophets relative to Torah nevertheless 
encounter the same dilemma as those arguing for the reverse chronological order: why 
are there so few relatively certain cases of reuses between Torah and the Prophets if one 
was the foundational document of the other? Moreover, this dilemma is not solved by 
dating the Torah after the Prophets. If the prophets founded the religion of the law, we 
should expect to find more parallels between the two corpora of texts. Furthermore, if the 
Torah was based on the prophets, why is there so little evidence for such a direction of 
dependence? Yehezkel Kaufmann argued against Wellhausen based on the absence of 
references to the prophets in the Torah. Contrary to Wellhausen and his associates he 
concluded as follows: “The Torah cannot be understood as a later outgrowth of prophetic 
faith. Literary prophecy cannot, then, be considered the fountainhead or ‘ideal source’ of 
Israelite monotheism. The development of Israelite faith was, indeed, more ramified and 
                                               
5 Wellhausen, Prolegomena, 5, 11–12. 
6 That Wellhausen’s basic outline is still accepted by many scholars is illustrated by Kratz’ recent 
repetition of his ideas: “Sie [die Propheten Israels] hatten das Gesetz (noch) nicht zum Fundament, aber sie 
machten es dazu. So wurden sie—nicht dem Begriff, aber der Sache nach—zu den ‘Begründern der 
Religion des Gesetzes’ (Julius Wellhausen)” (Reinhard G. Kratz, Die Propheten Israels (München: Verlag 
C. H. Beck, 2003), 18. See also pp. 13, 17). More recently Lyons has written that Wellhausen’s theory of 
the prophetic originality is today regarded generally as näive (Michael A. Lyons, From Law to Prophecy: 
Ezekiel's use of the Holiness Code, eds. Claudia V. Camp and Andrew Mein. Library of Hebrew Bible/Old 
Testament studies [LHBOTS] 507 (London: T&T Clark, 2009), 39). 
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intricate than either tradition or modern criticism has recognized.”7 And speaking of the 
‘Torah-group’ Kaufmann states: “From the viewpoint of the evolution of Israelite 
religion this stratum belongs not after, but before literary prophecy. It is the literary 
product of the earliest stage of Israelite religion.”8 Zimmerli wrote: 
Whilst Wellhausen is still correct in removing the cultic legislation of the Priestly 
Document from the time of Moses, it has nevertheless become evident that early 
Israel did not lack a formulated law. On the contrary, after Israel settled in the land, 
there began a lively process of interchange between different traditions of law, which 
was full of tension. Admittedly the law in the form given to it by the Priestly 
Document is later than the prophets, but the prophets themselves belonged to a people 
who traced their origin to the proclamation of the law. Not only were they familiar 
with it in the form of oral instruction of torah, as Wellhausen accepted, but as a 
divine law, formulated in awesome statutes and recited at regular intervals in the 
name of Yahweh.9 
                                               
7 Kaufmann, The Religion of Israel, 165. On the same page, he summarizes: “1. in the historical 
books of the Torah-group, literary prophecy is never mentioned; 2. in none of the books of the Torah-group 
is there an awareness of the ideas originated by literary prophets regarding the history of Israel, the relation 
of morality to cult, and eschatology; 3. the idea of a central chosen sanctuary, one of the pervading themes 
of the Torah literature, is absent in pre-Deuteronomic prophecy. The Josianic reform has, therefore, no 
roots in literary prophecy, though it does in the Torah literature.” Schwartz shows that Kaufmann’s position 
on the relation between Torah and the prophets stemmed from his view of monotheism as an original and 
radical rejection of paganism, not simply an outgrowth of it, a revolution and not an evolution (Baruch J. 
Schwartz, “The Pentateuch as Scripture and the Challenge of Biblical Criticism: Responses among Modern 
Jewish Thinkers and Scholars,” in Jewish Concepts of Scripture: A Comparative Approach, ed. Benjamin 
D. Sommer (New York: New York University Press, 2012), 224–25. Cf. pp. 226–27). 
According to Kaufmann the archetypal national sins addressed in Torah are “the cultic defection 
of the golden calf, and the lack of faith in YHWH shown in the episode of the spies (Num. 13–14; Deut- 
1:22ff.)” (Kaufmann, The Religion of Israel, 159. Cf. p. 157, 161). On the other side, the prophets place 
morality at center stage: “The great new doctrine of prophecy was the primacy of morality over the cult. . . .  
Whether or not the prophets objected to sacrifice on principle, it is plain that they considered morality the 
essence of religion and valued it over the cult” (Kaufmann, The Religion of Israel, 160). Cf. Schwartz, 
“The Pentateuch as Scripture,” 226. 
8 Kaufmann, The Religion of Israel, 166. 
9 Zimmerli, The Law and the Prophets, 42. For others arguing for the early origins of Torah see 
also e.g. Eduard Nielsen, Oral Tradition: A Modern Problem in Old Testament Introduction (London: 
SCM, 1954), 52–53; George E. Mendenhall, “Covenant Forms in Israelite Tradition,” Biblical 
Archaeologist 17 (1954): 26–46, 50–76; George E. Mendenhall, Law and Covenant in Israel and the 
Ancient Near East (Pittsburgh, PA: The Biblical Colloquium, 1955); James Barr, “Some Semantic Notes on 
the Covenant,” in Beiträge zur Alttestamentlichen Theologie: Festschrift für Walther Zimmerli zum 70. 
Geburtstag, eds. Herbert Donner, Robert Hanhart and Rudolf Smend (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1977), 23–58; Jacob Milgrom, Numbers [Ba-midbar]: The Traditional Hebrew Text with the 
New JPS Translation, JPS Torah Commentary (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1990), xxxii–
xxxvii; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 3–13; Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus: A Book of Ritual and Ethics, CC 
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A more recent trend is to see mutual influence between Torah and the prophets, 
dating the corpora to overlapping periods of composition. Both Rom-Shiloni and Schmid  
have pointed to this view as the solution to the entrenched debate over the priority of 
Torah or the Prophets.10 
Michael Fishbane’s ground-breaking work, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient 
                                               
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2004), 1–6; Kenneth A. Kitchen and Paul J. N. Lawrence, Treaty, Law and 
Covenant in the Ancient Near East Part 1: The Texts (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2012), xx–xi; 
Kenneth A. Kitchen and Paul J. N. Lawrence, Treaty, Law and Covenant in the Ancient Near East Part 2: 
Text, Notes and Chromograms (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2012), 251–68. John Day also argues that 
the prophets antedated the law, claiming that the prophets reused the law (John Day, “Inner-biblical 
Interpretation in the Prophets,” in "The Place Is Too Small for Us": The Israelite Prophets in Recent 
Scholarship, ed. Robert P. Gordon, Sources for Biblical and Theological Study [SBTS] 5 (Winona Lake, 
IN: Eisenbrauns, 1995), 230-31). 
Albrecht Alt’s distinction between apodictic and casuistic laws in his article, published in 1934, 
was accepted by many scholars (Albrecht Alt, “Die Ursprünge des Israelitischen Rechts [1934],” in Kleine 
Schriften zur Geschichte des Volkes Israel, ed. Martin Noth [München: Beck'sche, 1959], 278–332). Cf. 
Richard Victor Bergren, The Prophets and the Law (Cinncinnati: Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute 
of Religion, 1974); Ernst Würthwein, “Amos-Studien,” ZAW 62 (1950), 10–53. In contrast, Raymond 
Westbrook exposed the false and unfounded historical presuppositions behind this and similar models. 
According to him the earliest cuneiform records, dating back to the early third millennium, “reveal a highly 
organized legal system.” Based on comparative studies of ANE legal sources, he argues for a more 
restricted view of legal reforms than what is commonly accepted (Raymond Westbrook, “What Is the 
Covenant Code?,” in Law from the Tigris to the Tiber: The Writings of Raymond Westbrook, eds. Bruce 
Wells and Rachel Magdalene (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2009), 103, 107). He wrote: “Only three 
categories of reform are recorded in [the royal proclamations of reform]: retrospective cancellation of 
debts, reorganization of the royal administration, and the fixing of prices . . . . Any reforms, therefore, that 
are attributed to differences between law codes will only be credible if they fall within those three 
categories.” Westbrook also showed how we find apodictic laws in the Laws of Hammurabi §36-40, Laws 
of Eshunna §15-16 and 51-52, Hittite Law §56 and Middle Assyrian Laws A §40, and that it therefore 
cannot be an Israelite invention as claimed by Alt (Westbrook, “What Is the Covenant Code?,” 103, 107). 
Cf. David P. Wright, Inventing God's Law: How the Covenant Code of the Bible Used and Revised the 
Laws of Hammurabi (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 323 for an argument that the apodictic 
laws actually might depend on LH, and that both the apodictic and casuistic laws belong to a single 
composition. Even if we find apodictic laws in ANE legal collections, the dominant form is still the 
casuistic. Using the casuistic form, Torah nevertheless uses the apodictic form more frequent when 
compared to other ANE law collections. 
10 Dalit Rom-Shiloni, “Introduction,” in The Formation of the Pentateuch, eds. Jan C. Gertz et al., 
FAT 111 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016), 831–32, 837; Konrad Schmid, “The Prophets after the Law or 
the Law after the Prophets? Terminological, Biblical, and Historical Perspectives,” in The Formation of the 
Pentateuch, eds. Jan C. Gertz et al., FAT 111 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016), 848, 850. For earlier 
similar views see Bettenzoli, “Deuteronomium und Heiligkeitsgesetz,” 397–98; Rofé, “The Book of 
Deuteronomy. A Summary,” 8. 
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Israel (1988), stirred considerable scholarly debate concerning inner-biblical exegesis.11 
In his analysis of the legal reuse in the prophetic literature, he opens by stating: “Any 
discussion which purports to consider the relationship between the prophets and the legal 
materials of the Pentateuch must inevitably come up against the conundrum as to their 
relative priority.”12 Fishbane’s own study of inner-biblical exegesis opened a new 
perspective to the old question about the relation between Torah and the prophets. 
While scholars for a long time have been aware of the prophets’ reuse of other 
biblical materials in their oracles, the complexities of the question still haunt the field. 
Richard Schultz’s comment on reuse within the prophetic corpus is also applicable to 
parallel passages between Torah and the prophets: 
Parallel passages represent an important component of prophetic rhetoric which must 
be reckoned with in any attempt to assess the nature of the prophetic task and the 
                                               
11 Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel. 
12 Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 292. Fishbane writes that “legal exegesis” in 
the HB reflect “a concern with scrutinizing the content of laws for real or anticipated deficiencies; a 
concern with contradictions among the inherited cases; a concern with making the law comprehensive and 
integrated; and a concern with making the law workable and practicable” (Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation 
in Ancient Israel, 164). Cf. pp. 220–21. Kitchen finds that “prophetic appeal to that covenant is explicit in 
all three of the ‘great’ prophets, and in four of the Twelve. . . . It is special pleading simply to emend out of 
these texts anything “covenantal” that would fall before 621, merely to distort the data to fit in with an 
imaginary late-seventh-century date for Deuteronomy (as many do, following Wellhausen)” (Kenneth A. 
Kitchen, On the Reliability of the Old Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), 377). For other 
studies on the relative chronology between Torah and the Prophets, see Hans Walter Wolff, Das Zitat im 
Prophetenspruch: Eine Studie zur prophetischen Verfündigungsweise (München: Chr. Raiser Verlag, 
1937); Udo Rüterswörden, “Es gibt keinen Exegeten in einem gesetzlosen Land (Prov 29,19 LXX): 
Erwägungen zum Thema: Der Prophet und die Thora,” in Prophetie und geschichtliche Wirklichkeit im 
alten Israel, eds. Rüdger Liwak and Siegfried Wagner (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1991), 326–47; 
Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School, 320–61; David M. Carr, Writing on the Tablet of 
the Heart: Origins of Scripture and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 143–56, 167. 
Fischer speaks of Jeremiah’s “creative handling” (“kreativen Umgang”) of his sources (Georg Fischer, 
“Der Einfluss des Deuteronomiums auf das Jeremiabuch,” in Deuteronomium: Tora für eine neue 
Generation, eds. Georg Fischer, Dominik Markl and Simone Paganini (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2011), 
254). He writes that “Jer Dtn als Quelle verwendet und in freier Gestaltung verandert” (Fischer, “Der 
Einfluss des Deuteronomiums auf das Jeremiabuch,” 259). For him this freedom is also related to Jeremiah 




relationship between distinct prophetic writings. However, despite the considerable 
scholarly effort already devoted to the study of such passages, little progress has been 
made. Little or no consensus has emerged regarding what distinguishes a quotation 
from a mere verbal coincidence or vague reminiscence or which criteria are most 
useful for correctly identifying, explaining the origin of, and assessing the 
significance of literary borrowing.13 
He also makes the sobering comment that “the disagreement over methodology [of 
prophetic quotations] . . . reflects not so much the subjectivity of scholarly approaches as 
the complexity of the phenomenon of quotation. Any hopes of a simplistic solution to the 
problem of prophetic quotation should be dispelled immediately.”14 
Evidence from linguistics also points in the direction of the chronological 
precedence of Torah over the prophets. Contrary to theories conflating the history of 
biblical Hebrew,15 a perspective that easily lends itself to a late dating of Torah and the 
prophets, some linguists have begun to argue that several of the prophets show signs of 
belonging to the period of classical biblical Hebrew,16 while transitional prophets like 
Jeremiah and Ezekiel seem to use a later language than legal compositions in the Torah.17 
Further, in cases where reuse can be established with a degree of certainty, a 
                                               
13 Schultz, Search for Quotation, 18. 
14 Schultz, Search for Quotation, 215. 
15 Cf. Ian Young and Robert Rezetko, Linguistic Dating of Biblical Texts. 2 vols. (London: 
Equinox, 2008). 
16 Tania Notarius, “The System of Verbal Tenses in Archaic and Classical Biblical Poetry (in 
Hebrew) (Ph.D. diss., Hebrew University, 2007); Jan Joosten, The Verbal System of Biblical Hebrew: A 
New Synthesis Elaborated on the Basis of Classical Prose, Jerusalem Biblical Studies [JBS] 10 (Jerusalem: 
Simor, 2012), 378–80, 419–21. 
17 Avi Hurvitz, A Linguistic Study of the Relationship between the Priestly Source and the Book of 
Ezekiel: A New Approach to an Old Problem (Paris: Gabalda, 1982); Aaron D. Hornkohl, “The Language 
of the Book of Jeremiah and the History of the Hebrew Language (Hebrew)” (Ph.D. diss., Hebrew 
University, 2011); Aaron D. Hornkohl, “Biblical Hebrew: Periodization,” in Encyclopedia of Hebrew 
Language and Linguistics, ed. Geoffrey Khan, 2013), 1–11. 
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question is whether the borrowing passage should be understood as intended to replace or 
complement the source.18 Relevant for the present study, we can mention the 
supersessionists, who argue that a later instruction reused a previous legislation in order 
to usurp its authority in a program nevertheless intended to modify the previous 
legislation and introduce legal revisions.19 Complementarians, stressing a more 
synchronic reading, find legal dissimilitude best explained as differences in the intention 
and context of the various laws.20 
                                               
18 Cf. Kilchör, Mosetora und Jahwetora, 30; Joshua A. Berman, “Supersessionist or 
Complementary? Reassessing the Nature of Legal Revision in the Pentateuchal Law Collections,” JBL 135, 
no. 2 (2016): 201–22; Joshua A. Berman, Inconsitency in the Torah: Ancient Literary Convention and the 
Limits of Source Criticism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 171–72. 
19 Levinson and Stackert are examples of those arguing for a usurping supersessionism (e.g. 
Levinson, Deuteronomy; Bernard M. Levinson, “The Manumission of Hermeneutics: The Slave Laws of 
the Pentateuch as a Challenge to Contemporary Pentateuchal Theory,” in Congress Volume Leiden 2004, 
Supplements to Vetus Testamentum [VTSup] 109 (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 281–324; Levinson, Legal 
Revision; Bernard M. Levinson, “Zedekiah's Release of Slaves as the Babylonians Besiege Jerusalem: 
Jeremiah 34 and the formation of the Pentateuch,” in The Fall of Jerusalem and the Rise of the Torah, ed. 
Peter Dubovsky, Dominik Markl, and Jean-Pierre Sonnet (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016), 313–27; 
Stackert, Rewriting the Torah, 138––41, 211–24). 
20 Christophe Nihan writes: “H was never composed simply in order to replace the earlier codes, 
but rather to complete them. In some instances, H merely supplements the Decalogue, the CC, D or P. . . . 
Elsewhere, H’s redactor attempts to harmonize contradictory instructions, suggesting the necessity of a 
unified interpretation of such laws” (Christophe Nihan, From Priestly Torah to Pentateuch: A Study in the 
Composition of the Book of Leviticus, FAT 2/25 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 549). Chirichigno, 
Schenker, Bergsma, and Kilchör can be taken as examples of complementarians stressing a more 
synchronic reading of the legal discrepancies. In regard to the manumission instructions, studied further in 
chapter six, Chirichigno has argued that Lev 25 addressed the pater familias in contrast to Exod 21 and 
Deut 15, and they should thus be understood as addressing different groups (G. C. Chirichigno, Debt-
Slavery in Israel and the Ancient Near East, JSOTSup 141 (Sheffield: JSOT, 1993), 186–357). Schenker 
proposes that the manumission laws can be seen as complementary on the basis that they deal with distinct 
situations in regard to the familial status of the respective person subject to servitude (Adrian A. Schenker, 
“The Biblical Legislation on the Release of Slaves: The Road from Exodus to Leviticus,” Journal for the 
Study of the Old Testament [JSOT] 78 [1998]: 23–24, 32–38). Bergsma takes an intermediate position 
between the complimentarians and supersessionists, arguing that H was written during the tribal period and 
D during the monarchy, believing D was meant to replace H, while at the same time emphasizing 
arguments that hold open the door of a possible synchronic complimentary role as they address two 
different groups, the Hebrews and Israelites (Bergsma, The Jubilee from Leviticus to Qumran, 43–48, 139–
47). Kilchör has argued that Lev 25 and Deut 15 both were composed out of a concern for providing for the 




The following two chapters address more general issues. In the first I consider the 
question of how to characterize Torah and argue that it is best understood as normative 
covenantal instruction. In the third chapter, I address the question of identifying the 
scribal culture to which Torah belongs and argue that it seems to have been a culture in 
which memorized reuse was common. Both of these points add up to a helpful model for 
how to approach the phenomenon of repetition with variation of normative texts in the 






TORAH AS COVENANTAL INSTRUCTION 
 
The Legislative Concept of Law and the ANE 
Scholars have assumed that the cuneiform law collections found at the beginning 
of the 20th century were legislation in the classical or modern sense. The key question 
was whether they should be understood as codification or reform.1 Later, several scholars 
questioned whether the codification or reform debate actually represented a correct 
understanding of ANE law. The consensus today is that cuneiform law was written for 
purposes other than legislative ones.2 According to this view, ANE legal practice 
                                               
1 Westbrook, “Origins of Legislation,” 73. 
2 Shalom Paul says that “one absolute, all-binding, normative law code never existed in 
Mesopotamia” (Shalom M. Paul, Studies in the Book of the Covenant in Light of Cuneiform and Biblical 
Law (Leiden: Brill, 1970), 9). This can be accounted for by the absence of a legislative concept of law in 
ancient Mesopotamia. At this point I would like to briefly summarize some of the important claims about 
the concept of law in Mesopotamia. First of all, Greenberg famously wrote that “in Mesopotamia the law 
was conceived of as the embodiment of cosmic truths (kīnātum, sing. kittum). Not the originator, but the 
divine custodian of justice was Shamash, ‘the magistrate of gods and men, whose lot is justice and to whom 
truths have been granted for dispensation’. The Mesopotamian king was called by the gods to establish 
justice in his realm; to enable him to do so Shamash inspired him with ‘truths’. In theory, then, the final 
source of the law, the ideal with which the law had to conform was above the gods as well as men; in this 
sense ‘the Mesopotamian king . . . was not the source of the law but only its agent’. However, the actual 
authorship of the laws, the embodying of the cosmic ideal in statutes of the realm, is claimed by the king” 
(Moshe Greenberg, “Some Postulates of Biblical Criminal Law,” in Yehezkel Kaufman Jubilee Volume: 
Studies in Bible and Jewish Religion Dedicated to Yehezkel Kaufmann on the Occasion of His Seventieth 
Birthday, ed. Menahem Haran (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1960), 9). Paul wrote in a similar way about LH: 
“The ultimate goal of the law collection was to give tangible evidence to the gods that the king was a šar 
mēšarim. This could best be done by compiling a corpus to which he added his own reforms and 
amendments, thereby furnishing justice and equity to the four corners of the earth. . . . Their primary 
purpose was to lay before the public, posterity, future kings, and, above all, the gods, evidence of the king’s 
execution of his divinely ordained mandate to have been ‘the Faithful Shepherd’ and the šar mēšarim” 
(Paul, Studies in the Book of the Covenant, 25–26). The closest we come to our concept of the law of the 
land is then in the royal edict. It was the king’s word that had legislative force. Greenberg writes that “the 
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functioned on the basis of custom rather than legal codes. This is relevant to the present 
study because it also raises the question as to whether biblical law had a legislative 
                                               
immediate sanction of the laws is by the authority of the king. Their formulation is his, and his too . . . is 
the final decision as to their applicability” (Greenberg, “Some Postulates of Biblical Criminal Law,” 10). 
Raymond Westbrook found that “unlike the law-codes, the reform edicts were normative legislation. The 
text lays down a series of rules that come into force as a specific point in time and have to be obeyed by the 
courts. If the law codes had had the same effect, we would expect similar references to them as to the 
edicts, at least in the Old Babylonian period, when there is ample source-material. Instead, there is silence” 
(Westbrook, “Origins of Legislation,” 88–89). Westbrook has suggested that ANE law was understood as 
expressing “an ideal of justice” and “principles of social justice” to be followed, even as functioning 
correctively if practice deviated from them (Raymond Westbrook, “The Female Slave,” in Law from the 
Tigris to the Tiber: The Writings of Raymond Westbrook, eds. Bruce Wells and Rachel Magdalene (Winona 
Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2009), 151). Eckhart Frahm has recently stated similar ideas (Eckhart Frahm, 
Babylonian and Assyrian Text Commentaries: Origins of Interpretation (Münster: Ugarit-Verlag, 2011), 
241). For the propagandistic function of ANE law collections see Jean Bottéro, Mesopotamia: Writing, 
Reasoning and the Gods (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 156–84. As both Bernard Jackson 
and Bernard Levinson have pointed out, a challenge with Westbrook’s theory is “the absence in the trial 
records of any reference to either the ‘Law Codes’ or the primary sources to which they are claimed to 
refer” (Bernard S. Jackson, Wisdom-Laws: A Study of the Mishpatim of Exodus 21:1-22:16 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 15). Cf. Levinson, Legal Revision, 24–25. Westbrook himself concedes 
that “there is no direct evidence” for his claim that the literary law collections “were a reference work for 
consultation by judges when deciding difficult legal cases” (Westbrook, “Origins of Legislation,” 10). Be 
that as it may, in sum we can here say that there is a consensus today that the Mesopotamian law 
collections were composed for other reasons than legislative ones, even if scholarly opinion varies on how 
exactly then to understand them. It is more common to see legal practice as based on customs rather than 
prescriptive texts, with legal texts reflecting social customs instead of being the source of legal practice 
(Michael LeFebvre, Collections, Codes, and Torah: The Re-Characterization of Israel's Written Law, 
LHBOTS (New York: T&T Clark, 2006), 15, 18). Cf. e.g. B. Landsberger, “Die babylnischen termini für 
Gesetz and Recht,” in Symbolae ad iura orientis antiqui pertinentes Paulo Koschaker dedicatae, ed. J. 
Friedrich et al., Studia et documenta ad iura orientis antiqui pertinenta  (Leiden: Brill, 1939), 219–34; J. J. 
Finkelstein, “Ammiṣaduqa's Edict and the Babylonian 'Law Codes',” Journal of Cuneiform Studies 15 
(1961): 91–104; W. F. Leemans, “King Hammurapi as Judge,” in Symbolae ivridicae et historicae Martino 
David dedicatae. 2. Iura orientis antiqui, ed. J. A. Ankum et. al. (Leiden: Brill, 1968), 107–29; Paul, 
Studies in the Book of the Covenant; Bernard S. Jackson, Studies in the Semiotics of Biblical Law, 
JSOTSup 314 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2000); Raymond Westbrook, “The Character of 
Ancient Near Eastern Law,” in A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law, eds. Raymond Westbrook and Gary 
M. Beckman (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2003), 1–90; LeFebvre, Collections, Codes, and Torah; 
Joshua A. Berman, “The History of Legal Theory and the Study of Biblical Law,” Catholic Biblical 
Quarterly (CBQ) 76 (2014). For studies on ANE court procedures see Adam Falkenstein, Die 
Neusumerischen Gerichtsurkunden, Abhandlungen der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften Neue 
Folge (Munich, 1956–57); Roy E. Hayden, “Court Procedure at Nuzu” (Ph.D. diss., Brandeis University, 
1962); Eva Dombradi, Die Darstellung des Rechtsaustrags in den altbabylonischen Prozeßurkunden, 
Freiburger altorientalischen Studien 1–2 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1996); Remko Jas, Neo-Assyrian Judicial 
Procedures, State Archives of Assyria Studies [SAAS] (Helsinki: Helsinki University Press, 1996); John 
D. Fortner, “Adjudicating Entities and Levels of Legal Authority in Lawsuit Records of the Old Babylonian 
Era” (Ph.D. diss., Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion, 1997); Klaas R. Veenhof, “The 
Relation between Royal Decrees and Law Collections in the Old Babylonian Period,” Jaarbericht van het 
Vooraziatisch-Egyptisch Genootschap Ex Oriente Lux 35–36 (1997–2000); Shalom E. Holtz, Neo-
Babylonian Court Procedure (Leiden: Brill, 2009). 
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function.3 Westbrook summarizes the differences between what he calls ‘legislation’ and 
‘academic treatise’ as follows: 
Legislation is an authoritative source of law; the courts are bound to obey its precepts. 
That binding quality begins at a certain point in time, when the legislation is 
promulgated. And once promulgated, the text of the legislation takes on a life of its 
own—the text is the exclusive source of the law. For this reason, the courts must pay 
great attention to the wording of the text, interpret its meaning, and cite it in their 
decisions. Even if the legislation does not change the existing law but merely codifies 
it, the effect is to exclude reliance on the earlier sources. 
 
 An academic treatise on the law may be good evidence of what the law is, but it is not 
an authoritative source. The treatise in describing the law in effect refers the court to 
the real authoritative sources thereof, whether they be statute, precedent, or custom. 
The date of the treatise is therefore of less significance; there is no particular point in 
time at which it comes into effect. And its text has no independent value. Courts need 
not cite it or pay attention to its wording, since they are essentially looking beyond it 
to the source that it reflects.4 
These two concepts of law will therefore differ in how they reuse the legal texts. 
Within a legislative concept of law, reuse is more likely to include exact wording and 
quotation. On the other hand, in what Westbrook calls the ‘academic treatise,’ exact 
wording and citation is less likely to occur in reuse.5 Therefore the question of reuse is 
                                               
3 Cf. LeFebvre, Collections, Codes, and Torah, 15, 18, 31. 
4 Westbrook, “Origins of Legislation,” 74. For helpful discussions on legislative and non-
legislative views of ANE law collections, see LeFebvre, Collections, Codes, and Torah, 1–30; J. Bottéro, 
“Le 'Code' de Ḫammu-rabi,” Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore dii Pisa classe di lettere e filosofia 12, 
no. 2 (1982): 409–44; Anne Fitzpatrick-McKinley, The Transformation of Torah from Scribal Advice to 
Law (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), 81–112. For how Westbrook altered his view between 
his 1985 “Biblical and Cuneiform Law Codes” and 1989 “Cuneiform Law Codes and the origins of 
Legislation” see Fitzpatrick-McKinley, The Transformation of Torah, 96. A helpful discussion of ANE 
legal reforms see Otto, “Aspects of Legal Reforms,” 163–82. Otto’s study challenges a static concept of 
‘common law’ in the ANE: “Assyrian, Babylonian and Hittite legal history show that the legal sentences 
did not form a static ‘common law’ but had a history of continuous reformulations. These scholarly 
refinements reflect the continuous reforming of law in society” (Otto, “Aspects of Legal Reforms,” 182). 
For ANE legal revisions and how the legal collections were based on an already existing legal custom see 
Marc Van De Mieroop, Philosophy before the Greeks: The Pursuit of Truth in Ancient Babylonia 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 145, 161, 171. For how oral law/tradition regulated 
Mesopotamian social life, not LH, see Bottéro, “Le 'Code' de Ḫammu-rabi,” 441. Cf. Fitzpatrick-McKinley, 
The Transformation of Torah, 18. 
5 We could here also have used the distinction between statutory and common-law, as Berman 
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does. Berman explains how a statutory approach to law sees the relationship between law and texts as 
straightforward, in that “the law itself is contained in a codified text.” Further, it entails “two cardinal 
elements”: “(1) The law emanates from a sovereign. It is issued by a lawmaker, such as a king or a 
legislative body. Moreover, the law is laid down by the lawmaking body and is imposed upon the citizenry. 
(2) The law is a finite, complete system. Only what is written in the code is the law. The law code 
supersedes all other sources of law that preceded the formulation of the code, and no sources of authority 
have validity apart from the code itself.” In contrast, there is the common-law system where “the law is not 
found in a written code that serves as the judges’ point of reference and delimits what they may decide. 
Adjudication is a process whereby the judge concludes the correct judgment based on the mores and spirit 
of the community and its customs. . . . No particular formulation of the law is final. As a system of legal 
thought, the common law is consciously and inherently incomplete, fluid, and vague. Key here is the role 
that sanctioned texts play in determining the law. When decisions and precedents were collected and 
written down, these texts did not become the source of law, but rather a resource for later jurists to consult” 
(Berman, “The History of Legal Theory,” 21–22). Berman is drawing from Hurowitz’ study of the King of 
Justice in his article Victor Avigdor Hurowitz, “Hammurabi in Mesopotamian Tradition,” in "An 
Experienced Scribe Who Neglects Nothing": Ancient Near Eastern Studies in Honor of Jacob Klein, eds. 
Yitschak Sefati et al. (Bethesda: CDL, 2005), 497–532. As will be seen, however, neither ‘statutory law’ 
nor ‘common law’ describes Torah adequately. Mastnjak proposes a distinction between an ‘authoritative’ 
text and a ‘prestigious’ text (Nathan Mastnjak, Deuteronomy and the Emergence of Textual Authority in 
Jeremiah (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016), 135–36). I will argue below that Torah can be adequately 
understood as ‘normative covenantal instruction’ within the HB. 
Westbrook finds the origins of the legislative concept in Drakon’s (ca. 620 BC) and Gortyn’s (first 
half of the 5th century) laws in Athens. In previous ancient law collections he finds “the concept of a point 
in time at which the law comes into effect” to be lacking. Beside the ancient law codes there was a second 
source of law in the ANE, namely the edict. In the edict the time at which the law comes into effect is 
present. This characteristic of the edict Westbrook sees as being combined with the concept of a law code 
in lines 19–20 in the law of Drakon and col. XI 19–23 of the Laws of Gortyn, transforming the ancient law 
codes into a legislative concept of law (Westbrook, “Origins of Legislation,” 94–95). Van De Mieroop 
finds an imprint of Babylonian legal collections on Gortyn’s laws (Van De Mieroop, Philosophy before the 
Greeks, 206), in contrast to Gagarin (Michael Gagarin, Writing Greek Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 145–75). The latter also argues that the purpose of Greek law was to make laws 
available to the population and that it was little used for litigations. For how Gortyn’s laws and the Twelve 
Tablet format were replaced by a later emphasis upon legal oratory and legal philosophy in Greece and 
Rome see pp. 153–54. 
Aristotle pointed out three reforms by Solon that laid the foundation of democracy: “first and most 
important, the prohibition of loans on the security of the debtor’s person; secondly, the right of every 
person who so willed to claim redress on behalf of any one to whom wrong was being done; thirdly, the 
institution of the appeal to the jury-courts; and it is to this last, they say, that the masses have owed their 
strength most of all, since, when the people are master of the voting-power, it is master of the constitution 
(Ath.pol. 9)” (Aristotle, “Constitution of Athens,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford 
Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes. 2 vols. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 2345–46). 
According to Ostwald the first point “created the minimal social and economic prerequisite for the common 
man’s exercise of citizenship,” the second “constituted a major step toward the advancement of popular 
power,” and the third provided “a check against the arbitrary administration of justice on the part of the 
aristocratic establishment” (Martin Ostwald, From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law: Law, 
Society, and Politics in Fifth-Century Athens (Berkley: University of California Press, 1986), 14–15). 
Ostwald has argued that legal innovation in 5th century Athens can be described as the growth of popular 
sovereignty followed by a reaction against it, resulting in the sovereignty of law (Ostwald, From Popular 
Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law, xxii). In order to “achieve legislation in the modern sense,” 
however, still one more step was needed, “namely the analytical method of classical Greek philosophy, 
which enabled lawmakers to express the rules in abstract general categories and to define terms” 
(Westbrook, “Origins of Legislation,” 95). Cf. LeFebvre, Collections, Codes, and Torah, 18–23. For how 
jurisprudence functioned in early Athens and Pharaonic Egypt without the legal institutions and procedures 
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dependent on what concept of law may be in use within the biblical material. As will be 
seen, Torah does not fit nicely within either the concept of ‘legislation’ or ‘academic 
treatise’. 
Speaking of lexical, divinatory, and legal revisions in Mesopotamia Van De 
Mieroop writes: “The primacy of the Babylonian scholarly text also explains its 
instability. A text was never finished; its interpretation was never complete. Scholarship 
did not, as is often claimed, stand still; it continued by exploring existing writings further. 
Manuscripts show constant additions and subtractions, and although modern scholars 
often seek to reconstruct an authoritative canonical format, they admit it is a chimera.”6 
Van De Mieroop has argued that we find a common hermeneutic behind Babylonian 
lexical, divinatory, and legal lists. He writes:  
The list was not just a device of fictional literary creativity, it was the foundation of 
intellectual creativity in general. Everything could be and was explored in lists, using 
a methodology that was fully coherent within the list structure. Details were altered, 
specifications added, and the polysemy of the elements used to write them down was 
investigated in all its possibilities. The Babylonians did not create order in the 
universe by investigating its component parts; they created order in lists and applied 
the results to the universe. The text preceded reality. It had a primary status. 
Moreover, lists generated entries according to their internal principles and allowed for 
an almost unbounded creativity. They functioned in the same reality as the world 
outside them, naturally, but they were not limited by the parameters of that reality. In 
lexicography, written words were invented that were meaningless outside the list but 
completely valid within its structure. In divination, occurrences were explored that 
were physically impossible but again wholly meaningful within their list context. In 
law, the list-making behavior may have been more sober but the same underlying  
 
                                               
standard today, see Christopher Eyre, The Use of Documents in Pharaonic Egypt (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013); Adriann Lanni, Law and Order in Ancient Athens (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016). 
6 Van De Mieroop, Philosophy before the Greeks, 221. For ANE scribal creativity see pp. 25–26, 
30, 47–49, 54, 57–58, 75, 103, 111, 119, 138, 196, 199–201, 203, 221–22. 
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principles governed, and entries were created within the codes according to their 
internal logic.7 
According to Mieroop, and against those claiming that ANE legal collections were based 
on empirical cases, the legal elaboration was driven by its own literary logic.8 Significant 
for the present study is also the difference in reuse between the reuse in divinatory and 
legal corpora:  
There is, however, a striking difference between divinatory and legal writings in their 
practical use. While in reports diviners repeated omens verbatim and used them as the 
basis of their professional recommendations, no law paragraph was ever quoted in 
preserved legal writings, which are very extensive for the Old Babylonian period and 
include court decisions. There are only two cases in which an allusion is made to 
stipulations written ‘on the stele,’ and there is never an explicit reference to 
paragraphs of law.9 
                                               
7 Van De Mieroop, Philosophy before the Greeks, 221. 
8 Van De Mieroop writes: “The clusters show that individual laws were grouped together using 
two basic principles: opposition and pointillism. The first was very simple, as in many cases the premises 
could be changed to create the reverse situation. . . . Far from all cases display such pairing, but the 
principle of opposition, so dominant in omens, was important in laws as well. More prominent in laws was 
the principle of pointillism: every paragraph was but one example in a series of options that together 
painted a full and nuanced picture. Knowledge was thus cumulative, with each law gaining meaning 
because of its association with others surrounding it. Sequences were generated in two ways, either by 
adding new conditions or by following paradigmatic series” (Van De Mieroop, Philosophy before the 
Greeks, 165–66). And again: “Although the organization of the laws appears confusing to modern 
audiences, the sequence of laws in Near Eastern codes was not irrational or primitive. It was based on 
elements of Babylonian logic that were not legal in our sense of the term but rooted in daily practice, social 
hierarchy, and even word association” (Van De Mieroop, Philosophy before the Greeks, 169). Cf. pp. 163–
64, 190. For the similarity between lexical, divinatory, and legal lists see pp. 98, 136, 155, 158, even if he 
also sees dissimilarity in the absence of relative clauses in the divinatory texts (p. 11), in that the cultural 
influence of the legal collections outlived that of lexical and divinatory lists (p. 155), the legal collections 
having less creativity and unrealistic entries compared to the other two given that they dealt with “present 
and mundane affairs” (pp. 167, 169). For the organization of the legal materials see pp. 163–65, 168. For 
the priority of the linguistic over the ontological see pp. 78, 120, 132, 187–89, 192, 198. For how the 
omens can be understood as the gods writing in cosmos as their text, and how understanding text for them 
became a key to understand reality see p. 196. It reminds us of Derrida’s oft misunderstood “il n’y a pas de 
hors-texte” (“there is no outside-text”) (Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak (Baltimore, MA: John Hopkins University Press, 1997), 158). 
9 Van De Mieroop, Philosophy before the Greeks, 172–73. And further: “The approach to law was 
more restrained, but followed the same principles. Far fewer legal paragraphs were strung together, and on 
the whole thematic associations alone structured their order: bodily parts, social hierarchies, numbers, 
etcetera” (Van De Mieroop, Philosophy before the Greeks, 189). Cf. Bottéro, Mesopotamia: Writing, 
Reasoning and the Gods. 
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If we move to Egypt, what immediately strikes us is the lack of attested law 
collections there. Scholars have debated whether or not Egypt had a written code or 
collection of laws.10 In court, however, the goal of a legal process was “fundamentally an 
attempt to reach a result that both parties involved in a controversy are willing to 
accept.”11 Relevant for the question of reuse of law, McDowell writes that “laws and 
precedents are not cited in the preserved records of local court sessions. This is partly by 
chance, since both were quoted in disputes before the oracle and before the court of the 
temple, but mostly because the laws or customs involved were familiar to all concerned; 
the problem was to discover whether they had been breached.”12 
Nevertheless, the Egyptian non-legislative concept of ma‘at seems relevant for 
the question of how to conceptualize Torah. Versteeg writes: 
To the ancient Egyptians, the concept ma‘at was a central overriding principle in law. 
Ma‘at represented a universal harmony and order—the way that things are supposed 
to be. Ma‘at became the focal point of the legal system. Ma‘at represented the natural 
order and balance of life in ancient Egypt. It had a religious, ethical, and moral  
 
                                               
10 Russ VerSteeg, Law in Ancient Egypt (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2002), 7. He 
writes: “Although the ancient Egyptians had a functional legal system, it appears that they had little in the 
way of written law until about the eighth century B.C. Even then, the written law may not have been 
statutory, in the modern sense” (VerSteeg, Law in Ancient Egypt, 17). Cf. 53, 67, and 109. Egypt is not the 
only case where we lack a legal collection, however. Neither in Iran or Syria have any ANE legal 
collections turned up (Van De Mieroop, Philosophy before the Greeks, 150). Kitchen writes: “The “legal” 
contents of Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy has little in common with the social system of 
Egypt—but a great deal in common with the law collections and customs of the largely Semitic Near East” 
(Kitchen, On the Reliability of the Old Testament, 298). Cf. Aristide Théodorides, “The Concept of Law in 
Ancient Egypt,” in The Legacy of Egypt, ed. J. R. Harris (Oxford: Clarendon, 1971), 291–322; Jan 
Assmann, “Zur Verschriftung rechtlicher und sozialer Normen im Alten Ägypten,” in Rechtskodifizierung 
und soziale Normen im interkulturellen Vergleich, ed. Hans-Joachim Gehrke (Tübingen: Gunter Narr 
Verlag, 1994), 68. 
11 VerSteeg, Law in Ancient Egypt, 26. 
12 Andrea McDowell, Jurisdiction in the Workmen's Community of Deir El-Medîna (Leiden: 
Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten, 1990), 166. 
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connotation. It was the guiding principle for all aspects of life and represented the 
values that all people sought.13 
And he continues: “Ma‘at was ethical, moral, religious, and legal truth rolled into one. 
Ma‘at represented equilibrium.”14 According to Assmann, the ma’at literature should not 
be classified simply as wisdom-literature. According to him, the concept of ma’at brings 
morality and justice, social norms and judicial laws closely together.15 As will be seen 
                                               
13 VerSteeg, Law in Ancient Egypt, 21. Cf. p. 6, 22. Cf. John A. Wilson, “Authority and Law in 
Ancient Egypt,” JAOSSup 17 (1954): 1–7; James P. Allen, Middle Egyptian: An Introduction to the 
Language and Culture of Hieroglyphs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 147–49. 
Fitzpatrick-McKinley argues for a close analogy between the classic Indian concept of dharma and biblical 
Torah (Fitzpatrick-McKinley, The Transformation of Torah, 113–18), claiming that “torah is best 
understood on the basis of an analogy with the Indian concept of dharma” (Fitzpatrick-McKinley, The 
Transformation of Torah, 146), basing herself particularly upon Robert Lingat, The Classical Law of India, 
trans. J. Duncan M. Derrett (California: University of California Press, 1973) and Bernard S. Jackson, 
“From Dharma to Law,” The American Journal of Comparative Law 23 (1975). But claiming dharma to be 
the “best” analogy should seriously be questioned when we have closer cultural parallels like Egyptian 
ma’at and Babylonian kittum. Given that Torah itself explicitly makes an Egyptian link it makes sense to 
begin a comparison with ma’at, and then move to other analogies with a certain cultural proximity, like the 
Mesopotamian kittum, before making other comparisons. 
14 VerSteeg, Law in Ancient Egypt, 36. Assmann defines ma‘at as “connective justice,” explaining 
it as “the principle that forms individuals into communities and that gives their actions meaning and 
direction by ensuring that good is rewarded and evil punished” (Jan Assmann, The Mind of Egypt: History 
and Meaning in the Time of the Pharaohs (New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 2002), 128). For an 
analogy to Moses as the ‘prophet of Torah,’ cf. the vizier acquiring the title “Prophet of Ma‘at” in the 5th 
Dynasty (VerSteeg, Law in Ancient Egypt, 40). Since Deir El-Medina has given us an exceptional insight 
into ancient Egyptian jurisprudence (cf. McDowell, Jurisdiction), it can be mentioned that the ancient name 
of the city was Set Ma‘at, “the place of Ma‘at,” and the inhabitants there called “servants” of the place of 
Ma‘at (Leonard H. Lesko, Pharaoh's Workers: The Villagers of Deir El Medina (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1994), 7). 
15 Assmann writes that the category of ‘wisdom-literature’ is instructive (“aufschulßreich”) as it 
underlines the intercultural literary phenomena of wisdom-literature in Mesopotamia, Israel, as well as 
Egypt. But it is also misleading (“irreführend”) as it obscures the close connection between social norms 
and legal norms (Assmann, “Verschriftung rechtlicher und sozialer Normen,” 71). He writes on the same 
page: “Das ägyptische Wort Ma’at bezieht sich auf semantische Felder, die wir im deutschen mit Recht, 
erechtigkeit, Ricktigkeit, Wahrheit, Ordnung umschreiben können. Ma’at ist eine regulative Idee, an der 
sich sowohl die Rechtsprechung der Richter, als auch die Unterweisung der sogenannten Weisheitslehrer 
orientieren soll. Ma’at ist also der Oberbegriff aller Gesetze und Vorschriften, nach denen sich die Richter 
bei der Rechtsprechung, die Priester bei der Kultausübung, die Beamten bei der Verwaltung und – dieser 
Punkt ist entscheidend – jeder Ägypter in einer verantwortlichen Lebensführung zu richten haben. . . . Der 
ägyptische Begriff Ma’at stellt daher Moral und Recht, soziale Normen und juristische Gesetze in einen 
viel engeren Zusammenhang, als der ägyptologische Begriff ‘Weisheitsliteratur’ das erkennen läßt.” 
Further, he defines ma’at as iustitia connectiva, i.e. as what keeps the world together, morally together 
(Assmann, “Verschriftung rechtlicher und sozialer Normen,” 72–73). And again: “Die Normen der Ma’at 
stehen zu den Ordnungen des ‘Gegebenen’ bzw. ‘dieser Welt’ nicht in Widerspruch, sondern sind vielmehr 
mit ihnen identisch” (Assmann, “Verschriftung rechtlicher und sozialer Normen,” 74). It is at this point he 
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below, there may, therefore, be an analogy between Torah and ma‘at in that distinctions 
between the ethical, religious, and legal may prove artificial, or at least secondary.16 
While the pharaoh was closely associated with ma‘at, and even seen as an incarnation of 
ma’at,17 as with Torah, the entire people were expected to live according to ma‘at. In 
Egypt we also find a division between local courts and a form of centralized court, again 
analogous to the judiciary prescribed in Torah, as will be seen below.18 If we take the 
term “oracle” (from Latin ōrāre, “to speak”) in the general sense of divine speech, we 
can also see an analogy between the use of oracles by the judiciary in Egypt with the use 
of oracles by the judiciary in the Torah.19 
                                               
sees the major difference between Torah as an extraterritorial revelation and ma’at as the given world-
order: “Der fundamentale Unterschied zu Ägypten ligt darin, daß diese Gebote nicht die Normen des 
Gegebenen sind. Die Gebote stamen vom Sinai, sie gehören einer extraterritorialen, geoffenbarten und 
gewissermaßen ‘gesatzten’ Ordnung an” (Assmann, “Verschriftung rechtlicher und sozialer Normen,” 75). 
Cf. how Assmann also finds the inscription of social norms in the Book of the Dead (Assmann, 
“Verschriftung rechtlicher und sozialer Normen,” 81–85). For Assmann’s more elaborate study of ma’at 
see Jan Assmann, Ma'at: Gerechtigkeit und Unsterblichkeit im Alten Ägypten (München: C. H. Beck, 
2006). 
16 Assmann, “Verschriftung rechtlicher und sozialer Normen,” 67. 
17 Assmann, “Verschriftung rechtlicher und sozialer Normen,” 66–70; Richard Jastrow, “Egypt: 
Old Kingdom and First Intermediae Period,” in A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law, ed. Raymond 
Westbrook (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 99. For a more elaborate analysis of ma’at see Assmann, Ma'at: 
Gerechtigkeit und Unsterblichkeit im Alten Ägypten. For how Assmann differentiates between different 
types of legal texts, see Assmann, “Verschriftung rechtlicher und sozialer Normen,” 62–66, 70. 
18 VerSteeg, Law in Ancient Egypt, 37–38, 45, 52, 84. For a helpful analysis of the local court at 
Deir El-Medina see McDowell, Jurisdiction. Cf. Eckart Otto, “Das altägyptische Strafrecht,” in 
Altorientalische und biblische Rechtsgeschichte: Gesammelte Studien, BZABR 8 (Wiesbaden: 
Harrassowitz, 2008), 330–40. 
19 VerSteeg, Law in Ancient Egypt, 58–61; McDowell, Jurisdiction, 107–41. For how Egyptian 
and Athenian authorities had limited opportunities to enforce legal verdicts, and how jurisprudence to some 
extent depended on the consent of involved parties, see Eyre, The Use of Documents in Pharaonic Egypt, 
102; Lanni, Law and Order in Ancient Athens. For how the gods, not just the judicial system, would 
sanction breach of the moral order, and how this relates to the use of the oath and ordeal in ANE legal texts, 
see Karel van der Toorn, Sin and Sanction in Israel and Mesopotamia, Studia Semitica Neerlandica [SSN] 




It may be that ANE law should be understood as “custom dressed up as 
precedent,” as Westbrook suggested,20 but at this point I will leave unsettled the many 
questions and debates in recent scholarly literature on how best to characterize ANE 
law.21 While comparative studies might help us see new aspects of the HB, the biblical 
passages always need to be read and understood on their own terms. Too often concepts 
and interpretations from the literature of the surrounding nations are projected upon the 
biblical text, without paying sufficient attention to issues of divergence and uniqueness 
                                               
20 Westbrook, “Origins of Legislation,” 91. 
21 For studies on the concept of ANE law and comparative studies see e.g. Samuel Sandmel, 
“Parallelomania,” JBL 81 (1962): 1–13; Bottéro, “Le 'Code' de Ḫammu-rabi,” 409–44; Raymond 
Westbrook, Studies in Biblical and Cuneiform Law (Paris: J. Gabalda, 1988); Meir Malul, The 
Comparative Method in Ancient Near Eastern and Biblical Legal Studies (Kevelaer: Butzon & Bercker, 
1990); William W. Hallo, “Compare and Contrast: The Contextual Approach to Biblical Literature,” in The 
Bible in the Light of Cuneiform Literature: Scripture in Context III, eds. William W. Hallo, Bruce William 
Jones and Gerald L. Mattingly, Ancient Near Eastern Texts and Studies 8 (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen, 1990), 
1–30; Shemaryahu Talmon, “The Comparative Method in Biblical Interpretation: Principles and 
Problems,” in Literary Studies in the Hebrew Bible: Form and Content: Collected Studies (Jerusalem: 
Magnes, 1993), 11–49; Victor Avigdor Hurowitz, Inu Anum ṣīrum: Literary Structures in the Non-Judicial 
Sections of Codex Hammurabi 15 (Philadelphia: Occasional Publications of the Samuel Noah Kramer 
Fund, 1994); Westbrook, “The Character of ANE Law,” 1–90; Noel K. Weeks, Admonition and Curse: The 
Ancient Near Eastern Treaty/Covenant Form as a Problem in Inter-Cultural Relationships, JSOTSup 407 
(London: T&T Clark, 2004); Shalom M. Paul, Studies in the Book of the Covenant in Light of Cuneiform 
and Biblical Law (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2006); Westbrook, “Origins of Legislation,” 73–95; 
Westbrook, “What Is the Covenant Code?,” 97–118; Victor Avigdor Hurowitz, “What Was Codex 
Hammurabi and What Did it Become?,” MAARAV 18 (2013): 89–100. For the tension between source 
critical approaches and comparative studies see Weeks, Adminition and Curse, 140, 154. Hallo writes: 
“The fact that we cannot always be sure of the place, the date, or the direction of the borrowing does not 
invalidate either the comparative or the contextual approach: modern literary criticism properly investigates 
literary parallels without necessarily or invariably finding the exact route by which a given idea passed 
from one author to another. And given the fragmentary nature of the ancient record, the answers cannot 
always be forthcoming” (Hallo, “Compare and Contrast,” 6). And relevant for the present study of 
prophetic texts in the HB: “Biblical prophecy is utterly different from any cuneiform genre by virtue of 
authorship, structure, and content” (Hallo, “Compare and Contrast,” 12). In Talmon’s call “for the 
definition of a set of rules which should serve biblical scholars as a guideline in their pursuit of 
comparative studies,” he nevertheless sets forth the following principle as a starting point: “The 
interpretation of biblical features—whether of a sociopolitical, cultic, general-cultural, or literary nature—
with the help of innerbiblical parallels should always precede the comparison with extrabiblical materials” 
(Talmon, “The Comparative Method in Biblical Interpretation,” 48). 
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between the two.22 For the present purposes we can ask the following: Does Torah bear 
marks of being composed according to a legislative concept of law or not where the 
wording itself gives the precise demarcation between sanctioned and acceptable 
conduct,23 even if it can be modified and altered at a later stage? If not, how should it best 
be characterized? Is it simply reflecting custom, or is it also intervening in and modifying 
custom? And is it simply descriptive of legal tradition where tradition rather than the text 
is normative, or is the text itself viewed as normative? Also, is the text open to revisions 
or not? How should we understand the finality of Torah in light of e.g. Deut 4:2; 13:1? 
How should we understand differing legal formulations in the HB? Should they be 
understood as ‘legal reforms’ that can be organized into an evolutionistic diachrony or 
rather more as reflections on divine instructions without altering previous formulations? 
Can prophetic legal statements be understood as receiving the force of public law? All of  
 
                                               
22 As we now turn to the question of how to characterize Torah as such, we can begin with a 
warning against “illegitimate totality transfer” in comparative studies, to borrow a phrase James Barr 
coined in relation to biblical linguistics. James Barr explained “illegitimate totality transfer” to occur when 
“the total series of relations in which [a word] is used in the literature . . . is read into a particular case as its 
sense and implication there” (James Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language (London: SCM Press, 1991), 
218). Cf. also Meir Malul and William Hallo who has stressed the need of noticing both similarities and 
differences between ANE and the biblical legal material (Malul, The Comparative Method; Hallo, 
“Compare and Contrast,” 1–30). Malul writes: “In most cases one can determine only the existence of a 
connection, without being able to determine its direction, nature, or type” (Malul, The Comparative 
Method, 91). Weeks has also warned against “the allure of grand evolutionary theses,” arguing that “the 
native tradition tends to be more enduring than borrowings.” He sees “a common inheritance directed into 
particular forms in local centres. Some of these local traditions have tantalizing similarities but, as 
emphasized, similarity may have diverse causes” (Weeks, Adminition and Curse, 175–76, 181–82). 
23 Discussing the difference between a law-book and wisdom-laws, Jackson stated that while 
Deuteronomy could be understood more as a collection of wisdom-laws, “it is less obvious in the case of 
the earliest legal collection, the Mishpatim or Covenant Code of Exodus 21–22, which may originally have 
been intended as a statement of positive law if not a statute of which the wording was verbally binding” 
(Jackson, “From Dharma to Law,” 505. Italics original). Later, Jakson argues in his Wisdom-Laws that also 
BC should be considered wisdom-laws. 
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these questions should be kept in mind when we analyze the specific cases of reuse in the 
next chapter. 
Characterization of Torah as Covenantal Instruction 
As we move to the question how Torah should be positively characterized, I will 
discuss three claims particularly relevant for the present study: Torah as legislative, 
Torah as immutable, and Torah as normative. Given the danger of starting from 
anachronistic premises, I will first ask whether any of these claims can be falsified based 
on the textual evidence.24 Since the question of how to characterize Torah is not the main 
                                               
24 We can here remind of Karl Popper’s theory of testability, or falsifiability. He writes: “(1) It is 
easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly every theory—if we look for confirmations. (2) 
Confirmations should count only if they are the result of risky predictions; that is to say, if, unenlightened 
by the theory in question, we should have expected an event which was incompatible with the theory—an 
event which would have refuted the theory. (3) Every ‘good’ scientific theory is a prohibition: it forbids 
certain things to happen. The more a theory forbids, the better it is. (4) A theory which is not refutable by 
any conceivable event is non-scientific. Irrefutability is not a virtue of a theory (as people often think) but a 
vice. (5) Every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, or to refute it. Testability is falsifiability; 
but there are degrees of testability: some theories are more testable, more exposed to refutation, than others; 
they take, as it were, greater risks. (6) Confirming evidence should not count except when it is the result of 
a genuine test of the theory; and this means that it can be presented as a serious but unsuccessful attempt to 
falsify the theory. (I now speak in such cases of ‘corroborating evidence.’) (7) Some genuinely testable 
theories, when found to be false, are still upheld by their admirers—for example by introducing ad hoc 
some auxiliary assumption, or by reinterpreting the theory ad hoc in such a way that it escapes refutation. 
Such a procedure is always possible, but it rescues the theory from refutation only at the price of 
destroying, or at least lowering, its scientific status. (I later described such a rescuing operation as a 
‘conventionalist twist’ or a ‘conventionalist stratagem.’)” (Karl R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: 
The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (London: Routledge, 2002), 47–48). See also Karl R. Popper, The 
Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1968), 112–45, 265–81. And he sums up as 
follows: “One can sum up all this by saying that the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its 
falsifiability, or refutability, or testability” (Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, 48). It is a danger, as 
Popper himself pointed out, that the explanatory power of the theories like those of Marx, Freud, and Adler 
makes the one initiated in them see “the world [as] full of verifications of the theory, Whatever happen 
always confirm it” (Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, 45. Cf. pp. 46–47, 51, 294, 345). In The Logic of 
Scientific Discovery he also pointed out that falsifiability is always relative and a question of degree when 
comparing theories (Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 112). He formulated his view in explicit 
contrast to the early Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) and the Vienna Circle for whom 
“verifiability, meaningfulness, and scientific character all coincide” (Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, 
52). For the early Wittgenstein all meaningful propositions were truth functions of atomistic propositions 
that could be verified by empirical observations. He distinguished these from meaningless philosophical or 
metaphysical propositions that could not be verified by empirical observations (Wittgenstein, Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus, 5; 6.53; 6.54). While this is not meant as a full endoresement of Popper for biblical 
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question in the present study, but is included in order to shed light on the character of 
reuse found between Torah and the Prophets, the following can, therefore, only be a 
preliminary discussion. If falsification of any of the three claims does not seem possible 
in this present study, future studies might be necessary to clarify these questions. If such 
an eventuality occurs, I will summarize positive evidence that might corroborate the 
claim, in order to draw tentative conclusions in the present study.  
The three claims of Torah as legislative, immutable, and normative can be 
formulated as follows in terms that have the potential for falsification on textual grounds: 
1. The legislative concept of Torah: Torah is to be understood as the ultimate source in 
Pentateuchal legislation for civil law.25 It established a “rule of law” by not appealing 
to any ‘higher court’ than itself as text; the exact wording of Torah is the final 
reference for the court to pass a verdict even if its formulation can be supplemented or 
modified at a later stage. An appeal to a ‘higher court’ beyond the legal formulations of 
Torah and a standard other than Torah for the court would thus falsify this claim. 
2. The immutability of Torah: Torah should be understood as prohibiting alteration of any 
or all of its prescriptions. Legal revision within Torah or by later authors will not in 
itself falsify this claim. A form of legal revision is legal innovation, and since legal 
innovations can be understood as elaboration or reapplication, this would not 
necessarily entail a rejection of previous prescriptions. We will need to find clear 
                                               
studies, he raises the question how many cherished theories in the study of the HB also follow a 
verificationist approach. Much of the below is admittedly also focusing on positive evidence of various 
claims, but I have tried to formulate myself in terms of falsifiability where I have seen this to be possible. 
25 In the following I will reserve the terms ‘legislation’ and ‘legislative’ for this claim, while using 
the terms ‘legal’ and ‘law’ in a broader sense not necessarily restricted to the legislative concept of Torah. 
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evidence for a rejection of previous prescriptions, replacing them with new or no 
further prescriptions, in order to falsify the claim of the immutability of Torah. 
3. The normative concept of Torah: Torah should be seen as normative and prescriptive in 
the domains of cultic, civil, and/or moral law, prescribing what ought to be, defining 
values, and making cultic, civil, and moral judgments. The absence of such would 
falsify this claim. As in #2, demonstrable rejection of previous prescriptions would also 
falsify this claim. Here it is also helpful to distinguish between the self-presentation of 
Torah and later reception. Lack of evidence that later authors took Torah as normative 
would make problematic the claim that it enjoyed normative status in its reception 
history. 
The Legislative Model of Torah Falsified 
The textual material appears to falsify the legislative model of Torah, but this is 
not the place to provide a comprehensive survey of the various scholars who interpret 
Torah as legislative. Fishbane can be taken as a representative example. He argued that  
the biblical law collections may best be considered as prototypical compendia of legal 
and ethical norms rather than as comprehensive codes. Even if jurists made quasi-
statutory, analogical, or referential uses of some of these ordinances, the publication 
of agglomerate collections primarily served to make available digests of the divine 
requirements of ‘justice and righteousness’ which served as the contractual basis for 
the Israelite covenant. The received legal codes are thus a literary expression of 
ancient Israelite legal wisdom: exemplifications of the ‘righteous’ laws upon which 
the covenant was based.26  
Thus far, Fishbane could be seen as following a trajectory where Torah is perceived in 
similar terms to those denying that Torah should be understood according to a legislative 
                                               
26 Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 95. 
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model. But he nevertheless continues claiming that the instructions take the form of 
legislation, finding that there are 
inherent limitations in a comparison between the ancient Near Eastern and biblical 
legal corpora. For while the biblical corpora are, as noted, also incomprehensive in 
scope and frequently imprecise in formulation, the fact remains that the biblical 
collections are presented as divine revelation and the basis for covenantal life. The 
priests must teach these laws (e.g. Lev. 10:10–11; Mal. 2:7); the judges are enjoined 
to follow them (e.g. Deut. 16:18–20; 2 Chron. 19:6–10); the kings are held 
accountable to their enforcement; and the prophets repeatedly exhort their 
observance. In addition, the covenantal laws are the basis for many citations, 
precedents, and cross-references . . . . Accordingly, despite the fact that the biblical 
legal corpora are formulated as prototypical expressions of legal wisdom, the internal 
traditions of the Hebrew Bible present and regard the covenantal laws as legislative 
texts.27 
As will be argued below, instead of reverting to a legislative model for interpreting the 
phenomena observed by Fishbane, a better model seems to be seeing Torah as non-
legislative normative covenantal instruction. We will see that “the judges are [not] 
enjoined to follow them,” i.e. the legal collections as we have them. While a legislative 
model operates by external control of the population through the court, Torah rather 
stresses a model where the people are guided individually through appropriation of its 
covenantal instructions into their own hearts. 
The question also occurs as to whether Torah was to be used as the lawbook in 
Israelite courts? In the debate whether ANE and biblical law was legislative, the litmus 
                                               
27 Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 96 (italics original). Cf. Michael Fishbane, 
“Revelation and Tradition: Aspects of Inner-Biblical Exegesis,” JBL 99 (1980): 346. More recently, 
Simeon Chavel appears simply to assume that Torah should be understood as “statutory law” (Simeon 
Chavel, Oracular Law and Priestly Historigraphy in the Torah (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), 242–43, 
247, 260, 263–64). Berman also critiques Levinson for implicitly adhering to a concept of statutory law 
when reading biblical law (Berman, “The History of Legal Theory,” 31). See also Benjamin D. Sommer, 
Revelation and Authority: Sinai in Jewish Scripture and Tradition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2015). Cf. LeFebvre, Collections, Codes, and Torah, 50–53 for Phillips also arguing that the Decalogue 
was legislative, and the criticism of Phillips on this point. 
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test seems to be whether or not it had a function in the court.28 We find some substantial 
indicators in the instructions given specifically to judges that this was not the case (see 
Exod 18:21–22; 23:1–8; Lev 19:15–16; Deut 1:16–17; 16:19–20; 25:1; cf. 2 Chr 19:6–
10).29 Torah, as such, is nowhere explicitly said to be a legal source in ancient Israelite 
jurisprudence. It is not seen as an autonomous legal source with sufficiently 
                                               
28 Cf. LeFebvre, Collections, Codes, and Torah, 31–54. For a discussion on the difference between 
the legislative and adjudicative type of texts in Torah, see Rolf P. Knierim, “The Problem of Ancient 
Israel's Prescriptive Legal Traditions,” Seimeia 45 (1989): 7–25. Depending on Gurvitch, he defines the 
following characteristics of ‘law’ in contrast to a moral instruction: “The meaning of these descriptions of 
the characteristics of law, related to our specific problem, can be summarized as follows: first, a prohibition 
or command can be law, just as it can be an ethical imperative, but it is not by definition a non-law; second, 
law has an imperative structure the legal nature of which depends on the societally regulated adjudicability 
of duties of some and claims by others, i.e, on the social guarantee of that imperative structure; and third, 
laws do not have to be formulated casuistically. They can, but do not have to be accompanied by 
definitions of consequences (‘constraints’)” (Knierim, “Ancient Israel's Prescriptive Legal Traditions,” 21). 
Phillips wrote: “The only adequate definition of a crime is that conduct which the state prohibits” (Anthony 
Phillips, Ancient Israel's Criminal Law: A New Approach to the Decalogue (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1970), 2). To this definition Knierim asks how we can know “which of the Old Testament prohibitions . . . 
were issued as state-laws?” (Knierim, “Ancient Israel's Prescriptive Legal Traditions,” 21). As argued 
below, by taking the self-claim of the instructive material seriously, we should not confuse the divine 
instruction of Torah with state laws. Depending on Schulz, Knierim points out that we should be careful 
with making a too strong distinction between law and ethics in ancient Israel, as the two to some extent 
merged for the clan (Knierim, “Ancient Israel's Prescriptive Legal Traditions,” 21–22). While I here argue 
that a legislative reading should not be imposed upon the instructive material of Torah, later I will also 
problematize designating it as ethical. Both terms might be anachronistic, and it is just as problematic to 
argue that it is a matrix of the two. Cf. Otto, “Aspects of Legal Reforms,” 185–86 showing that talion law 
was not enforced, at least not according to the evidence, just as ANE law lacks evidence of being enforced 
in court. See his pp. 160–63. 
29 Commenting on Deuteronomy’s instructions regarding the different offices: “No single 
institution, therefore, can claim to be ‘prior’ to another in its antiquity, status, privilege, or closeness to 
divinity. The new vision rejects all conventions of rank and hierarchy” (Bernard M. Levinson, “The First 
Constitution: Rethinking the Origins of Rule of Law and Separation of Powers in Light of Deuteronomy,” 
Cardozo Law Review 27, no. 4 (2006): 1884). While the prophets and priests are exclusively chosen by 
God, the king mutually by God and the people, “the judiciary, however, is chosen exclusively by human 
agents” (Joshua A. Berman, Created Equal: How the Bible Broke with Ancient Political Thought (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 80). 
Levinson argues that already in Deuteronomy we find the first expression in legal history of the 
idea of the separation of powers and the rule of law. Further, “these visionary thinkers sought to safeguard 
the rule of law by establishing an independent judiciary. . . . the political experiment represented by 
Deuteronomy was without precedent either in the Near East or in ancient Israel itself” (Levinson, “The First 
Constitution,” 1887). Given that judges are not instructed to judge according to Torah, the “rule of law” in 
Israelite judiciary is unclear. To me it seems clear that we find the “rule of law” in the textual material itself 
in the sense of the normativity of the covenantal instructions, as argued below. To speak of the “rule of 
law” beyond this would need to be closely nuanced. 
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comprehensive formulations to regulate and sanction the conduct of the people.30 As 
Patrick has pointed out, it is a striking fact that none of the instructions for judges speak 
of consulting and judging according to Torah. Instead the judges are admonished to judge 
according to the more general ֶצֶדק (“justice”).31 
                                               
30 According to Berman “judges, perforce, must have also engaged a comprehensive oral law, or 
set of unwritten norms and social customs” (Berman, Created Equal, 84). As mentioned above, for how 
jurisprudence functioned in early Athens and Pharaonic Egypt without the legal institutions and procedures 
standard today, the studies of Lannu and Eyre are helpful. Lanni, Law and Order in Ancient Athens shows 
that even if the legal system in Athens did not have public prosecutors, and the court’s ability to enforce 
verdicts, the legal system nevertheless functioned surprisingly well. This should caution us in assuming 
some kind of ‘malfunction’ of ancient and biblical legal systems simply because they lacked our legal 
institutions and functioned differently. A similar situation is seen in Pharonoic Egypt, where the legal 
system functioned on a more personal level, without the formal institutions we are accustomed to. Cf. Eyre, 
The Use of Documents in Pharaonic Egypt. In the following I will argue that given that Torah was intended 
to be embodied by all the people, including the judges, the possibility is strong that Torah influenced the 
ancient Israel judiciary. Since all the people were supposed to memorize and embody Torah, something that 
would also apply to the judges, Torah would likely at least indirectly affect Israelite jurisprudence, even if 
it is not explicitly referred to in the instructions given specifically to judges (Exod 18:21; 23:1–8; Lev 
19:15–16; Deut 1:16–17; 16:19–20; 25:1). Bruce Wells concludes his study on the laws of testimony 
stating that “not all of the laws in the Pentateuchal codes may be of use to the legal historian, but the codes 
do not have to be excluded as a legal-historical source, as some have suggested. They do not have to be 
mined only for wisdom and ideology. They can still be used for law. And, as this study has attempted to 
demonstrate, this is especially true of the Pentateuchal laws on testimony” (Bruce Wells, “The Law of 
Testimony in the Pentateuchal Codes” [Ph.D. diss., John Hopkins University, 2002], 247). He finds “an 
indirect connection between biblical law and Israelite/judahite law” (Bruce Wells, “What is Biblical Law? 
A Look at Pentateuchal Rules and Near Eastern Practice,” CBQ 70 [2008], 224). And again: “At the outset, 
it must be recognized that, in the final form of the biblical text, the pentateuchal codes seem to have a 
religious purpose as they relate to issues of covenant, community, and purity. Scholars have articulated this 
purpose in varous ways, but most agree that biblical law, as it is presented in the Pentateuch, functions to 
promote a religious agenda rather than to establish a full-fledged legal system. In some respects, though, it 
is important that a discussion of whether the provisions in the Pentateuch constitute law precede an analysis 
of the religious function of biblical law. It is possible, for instance, that the codes or parts of the codes were 
self-contained entitites at one time, before they were incorporated into the larger sections in which we now 
find them” (Wells, “What is Biblical Law?,” 225–26. Cf. pp. 226–32 for a good overview of the different 
ways to characterize Torah. For how he himself sees Torah as “legally descriptive treatises” see pp. 242–
43). In his study of the legal use of documents in Pharaonic Egypt, Eyre points out two opposites in how a 
society can function legally: “One pole here is the image of a purely face-to-face society, in which 
transactions could only function through the personal interaction of interested parties, and in their presence. 
The opposite is a purely bureaucratic society, in which all business is transacted impersonally, on the basis 
of documents, or indeed electronically” (Eyre, The Use of Documents in Pharaonic Egypt, 7). Cf. p. 9, 94. 
As in Egypt, the impression left by the ancient Israelite judiciary is that it operated more on a face-to-face 
personal basis. 
31 Cf. Dale Patrick, Old Testament Law (Atlanta: John Knox, 1985), 191. Cf. pp. 197–98. 
Nevertheless, Patrick claimed that the laws “were designed to inculcate the concepts and principles of 
Israelite law for judges and the community at large,” seeing “the framer of a biblical lawbook” as writing 
for “practitioners of the law” (Dale Patrick, “Studying Biblical Law as a Humanities,” Semeia 45 (1989): 
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33, 42. Cf. Fitzpatrick-McKinley, The Transformation of Torah, 82 for others with a similar view). 
According to Anthony Phillips the law collections “are not so much instructions to the judiciary as sermons 
to the nation. Rather than legal codes establishing a judicial system, these collections constitute theological 
literary works concerned with the maintenance of Israel’s election” (Anthony Phillips, Essays on Biblical 
Law, JSOTSup 344 (London: Sheffield Academic Press, 2002), 13). 
Patrick further argued that during the reforms of Josiah we see an emergence of a prescriptive 
approach to biblical law, which for him consists primarily in “an identification of the text with the law” 
(Patrick, Old Testament Law, 189–90, 200). Westbrook saw the “transformation to true prospective 
legislation” in the 7th century B.C., more specifically in Deut 15:1–11, which he saw as expressing “a 
different intellectual climate” testifying to a transition into a prescriptive model, and which composition he 
dates to this time (Westbrook, “Origins of Legislation,” 92–94). Contra Westbrook on Deut 15, LeFebvre 
claims that prospective and cyclical cultic calendars were not unique to the HB, but “what was unique 
about Israel was its tendency to incorporate such cultic cycles into its law collections” (LeFebvre, 
Collections, Codes, and Torah, 79. Cf. my criticism below of seeing a disctinction between the cultic and 
ethical as primary in the legal material). He also claims that the prospective element in the ‘release’ (ְׁשִמָּטה) 
of Deut 15 does not signal Westbrook’s “transformation to true prospective legislation,” “a different 
intellectual climate,” or a “fundamental innovation”(Westbrook, “Origins of Legislation,” 92–93), but is 
already found in the command to ‘release’ (ִּתְׁשְמֶטָּנה) the land every seventh year in Exod 23:10–11 
(LeFebvre, Collections, Codes, and Torah, 81). For further discussions cf. LeFebvre, Collections, Codes, 
and Torah; Westbrook, “Origins of Legislation,” 97–118; Berman, “The History of Legal Theory,” 19–39. 
Bergsma, The Jubilee from Leviticus to Qumran, 23, 27 argue that LH 117 shows a similar prescriptive 
element as that found in Deut 15. In other words, the origin of prescriptivism should most likely not be 
dated to Deut 15 and 7th century Greek Law, as Westbrook does, but is already found in this early analogy. 
Against Patrick and Westbrook, LeFebvre has also pointed out that during Josiah’s reforms we see 
a dissimilitude between the regulations of Torah and the royal edicts, indicating that it was still the royal 
edict that functioned as the law of the land. According to him Josiah’s reforms can therefore not be taken as 
a point of transition into a legislative concept of law (LeFebvre, Collections, Codes, and Torah, 59–63).  
Several scholars have argued for a transformation of Israelite law to prescriptivism in the Persian 
era (Frank Crüsemann, The Torah: Theology and Social History of Old Testament Law (Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 1996), 336–37; Cassuto, A Commentary on the Book of Exodus, 262; James W. Watts, Reading Law: 
The Rhetorical Shaping of the Pentateuch, The Biblical Seminar (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 
1999), 138–43; Jackson, Semiotics of Biblical Law, 142; Peter Frei, “Persian Imperial Authorization: A 
Summary,” in Persia and Torah: The Theory of Imperial Authorization of the Pentateuch, ed. James W. 
Watts (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature [SBL], 2001), 12, 38; Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the 
Heart, 171; Chad L. Eggleston, "See and Read All These Words": The Concept of the Written in the Book 
of Jeremiah, Siphrut: Literature and Theology of the Hebrew Scriptures 18 (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 
2016), 158). We have already seen how Westbrook finds the first indications of a transition to a legislative 
concept of Torah in the 7th century. It is, however, with Ezra he sees the real transition to the legislative 
view of Torah (Westbrook, “Biblical Law,” in Law from the Tigris to the Tiber, vol. 2, 302). For Bernard 
Jackson there are two converging factors resulting in a legislative concept of Torah. First, Jackson having 
distinguished the didactic and ritual functions of Torah, which I shall discuss more below, sees Ezra as 
combining “the traditional ritual reading of the religious reform with a didactic function: the words should 
not only be read out, they should also be explained” (Jackson, Semiotics of Biblical Law, 141). Here he 
refers to Neh 8:7–8. It is in this context that he sees “the transformation of the biblical legal collections into 
‘statutory’ texts” (Jackson, Semiotics of Biblical Law, 142). Second, by using “a berit with God as 
guarantor . . . an element of continuity is introduced, the continuity that attaches to the (divine) person of 
the guarantor.” For Jackson this “appears to provide a basis for explaining the emergence of the idea of 
enduring law in ancient Israel” (Jackson, Semiotics of Biblical Law, 162). 
Again, LeFebvre questions the evidence for claiming that Persia endorsed Torah as legislative, 
since “Persia itself did not have a prescriptive law code” (LeFebvre, Collections, Codes, and Torah, 98). 
He points to several points of dissimilarity between Torah and Ezra’s legislative measures (LeFebvre, 
Collections, Codes, and Torah, 105–28). LeFebvre thus does not find the alleged evidence to support the 
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Second, I do agree with Patrick in that ֶצֶדק cannot be limited to a literalistic 
reading of Torah.32 But he continues: “During the period in which the legal texts were 
                                               
claim that a legislative concept of Torah arose either in Josiah’s Judah nor in the Persian period Israel. He 
concludes by arguing that we, instead, need to go to the Hellenistic period to find this transition: “Instead of 
identifying periods of incipient legislation in Israel, what scholars have identified in these two periods are 
turning points in the content and esteem of Torah. . . . An important implication of the findings thus far is to 
challenge the current consensus on the timing of Torah’s prescriptivization. These findings push the period 
for Israel’s recasting of the Torah as legislation into the Hellenistic era. In many ways, this is actually a 
‘common sensical’ conclusion. Prescriptive legislation is known to have been innovated in classical 
Greece” (LeFebvre, Collections, Codes, and Torah, 143). For a similar view see Fitzpatrick-McKinley, The 
Transformation of Torah, 21, 147–48. As Fitzpatrick- McKinley summarizes, according to Lingat’s study 
of the classical law of India there are three areas that influence “the gradual increase in the juridicial 
content and technique of these originally non-legal, sacred moral texts . . . : the association of dharmic texts 
with royal authority, the impact of writing and the influence of foreign conquerors” (Fitzpatrick-McKinley, 
The Transformation of Torah, 147. Cf. Lingat, The Classical Law of India). According to Fitzpatrick-
McKinley it is especially the two first points that explain the recharacterization of Torah into a legislative 
model, but the reference to for example Deut 17:19 and Prov 25:1 does not seem to provide adequate 
evidence for the theory of “royal patronage . . . of torah-wisdom scribes in ancient Israel” (Fitzpatrick-
McKinley, The Transformation of Torah, 150). Cf. pp. 146–77. 
In the following I have not entered the question whether Torah should be seen as normative in the 
cultic domain. The narrative of Lev 10 for example, and the ensuing dialogue between Moses and Aaron 
could be taken as evidence of a particularism in following the exact wording of the cultic Torah-instruction 
given, even if it would need to be studied whether this is a reference to the oral or written instruction, and 
what role the written cultic instructions are assigned within Torah. 
In the Yabneh Yam letter we hear of a harvester who complains to his master that his mantle is 
stolen. In the words of Fitzpatrick-McKinley, “he points out that his rights of ownership had been violated; 
he does not point out that Pentateuchal law had been broken,” (Fitzpatrick-McKinley, The Transformation 
of Torah, 93) even if Pentateuchal legislation specifically prohibits such an act (Exod 22:25–27; Deut 
24:10–13. 
32 Schmid has argued that the word-group צדק in the pre-exilic HB denotes a historically 
progressing world-order, unifying aspects like justice, wisdom, nature, war, cult, and finds a concrete form 
in the monarchy (Hans Heinrich Schmid, Gerechtigkeit als Weltordnung: Hintergrund und Geschichte des 
alttestamentlichen Gerechtigkeitsbegriffes (Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 1968), 166, 169). For a discussion 
on how צדק in the HB relates to other ANE concepts of a comprehensive world-order like Egyptian Ma‘at 
see Schmid, Gerechtigkeit als Weltordnung, 23–66, 171–73. As noted above, Assmann would disagree 
with Schmid here. While he agrees that ma’at represents a given world-order, Torah differs in being special 
revelation (Assmann, “Verschriftung rechtlicher und sozialer Normen,” 75). 
The Greek concept of λόγος is also of interest in a comparative study, as it resonates with some of 
the key terms in ancient Israel and the ANE regarding a universal order. In Craig S. Keener’s discussion of 
the λόγος in the Prologue of the Gospel according to John, he argues that λόγος there should be understood 
as Torah: “Playing on the link between Torah and Wisdom, the Fourth Gospel presents the Logos of its 
prologue as Torah” (Craig S. Keener, The Gospel of John: A Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Academic, 2003), 360). John’s λόγος is therefore relevant for the present discussion as he claims that Christ 
is the Incarnated Torah. Keener writes: “Although Torah could be said to consist of commandments, its 
sense is broader than code or custom, denoting instruction and revelation” (Keener, John, 355–56). He 
surveys the use of λόγος in Gnosticism, Hellenistic philosophy, Philo, extra-biblical Palestinian sources. 
Even if he finds more parallels between the latter Jewish sources in this list and John’s λόγος, he does not 
find them to be strong enough to legitimate speaking of influence (Keener, John, 339–50). Contra Rudolf  
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being composed, the law of God was an unwritten law, that is, the principles and 
concepts constituting ancient Israel’s understanding of justice and righteousness.”33 
While he sees the ultimate reference of law as “the sense of justice shared by the legal 
community” constituting “the fundamental norms of the social order,”34 I would rather 
argue that the transcendent reference in Torah, as we have it, seems rather to be YHWH 
himself. In that sense, the transcendent reference of the court is “unwritten,” as it refers to 
YHWH. But Torah is his hortatory or paraenetic instruction, the written formulation of 
his character.35 If we look at the instructions given to judges the reference is not to the 
                                               
Bultmann, The Gospel of John: A Commentary, trans. G. R. Beasley-Murray (Oxford: Blackwell, 1971), 
28). Cf. Keener, John, 340–42, 346–47, 349–50. 
33 Patrick, Old Testament Law, 218. 
34 Patrick, Old Testament Law, 192, 198. 
35 In contrast to Mesopotamian law, where “the final source of the law, the ideal with which the 
law had to conform was above the gods as well as men” (Greenberg, “Some Postulates of Biblical Criminal 
Law,” 9), “in the biblical theory the idea of the transcendence of the law receives a more thoroughgoing 
expression. Here God is not merely the custodian of justice or the dispenser of ‘truths’ to man, he is the 
fountainhead of the law, the law is a statement of his will. The very formulation is God’s; frequently laws 
are couched in the first person, and they are always referred to as ‘words of God’, never of man. Not only is 
Moses denied any part in the formulation of the Pentateuchal laws, no Israelite king is said to have authored 
a law code, nor is any king censured for so doing. The only legislator the Bible knows of is God; the only 
legislation is that mediated by a prophet (Moses and Ezekiel)” (Greenberg, “Some Postulates of Biblical 
Criminal Law,” 11). Greenberg here formulated a key characteristic of Torah, but should be slightly 
modified in light of the observations of Cassuto and LeFebvre, showing that persons in authority in ancient 
Israel could pass laws and regulations, even if they should be seen as ‘secular law,’ or better as ‘human 
law,’ in contrast to Torah as divine instruction. In texts like 1 Sam 30:24–25; Isa 10:1; Jer 34:8ff, Cassuto 
found a basis for seeing a secular, or royal, law in ancient Israel (Cassuto, A Commentary on the Book of 
Exodus, 260–1). See also the discussion in LeFebvre, Collections, Codes, and Torah, 55–145. 
Fitzpatrick-McKinley discusses and criticizes various theories of how Torah should be seen as a 
rational response to social change, and summarizes: “The emphasis of Yhwh as the source of Israel’s torah 
was not the result of, nor is it immediately related to, social and economic developments. It is a statement 
of the reality of Israel’s torah which was at least an implicitly characteristic of it from the beginning” 
(Fitzpatrick-McKinley, The Transformation of Torah, 177. Cf. pp. 23–53). Berman writes: “The nature of 
biblical law codes, it may be posited, is different from those of the ancient Near East. Only in the Bible is 
law presented as divine revelation, and only in the Bible do laws appear as treaty stipulations between a 
sovereign and a vassal. Moreover, we find that biblical law is often expressed in a paranetic or sermonic 
style, and is interwoven with narrative, homily, and hortatory passages, all uncharacteristic of ancient Near 
Eastern law” (Berman, Created Equal, 84–85. Cf. p. 59). A similar statement is found in Cassuto, A 
Commentary on the Book of Exodus, 259–60. Sonnet writes: “Far from reactivating mythological 
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“legal community” and “the fundamental norms of the social order.” The chosen judges 
are described as “fearers of God” (ִיְרֵאי ֱאֹלִהים, Exod 18:21), thus placing God as the 
prime reference. Again, in Lev 19:16 the reference is YHWH (ֲאִני ְיהָוה). And Deut 1:17 
could hardly make the ultimate reference of the court clearer declaring that “the judgment 
belongs to God” (ַהִּמְׁשָּפט ֵלאֹלִהים הּוא). The double reference to “the land which God is 
giving you” ( ֶׁשר ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֶהיָך ֹנֵתן ְלָךאֲ  ) in Deut 16:18–20, is again a reminder that the judges 
judge on behalf of God in his land. The concept of “unwritten law” is thus not necessary, 
and relieves us of the conjectural reasoning of trying to reconstruct what it might be. 
Rather, we have the written Torah and a transcendent reference beyond it, YHWH, who 
constitute the final authority in all manners of life and justice.  
Third, the above also concurs with LeFebvre’s point that oracle in the person of 
Moses the prophet, as YHWH’s representative, stood at the center of the Israelite 
judiciary (Exod 18:13–27).36 Still, as pointed out by others, it can not be assumed that the 
                                               
representations, the reference to a writing God rather highlights the rational discursiveness of God’s 
revelation” (Jean-Pierre Sonnet, The Book within the Book: Writing in Deuteronomy, eds. R. Alan 
Culpepper and Rolf Rendtorff. Biblical Interpretation Series [BibInt] [Leiden: Brill, 1997], 51. Cf. pp. 49–
50). Finally, our available evidence is too meager to conclude that Torah was “unwritten” in the period 
when it was “being composed,” as Patrick claims. I will return to the question of orality and writing below. 
Cf. Fitzpatrick-McKinley, The Transformation of Torah, 19. 
For how it was rather rare in the ANE to see all the participants involved, both the speaker and 
messenger, as involved in the writing process like we see it with God authoring the Decalogue tablets and 
Moses the messenger also authoring, cf. Martti Nissinen, “Spoken, Written, Quoted, and Invented: Orality 
and Writtenness in Ancient Near Eastern Prophecy,” in Writings and Speech in Israelite and Ancient Near 
Eastern Prophecy, eds. Ehud Ben Zvi and Michael H. Floyd, Symposium Series 10 (Atlanta: SBL, 2000), 
241. 
36 LeFebvre, Collections, Codes, and Torah, 40–47. Cf. Fishbane, “Revelation and Tradition,” 
344. The use of ֱאֹלִהים in Exod 21:6 and ַיְרִׁשיעֻן ֱאֹלִהים in 22:8 are ambivalent and have received much 
attention. It is variously argued to be an oracular judgment (William Henry Propp, Exodus 19–40: A New 
Translation With Introduction and Commentary, Anchor Yale Bible (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2008), 125; Wright, Inventing God's Law, 252–58. Cf. Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 
237–38n), oath (O. Loretz, “Ex 21,6; 22,8 und angebliche Nuzi-Parallelen,” Bib 41 (1960): 173; 
Fitzpatrick-McKinley, The Transformation of Torah, 139; Paul, Studies in the Book of the Covenant, 90–
91), ordeal (Julian Morgenstern, “The Book of the Covenant Part 2,” HUCA 7 (1930): 112–13), or simply 
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‘high court’ in Deut 17:8–13 would consult with an oracle.37 In all the four actual legal 
                                               
the court (e.g. Cassuto, A Commentary on the Book of Exodus, 267, 286). Cf. David Andrew Teeter, Scribal 
Laws: Exegetical Variation in the Textual Transmission of Biblical Law in the Late Second Temple Period 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), 128, 131). This discussion cannot be settled here. 
37 Rofé writes that Deuteronomy “does not assign the priest any role of inquiring of YHWH, 
through the Urim and Thummim or by any other means. According to the constitutional collection of laws, 
YHWH speaks to the people only by means of the prophet. Unresolved legal cases are presented not to the 
divinity, but to a human judge for decision” (Alexander Rofé, “The Organization of the Judiciary in 
Deuteronomy (Deut. 16.18–20; 17.8–13; 19.15; 21.22–23; 24.16; 25.1–3),” in The World of the Aramaeans 
I: Biblical Studies in Honour of Paul-Eugène Dion, eds. P. M. Michèle Daviau, John W. Wevers and 
Michael Weigl, JSOTSup 324 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2001), 99). Berman writes that the 
priests receive a more prominent judicial role in Deuteronomy: “In other books of the Pentateuch, priests 
are not assigned a regular judicial role, and become involved only when cases need to be resolved by sacral 
means: oaths (Exod 22:7–10), ritual ordeal (Num 5:11–31), and Urim and Thummim (Exod 28:29–30). Yet 
in Deuteronomy, priests play a local judicial role in civil and criminal cases (19:17; 21:5)” (Berman, 
Created Equal, 65). He continues to deny the common assumption that the rationale for the priestly 
inclusion in the ‘high court’ was their oracular role: “Of all the cultic roles and tasks, the capacity to 
receive communication from the divine is the most sublime. Yet in Deuteronomy, the power to receive the 
oracle is mentioned with regard to the priest only once, at 33:10. In more explicit fashion, it is the domain 
of the prophet, who transmits God’s commands and who correctly foretells events (18:9–22). Some assume 
that the role of the priests as the members of the supreme tribunal in difficult matters of law (17:8–13) in 
fact rests on the assumption that they consult oracular means. Yet this is nowhere stated explicitly, and as 
we have seen, priests are not the sole members of the high tribunal: it includes as well ‘the judges of that 
time’ (17:9, 12). There is an enormous difference between the priestly power to adjudicate on the basis of 
oracular divination, such as the Urim and Thummim, and the priestly power in Deuteronomy to adjudicate 
on the basis of interpretation and application of the law and the examination of evidence. Divination by 
means of the Urim and Thummmim is almost by definition a process that can have no control, no oversight, 
no inspection. . . . Divination has the potential to be an exclusionary source of power, par excellence. By 
contrast, authority that is rooted in the interpretation of a public text written in a language that is accessible 
to a wide audience limits the potential for domination by the priests, because their pronouncements may 
ultimately be measured against the spirit of the text itself” (Berman, Created Equal, 66–67). And again: 
“What Deuteronomy emphasizes is that justice is determined by the interpretation and application of law 
alone” (Berman, Created Equal, 69). Berman also points out that the  ִיִאיםְּנׂש  (“elders” or “chieftains”) and 
 .assembly”), prevalent in the wilderness wanderings, are not even mentioned in Deuteronomy“) ֵעָדה
Deuteronomy neither has much to say about the tribes (Berman, Created Equal, 74, 77). Cf. Christie G. 
Chadwick, “Archaeology and the Reality of Ancient Israel: Convergences between Biblical and Extra-
biblical Sources for the Monarchic Period” (Ph.D diss., Andrews University, 2015), 15–28. Thus, the high 
court in Deut 17 replaces Moses as the ‘high court’ in Exod 18, but his oracular role is largely maintained 
by subsequent prophets, even if priests served in some oracular capacity as well. While Berman seems to be 
correct in pointing out the lack of an explicit reference to the oracle in Deut 17:8–13, it nevertheless does 
not seem clear that the ‘high court’ would primarily consult and interpret the Torah. This likewise lacks 
explicit formulations in Deut 17:8–13. The passage simply does not give us any information about how the 
‘high court’ would make its decisions. Given that Deut 16:18–20; 17:8–13 is the only Pentateuchal law 
about the appointment of judged, Rofé asks why the author of Deuteronomy saw the need to include this 
instruction: “The novelty seems to lie precisely in the fact of their being appointed. It seems likely that 
before this law was enacted, judgment was entrusted to individuals whose authority arose from their 
spontaneous recognition by the people” (Rofé, “The Organization of the Judiciary in Deuteronomy,” 95). 
Cf. Eckart Otto, “ ערׁש ,” eds. G. Johannes Botterweck, Helmer Ringgren and Heinz-Josef Fabry, TDOT 15 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006), 359–405. 
It may be appropriate here also to include some observations on the role of the king in regards to 
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cases mentioned in Torah we see the centrality of the oracular judgment: in the case of 
the blasphemer (Lev 24:10–23, esp. vv. 12–14), the case of the Second Passover (Num 
9:1–14, esp. vv. 8–14), the case of the Sabbath breaker (Num 15:32–36, esp. vv. 34–35), 
and the case of Zelophehad’s daughters’ land inheritance (Num 27:1–11, esp. vv. 5–6. Cf. 
36:1–12).38 In all these cases the incompleteness of the legal instructions in Torah 
                                               
Torah and the judiciary. LeFebvre comments on Deut 17:18–20 in comparative perspective: “There are 
instances in the wider ancient Near East of wisdom texts intended for the instruction of princes. Also, 
Hammurabi expected subsequent rulers to read his law compilation: ‘May any king who will appear in the 
land in the future, at any time, observe the pronouncements of justice that I inscribed upon my stela . . .’ 
(LH 48.59–49.17). Nowhere in the ancient Near Eastern materials, however, is there an instance of a king 
enjoined to write out a law book for himself (and one which contains limiting instructions on his own 
reign). He who in other nations is chief law teacher, has for Israel become the first law student. Like the 
preceding four stipulations, the book-reading stipulation is intended to make Israel’s king ‘like his brothers’ 
(vv. 19–20; cf. 6:6–9; 11:18–21). In other words, study of the law book is (for Deuteronomy) a non-kingly 
activity. This is so much the case that calling the king to daily law-book study is expected to keep him on a 
peer level with the general public in the land” (LeFebvre, Collections, Codes, and Torah, 90). For the king 
as the model Israelite and arch Torah-reader see Sonnet, The Book within the Book, 71, 73, 78, 234. 
Jackson writes about the formative purpose of Torah according to Deut 17 in that “the leader is conceived 
to be in possession of a written sefer, and that sefer is presented as a source of meditation/learning that 
affects the character in such a way as to lead to success. Though the term chakhmah is not used in either 
source, there is a clear association here with wisdom thinking. Whether the purpose is ultimately juridicial 
is less clear” (Jackson, Semiotics of Biblical Law, 134. Cf. p. 132 for his comments on Deut 17). 
Cf. the chapter on the judicial oracle in Deir El-Medina in McDowell, Jurisdiction, 58–61. 
According to McDowell the oracle or vizier, and never the court, decided all disputes about property 
ownership in ancient Egypt. In addition, the oracle was consulted in cases where the court could not be 
applied, as identifying a thief and determining a disputed price on goods (McDowell, Jurisdiction, 118). 
The use of the oracle or vizier for determining questions of private property in Deir El-Medina might be 
related to the special status there due to the service of its inhabitants for the royal necropolis (McDowell, 
Jurisdiction, 122–23). Cf. p. 126–27, 132–33. She explains that in Egypt “it became a common practice to 
submit dilemmas of even the most trivial sort to divine judgement” (McDowell, Jurisdiction, 107). Cf. 
Chavel, Oracular Law. See also my review, Kenneth Bergland, review of Oracular Law and Priestly 
Historiography in the Torah, by Simeon Chavel, Bulletin of Biblical Research (BBR) 25 (2015): 557–58. 
For the process of identifying Achan in Josh 7 see the process of identifying a thief in Deir El-
Medina (McDowell, Jurisdiction, 109, 133). See also McDowell, Jurisdiction, 114 for how the overlap in 
areas of jurisdiction and power between oracle and ḳnbt, the ‘secular court,’ has puzzled scholars. Within 
Exod 18 the differentiation between the ordinary court and the oracle was between  ַֹדלּגָ הַ  ָברּדָ ה  (“major 
issues,” Exod 18:22) and  ַהָּקׁשֶ הַ  ָברּדָ ה  (“difficult cases,”18:26) on the one side, and  ַֹטןּקָ הַ  ָברּדָ ה  (“the minor 
issues,” 18:22, 26) on the other. In Deut 17:8 the high court is consulted  ִָדָבר ָךּמְ מִ  ֵלאּפָ יִ  יּכ  (“if a case is too 
baffling [lit. ‘too wonderful’] for you,” Deut 17:8). 
38 Relevant for the case of Zelophead’s daughters, see VerSteeg, Law in Ancient Egypt, 105 for 
female ownership in Egypt. And for a female’s plea to receive her fair share of her father’s inheritance see 
McDowell, Jurisdiction, 135. 
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appears to call for additional oracular judgment. It may be that these four cases are 
mentioned exactly because of the oracular judgment involved. 
The combination of reference to YHWH as a transcendent ground for Torah, the 
use of oracular judgment in ‘difficult’ cases, and lack of reference to Torah in the 
instructions to judges all mitigate against a legislative model for Torah.39 It therefore 
seems warranted to conclude that Torah does not appear to fit the legislative model. 
Literalistic reuse is therefore not needed, as in a classic or modern court, where the law-
book is quoted verbatim as the “exclusive source of the law.”40 This accounts for the 
fluidity we find in legal reuse both within the Torah itself and in other passages of the 
HB. On the other hand, we often find a second and simultaneous phenomenon in the very 
same passages containing fluid legal reuse in HB that also needs to be accounted for, 
namely a significant amount of parallels in the form of lexemes, phrases, and concepts. 
We thus find combined both exact correspondence  
                                               
39 LeFebvre sums up some questions that might be good to keep in mind when we approach our 
concrete cases: “Is it [the law citations in the biblical literature] being cited as legislation for social 
regulation? Is it being referenced as an eminent didactic guide? Or is it being held up as a ritual symbol? 
Furthermore, if cited in places as legislation, is that legislative use indication of an emerging approach to 
law or a long-standing practice?” (LeFebvre, Collections, Codes, and Torah, 50). LeFebvre also concludes: 
“At least these two point can be confidently accepted: (1) a legislative use of law writings cannot be 
demonstrated from the Hebrew literature; and, (2) non-legislative uses of law writings can be demonstrated 
from the Hebrew literature” (LeFebvre, Collections, Codes, and Torah, 38–39). And again: “A legislative 
use of law writing cannot be shown for ancient Israel. Non-legislative uses for law writings can” 
(LeFebvre, Collections, Codes, and Torah, 50). While Berman might be correct in claiming that both Torah 
and Greek law subordinate all public institutions to law (Berman, Created Equal, 62), a difference 
nevertheless seems to be that Torah is not the final legal reference. While the role of the oracle might not be 
as prominent in Deuteronomy as in Exodus–Numbers, even here YHWH is the transcendent reference of 
Torah (Deut 1:17; 16:18–20) and the prophetic privilege of being his spokesman is retained (Deut 18:15–
22). The comparison between Torah and Greek law would need further refinement than what is possible 
here. 
40 Westbrook, “Origins of Legislation,” 74. 
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and creative freedom in proto-halakhic reuse in the HB.41 
It is, of course, not only the instructive material of Torah that is reused, and 
neither is it only here that we find a more ‘fluid’ or creative reuse. We are used to finding 
free reuse of poetry and narrative. It could, therefore, be said that the real surprise is not 
finding fluid reuse of other genres, but that Torah, as well, appears to be reused more 
freely than we might expect. A comparable phenomenon may be the reuse of unfulfilled 
prophecies. Here we would certainly not expect fluidity in cases predictive of the future, 
but, rather, precise wording. Thus, reuse of legal material and prophecy can be compared, 
and, perhaps, they can mutually inform one another.42 This, naturally, leads us to a 
discussion as to whether Torah is to be understood as immutable. 
The Immutability of Torah  
The immediate question is how we should relate to the two claims mentioned 
above; namely, the normativity and the immutability of Torah. In the following section, 
“Torah as Normative Covenantal Instruction,” I will argue that Torah appears to be 
perceived as normative even though it is non-legislative in character. The claim of the 
immutability of Torah is more complex, and it will not be addressed in full here. The 
                                               
41 I here borrow terminology from Rom-Shiloni, “Compositional Harmonization,” 938–39, who 
also acknowledging this dual phenomenon in legal reuse. 
42 Cf. Fishbane, “Revelation and Tradition,” 356–59. Cf. Felipe Masotti, “Oracular Reuse: Inner-
Biblical Reuse of Oracles in Exilic and Post-Exilic Temple Eschatology” (Ph.D. diss., Andrews University, 
(forthcoming)). Greenberg discussed the phenomena of Ezekiel’s own reuse of his failed prophecies 
regarding Tyre (Moshe Greenberg, Ezekiel 21–37: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, 
AB 22A (New York: Doubleday, 1997), 616–18). See also Fishbane commenting on the same phenomena 
in Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 476–77. A difference here is that while several of the 
passages I am studying regarding legal reuse indicate that ordinary people should have read Torah in an 
expansionistic fashion, I know of no similar expectation regarding prophetic material. Here the elaborations 
are solely possible through divine revelation. 
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following case studies will, however, shed light on this question. In principle, it should be 
sufficient to demonstrate a revision of one instruction from Torah in order to falsify the 
claim of the immutablity of Torah in toto. But strictly speaking, this would only show the 
mutability of the one particular instruction in question. The immutability of the rest of the 
corpus could still, theoretically, be maintained. 
Levinson has argued that the formulations in Deut 4:2 and 13:1 imply that 
Deuteronomy closes itself ‘canonically’ and prohibits any further supplements or 
modifications. For him the “intent is to preclude both literary and doctrinal innovation by 
safeguarding the textual status quo.”43 He explains that “the essence of a canon is that it 
be stable, self-sufficient, and delimited” and “biblical law is rhetorically constructed to be 
infallible and error free.”44 According to him a dilemma arises between the fixity and 
sufficiency of the canon and later applications: “With such fixity and textual sufficiency 
as its hallmarks, how can a canon be made to address the varying needs of later 
generations of religious communities?”45 Berman critiques Levinson at this point:  
                                               
43 Levinson, Legal Revision, 14. See pp. 12–15. For Hittite analogies to Deut 4:2; 13:1, see Weeks, 
Adminition and Curse, 78–79. Kaufmann pointed out that loyalty to the instructions and their ideas was 
essential, even if there was a freedom to modify them in new contexts: “Only the assumption then that by 
then the elements of the Torah has become fixed and hallowed is adequate to explain the reluctance of the 
compilers to revise and emend” (Kaufmann, The Religion of Israel, 210). Cf. pp. 171–72, 211 as well. 
44 Levinson, Legal Revision, 12, 46. 
45 Levinson, Legal Revision, 14. Cf. Michael Fishbane, “Varia Deuteronomica,” ZAW 84 (1972): 
200. Carasik writes: “In the case of a code of law, the prohibition of addition or subtraction means that no 
new laws will ever be needed, and no current law will become obsolete. To be sure, wisdom will be needed 
to apply the laws to future situations that may arise: הבו לכם אנׁשים חכמים ונבנים וידעים, ‘Get yourselves 
wise, understanding, knowledgeable people’ (to serve as judges; Deut 1:13). But wise interpretation of 
existing law will always be sufficient: ‘I commanded you at that time all the things which you must do’ 
(Deut 1:18)” (Michael Carasik, Theologies of the Mind in Biblical Israel, Studies in Biblical Literature 
[StBibLit] 85 (New York: Peter Lang, 2006), 208). Cf. Alex P. Jassen, Scripture and Law in the Dead Sea 
Scrolls (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014) showing how the prophets open the possibility of 
new instructions. Should this be seen as ‘new instruction’ or simple wisdom to apply the already existing 
instructions? In dialogue with Levinson, Sommer argues that a participatory model of revelation reduces 
 
 45 
Levinson disavows viewing biblical law as legal codes. Yet Levinson ascribes to the 
authors of these legal texts a theology whereby the clauses of the law collections are 
immutable forms due to their divinity. Implicitly, then, Levinson is suggesting that 
the two codes [the Covenant Code and Deuteronomy] are mutually exclusive, which 
is to read into them statutory assumptions about the nature and authority of the texts 
at hand.46 
We cannot simply assume that innovation was intended to be legal revision. It is 
well known that ancient authors intentionally inscribed themselves within a longer 
tradition; often reusing former revered texts and assigning themselves a more secondary 
role.47 We, therefore, need to ask why the biblical authors chose innovation instead of 
exact correspondence. As will be argued in the following, some prophetic texts introduce 
innovations without any suggestion that the innovations should entail rejection of 
previous instruction. If we examine instances of legal revision, we must also question 
whether these should be understood in terms of continuity or discontinuity: as in, do new 
instructions supersede previous ones or appropriate former instruction in new settings? 
                                               
the otherwise posed tension between divine immutable revelation and human hermeneutics: “The emphasis 
of participatory theology on the human voice encourages us to realize that covenantal law always involves 
dialogue. The possibility that law may evolve—whether because new human voices enter the dialogue or 
because God corrects a misinterpretation of the divine will—is ever present. Further, the fact that the Bible 
frequently portrays God as changing God’s mind encourages considerable doubt as to whether law given by 
this deity really is unchanging” (Sommer, Revelation and Authority, 245). 
46 Berman, “The History of Legal Theory,” 31. Cf. also p. 32. Sommer writes: “The Pentateuch 
does not function as a prescriptive code, simply because a self-contradictory and incomplete legal 
anthology cannot so function” (Sommer, Revelation and Authority, 172). While the contradictions and 
limitations of Torah lead him to a non-legislative concept of Torah, he nevertheless accepts a source critical 
solution to the observed contradictions and limits of Torah. 
It makes sense to see the prohibition against adding or changing in Deut 4:2 and 13:1, as a 
prohibition against changing this very document. Given that the book itself modifies Exodus–Numbers, and 
I here side with those seeing D as dependent on and reusing the other legal corpora in Torah, the book itself 
seems to invite future legal innovations. At the same time, the supplementation of the book—seen most 
clearly with the account of the death of Moses in Deut 34—raises the question how later redactors could 
feel entitled to such supplementation in the face of the prohibition in Deuteronomy itself against such 
redactional activity? Cf. Sonnet’s discussion of the book of Moses being redacted into and supplemented in 
the book of Deuteronomy (Sonnet, The Book within the Book). 




But we should not simply assume that innovations are a sign of a need to be original in a 
modern sense. As already argued by others, comparing the textual fluidity of ANE 
treaties may shed light on similar fluidity in the Torah covenant, as both may be seen as 
part of a common legal tradition.48 
For James Watts the repetition seen between the instructions in BC, HI, and D is 
typical of Torah’s rhetoric insofar as it aids memorization and functions persuasively: 
This depiction of Pentateuchal law in the form of a threefold (at least) repetition 
creates the impression of a unified Mosaic law and obscures the contradictions 
contained within it . . . . The rhetorical force of this large-scale repetitive structure 
thus motivates allegiance and obedience to the law while hiding but not harmonizing 
the different traditions that it contains.49 
While adhering to a source critical division, Watts’ suggestion of an intentional 
repetition and variation in the instructive material, as a mnemonic devise, is here worth 
considering. He continues: “Repetitions of law in the Pentateuch frequently involve 
variation as well, ranging from differences in wording and alternative motive clauses to 
contradictory instructions and differences in punishments mandated for the same 
offense.”50 
                                               
48 Cf. Amnon Altman, The Historical Prologue of the Hittite Vassal Treaties: An Inquiry into the 
Concepts of Hittite Interstate Law, Bar-Ilan Studies in Near Eastern Languages and Culture (Ramat Gan: 
Bar-Ilan University, 2004); Weeks, Adminition and Curse; Joshua A. Berman, “Histories Twice Told: 
Deuteronomy 1–3 and the Hittite Treaty Prologue Tradition,” JBL 132 (2013): 229–50; Berman, 
Inconsitency in the Torah, 81–103. 
49 Watts, Reading Law, 71. And again: “The juxtaposition of three major Hebrew codes in the 
Pentateuch displays a remarkable tolerance for legal ambiguity and change” (Watts, Reading Law, 136). 
But while the unified composition of the somewhat repetitive legal corpora “obscures the contradictions 
contained within it,” it is also true that it highlights the variation and tensions. 
50 Watts, Reading Law, 73. He mentions the variations in the Sabbath commandments (Exod 
20:11; 23:12; 31:13–17; Lev 19:3, 30; 26:2; Deut 5:15), reparations for theft (Exod 21:37–22:3; Lev 6:5), 
and the altar laws (Exod 20:24; Lev 17; Deut 12:13–15) as examples. On the following page, he criticizes 
the inadequate explanations in evolutionary models for the dual phenomena of repetitions and variations in 
the instructive material: “Developmental hypotheses, however, leave half the question unanswered: though 
they account for the origins of contradictions, they do not explain why such differences were acceptable to 
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Eckart Otto reflects on the quest for coherent texts, relevant for the treatment of 
legal variation, as follows: 
Incoherencies in given texts have caused critical exegetes over the past three hundred 
years to look for coherent texts behind the given text, for consistent sources. 
Ultimately, however, they have had to admit that the sources of the documentary 
hypothesis are not at all coherent. Consequently, the source-division continued, and 
new sources such as J1, P, JS(Sondergut) and JES were created. Source criticism became a 
recursus ad infinitum, because literary-critical reduction of the text hardly lead to 
basic texts of convincing coherence. . . . this was nothing more than modernization of 
the ancient allegorical interpretation of the Bible, which searched for a dogmatic truth 
behind the text.51 
He is equally critical of both source critical approaches and traditional approaches, both 
insisting on presenting coherent texts. As a third alternative, he proposes seeing the legal 
tensions as authorially intended: 
With this in mind, let us turn things around: if there are tensions on the level of 
language and contents in the given text, we should not simply try to dissolve these 
tensions by literary-critical means, by dismembering the text, by reconstructing a 
literary-historical diachrony of the text. Rather we should ask whether it could be that 
the ancient authors deliberately left tensions in the text, knowing exactly what they 
were doing, whether they deliberately did not smooth the text, which would have 
been easy for them to do, or whether they even deliberately and systematically 
brought tensions into the text.52 
                                               
the earliest hearers and readers of the Pentateuch. The latter problem requires that attention be paid to the 
literary and rhetorical conventions shaping contradictions in the law collections.” Cf. Eggleston, "See and 
Read All These Words", 160. 
51 Eckart Otto, “A Hidden Truth Behind the Text or the Truth of the Text: At a Turning Point of 
Biblical Scholarship Two Hundred Years after De Wette's Dissertatio critico exegetica,” in Die Tora 
Studien Zum Pentateuch: Gesammelte Aufsätze, BZABR 9 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2009), 3. Again, he 
writes: “Historical-critical exegetes normally use tensions, contradictions and other inconsistencies in the 
given text as reason for reconstructing texts behind text, and it was the result of the Enlightenment that 
these texts behind the given text were interpreted diachronically as the historically real texts. The more 
indications of inconsistencies the given text shows, the more hands seem to have formed it, the deeper the 
literary history of the text is supposed to be diachronically. . . . This approach overlooks, however, the fact 
that the involvement of multiple hands in the formation of a text does not necessarily mean more 
incoherence of the final text – many hands tend to improve a text’s coherence, smoothing out the tensions 
and contradictions” (Otto, “A Hidden Truth Behind the Text,” 4). 
52 Otto, “A Hidden Truth Behind the Text,” 5. Cf. pp. 5–6 where he criticizes both the “literary-
critical analysis” and the “unhistorical synchronic analysis.” Instead, he proposes “a third way of 
integrating diachrony and synchrony in the interpretation of a given text, and understand tensions and 
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For him the texts combine the synchronic and diachronic within themselves, lending “a 
hermeneutical transparency to the given text which tells the reader: tua res agitur [‘it 
concerns you’].”53 To me, Otto’s suggested ethical dimension to literary dissimilitude in 
the HB raises several questions. Should we simply assume that our standard of literary 
coherence was the literary standard in the ancient world, and that if a text appears to lack 
coherence (as we would define ‘coherence’) that it must, by necessity, be identified as 
having been composed by different hands all driven by differing ideological 
committments? Might it not also be possible that cognitive dissonance created by 
passages in the HB was, instead, part of an intentional ancient literary strategy? And if so, 
what might that strategy be? One possibility is that the authors were trying to confront the 
reader ethically by encouraging the reader to examine moral problems himself. It might 
also be the case that the ancient authors were simply not troubled by incongruities and 
dissimilitudes in the same way as we are? But it borders on arrogance to assume they 
were incapable of recognizing the various tensions and dissimilitudes that appear so 
glaring to us. I see no reason to accept the postulate that “the premodern reader of the 
final form of the text” was “constitutionally unable to become aware of the self-
contradictions the text contains.”54 A more likely scenario is that we have become blind 
                                               
inconsistencies as consciously and deliberately left in the text to enable the reader to realize that a given 
text functions on two levels-namely, at the time of narration, that is, at the time when the text was written 
down, and the narrated time, that is, in the Pentateuch, the time of Moses.” 
53 Otto, “A Hidden Truth Behind the Text,” 8. 
54 Sommer, Revelation and Authority, 74. Again, a further discussion would take us outside the 
present task. I will allow me just some few comments on Sommer’s argumentation. It is worth pondering 
why the Pentateuch in its final form “gives no indication that its laws need to be reconciled” (Sommer, 
Revelation and Authority, 224). Given that “Jewish thought is famously dialogical in nature” (Sommer, 
Revelation and Authority, 23), and that thinkers up until Rosenzweig, Heschel, and Sommer himself have 
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to certain literary techniques, because we insist upon on a concept of literary coherence 
that did not exist in ancient times? It follows that the more incoherence and dissimilitude 
we find—and here source criticism has helped to point these out—the more pressing the 
questions becomes, as the phenomenon of literary tension and dissimilitude seem rather 
pervasive in the HB. The possibility also exists that the rough voyage the texts often 
gives us, with undercurrents, waves, and shifting winds, was actually a necessary 
function of a literary strategy intended to stimulate moral reflection on the part of the 
reader. If this is the case, it follows that we should not force the texts into calm and 
smooth waters, either through speculative source criticism or extra-textual 
harmonizations in a doomed quest to find coherence and harmony behind all the apparent 
or real incongruities and tensions we find in the text. Maybe the dire straits of the texts 
not only speak tua res agitur, but also functions as a test in order to help us to determine 
the ethical posture of our heart ( ְלָבְבָךּבִ  רׁשֶ ָלַדַעת ֶאת־אֲ  ְתָךּסֹ ְלנַ  , Deut 8:2) as readers? Suffice 
it to say that what comes across to us as a primitive inability to achieve textual coherence, 
                                               
been able to think in such a dialogical manner, why is it that only the original authors and original readers 
are excluded from such good company? Why do we need to postulate that “the premodern reader of the 
final form of the text” was “constitutionally unable to become aware of the self-contradictions the text 
contains” (Sommer, Revelation and Authority, 74)? Premodern readers in the Middle Ages including the  
rabbinic authors of the period, and even biblical authors themselves clearly saw tensions or ‘dialogical 
elements’ in the Pentateuch in need of serious attention, even if they did not separate them into different 
sources as modern readers do. Plato’s dialogues and Kierkegaard’s dialectics are well-known examples of 
authors being able to write in a dialogical fashion. May it not be that dialogical thinking is to be seen 
already in “the most ancient Jewish understandings of revelation and the law” (Sommer, Revelation and 
Authority, 120)? Might it be that the Pentateuchal texts were written in a form to create a dialogue, in which 
we as readers are drawn into it by this very intriguing material? The sheer number of readers the Bible has 
had through the ages up until now is profound testimony of its effectiveness to create dialogue. See my own 
review of Revelation and Authority: Sinai in Jewish Scripture and Tradition, by Benjamin D. Sommer, 
BBR 26 (2016): 381–83. Cf. Shalom Carmy, “Concepts of Scripture in Mordechai Breuer,” in Jewish 
Concepts of Scripture: A Comparative Introduction, ed. Benjamin Sommer (New York: New York 
University Press, 2012), 267–79. This said, I am aware that I am vascillating between explaning the 
phenomena as if the ancients thought differently about contradiction than us, or whether they were not as 
concerned about it as us. This needs further study. 
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or a lamentable failure on the part of the biblical authors to recognize obvious 
discrepancies would probably have been perceived very differently by the ancient authors 
simply because they had different literary models and rhetorical aims than we do. We 
should not automatically assume that they should have held to our literary norms.55 
Before proceeding, let me specify once more that while it is common to speak of 
‘legal discrepancy’ or ‘apparent legal discrepancy’ between the different instructions in 
Torah, the first postulates an actual discord between the legal corpora of Torah while the 
second postulates that behind its appearance there is a likely accord. In order to suspend 
such judgments of the textual material, acknowledging the limitations of our 
understanding, I rather prefer more neutral phenomenological descriptions like legal 
‘dissimilarity,’ ‘dissimilitude,’ ‘differences,’ ‘diversity,’ ‘variation,’ ‘inconsistency,’ and 
‘tension.’ These terms seem to help us describe different aspects of a recurring 
phenomenon in the HB, allowing, as well, for a more nuanced description of the 
variations between cases, and the perspectives we decide to adopt with each case. 
Rendsburg has also recently discussed the phenomena of polyproposon, or 
repetition with variation, as he calls it.56 While focusing on phraseological variation in 
                                               
55 For the classic discussion of the principle of non-contradiction in occidental thought, see 
Aristotle, “Metaphysics,” Book IV, 1584–99. For a more recent discussion, see Graham Priest et al., eds., 
The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
56 In Paul Delnero’s extensive study of variation in Sumerian compositions, with particular focus 
upon the Decad collection, he writes: “Many of the literary works that were composed in Sumerian are 
known primarily from copies that were produced during the Old Babylonian Period (ca. 1900–1700 
B.C.E.). The copies of these compositions, which, with few exceptions, have typically survived in an 
average of ten to fifty, but in some instances, as many as 200 duplicates, rarely, if ever, contain completely 
identical versions of the same text” (Paul Delnero, “Variation in Sumerian Literary Compositions: A Case 
Study Based on the Decad” (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2006), v). 
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Torah, his study exposes a literary strategy of intentional variation that might also help us 
understand semantic variation and dissimilitude between the legal corpora in Torah and 
reuse of normative texts between Torah and the Prophets. He notes that this type of study 
has received only scant attention in scholarship: “Of the various literary devices that have 
been identified by scholars of ancient Near Eastern literature, the least recognized, it 
appears to me, is the technique of polyprosopon, or repetition with variation.”57 Knut 
Heim studied variant repetition in the book of Proverbs. According to him, “The creative 
combination of repetition with variation is the very essence of Hebrew poetry.”58 This 
raises the question whether repetition with variation is also the norm in Hebrew prose, 
specifically in proto-halakhic reuse in the HB. Rendsburg confirms such a suspicion: 
“The norm in all these texts, as elsewhere in the Bible, is not to repeat the wording or 
phraseology in verbatim fashion but to modify the language in some minor way. To my 
mind, this procedure alters the very nature of the text, transforming what could have been 
                                               
57 Gary A. Rendsburg, “Repetition with Variation in Legal-Cultic Texts of the Torah,” in Marbeh 
Ḥokmah: Studies in the Bible and the Ancient Near East in Loving Memory of Victor Avigdor Hurowitz, 
eds. S. Yona et al. (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2015), 436. Among others he mentions the following 
studies as having addressed the issue: Hurowitz, Inu Anum ṣīrum: Literary Structures in the Non-Judicial 
Sections of Codex Hammurabi; Shamir Yona, “Repetition and Variation in Biblical Texts,” UF 37 (2005): 
729–40; Scott B. Noegel and Gary A. Rendsburg, Solomon's Vineyard: Literary and Linguistic Studies in 
the Song of Songs, SBL Ancient Israel and Its Literature (Atlanta: SBL, 2009); Knut Heim, Poetic 
Imagination in Proverbs: Variant Repetitions and the Nature of Poetry, ed. Richard S. Hess. BBRSup 4 
(Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2012); Gary A. Rendsburg, “Variation in Biblical Hebrew Prose and 
Poetry,” in "Built in Wisdom, Established by Understanding": Essays on Biblical and Near Eastern 
Literature in Honor of Adele Berlin, ed. Maxine L. Grossman (Bethesda, MD: University Press of 
Maryland, 2013), 197–226. On the morphological level, see Robert J. Ratner, “Morphological Variation in 
Biblical Hebrew Rhetoric,” Maarav 8 (1992): 143–59; Jaakov Levi, Die Inkongruenz im biblischen 
Hebräisch (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1987). 
58 Heim, Poetic Imagination in Proverbs, 636. Italics original. It is here tempting to draw the 
analogy with variation over a theme in classical music. Cf. David M. Carr, The Formation of the Hebrew 
Bible: A New Reconstruction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 29–31. 
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a dry and laborious composition into a creative and imaginative literary product.”59 And 
he sums up: “Our modern bias might suggest that legal writing (or legal-cultic writing) 
should be dry, cumbrous, and ponderous, with little or no literary creativity. In the case of 
ancient Near Eastern legal texts, however, the scribes/authors responsible for these 
compositions strove just as much as their colleagues responsible for belletristic material 
(myths, epics, narratives, etc.) to imbue their writing with literary flair.”60 While 
Rendsburg argues that there might be a literary artistic intention behind phraseological 
variation,61 I will argue that there may also be an ethical thrust behind semantic variation 
                                               
59 Rendsburg, “Repetition with Variation,” 437. 
60 Rendsburg, “Repetition with Variation,” 463. 
61 Rendsburg explains the phenomena as virtuosic display (“the author jumbles the material to 
allow for the reader's admiration of his literary flair” [Rendsburg, “Repetition with Variation,” 445]) or to 
create an aesthetically appealing text robbed of tiresome monotonous repetition (“all in the interest of 
keeping the mind alert in the continual play of author → text → reader/ performer → listener/audience” 
[Rendsburg, “Repetition with Variation,” 450]). He even emphasizing the aesthetic oral appeal of 
phraseological variation (“served to create a composition characterized by the ebbs and flows of the written 
word in order to allow for maximum enjoyment at the oral/aural level” [Rendsburg, “Repetition with 
Variation,” 461]). He finds the phenomena to be omnipresent (“the author deliberately introduces variation 
at every level” [Rendsburg, “Repetition with Variation,” 447]), introduced “whenever possible” 
(Rendsburg, “Repetition with Variation,” 448). Contrary to source critical approaches seeing the signs of 
interpolations and multiple redactors in variation, Rendsburg even suggests that the repetition with 
variation between Lev 11 and Deut 14 might indicate an intentional reuse or unified redaction of the 
Pentateuch, where the author altered the material “so as not to repeat his source material verbatim” and “to 
ensure that repeated information did not reprise in verbatim fashion” (Rendsburg, “Repetition with 
Variation,” 459). Cf. pp. 443, 453, 458–59. Cassuto also explains the repetition with variation in prose as 
an artistic attempt to make the text more readable. In contrast to the audible effect of such variation upon 
the listener, as Rendsburg argues, Cassuto explains it in terms of the effect upon the reader: “Mostly, when 
the subject is not so technical, as in the case of the construction of the Tabernacle (Ex. 25–31, 35–40), or 
the offerings of the leaders (Num. 7:12–83), and it does not require meticulous exactitude of details, the 
repetitions in prose are not identical—word for word. Prose is intended to be read rather than to be heard, 
and the reader is not as keen as the listener on the repetition of words that he already knows by heart. On 
the contrary, the recurrence of the ipsissima verba may at times be a burden to him. Hence prose likes, 
artistically, to vary the expressions, or to abridge them, or to change their order, when it repeats any 
subject” (Umberto Cassuto, “Biblical and Canaanite Literature,” in Biblical and Oriental Studies 
(Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1975), 2:31. Cf. pp. 29–32). See also Robert Gordis, “Quotations as a Literary 
Usage in Biblical, Oriental, and Rabbinic Literature,” HUCA 22 (1949): 157–219. For other relevant 
studies for the discussions of repetition in biblical narrative see Gordis, “Quotations as a Literary Usage in 
Biblical, Oriental, and Rabbinic Literature,” 157–219; Jerrold S. Cooper, “Symmetry and Repetition in 
Akkadian Narrative,” Journal of American Oriental Society 97, no. 4 (1977): 508–12; Yair Hoffmann, 
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that may inform what has been described as the artistic reuse of normative texts.62 
Whether the author introduces legal variation in order to raise halakhic issues in a 
dialectical manner,63 or variation becomes halachic because the passage itself in which it 
is embedded is already halachically tuned,64 is a question that needs to be studied further. 
In other words, while the phenomena of repetition with variation can be explained in 
various ways, how should it be understood within a halachic passage? 
In his study of quoted direct speech George Savran finds that “in the narrative 
sections from Genesis through 2 Kings there are 97 occasions in which a character quotes 
one or more prior speeches . . . . Of these 97 instances 70 contain verifiable quotations 
and 31 have unverifiable quotations.”65 Among these verifiable quotations he finds that 
the normal is repetition with variation: “As with other types of repetition in the Bible, 
verbatim repetition of the original speech, with no omissions or additions whatsoever, is 
an infrequent occurrence. There are only ten instances of this type of quoted direct 
                                               
“Between Conventionality and Stretegy: On Repetition in Biblical Narrative (Hebrew),” ha-Sifrut 28 
(1979): 89–99; Meir Sternberg, The Poetics of Biblical Narrative: Ideological Literature and the Drama of 
Reading (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1985), 365–440; Robert Alter, The Art of Biblical 
Narrative (New York: Basic Books, 2011), 111–41; Delnero, “Variation in Sumerian Literary 
Compositions.” 
62 For a survey of the discussion whether phraseology can be changed without changing semantics, 
or whether the two are inseparable, see Savran, Telling and Retelling, 1–5. 
63 For the apparently intentional dialectical case of Prov 26:4–5 see Carr, Formation of the Hebrew 
Bible, 32–33. 
64 Rendsburg’s aesthetic explanation of repetition with variation raises the question whether it is 
neither the concept of Torah or memorized reuse, but an intentional literary artistry that created the 
variation also on the content level, even the dissimilarity between the legal corpora on the content-level? Is 
it reasonable to see aesthetics alone as trumping the coherence of the text? If so, we should be careful in 
interpreting legal variation in ethical rather than aesthetical terms. 
65 Savran, Telling and Retelling, 19. Cf. p. 16. 
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speech: Gen. 20:5; 26:9; 38:22; 44:25; Ex. 32:8; 1 Sam. 21:12; 29:5; 1 Kg. 18:11, 14; 
22:18. Each of these discourses is very short (from two to seven words), increasing the 
statistical probability of literal repetition.”66 He finds that 
the overwhelming tendency of the narrator is to abridge the material repeated in 
quoted direct speech. . . . Given the almost normative occurrence of shortening in 
quoted direct speech, it can be difficult to determine whether or not the omission of 
certain details in quoted repetition is rhetorically significant. . . . These cases, and 
others like them, demonstrate the absence of any “automatic” connection between 
shortened quoted direct speech and simple stylistic convention on the one hand, and 
deliberate change in meaning on the other. . . . the context of the quotation in the 
story must be the final arbiter.67 
According to Savran, the most frequent variation in narrative quoted direct speech is 
paraphrastic as found both in shortening and lengthening passages.68 Again, there is no 
necessary correlation between phraseological and semantic change: “A certain amount of 
paraphrase is to be expected in quotations, but there is no absolute correlation between 
the type and extent of the paraphrase and any change in meaning of the quoted words. 
One must therefore examine not only the words with which a speaker quotes his source, 
but also the context, the tone of voice, and the purpose of the repetition.”69 He also makes 
                                               
66 Savran, Telling and Retelling, 29. Cf. p. 20. 
67 Savran, Telling and Retelling, 29, 31–32. Savran writes that it is not justified to assume that the 
limited cases of lengthened quoted direct speeches necessarily imply a change in meaning. For him “it is 
the context of the quotation that is the ultimate basis of such determinations” (Savran, Telling and 
Retelling, 33). 
68 The variations “range from the simplest kind of morphological variations in verbal forms, to the 
interchange of synonymous words and phrases, to complete changes in language and syntax” (Savran, 
Telling and Retelling, 33). 
69 Savran, Telling and Retelling, 35. Again he writes: “In terms of change in repetition, both 
conciseness and variation in language are high priorities in quoted direct speech. Quotations rarely appear 
in a form identical to their source, or with substantial additions tacked on by the quoter. But the 
significance of these changes (and the significance of verbatim repetition) can be assessed only in light of 
the context in which the quotation is placed” (Savran, Telling and Retelling, 36). Sternberg concludes on 
the same note: “It follows that the bearing and effect of variation can be determined only in context. This 
rule holds even for verbatim via-à-vis frankly  
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the interesting observation that even if quoted, direct speech normally contains variations 
from the source, “no character ever protests that he has been quoted incorrectly, even 
when his earlier words are repeated directly to him.”70 This seriously questions the 
common assumption in present biblical scholarship that the slightest variation (in reuse) 
has major ideological, sociological, and/or source critical implications. Even if repetition 
with variation is “not necessarily fraught with the theological significance it has in legal 
and prophetic texts,” Savran nevertheless sees an analogy in this phenomenon between 
narrative, prophetic, and legal texts.71 Sternberg lists the following forms of repetition 
with variation in biblical narratives: (1) expansion or addition, (2) truncation or ellipsis, 
(3) change of order, (4) grammatical transformation, and (5) substitution.72 These 
phenomena do not seem unique to biblical narrative, but will be observed in the cases to 
be studied in the following chapter. 
Rom-Shiloni uncovers the dual phenomena of exact and creative legal reuse in 
Jeremiah; this is relevant, as well, for the question of legal reuse in the HB in general. 
She writes:  
Two features of this rhetorical/literary technique within the book of Jeremiah (and 
prophecy in general) deserve special attention: the thoughtful intentionality behind 
                                               
deviant repetition” (Sternberg, The Poetics of Biblical Narrative, 393). 
70 Savran, Telling and Retelling, 75. And a little later: “It is probable that the character himself is 
aware of the change introduced by the quotation, that these characterizations exist both on the level of story 
(the character’s intention) and on the level of discourse” (Savran, Telling and Retelling, 80-81). 
71 Savran, Telling and Retelling, 112. Cf. p. 114 where he shows that there is clear overlap 
between quoted direct speech in narrative and legal material, in for example Deut 5:6–18 (Moses’ rehersal 
of the Decalogue); 17:16; 18:16–20; 19:7. Carr sees “a certain magic attached in scriptural contexts to 
finding meaning in every non-understood variation of a line or saying” (Carr, Formation of the Hebrew 
Bible, 33). 
72 Sternberg, The Poetics of Biblical Narrative, 391–92. 
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the harmonizations and the prophet’s freedom in creating harmonizations in what 
appear oftentimes to be virtuosic ways. The prophet clearly feels completely free to 
create these wordplays and thematic combinations purely to suit the context of his 
prophecy. Jeremiah utilizes these national narrative and legal traditions interpretively, 
in the most creative ways – making use of analogy, expansion, transformation, 
reversal, and many other techniques – to tap this treasury of traditions for his own 
message.73  
And again, “the prophet pursues the double (and not easily cooperative) aims of 
preserving authoritative earlier traditions while creating new prophetic messages.”74 
By way of summary, thus far, we can say that repetition with variation is regularly 
observed in various texts in the HB ranging from narrative and lyric to legal and 
prophetic texts. While such variation appears to be a widespread and common 
phenomenon in the HB, we should ask ourselves why such variation has become 
offensive to our modern critical sensibilities, and, also, to what extent we are entitled to 
insist upon modern standards of literary coherence as a critical basis for evaluating the 
relative quality of ancient texts? Might not our habit of imposing the literary norms of 
                                               
73 Rom-Shiloni, “Compositional Harmonization,” 939. This dual phenomenon has also been 
pointed out by Watts, Reading Law, 11, 68–84. Watts claims that YHWH himself is presented in the Torah 
as the one initiating the tradition of interpretation and revision of his own laws, referring to the four legal 
cases in Torah in Lev 24:10–23; Num 9:6––14; 15:32–36; 27:1–11. He writes: “These cases not only 
illustrate the development of Israelite legal traditions. They also cast God as the principal instigator of 
change within law. In addition to giving the laws in the first place, YHWH reacts to new circumstances by 
enunciating underlying judicial principles, defining the scope of the law’s jurisdiction, developing 
alternative means for compliance, and expanding enfranchisement. Thus God establishes not only the laws 
but also the process of legal development. These case laws characterize YHWH as judge, legal interpreter 
and legal reformer, as well as law-giver” (Watts, Reading Law, 104–5). He writes: “Moses in 
Deuteronomy, like YHWH in Exodus–Numbers, gives voice to changing and incommensurate legal 
traditions. Contradiction in Pentateuchal law does not pose a conflict between YHWH and Moses so much 
as it authorizes legal change as a natural part of Torah” (Watts, Reading Law, 119). For the divine-human 
revision of laws see pp. 105–7, 118–21. For repetition with variation presented in Moses’ voice, in a human 
voice, in Deuteronomy see Sonnet, The Book within the Book, 47. For the iterative phenomena in biblical 
narrative see Sonnet, The Book within the Book, 199–200. 
74 Rom-Shiloni, “Compositional Harmonization,” 939. Cf. Konrad Schmid, Schriftgelehrte 
Traditionsliteratur: Fallstudien zur innerbiblischen Schriftauslegung im Alten Testament (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2011). For lack of correspondence also in ritual literature see Catherine Bell, Ritual Theory, Ritual 
Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 137–40. 
 
 57 
modernity on ancient texts expose us as severely restricted in terms of our ability to 
comprehend and, ultimately, interpret ancient literary texts? Does not this possibility test 
the modern reader’s willingness to consider the extent to which we are willing and able to 
see and listen to the ancient texts, as opposed to merely insisting that they conform to our 
standards with the result that we end up with little more than a mass of mis-conjecture 
and baseless theory?75 
Related here is the question of how texts were seen as authoritative in ancient 
times. Pakkala has challenged the assumption that the authoritative status of a text should 
be seen as equal to its unchangeability: “It is possible that the authoritativeness of texts 
has some correlation with the changes made to them. However, this correlation cannot be 
assumed to inevitably mean that authoritative equals unchangeable—whether this means 
additions, rewriting or omissions. It is possible that in some stages of its transmission a 
text remained authoritative precisely because it was changed.”76 Stackert helpfully 
distinguishes between two modes of conceptualizing textual authority. He writes that 
it is important to contrast redaction/canonization with divine revelation as claims to 
textual authority. Specifically, the locus of authority differs between these two modes 
                                               
75 Cf. Latin conjectūra, ‘inferring, reasoning,’ with ‘conjecture’ used for forming an opinion or 
theory without sufficient evidence and Greek θεωρία, ‘a looking at, viewing, beholding.’ 
76 Pakkala, God's Word Omitted, 86. Pakkala himself, however, seems to make the same 
assumption even when he is criticizing it (e.g. Pakkala, God's Word Omitted, 144, 363). See also pp. 19, 
55–57, 73, 78, 89–90, 118–19, 121–22, 133, 362 for discussions on the stability and fluidity of the sources. 
Fishbane appears to be correct in pointing out a transition from inquiring God directly via oracle to “the 
post-deuteronomic development of the notion of scripture as a religious entity, mediating between God and 
man through its faithful study” (Fishbane, “Revelation and Tradition,” 350. Cf. pp. 343, 359–60), even if as 
observed above this shift might be testified already in Deuteronomy itself. This transition can be studied 
through the semantic change of the verb דרׁש between CBH and LBH (Kenneth Bergland, “Interpretation of 
the Written: The Change of the Semantic Field of דרש and Appearance of 19–1 ,ִמְדָרׁש). For how authorship 
was significant in the ANE only to authorize a text, cf. Karel van der Toorn, Scribal Culture and the 
Making of the Hebrew Bible (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 27; Eggleston, "See and 
Read All These Words", 66, 104. 
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of legitimation. In the case of divine revelation, the claim of authority is internal to 
the text itself: the very words of the deity are contained in that text. By contrast, the 
authority of canon is external to the texts canonized: it is not the text’s own claim but 
rather a secondary authorization that legitimizes such a text.77 
In my view, it seems clear that both in the Torah and the Prophets the claim to textual 
authority resides in the claim to contain divine revelation, not a claim of extrinsic 
canonicity, as described by Stackert.78 This problematizes a canonical approach to inner-
biblical reuse. Again and again we are reminded that they are the words of YHWH.79 In 
                                               
77 Stackert, Rewriting the Torah, 215. Ulrich’s definition of ‘an authoritative work’ is clarifying: 
“An authoritative work is a writing which a group, secular or religious, recognizes and accepts as 
determinative for its conduct, and as of a higher order than can be overridden by the power or will of the 
group or any member. A constitution or law code would be an example” (Eugene Ulrich, “The Notion and 
Definition of Canon,” in The Canon Debate, eds. Lee Martin McDonald and James A. Sanders (Peabody, 
MA: Hendrickson, 2002), 29). Cf. Carasik, Theologies of the Mind, 59–60; Jassen, Scripture and Law, 5–7, 
41–67. 
78 For a critique of the commonly accepted idea of the authority of the HB as resting on extrinisic 
canonicity where the canon as a closed literary corpus gives canonical authority by the community and 
conceding a decisive role to the human and communal decision, and how this “fails to do justice to the 
character and claims of the Old Testament as word of God”, see Meredith G. Kline, The Structure of 
Biblical Authority (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 1997), 23 and the following discussion. For an argument 
for an intrinsic canon approach see John C. Peckham, Canonical Theology: The Biblical Canon, Sola 
Scriptura, and Theological Method (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2016). While I agree with David Aaron 
in that the divine voice held a prime authority and that ‘canonicity’ in the sense of a closed corpus 
recognized by a community as such was a late invention, he does not seem to be precise or clear when 
reducing all textual authority to the concept of canon itself: “In Tanakh, there is never an appeal to the logic 
or perspective of some independent authoritative text. Indeed, the only authority depicted as in any sense 
external to the narrative is the divine voice. The concept of a canon, a set of privileged documents, must, by 
definition, postdate the biblical documents themselves. While it is commonly accepted that numerous 
passages reflect cognizance of earlier documents, either by emending them or by adopting them, no single 
passage ever attempts to interpret a historical phenomenon, or some idea in the abstract, by harmonizing 
some authoritative writ with reason” (David H. Aaron, Biblical Ambiguities: Metaphor, Semantics, and 
Divine Imagery (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 19). First of all, we should distinguish between the authority 
perceived to reside in a text as God’s words on the one side, and the stabilization of a textual corpus and the 
authority attributed to a document in the reception history as an extrinsic canonization. It is the latter that 
should be understood as canon recognition. Aaron does not seem to adequately differentiate between the 
two. Further, as I will try to demonstrate in the following, there are several cases in the HB where we find a 
type of reuse indicating a perceived authority to reside in the source text, but not reflecting an attitude 
where the source text needs to be reproduced unaltered. And finally, the borrowing text may attempt to 
reconcile a perceived authoritative text with a historical situation, thus altering the authoritvative source 
text in the process. 
79 Even if the book of Deuteronomy is couched in the words of Moses, the book presents the 
instructions as having originally been given by YHWH himself (Deut 1:3; 4:5, 14; 6:1, 17, 25; 10:13). Does 
Deut 4:14:  ִַטיםְׁשּפָ מִ ּו יםּקִ ֶאְתֶכם חֻ  דּמֵ ְלל  (“to teach you regulations and rulings”) mean that Moses did not 
necessarily receive all the  ִֻטיםְׁשּפָ מִ ּו יםּקִ ח  (“regulations and rulings”) directly from God, but that God gave 
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the narrative setting Moses wrote Torah over a 40 year period (beginning in Exod 24 and 
lasting until Deut 31/32), while divine revelation is presented as continuing all along this 
period. In a synchronic reading, YHWH is therefore seen as having supplemented and 
modified previous instructions, introducing some of the variation we now find between 
the legal corpora. The words in our passages are ultimately claimed to be the words of 
YHWH. And as is the case with reuse within Torah, so, also, with reuse between Torah 
and the Prophets; YHWH is claimed to reuse his own instructions. The initial giving of 
the instructions and their reuse are thus presented as having the same reference, namely 
YHWH. Fishbane’s questions should here be kept in mind:  
What would revelation have meant to the tradents, redrafters, or reformulators of 
older laws—that is, those who adjusted legal revelations to new ends? Is the 
projection of an incipient belief in the plenitude of meanings of a revelation, or the 
fluidity of context of diverse revelations, valid for this early stage of biblical 
exegesis? If so, then the exegete would have understood his task as one which merely 
unpacks that which is latent, or recombines that which is manifest, in ‘Scripture’.80 
However we read the reference to YHWH as the speaker and re-reader, if we allow that 
                                               
him a certain freedom to elaborate on the Ten Words? But then we have 4:5:  ִיםּקִ ֶאְתֶכם חֻ  יּתִ דְ ּמַ ְרֵאה ל 
ֹותׂשְיהָוה ֱאֹלָהי ַלעֲ ִניּוַ צִ  רׁשֶ אֲ ּכַ  ִטיםְׁשּפָ מִ ּו  (“See, I have taught you regulations and rulings, as YHWH my God 
commanded me to do”). The question is if  ַֹותׂשְיהָוה ֱאֹלָהי ַלעֲ  ִניּוַ צִ  רׁשֶ אֲ ּכ  (“as YHWH my God commanded me 
to do”) should be understood as a command to teach  ִֻטיםְׁשּפָ מִ ּו יםּקִ ח , rather than passing on  ִֻטיםְׁשּפָ מִ ּו יםּקִ ח  
that he had received from YHWH. For a further discussion see Nicholas Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse: 
Philosophical Reflections on the Claim that God Speaks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); 
Christine Hayes, What's Divine about Divine Law? Early Perspectives (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2015). Levinson argues that the claim to be rooted in revelation, the “origin myth” as he calls it, 
“diverges from other ancient legal systems” (Levinson, “The First Constitution,” 1858). And again: 
“Israelite authors were well tutored in the topical and formal conventions of cuneiform law. They drew 
upon the Mesopotamian concept of a royal propounder of law but also radically transformed it in light of 
their own cultural and religious priorities. They transformed precedent by making the royal legislator of 
biblical law the nation’s divine monarch, Yahweh . . . The scribes responsible for the Laws of Hammurabi 
are equally concerned to account for the origins of the laws themselves. The scribes locate the laws not in 
cosmic history but in human history as the ipsissima verba of Hammurabi himself” (Levinson, “The First 
Constitution,” 1863–65). If we suspend judgment on the veracity of the claim to be based on divine 
revelation, at least it should be clear that this is the claim set forth by the textual material here under study. 
80 Fishbane, “Revelation and Tradition,” 360. 
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later tradents introduced variations and modifications, there seems to be no good reason 
to deny a similar literary strategy to the original authors. 
The question of the immutability of Torah is further interlinked with the question 
of the mutability/immutability of YHWH himself.81 Benjamin Sommer’s statement is 
worthy of reflection: “The emphasis of participatory theology on the human voice 
encourages us to realize that covenantal law always involves dialogue. The possibility 
that law may evolve—whether because new human voices enter the dialogue or because 
God corrects a misinterpretation of the divine will—is ever present.”82 This brings us to 
the discussion of how to characterize Torah itself. I will argue that it should be 
understood as the covenantal instructions of dynamic YHWH to his dynamic people, 
creating a dynamic covenant adaptable to various circumstances and settings. 
Torah as Normative Covenantal Instruction 
Above I argued that the evidence seems to corroborate a non-legislative model for 
Torah. Further, I briefly considered the immutability claim while leaving much of the 
matter unexamined, given the stated aims of this present study. In what follows, I will 
discuss the normative model for Torah. I will argue that Torah may best be understood as 
                                               
81 For a critique of the concept of God as utterly immutable and timeless see Fernando Luis 
Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason: Time and Timelessness as Primordial Presuppositions, 
Andrews University Seminary Doctoral Dissertation Series 10 (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University 
Press, 1987). For responses and discussions of Canale’s argument for a temporal conception of God in 
contrast to the timeless conception, see Tiago Arrais et al., eds., Scripture and Philosophy: Essays 
Honoring the Work and Vision of Fernando Luis Canale (Berrien Springs, MI: ATS, 2016). 
82 Sommer, Revelation and Authority, 245. He continues: “Further, the fact that the Bible 
frequently portrays God as changing God’s mind encourages considerable doubt as to whether law given by 
this deity really is unchanging.” I am, however, not convinced this observation necessarily leads us to the 
conclusion of the mutability of Torah. 
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‘covenantal instruction,’ thus implying that Torah had a normative function in the 
passages under study. The lexeme תְּבִרי  (‘covenant’) is used in Exodus—Deuteronomy 
for a verbally explicated exclusive binding relation to exist between YHWH and his 
people Israel, represented either through their forefathers Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob or as 
a collective people.83 
The reason it is important to establish the concept of covenantal instruction in a 
discussion of reuse is that it helps understand why we find the phenomena of legal reuse 
within Torah and the HB.84 If only custom was seen as normative, it is less clear why we 
find literary legal reuse. If the Torah-instructions were not invested with some kind of 
normativity it is not clear why we find such significant parallels between the legal 
corpora within Torah, and later biblical authors. In other words, a non-legislative 
characterization helps us understand why legal reuse within Torah and the HB might be 
more fluid, innovative, and contradictory than what we are used to in classical and 
modern legal thought. On the other hand, the concept of covenantal instruction helps us 
understand why we, nevertheless, find significant literary reuse between the legal corpora 
within Torah, as well as between Torah and the Prophets. In what follows, I will focus on 
some observations of shared features by BC, HI, and D that support seeing them as 
covenantal instructions, and thus normative. I will attempt to duly note both similarities 
                                               
83 The lexeme ְּבִרית is attested in Exod 2:24; 6:4-5; 19:5; 23:32; 24:7–8; 31:16; 34:10, 12, 15, 27–
28; Lev 2:13; 24:8; 26:9, 15, 25, 42, 44–45; Num 10:33; 14:44; 18:19; 25:12–13; Deut 4:13, 23, 31; 5:2–3; 
7:2, 9, 12; 8:18; 9:9, 11, 15; 10:8; 17:2; 28:69; 29:8, 11, 13, 20, 24; 31:9, 16, 20, 25–26; 33:9. 
84 My approach contrasts with Wellhausen’s claim that a covenant concept was a rather late 
invention in the history of religion in Israel (Wellhausen, Prolegomena, 417–19). As mentioned other 
places in this study, Mendenhall, Kitchen, and Weeks have shown that to covenant-concepts finds ancient 
analogies. Dating texts late based on the presence of the covenant-concept is not warranted. Cf. C. J. 
Bredenkamp, “The Covenant and the Early Prophets,” The Old Testament Student 4, no. 3 (1884): 123. 
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and differences significant for the present study. The intention is not to be exhaustive or 
comprehensive, but simply give some reasons why it seems best to characterize Torah as 
‘covenantal instruction.’ And instead of separating out distinct points, and thus making a 
long list of points, I have rather tried to collect them together under main thematic 
headings. 
First, Torah intervenes and modifies custom, and does not simply reflect and 
describe it. It amends, opposes, and confirms existing legal traditions according to 
Cassuto.85 Torah can therefore not be seen as simply reflecting ‘common law.’ While 
archaeology can shed some light,86 a challenge we have is that Torah itself is basically 
the only source we have for establishing the custom of its time. When speaking of 
modifying custom, it therefore has to be either on the basis of the internal evidence in 
Torah itself or on the basis of comparative material with other ANE cultures. The former 
depends on a degree of trust in the reliability of the biblical material itself, while the latter 
can necessarily only constitute indirect evidence. 
As mentioned earlier, the text presents YHWH s the primary source for Torah, not 
custom. This contrasts with ANE laws where “the final source of the law, the ideal with 
which the law had to conform was above the gods as well as men,” while in Torah “God 
is not merely the custodian of justice or the dispenser of ‘truths’ to man, he is the 
                                               
85 Cassuto, A Commentary on the Book of Exodus, 262–64. Cf. Fitzpatrick-McKinley, The 
Transformation of Torah, 117–41. The claim by van der Toorn, that the Israelite moral code “remained 
materially co-terminous with the moral views held by neighbouring civilizations,” might therefore need 
more refinement (van der Toorn, Sin and Sanction, 39). 
86 E.g. Philip J. King and Lawrence E. Stager, Life in Biblical Israel, Library of Ancient Israel 
(LAI) (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2002); William Dever, The Lives of Ordinary People in 
Ancient Israel: When Archaeology and the Bible Intersect (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012). 
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fountainhead of the law, the law is a statement of his will.”87 Further, in ANE laws where 
“there is a complete separation of secular and religious law: dīnu (law), kibsu (moral 
rules), and parṣu (religious orders) are never combined in a single corpus.”88 I will return 
                                               
87 Greenberg, “Some Postulates of Biblical Criminal Law,” 9, 11. 
88 Paul, Studies in the Book of the Covenant, 8–9. For similar points see Mendenhall, “Covenant 
Forms in Israelite Tradition,” 64; Greenberg, “Some Postulates of Biblical Criminal Law,” 11; Kaufmann, 
The Religion of Israel, 171; Cassuto, A Commentary on the Book of Exodus, 263. Fitzpatrick-McKinley’s 
claim that “the mixture of cultic rules (rules of religious etiquette) and behavioural rules (ethics) in the 
Book of the Covenant is in conformity with the wisdom-moral teaching of the ancient Near East and would 
not have appeared as odd to the ancient compilers” (Fitzpatrick-McKinley, The Transformation of Torah, 
141) thus seems to need some modification. Cf. also Greenberg’s article where he shows the difference 
between attidues in ANE law and Torah in regard to life and monetary or other compensation for it 
(Greenberg, “Some Postulates of Biblical Criminal Law,” 5–28). Eckart Otto rejects the idea that ANE 
custom should be seen as a static entity. This complicates sweeping claims that simply identify ANE with 
Israelite morals. Otto summarizes writing: “Assyrian, Babylonian and Hittite legal history show that the 
legal sentences did not form a static ‘common law’ but had a history of continuous reformulations. These 
scholarly refinements reflect the continuous reforming of law in society” (Otto, “Aspects of Legal 
Reforms,” 182). And again: “Legal reform and reformulation of laws together represent decisive features of 
ancient Oriental and Israelite legal history. They represent ‘common law’ only in this respect: they were 
continuously changing laws—leges semper reformandae et reformatae—because they were a mirror of 
ever-changing human life in society. ‘Law is the life of man seen from a special side’ (Friedrich Carl von 
Savigny)” (Otto, “Aspects of Legal Reforms,” 196. Cf. 160–96). He also discusses the laws of bodily injury 
and idea of compensation, relating to Greenberg’s article.  
Van De Mieroop has pointed out that some of LH §1–41 can be seen as dealing with “state and 
religious matters,” while the rest with individuals (Van De Mieroop, Philosophy before the Greeks, 148). 
For laws explicitly referring to the religious domain, see §§2, 6, 8, 9, 20, 23. Kaufmann wrote: “Israelite 
tradition knows of no secular legislative authority. Ideally, only the prophet, as the spokesman of YHWH, 
can legislate” (Kaufmann, The Religion of Israel, 171). According to Cassuto “the legal tradition of the 
ancient East was, in all its branches, secular, not religious. The sources of the law were on the one hand 
usage—consuetudo—and on the other, the king’s will. In all the aforementioned codes we observe that the 
law does not emanate from the will of the gods” (Cassuto, A Commentary on the Book of Exodus, 259–60). 
In texts like 1 Sam 30:24–25; Isa 10:1; Jer 34:8ff, Cassuto found a basis for seeing a secular, or royal, law 
(Cassuto, A Commentary on the Book of Exodus, 260–1). On this basis, he explains that “although the 
codes of the Eastern kings are also incomplete and do not include every branch of law, yet, when they deal 
with a given subject, they enter into all its details, and are not content with a few chance, unrelated notes.” 
This can be compared to how Torah seems to give examples on various topics without covering all possible 
scenarios. According to him Torah is based on “the premise that there are already in existence legal usages 
and secular statutes, and that the rulers have the right to enact more laws, only the Torah sets bounds to this 
right from a religious viewpoint.” Therefore, “Torah does not deal at all with several subjects that 
constitute basic legal themes: for example the laws of marriage, apart from forbidden relations and the 
reference to the marriage-price of virgins, which occurs incidentally; or with the laws of divorce, which are 
also mentioned only incidentally in order to forbid, on moral grounds, that a divorced woman who has 
married another man should return to her first husband” (Cassuto, A Commentary on the Book of Exodus, 
262–3). For him the proper designation of the legal passages in Torah is “religious and ethical instructions 
in judicial matters” (Cassuto, A Commentary on the Book of Exodus, 262). Cassuto sums up: “The entire 
concern of the aforementioned [ANE] codes is to determine what is due to a person according to the letter 
of the law, according to abstract justice, whereas the Torah seeks on many an occasion, to go beyond 
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to this point below, discussing further the relation between the cultic and the ethical in 
Torah. For now, we can note that if tradition and custom constituted the sole normativity 
in ancient Israel rather than texts, it is not clear why we would find literary reuse of 
Torah. That we do find such reuse indicates that authors did see the Torah-text itself as 
providing some kind of normative source, at the very least as a literary reference. 
                                               
strictly legal requirements and to grant a man what is due to him from the ethical viewpoint and from the 
aspect of the love a man should bear his fellow, who is his brother, since both have One Heavenly Father” 
(Cassuto, A Commentary on the Book of Exodus, 263). Westbrook and Wells write in a similar fashion: 
“No law in the Bible deals directly with the central features of marriage. The few laws that discuss 
marriage are concerned with unusual cases and assume knowledge of the general rules” (Raymond 
Westbrook and Bruce Wells, Everyday Law in Biblical Israel: An Introduction (Louisville, KY: 
Westminister John Knox, 2009), 56). And more in general: “They are not, however, laws in any meaningful 
sense. They contain no sanctions, and there is no hint that they ever played a role in the Israelite courts” 
(Westbrook and Wells, Everyday Law in Biblical Israel, 13). And again: “While the Mishpatim regulate a 
few commercial contracts, the primary interest of the biblical law codes, as indeed of the prophets, in the 
law of contracts is in measures of social justice to temper their harsh application to the poor and weaker 
members of society” (Westbrook and Wells, Everyday Law in Biblical Israel, 108). Joshua Berman writes: 
“No particular formulation of the law is final. As a system of legal thought, the common law is consciously 
and inherently incomplete, fluid, and vague” (Berman, “The History of Legal Theory,” 21). This approach 
to Torah seems to reverberate in later rabbinic discussion (Hyam Maccoby, Ritual and Morality: The Ritual 
Purity System and its Place in Judaism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 14). For similar 
observations see Patrick, Old Testament Law, 199.  
Van De Mieroop has argued that the Babylonian legal collections where developed on the basis of 
underlying linguistic principles in the Sumerian and Akkadian languages, more than empirically based 
court cases as often assumed. He characterizes their reasoning as “pointillistic, cumulatively exploring case 
by case” (Van De Mieroop, Philosophy before the Greeks, 30, 73). Contra Fitzpatrick-McKinley, The 
Transformation of Torah, 39, 109–112, which refers to Schwienhorst-Schönberger’s study and views the 
cases as empirically based. Having pointed out the similarities between ANE omens and law collections, 
Van De Mieroop tempers Cassuto’s claim that the ANE legal collections entered all the details of a subject, 
when they are compared to the creativity of Babylonian lexical and omen lists: “Divinatory writings dealt 
with the entire universe in all its aspects and aimed to encompass all conceivable possibilities. Their 
purview was unlimited and their authors displayed an unbounded creativity, producing a massive corpus of 
lengthy series of omens with tens of thousands of entries. In contrast, law codes were tied to the mundane 
and were rooted in the practicalities of daily life. They were much more sober, so to speak, more brief and 
more realistic. But they used the same methods of reasoning as lexical and divinatory lists and thus show us 
that the Babylonian search for truth, with its procedures that are very alien to us, was nevertheless 
pragmatic” (Van De Mieroop, Philosophy before the Greeks, 83–84). Cf. pp, 167, 169, 172–73, 189. He 
also speculates as to the reason why omen lists seem to flourish after the decline of the legal collections: “It 
is possible that the idea of justice being guaranteed by the king gave way to one in which the gods took 
over this role. Omens were explicitly called legal verdicts by the gods. The decline of the law code may 
thus have been part of the end of the king’s divine status, which I argued could have inspired the divinatory 
series. This is pure conjecture, I admit” (Van De Mieroop, Philosophy before the Greeks, 155). Cf. pp. 100, 
111, 176–78, 181. Cf. Bottéro, “Le 'Code' de Ḫammu-rabi,” 409–44. 
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Second, whether Torah is written on a tablet ( ַלּוח), scroll (ֵסֶפר), pillar (ַמֵּצָבה), or 
stone (89,(ֶאֶבן or whether it is read publically or spoken of privately, the didactic function 
seems predominant. Berman states that the didactic function “goes precisely to the heart 
of a proper understanding of biblical ‘law’: the treaty stipulations are themselves 
presented as a body of teaching. The purpose of biblical law is to shape and form the 
polity, not merely address cases and provide remedy.”90 Bernard Jackson speaks of the 
“monumental function” and “ritual function of reading from a holy book,” as if the 
monument and ritual were separate functions. Even though Jackson concedes that “the 
narrative thus somewhat uneasily combines the monumental function of law inscribed on 
stone with the ritual function of reading from a holy book,” 91 this ‘unease’ rather seems 
to be a confusion between medium, event, and function on Jackson’s part. The monument 
should properly be understood as a medium and ritual as an event. As I will argue, in 
both cases, the didactic function appears to be at the core. Both the monument and ritual 
appear to have an instructional function with the judicial implications of the monumental 
stones and the written records serving as a witness against the people (cf. Deut 27:1–4; 
31:25–26; Josh 8:32).92 In my view, Jackson’s division into the monumental, archival, 
                                               
89 In Deut 27:5–8 the Torah (את ֹ  .Cf .(ִמזְ ּבֵ חַ ) of the altar (ֲאָבִנים) is written on the stones (הַ ּתֹוָרה הַ ּז
Weeks, Adminition and Curse, 145. In Egypt, writing on stone was the most spectacular form of inscription 
(Eyre, The Use of Documents in Pharaonic Egypt, 6). Cf. p. 130, 142. For how the monument was used for 
ANE legal collections, and how the physical medium might even have determined the length of the 
collections see Van De Mieroop, Philosophy before the Greeks, 146–47, 167–68. 
90 Berman, Created Equal, 100. 
91 Jackson, Semiotics of Biblical Law, 128.  




didactic, and ritual use of Torah lacks precision. First of all, the monumental and archival 
uses say less about function than they do about where Torah is inscribed and located.93 
Second, the ritual use of Torah could easily be seen as a subcategory of the didactic. One 
of the passages quoted by Jackson,94 Deut 31:9–13, make this adequately clear. Twice in 
this passage the explicitly stated purpose of the ritual reading of Torah is that the people 
should learn, using the verb למד. Carasik supports understanding Deut 31:12–13 as 
referring to a didactic function of the ritual reading.95 It therefore seems difficult to 
sustain a strict separation between the ritual reading and the didactic function of Torah. 
The reading of Torah is not “fulfilled by the act of public reading itself.”96 Reading was a 
means for teaching the people the ways of YHWH. Even if the reading was not 
accompanied by “any interpretation or discussion of the text,”97 the very act of public 
reading had a didactic function.98 As far as I can see the inscription of Torah upon a 
                                               
93 Of course, the archive preserves a text for future record (cf. Eyre, The Use of Documents in 
Pharaonic Egypt, 8). But while the archive itself is not a function in its own right, a text is put in an archive 
for future possible reference of various sorts. Thus, Torah placed in the archive might be understood as 
having a didactic function as well, specifically for future generations. Cf. Niditch on the archival intent of 
Deut 31:24–26 (Susan Niditch, Oral World and Written Word: Ancient Israelite Literature, ed. Douglas A. 
Knight. LAI (Louisville, KY: Westminister John Knox Press, 1996), 87). 
94 Jackson, Semiotics of Biblical Law, 139. As mentioned above, Fishbane saw that priests, judges, 
and kings were somehow obliged to be practitioners of Torah. For him this resulted in a legislative model 
of Torah (Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 96). As argued above, these observations do 
not need to lead to a legislative model. 
95 Carasik, Theologies of the Mind, 47. Cf. Deut 5:1, 31; 6:1 for the didactic aspect of Torah as 
well. For the idea of God disciplining his people see Deut 4:36; 11:2. 
96 Jackson, Semiotics of Biblical Law, 139. 
97 Jackson, Semiotics of Biblical Law, 141. 
98 According to Jackson it is first Ezra that “wishes to combine the traditional ritual reading of the 
religious reform with a didactic function: the words should not only be read out, they should also be 
explained,” referring to Neh 8:7–8 (Jackson, Semiotics of Biblical Law, 141). But in my view, the felt need 
for interpretation in later biblical books appears to be occasioned by the temporal and cultural distance of 
the original events and instructions narrated in Torah, rather than a later attribution of a didactic function to 
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monument, tablet, or written record seems to have had an instructional function—even 
for the illiterate who would need their contents to be read to them, with the judicial 
implications involved in this instruction also serving as a witness against the people. In 
commenting on Deuteronomy, and we could include the entire Torah, Daniel Block 
writes: “Although in later chapters Moses will integrate many prescriptions given at Sinai 
into his preaching, contrary to prevailing popular opinion Deuteronomy does not present 
itself as legislation, that is, a book of laws. This is prophetic preaching at its finest.” He 
then goes on to remind that ּתֹוָרה is best rendered as ‘instruction.’ He sums up: 
“Recognizing the fundamentally covenantal character of Deuteronomy has extremely 
significant implications for the message we hear in the book.”99 Anthony Phillips claims 
that “the law collections, with the exception of the mišpāṭı̂m of the Book of the Covenant 
(Exod. 21.12–22.16), are not so much instructions to the judiciary as sermons to the 
                                               
the ritual reading. Cf. Paul, Studies in the Book of the Covenant, 39; Bergland, “Interpretation of the 
Written,” 1–19. Watts writes: “Most references to reading portray the reading of law. The Hebrew Bible 
provides more information on the reading of law than on reading any other genre of its literature. . . . In 
Deut. 31.9, Moses writes ‘this law’. He then commands the Levites to read it to ‘all Israel every seventh 
year during the festival of booths (v. 11). The emphasis is clearly on instruction, ‘that they may hear and 
learn to fear YHWH your God and to keep all the words of this law to do them’ (v. 12)” (Watts, Reading 
Law, 15–16). And contrary to what has seen plausible to many modern interpreters, Watts argued that for 
the ancient authors public reading of law was plausible: “In response to the question, How was law read in 
Israel?, the Hebrew Bible gives a definite answer: the whole law, or at least large portions of it, was read 
aloud in public. . . . Only in its Mosaic origins is biblical law depicted as the transcription of orally 
proclaimed law (Exod. 24.4; Deut. 31.9) and even then, its core is received in writing (Exod. 31.18; 34.1; 
Deut. 5.22; cf. Exod. 34.28). Thus modern intuitions of the implausibility of public readings do not 
correspond with the ancient writers’ notions of plausibility. Whatever the actual origins of Israel’s laws, the 
Bible depicts their oral proclamation as based on written text” (Watts, Reading Law, 22–23). He then gives 
references to “text-based performance” of law in Greece and Rome. He even argues “that much of 
Pentateuchal law was written or at least edited with such public readings in mind” (Watts, Reading Law, 
29). According to Watts, the public reading of the Torah-pattern of narrative, law, and sanction was for the 
purpose of persuasion. He writes regarding the three legal collections in the Pentateuch: “Each of these 
presentations exhibits the characteristic features of ancient persuasive rhetoric . . . , namely the 
juxtaposition of story, list and divine sanction” (Watts, Reading Law, 49. Cf. esp. 32, 45, 52, 55, 61–62). 
99 Daniel I. Block, The Gospel According to Moses: Theological and Ethical Reflections on the 
Book of Deuteronomy (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2012), 8. 
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nation. Rather than legal codes establishing a judicial system, these collections constitute 
theological literary works concerned with the maintenance of Israel’s election.”100 
Further, Torah appears to have been intended for the general public, and thus not 
only serves an exclusive scribal elite. This confirms its didactic role for the whole nation. 
Shalom Paul’s characterization of the BC seems to me applicable to HI and D as well:  
Publicity, not secrecy, is the hallmark of the law, which is proclaimed openly to the 
entire society and is not restricted to any professional class of jurists, lawyers, or 
judges. . . . Law in Israel is prospective and prescriptive not retrospective and 
descriptive. Though LH was frequently copied in scribal circles, there is no mention 
in the collection itself of making the law part of the public domain. In the Israelite 
society, on the other hand, law was not only proclaimed publicly at the very outset, 
but, in addition, a renewed proclamation was required once every seven years.101 
Torah is not governed by an elitist “rhetoric of concealment.”102 It is written for the 
people and common man in general.103 
Third, the terminology used within Torah to describe its own genre seems well 
summed up as ‘covenantal instruction,’ even if it must be admitted that this phrase is 
somewhat of an extra-textual construct, singling out the terms ּתֹוָרה and ְּבִרית as 
representative for the rest. Even if, statistically, they are not the dominant terms used in 
                                               
100 Phillips, Essays on Biblical Law, 13. 
101 Paul, Studies in the Book of the Covenant, 38. Cf. p. 39. Arguing with James Watts, Roy Gane 
has claimed that the “didactic logic in Leviticus points away from the idea that the composition of the book 
took place within a strictly priestly scribal matrix during or originally directed toward the post-exilic 
period” (Roy E. Gane, “Didactic Logic and the Authorship of Leviticus,” in Current Issues in Priestly and 
related Literature: The Legacy of Jacob Milgrom and Beyond, eds. Roy E. Gane and Ada Taggar-Cohen, 
Resources for Biblical Study [RBS]  (Atlanta: SBL, 2015), 219–21). For the question about who receives 
the benefit, see as well Berman, Created Equal, 47. 
102 Levinson, Legal Revision, 48, 92. Cf. p. 80. See also Levinson, Deuteronomy, 6, 15–17, 20–22, 
27, 30–33, 40–42, 46–48. 
103 Cf. Berman, Created Equal. 
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Torah for its self-designation, conceptually they seem to summarize the rest.104 
It may come as a surprise to us that ּתֹוָרה has a relatively low frequency, 
especially when taken into consideration that it is often used for individual portions of 
instruction. Leviticus and Numbers tend to speak of ּתֹוָרה in terms of individual 
instructions105 while Deuteronomy tends to use it to refer to the entire instructive corpus. 
In Gen 26:5; Exod 16:4, 28; 18:16, 20; Lev 26:46; and Deut 33:10 ּתֹוָרה is used in the 
plural, indicating that its singular form is used to refer to individual instructions. For a 
                                               
104 If we limit the textual parameters to the legal sections (Exod 18:1–23:33; Lev 1:1–27:34; Num 
5:1–6:27; 15:1–41; 19:1–22; 27:1–30:17; 33:50–36:13; Deut 4:1–28:69) we can give the self-designation in 
Torah a statistical presentation. Key terminology here is ּתֹוָרה ,(39) ֻחָּקה ,(54) ִמְצָוה ,(65) ִמְׁשָּפט ,(100) ָּדָבר 
 Among words used in the instructive sections of Torah to refer to its own genre .(28) ְּבִרית ,(35) ֹחק ,(37)
טִמְׁשּפָ  and ָּדָבר  are the most frequently used. We would of course expect a high frequency of the word ָּדָבר 
in a discourse setting such as this one, and many of the references are not to Torah as such. In 35 cases ָּדָבר 
can be said to describe the genre or parts of Torah (Exod 20:1; (34:28); Lev 8:5, 36; 9:6; 10:7; 17:2; Num 
15:31; 30:2-3; 36:6; Deut 4:2, 10, 12–13; 5:5, 22; 6:6; 9:10; 10:2, 4; 11:18; 12:28; 13:1; 15:2, 15; 17:19; 
19:4; 24:18, 22; 27:3, 8, 26; 28:14, 58, 69). Both the BC in Exod 21:1 and Deut 12:1 call the legal section 
that follows: ִּמְׁשָּפִטים (the latter together with ַהֻחִּקים) (Sonnet, The Book within the Book, 57. Cf. pp. 58, 
157). For the use of  ַתּד  in the qere in Deut 33:2 as LBH see Jan Joosten, “Diachronic Linguistics and the 
Date of the Pentateuch,” in The Formation of the Pentateuch, eds. Jan C. Gertz et al., FAT 111 (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2016), 343. 
Exod 20:1 calls the Decalogue ַהְּדָבִרים, implying that each command or unit in them is seen as a 
םֲעֶׂשֶרת ַהְּדָבִרי The reference to the .ָּדָבר  in Exod 34:28; Deut 4:13; and 10:4 confirms that each command is 
seen as a ָּדָבר. For a helpful discussion of the various traditions on the division of the Decalogue, see 
Kilchör, Mosetora und Jahwetora, 42–52. Deut 5:5 introduce the Decalogue as  ַר ְיהָוהֶאת־ְּדב , taking  ְּדַבר
 in the ָּדָבר as a collective designation of the entire decalogic collection. Thus, Deuteronomy uses ְיהָוה
singular to refer both to each of the ten instructions in the Decalogue and to the Decalogue as a whole. For 
the phrase  ַהּלֶ ָהאֵ  ָבִריםּדְ ה  or analogies in Deuteronomy see Deut 1:1; 4:30; 5:22; 6:6; 11:18; 12:28; 17:19; 
22:17; 28:69; 30:1; 31:1, 28; 32:45. Sonnet made an observation about the specificity of the words being 
reused. Reuse is bound to specific words/instructions: “The use of the term דברים (here, in the specific 
sense of ‘words’) is meaningful: the Mosaic teaching is not entrusted to the people’s care in its formality of 
‘commandment, statutes and ordinances,’ but in its very wording. As such (in its literality), this teaching 
lends itself to be learned, taught, repeated and inscribed. The teaching that will pervade Israel’s time and 
space is, moreover, a defined teaching; it is determined as ‘these words’ that will be communicated within a 
unity of time, ‘this day’” (Sonnet, The Book within the Book, 57). 
Cf. Kline, The Structure of Biblical Authority arguing that the Bible in its literary-legal form is a 
covenantal document. 
105 Lev 6:2, 7, 18; 7:1, 7, 11, 37; 11:46; 12:7; 13:59; 14:2, 32, 54, 57; 15:32; Num 5:29–30; 6:13, 
21 (2x); 15:16, 29; 19:14. Cf. Exod 12:49. 
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general meaning of ּתֹוָרה in the singular as referring to the entire instructive corpus see 
Exod 13:9; 24:12; Deut 1:5; 4:8, 44; 17:11, 18–19; 27:3, 8, 26; 28:58, 61; 29:20; 29:28; 
30:10; 31:9, 11–12, 24, 26; 32:46; 33:4. In Deuteronomy it is likely that ּתֹוָרה refers to 
Deuteronomy itself. In Deut 4:13 ( ָבִריםּדְ הַ  ֶרתׂשֶ עֲ  ֹותׂשֶאְתֶכם ַלעֲ  הּוָ צִ  רׁשֶ אֲ  ִריתֹוּבְ ֶאת־ ) the 
covenant itself seems to be defined as the doing of the Ten Words. The ּתֹוָרה in the 
construct ֻחַּקת ַהּתֹוָרה in Num 19:2; 31:21 may also be understood as references to the 
entire instructive corpus.106 
Fourth, the legal sections of Torah share features with ANE treaty, law, and 
covenant. It may be asked why we should not call Torah “treaty stipulations” or “treaty 
instructions,” rather than “covenantal instructions”?107 But, instead of forcing Torah into 
other established genres in ANE literature, it appears more accurate to say that it shares 
features of law, treaty, and covenant. Kitchen writes: “Sinai is neither just law nor 
properly a treaty. It represents a confluence of these two, producing a further facet in 
group relationships, namely, social-political-religious covenant.”108 Greenberg also saw 
                                               
106 Cf. Daniel I. Block, Deuteronomy, The NIV Application Commentary: From Biblical Text ... to 
Contemporary Life [NIVAC] (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2012), 36–37 for the terminology of self-
presentation in Torah. 
107 Berman for example calls the instructions “treaty stipulations” (Berman, Created Equal, 84). 
108 Kitchen, On the Reliability of the Old Testament, 289. In Treaty, Law and Covenant in the 
Ancient Near East Kenneth A. Kitchen and Paul J. N. Lawrence demonstrate the form critical proximity 
between the legal sections of Torah and ANE legal texts, particularly Hittite treaties (Kitchen and 
Lawrence, Treaty, Law and Covenant in the Ancient Near East Part 2: Text, Notes and Chromograms, 
259–65). Kitchen and Lawrence define treaties as “used to govern relations (parity or vassals) between 
separate groups, or group(s) and/or a significant individual,” laws as “a device for regulating conduct 
within a given society or social group,” and covenants “used to define relations between individuals on the 
purely human level, or between individual(s) and deity” (Kitchen and Lawrence, Treaty, Law and Covenant 
in the Ancient Near East Part 1: The Texts, xxii). Given the arguments above concerning the non-
legislative concept of ANE law their definition of law might need refinement. 
In Treaty, Law and Covenant in the Ancient Near East Kitchen and Lawrence explain how this 
three-volume tome grew out of G. E. Mendenhall’s publications in The Biblical Archaeologist 17 (1954), 
26–46, 50–76 (reprinted as a booklet in 1955 as Mendenhall, Law and Covenant in Israel and the Ancient 
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Torah as a mixture of various genres based on the unique relation between God and his 
people: “The biblical law collections bear resemblance to the treaty and instruction form 
on the one hand and to the law collection on the other. God is at once a treaty partner and 
the proper King of Israel.”109 Even if Weeks sees biblical covenant as a form of ANE 
treaties, he is cautious, even pessimistic in regard to comparing ANE treaties and biblical 
covenants: “As long as there is no consensus on dates there is no uniformly acceptable 
method of determining the origin and development of covenant concepts in Israel. In turn 
that means it is practically impossible to judge whether covenants in Israel have any 
relationship to treaties in the world outside.”110 While I speak of Torah as ‘covenantal 
                                               
Near East where he argued for a structural parallel between the 14th/13th century Hittite treaties and the 
Sinai Covenant in the Book of Exodus. In contrast to George Mendenhall, who, building upon Korošec’s 
study of Hittite treaties (Viktor Korošec, Hethitische Staasverträge. Ein Beitrag zu ihrer juristichen 
Wertung (Leipzig: T. Weichter, 1931)), first suggested a link between biblical covenants and Hittite treaties 
and saw reference to the exodus account as the equivalent to the historical prologues in Hittite treaties.  
Berman points out that Deuteronomy does not make frequent mention of the exodus account. Rather, for 
him Deuteronomy is closer to the land-grant treaty as described by Amnon Altman. He also finds an 
explanation for the historical variations between Deut 1–3 and earlier Pentateuchal traditions in the 
‘diplomatic signaling’ of Hittite historical treaty prologues (Berman, “Histories Twice Told,” 232–33). Cf. 
Berman, Inconsitency in the Torah, 88–89. Christer Jönsson, “Diplomatic Signaling in the Amarna 
Letters,” in Amarna Diplomacy: The Beginnings of International Relations, eds. Raymond Cohen and 
Raymond Westbrook (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2000), 191–204; Altman, The 
Historical Prologue; Weeks, Adminition and Curse, 68–69, 74, 79–82). Cf. how Berman, Created Equal, 
32–33 compares Exod 1–19 and the historical prologue of the Hittite treaties. The intention seems to try to 
avoid the limited historical element referred to in the prologue to the Decalogue in Exod 20:2, which 
Mendenhall used as basis for comparison with the historical prologue. But the question arises whether 
Exod 1–19 can be understood as a historical prologue proper to the instructions, or if the legal material is 
rather to be understood as embedded in the narrative? In other words, is the basis of the text the narrative 
(with legal material embedded) or the legal material (with the narrative as prologue)? Berman does not 
seem focused upon clarifying the relation between ‘historical prologue’ and instructive material, as much as 
showing that the historical references place the instructive material more in the context of moral and 
voluntary appeal to loyalty (cf. Berman, Created Equal, 38). Cf. the discussion below showing that the 
narrative and legal material cannot be separated. 
109 Moshe Greenberg, “Three Conceptions of the Torah in Hebrew Scriptures (1990),” in Studies 
in the Bible and Jewish Thought (Jerusalem: Jewish Publication Society, 1995), 15. 
110 Weeks, Adminition and Curse, 139. Even if there can be strong parallels, according to him we 
should not simply conflate treaty and covenant (Weeks, Adminition and Curse, 151–56). He nevertheless 
sees a common ethical concern in the historiographies of Israelite and Hittite covenants/treaties: “The basic 
historical texts of Israel not only embody covenants in which history is used to motivate. They are in 
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instruction’ it is not to deny the similarities with ANE law and treaties, but rather to 
choose a representative word for the various aspects of Torah—simultaneously signaling 
a certain uniqueness of Torah compared to other ANE literature. It is well-known that 
Torah might be the only case documenting a covenant between a people and its God.111 
Rather than reducing Torah to some of the genres known from other ANE literature, 
Stahl’s “anti-essentialist approach to genre in general, and to legal discourse in 
particular” may be preferable, seeing “biblical law as ambivalent, embedded 
communication.”112 For my part I do not intend to claim that a certain genre and literary 
fluidity is unique to Torah.113 Rather, my point here is that Torah needs to be treated as a 
unique corpus with unique characteristics, and ‘covenantal instruction’ seems adequate to 
describe it. 
                                               
themselves history written with a view to producing a motivation for obedience. . . There runs through 
biblical, as through Hittite, historiography the pedagogic use of history. An explanation of the formal 
relationship, if any, of covenant and treaty cannot avoid consideration of the relationship of 
historiographies” (Weeks, Adminition and Curse). Cf. James K. Hoffmeier, Ancient Israel in Sinai: The 
Evidence for the Authentiticy of the Wilderness Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 183–92. 
Weeks argues that the biblical covenant should be seen as a type of ANE treaties (Weeks, Adminition and 
Curse, 8). He further writes: “The terminology of instructions is very similar to that of treaties” (Weeks, 
Adminition and Curse, 86). Interestingly enough, in Egypt according to him “the instruction form belongs 
by right and origin not to pharaohs but to Egyptian officials” (Weeks, Adminition and Curse, 110).  
111 For a discussion of a possible treaty between a ruler and a deity stemming from Lagash see 
Kenneth A. Kitchen, “Egypt, Ugarit, Qatna and Covenant,” UF 11 (1979): 462; Weeks, Adminition and 
Curse, 19, 111, 122, 125, 130. Cf. Van De Mieroop, Philosophy before the Greeks, 151, 155, 175. 
Analogical to ANE treaty traditions, Weeks suggests that there might be a correlation between a moral 
sensitivity or need of moral justification and increased likelihood of entering into treaties: “States which 
conceptualize history and their external relations in moral terms are not only more likely to talk about 
treaties – they may be more likely to enter into treaties. . . . attempts to depict the state’s cause as just are 
more likely to be accompanied by references to treaties” (Weeks, Adminition and Curse, 22. Cf. p. 53). 
112 Nanette Stahl, Law and Liminality in the Bible, eds. David J. A. Clines and Philip R. Davies. 
JSOTSup 202 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995), 21. 
113 Cf. Altman, The Historical Prologue; Weeks, Adminition and Curse; Berman, “Histories Twice 
Told,” 229–50; Berman, Inconsitency in the Torah, 81–103. 
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Further, Torah is neither adequately described as either “retrospective,”114 
common law,”115 “descriptive,”116 or as the “moral advice of scribes.”117 The biblical 
passages present Torah as normative instruction in a covenantal setting. While we seem 
to find a similarity between ANE law collections and Torah in that neither were referred 
to as source in their respective courts, the Torah-text clearly presents itself as source for 
covenantal instruction. As the text is intended to facilitate a dynamic and living 
covenantal relationship—a relationship that cannot be reduced to and comprehensively 
expressed by a static text—its didactic content stands interspersed with exemplary 
instruction to guide the people along the ways of YHWH.118 As covenantal instruction it 
becomes normative, but as the covenantal relationship transcends the textual perimeters, 
as shown above, YHWH becomes the ultimate source. This calls for an expansionistic 
reading of Torah, because the application and appropriation of the text goes beyond a 
strictly literalistic reading.119 This also allows for a more dynamic and innovative reuse 
than would be the case in a more literalistic reuse in a legislative model. From this it is 
                                               
114 Westbrook, “Origins of Legislation,” 92. 
115 Berman, “The History of Legal Theory,” 39. 
116 LeFebvre, Collections, Codes, and Torah, 54. 
117 Fitzpatrick-McKinley, The Transformation of Torah, 21. 
118 Cf. Cassuto, A Commentary on the Book of Exodus, 262–3. For further discussion of the 
exemplary character of Torah, see above. Cf. Watts, Reading Law, 117 for the instructive character of 
Deuteronomy. 
119 Weingreen summarizes his characterization of Deuteronomy as a “proto-rabbinc” type of 
composition by stating: “the implication has been not that he [the deuteronomic legislator] was an 
innovator but rather the developer of already existing and effective legalistic processes” (Jacob Weingreen, 
From Bible to Mishna: The Continuity of Tradition (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1976), 142). 
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clear that Westbrook’s division between ‘legislation’ and ‘academic treatise,’120 
mentioned above, is not adequate to classify Torah as such. 
Fifth, the language of the Torah seems intended to create a personal interaction 
between YHWH and the reader/listener. The relatively frequent use of the 1st and 2nd-
person in the legal material of Torah, in contrast to the dominant—if not exclusive—use 
of the 3rd person in other ANE law, create an immediate discursive and dialogical setting 
for the instructions.121 Harry Hoffner for example wrote that “no laws in the Hittite 
collection are expressed in the second person, that is, ‘you shall (not) do such-and-such,’ 
although such a formulation can be found in texts of a legal nature outside the law 
                                               
120 Westbrook, “Origins of Legislation,” 74. 
121 If we define Exod 18:1–23:33; Lev 1:1–27:34; Num 5:1–6:27; 15:1–41; 19:1–22; 27:1–30:17; 
33:50–36:11; Deut 4:1–28:69 as the instructive material in Torah we get the following statistics: The PNG 
(Person, Number, Gender) distribution of verbs would be 1cs 5,06%, 2ms 18,16%, 2fs 0,08%, 3ms 47,49%, 
3fs 9,78%, 1cpl 0,49%, 2mpl 11,97%, 2fpl 0%, 3mpl 6,19%, and 3fpl 0,79%. The PNG distribution of 
suffixes would be 1cs 5,46%, 2ms 20,84%, 2fs 0,75%, 3ms 33,24%, 3fs 11,54%, 1cpl 1,22%, 2mpl 
12,36%, 2fpl 0%, 3mpl 13,62%, 3fpl 0,98%. Watts writes: “In the Book of the Covenant, apodictic laws 
(Exod. 20.23–26; 22.21–23.19, usually second-person singular, but occasionally plural—20.23; 22.20–21, 
30 . . . surround a central core of third-person casuistic (‘if . . . then . . .) legislation. . . . In the Holiness 
Code, sections dominated by laws in the second-person (Lev. 18–19; 23–24) and third-person (chs. 17; 
20.1–16; 27) are interspersed with sections that mix third-person casuistic formulations with second-person 
apodictic commands (20.17–22.33; 25). . . . Deuteronomy, however, maintains a second-person form of 
address throughout that is consistent with its setting as a speech, but it varies between singular and plural 
and between apodictic and casuistic formulas” (Watts, Reading Law, 62–63). We can mention that the 
second-person is also used in Exod. 21.2, 14, 24; 22.17. 
Some of this personalized language in Torah, using 1st and 2nd person might be better appreciated 
if Berman is correct in that each individual Israelite is posited as a subordinate king in which God enters a 
treaty (Berman, Created Equal, 41–42). Berman’s point that the collective address establishes an 
interconnectedness between the members is worth pondering in light of modern individualism (Berman, 
Created Equal, 175). See also p. 174. Cf. Greenberg, “Three Conceptions of the Torah,” 14–15. According 
to Knohl there is a difference between the so-called Priestly Torah which never has God use ֲאִני in contrast 
to the so-called Holiness School (Israel Knohl, The Sanctuary of Silence: The Priestly Torah and the 
Holiness School (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1995), 169). Given that source critical divisions are up 
for debate in present scholarship, even if Knohl’s claim should be correct, it does not alter the general 
observation above of the striking use of 1st and 2nd person in Torah when compared to other ANE legal 
material. Cf. Stackert, Rewriting the Torah, 14–15. 
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corpus, such as treaties or loyalty oaths.”122 It would be necessary to survey each use of 
grammatical person in ANE legal sources to make more general claims. 
Further, in his article “The Conflict between Value Systems and Social Control” 
(1975), Mendenhall criticized the reduction of biblical covenants to mere social and 
political systems of controlling a population.123 As a well-known expert on ANE treaties 
and covenants he wrote: 
To summarize the biblical concept of social control systems, any action induced by 
such systems that is based upon individual motivations of economic gain, prestige 
(publicity), or ambition for power has nothing to do with the Kingdom of God. . . . 
During that period there was gradually worked out in the crucible of historical 
experience the structure of a value system, usually in opposition to social control 
systems, that has been completely confused by repeated attempts to identify the two. 
This attempt to identify the merely historical control system with a transcendent rule 
of God must always founder upon the shoals of the religious ethic, but the natural 
instinct of corporate self-preservation that is the first law of political science virtually 
demands the destruction of the religious ethic.124 
                                               
122 Harry A. Hoffner, Jr., “Hittite Laws,” in Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor, 
ed. Martha T. Roth, Writings form the Ancient World Series 6 (Atlanta, GA: SBL, 1995), 216. 
123 For a similar criticism see Fitzpatrick-McKinley, The Transformation of Torah, 23–52. 
124 George E. Mendenhall, “The Conflict between Value System and Social Control,” in Unity and 
Diversity: Essays in the History, Literature, and Religion of the Ancient Near East, eds. Hans Goedicke and 
J. J. M. Roberts (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1975), 170. It is a question whether 
Mendenhall’s description is correct of non-biblical social structures as always to be understood as 
dominated by the idea of social control. Given the wisdom cultures of the ANE, the freedom of inner 
convictions does not seem entirely foreign in the ancient world. Cf. Fitzpatrick-McKinley, The 
Transformation of Torah, 113–45; van der Toorn, Sin and Sanction. 
Further, even if the word ‘value’ is nowadays easily understood as an internal ground of 
motivation, it might not be the best terminology for describing the biblical material. The concept of ‘value’ 
as used today is a relatively modern concept, only a little over a century old. Before Lotze, Ritschl and 
Nietzsche philosophers hardly spoke of value. Up until their time the concept of ‘value’ had a relatively 
clear and well defined meaning: “Their meaning was once relatively clear and their use limited. ‘Value’ 
meant the worth of a thing, and ‘valuation’ meant an estimate of its worth. The worth in question was 
mainly economic or quasi-economic, but even when it was not, it was still worth of some sort – not beauty, 
truth, rightness, or even goodness. The extension of the meaning and use of the terms began in economics, 
or political economy, as it was then called. ‘Value’ and ‘valuation’ became technical terms central to that 
branch of economics which was labelled the theory of value” (William K. Frankena, "Value and valuation," 
in Sprangter to Zubri (ed. Paul Edwards; The Encyclopedia of Philosophy; New York: The Macmillan 
Company & The Free Press, 1967), 229. Cf. William K. Frankena, "Value," in Dictionary of Philosophy 
(ed. Dagobert D. Runes: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1983), 346). Since the time of the mentioned 
three philosophers, ‘value’ has been seen in a much broader sense than merely in economic terms, and it is 
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He finds three major structural contrasts between these two alternatives in how they 
relate to (1) private and public matters, (2) the differences between covenant and law, and 
(3) value versus interests.125 It is the second area that particularly interests us here. While 
law, what I above have called ‘legislation,’ attempts to socially control the population 
through external sanctions and incentives, covenant places the main emphasis upon 
individual and collective volition to live in a binding relationship with God, even if we 
also find external motivators, for example, in the blessings and curses.126 
This also accords with the observations that Torah’s imperatives regarding 
specific mental states does not fit a legislative concept of law. Having surveyed the 
                                               
now one of the central questions of philosophy. Even if the concept of ‘value’ is a new one, the subject 
matter is still well known in the garb of the ‘idea of the good’, as Plato famously spoke of. Lotz writes: 
“With regard to the thing in question, actually philosophy always had dealt with the problem, but under the 
aspect of the good and its goodness (bonum et bonitas)” (Johannes B. Lotz, "Value," in Philosophical 
Dictionary (eds. Walter Brugger and Kenneth Baker; Spokana, WA: Gonzaga University Press, 1972), 
437). Cf. Frankena, "Value and valuation," 229). The term usually translated with ‘good’ in the HB is טֹוב. 
Instead of using the term ‘value’ uncritically, this reminds us that we again need to be careful and 
conscious about what words we choose to describe the biblical material with. It would be preferable to use 
as close a translation as possible to the words used in the HB itself. This might prevent us from adopting 
modern terminology that later may preclude a fuller understanding of the terminological, and related 
ideological, universe of the biblical authors.  
125 Mendenhall, “The Conflict between Value System and Social Control,” 172–78. 
126 This is not the place to discuss how books like Ecclesiastes and Job problematize the idea of 
blessings and curses as a motivating factor. Suffice it here to state that the tension between relating to 
Torah on the basis of inner conviction versus either external coercion or incentive is already witnessed in 
Torah itself, attempting to evoke an individual and communally embrace of the covenantal life with 
YHWH while at the same time promising blessings and threatening with curses. For a helpful 
differentiation between a paradigm governed by the concepts of covenant versus law see Mendenhall, “The 
Conflict between Value System and Social Control,” 174–75. He described this Torah rhetoric as 
dialectical: “The material from Exodus 25 through Numbers 9 thus uses the rhetoric of story and list to 
develop a dialectical tension between the idealistic vision of a divine-human communion and realistic 
warnings of its dissolution due to popular disobedience and realistic warnings of its dissolution due to 
popular disobedience and official malpractice. The persuasive intent behind this pattern aims to inspire 
compliance with the legislative program by describing ideal communion with God and to discourage 
noncompliance by detailing past and future threats. The divine sanctions of Leviticus 26 combine both 
elements of the dialectic and transcends them with a wider promise of God’s covenant faithfulness” (Watts, 
Reading Law, 55). For how Plato objected to the use of sanction, and Aristotle to the use of story in 
persuation—in contrast to the Torah, see Watts, Reading Law, 55. 
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general tendency in Deuteronomy to command attitudes and feelings, Carasik writes that 
“the psychological commands in general do not fit into our notion of an objective system 
of law.”127 Weeks finds the use of terminology like ‘good,’ ‘love,’ ‘know,’ and ‘son’ as 
likely covenantal language.128 Uncoerced willingness is expressed by terms like ‘love’ 
and ‘joy,’ both found in Israelite and ANE legal traditions.129 
                                               
127 Carasik, Theologies of the Mind, 202. Cf. Carasik, Theologies of the Mind, 201, 213 where 
Carasik becomes somewhat inconsistent on the question of law and freedom. Cf. how Carasik discusses 
that the command to love is not merely ‘loyalty,’ but a real love (209–10). Also in the Exodus, with the 
Decalogue and BC (Exod 20:1–23:33) and Holiness Collection (Lev 17–26), we see that the instructions 
were not merely intended to be external controls, but also to address and appeal to the heart and emotions. 
The prohibition against coveting in the Tenth Word of the Decalogue (Exod 20:17) and the command to 
love one’s neighbor and the stranger (Lev 19:18, 34) are examples. Cf. also Carasik, Theologies of the 
Mind, 196–215. He writes: “One of the unusual features of Deuteronomy that is often overlooked, however, 
is that it has a general tendency to prescribe not merely activity, but attitude. That is, in addition to actions, 
the commandments in Deuteronomy cover not just memory but many other thoughts and emotions as well. 
The Israelites are enjoined to know, to revere, to love, and to rejoice, forbidden to fear, to covet and to take 
pity, all in just the same way as they are commended to observe the Sabbath or to pour off the blood from a 
slaughtered animal” (Carasik, Theologies of the Mind, 196–97). This he finds contrasting to the relatively 
rare injunctions to feel or think in other portions of the Pentateuch. 
128 Weeks, Adminition and Curse, 160. Cf. William L. Moran, “The Ancient Near Eastern 
Background of the Love of God in Deuteronomy,” CBQ 25, no. 1 (1963): 77–87; Norbert Lohfink, “Hate 
and Love in Osee 9:15,” CBQ 25, no. 4 (1963): 417; Herbert B. Huffmon, “The Treaty Background of 
Hebrew Yāda',” Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research 181 (1966): 31–37. 
129 Yohanan Muffs, Love and Joy: Law, Language and Religion in Ancient Israel (New York: 
Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1992), 124, 127, 148, 187. To love YHWH by walking in all his 
ways is the basic deuteronomic ethos. Cf. Deut 10:12 ( ֹאתֹו ְוַלֲעֹבד ֶאת־ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֶהיָך  ֲהָבהַאלְ ּו ָרָכיוּדְ ָכל־ּבְ ָלֶלֶכת 
ָךׁשֶ ְבָכל־ַנפְ ּו ָכל־ְלָבְבָךּבְ  ). Note the idea of a whole heart and soul loving and serving YHWH. This is the key 
as well to how to read the Torah, reading it in love and a mind to serve with a whole heart and soul. Cf. 
Berman, Created Equal, 34, 38 for similar points. In Torah the verb מחׂש  (“to be glad”) is used in a 
command to be joyful during the festivals in the following verses: Lev 23:40; Deut 12:7, 12, 18; 14:26; 
16:11, 14; 26:11; 27:7. Num 10:10 uses the noun ִׂשְמָחה to describe the festivals as  ְִמַחְתֶכםׂש  (“your 
rejoicing”), and Deut 16:15 uses the adjective  ֵָמחַ ׂש  (“joyful”) to again speak of the festivals stating that 
ֵמחַ ׂשָ  ְךַאְוָהִייָת   (“and you shall surely rejoice”). At Deut 28:47 even warns that if the people fail to serve 
YHWH  ִלּכֹ ָבב ֵמֹרב לֵ  בּוְבטּו ְמָחהְּבׂש  (“in joy and gladness of heart for all”) they will fall under the curse of 
enemy hans. Cf. Deut 33:18. For an analogy to the attitude of obedience in Egypt, see Eyre, The Use of 
Documents in Pharaonic Egypt, 97. When Marduk aims at supremacy among the gods in Enūma Elish he 
desires to be elected by the gods “in joyful mood” ("Epic of Creation (Enūma Elish)," trans. Benjamin R. 
Foster (The Context of Scripture [COS] 1: 1.111:395 (61))). Walton has argued that Israelite religion is 
characterized by the more internalized aspects of morality in contrast to the more externalized focus in 
ANE ethics, the latter being more concerned about sustaining the cosmic order (John H. Walton, Ancient 
Near Eastern Thought and the Old Testament: Introducing the Conceptual World of the Hebrew Bible 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006), 149–61). For a discussion of the use of anthropological 
categories like internal/external to describe the textual material of Torah, see below. Muffs elaborates: “It is 
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Sixth, the sanctions, including covenant curses (Lev 26; Deut 28), and the need to 
expiate sins in case of failure or breach of the covenantal relationship (e.g. Lev 4–5), 
indicate normativity.130 While we do not find sanctions attached to all instructions, 
something that also problematize a legislative model, their presence in many cases 
support seeing Torah as normative.131 
                                               
as if to say that since all the goods in the world belong to the Divine, the only real contribution man can 
offer is the willingness with which he gives his contributions, and the alacrity with which he performs the 
act (cf. 1 Chr 29:14)” (Muffs, Love and Joy, 166). Muffs sees in Deut 15:10 “the concatenation of the three 
ideas” of (a) giving willingly, (b) according to one’s means, and (c) the concomitant blessing” (Muffs, Love 
and Joy, 179–81, 185). He suggests, “with due reservation, that the later the literature—be it legal, 
religious, or literary—the greater the stress on inner states of mind, and in legal contexts in particular, the 
great[er] the constitutive importance of intent and volition” (Muffs, Love and Joy, 145). On how the aspect 
of volition becomes more prominent in Chronicles see Muffs, Love and Joy, 183–84. Cf. Bernard S. 
Jackson, “Liability for Mere Intention in Early Jewish Law,” in Essays in Jewish and Comparative Legal 
History (Leiden: Brill, 1975), 202–34; Maccoby, Ritual and Morality, 80; Jassen, Scripture and Law, 132–
33 on the regulation of the internal in Torah. The frequent use of motivation clauses in Torah is intended to 
persuade the listener/reader, to create a positive disposition. Paul commented that “since law serves as an 
instrument of education, a didactic aim is to be found only in biblical legislation. Thus, unlike most other 
ancient legal corpora, motive clauses are occasionally appended to both apodictic and casuistic injunctions. 
These explanatory, ethical, religious, and historical comments appeal to the conscience of the people and 
pedagogically aid and motivate them to observe the law” (Paul, Studies in the Book of the Covenant, 39). 
According to Greenberg, the publication of Torah is interlinked with the call of Israel “to live in dedication 
to God after the manner of priests” (e.g. Exod 22:30; Lev 20:26, and Deut 14:2), implying that Torah “is to 
function as a pedagogue, a trainer in a course of life” (Greenberg, “Three Conceptions of the Torah,” 14–
15). For differences in the use of the motivation clauses within the legal corpora of Torah and 
Mesopotamian law see Rifat Sonsino, Motive Clauses in Hebrew Law: Biblical Forms and Near Eastern 
Parallels, ed. Douglas A. Knight. Society of Biblical Literature Dissertation Series [SBLDS] 45 (Chico, 
CA: Scholars Press, 1980), 221–23, 225. For further analyses of motivation clauses in Torah see Berend 
Gemser, “The Importance of the Motive Clause in Old Testament Law,” in Congress Volume: 
Copenhagen, 1953, ed. G. W. Anderson et. al., VTSup 1 (Leiden: Brill, 1953), 50–66; Bent Mogensen, 
Israelitiske leveregler og deres begrundelse (København: Gads Forlag, 1983); Watts, Reading Law, 65–67; 
Sonsino, Motive Clauses in Hebrew Law. Berman sees a contrast between the Pentateuch and the 
prophets/NT in their ethical outlook, given its own anthropology: “The Pentateuch has a fundamentally 
optimistic view of human nature—it expects that an entire nation can behave in exemplary fashion with 
regard to one another and with regard to their sovereign king, God” (Berman, Created Equal, 169). This 
relates to the focus upon keeping Torah, rather than studying Torah in the early books of the HB (Kent 
Aaron Reynolds, Torah as Teacher: The Exemplary Torah Student in Psalm 119, VTSup (Leiden: Brill, 
2010), 182). Cf. my “Interpretation of the Written,” 1–19. 
130 For the sanction of כרת (“to cut off”) see Donald J. Wold, “The Meaning of the Biblical 
Penalty Kareth” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkley, 1978). 
131 Cf. Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 91–92; Fitzpatrick-McKinley, The 
Transformation of Torah, 116. 
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Seventh, with YHWH as the transcendent reference of the Torah-text and the 
ancient Israelite court, the text as YHWH’s word is also imbued with normativity. As 
mentioned, in all four legal cases mentioned in the instructive material of Torah (Lev 
24:10–23; Num 9:1–14; 15:32–36; 27:1–11) we find the centrality of the oracle. But 
these four cases also show the proximity of instruction and practice, again showing an 
assumed normativity of the instructions.132 Past, present, and future instructions by 
YHWH receive a normative status. As we have seen above, YHWH stood as the 
transcendent reference of the covenant stipulations. Thus, law is not the absolute referent, 
but, instead, receives a contingent status. Strictly speaking, Torah does not present us 
with “the rule of law” but “the rule of YHWH.”133 With YHWH as the transcendent 
referent, the inclusion of oracle (Lev 24:10–23; Num 9:1–14; 15:32–36; 27:1–11), oath 
before YHWH (e.g. Exod 22:8–10; Num 5:21),134 and ordeal (Num 5:11–31) become 
understandable, even if they obscure the legislative model. While the instructions to 
judges do not admonish judging according to Torah, as discussed above, and while the 
inconsistency in providing procedures and sanction in the instructive material would 
                                               
132 Cf. Fitzpatrick-McKinley, The Transformation of Torah, 110–11. 
133 For the idea of “rule by law” in Egypt see "The Eloquent Peasant," trans. Nili Shupak (COS 1: 
1.43:101 (104ff)). 
134 Cf. Fitzpatrick-McKinley, The Transformation of Torah, 137–39. A question is what role the 
oracle, oath before YHWH, and ordeal have in the book of Deuteronomy. The clearest cases are at least 
found in Exodus–Numbers. In the majority of cases the verb בעׁש  (“to swear”) is used in Deuteronomy for 
God swearing to his people (Deut 1:8, 34–35; 2:14; 4:21, 31; 6:10, 18, 23; 7:8, 12–13; 8:1, 18; 9:5; 10:11; 
11:9, 21; 13:18; 19:8; 26:3, 15; 28:9, 11; 29:12; 30:20; 31:7, 20–21, 23; 34:4). Exceptions are 6:13 and 
10:20 where the people swear by the name of YHWH. The noun  ְָעהּובׁש  (“oath”) is used only in 7:8, and 
here for the oath YHWH swore to the people. Further, we have no account of actual court cases as in 
Leviticus and Numbers. And as we have seen, the central role of the oracle in court as seen in Exod 18, 
seems to disappear in Deut 17, and is instead passed on to the line of prophets and their public indictments 
of the people. 
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make them problematic as a legislative document, the oracle, oath, and ordeal remind the 
reader of living in the divine courtroom, where blessings and curses—most clearly 
formulated in Lev 26 and Deut 28—function as divine sanctions.135 
Eighth, it seems difficult to separate the instructive material from the narrative 
covenantal setting. Averbeck has made a convincing argument that the deliverance 
narrative permeates the entire instructive material of the BC: “Virtually at every turn, the 
rationale for the Law depends on the people’s deliverance from slavery in Egypt and its 
implications for the way that they must treat the poor and disadvantaged in Israel, 
including the resident alien.”136 It thus becomes understandable why the manumission 
                                               
135 Fitzpatrick-McKinley makes the following comment with regard to divine sanctions in relation 
to the oracle, oath, and ordeal: “Wisdom morality was to be observed not because it was backed up by a 
juridicial body, courts and something akin to a policing force, but because ignoring the advice of the 
wisdom ideals could bring the curse and disapproval of the gods, resulting ultimately in the destruction of 
society. Observance of the moral stipulations, in contrast, would bring prosperity and blessings which were 
bestowed by the approving gods. It has been shown that, even prior to the Deuteronomic movement which 
placed all ‘law’ under Yhwh’s will and authorship, Israelite wisdom ideals were also protected by Yhwh. . . 
. It involved a making explicit of what had always been implicit: namely that order in creation could only 
be sustained through the observance of the torah rules which were viewed by the scribes as expressive of a 
comsic reality. The emphasis of Yhwh as the source of Israel’s torah was not the result of, nor is it 
immediately related to, social and economic developments. It is a statement of the reality of Israel’s torah 
which was at least an implicitly characteristic of it from the beginning” (Fitzpatrick-McKinley, The 
Transformation of Torah, 177). 
136 Richard E. Averbeck, “The Egyptian Sojourn and Deliverance from Slavery in the Framing and 
Shaping of the Mosaic Law,” in "Did I Not Bring Israel Out of Egypt?" Biblical, Archaeological, and 
Egyptological Perspectives on the Exodus Narratives, eds. James K. Hoffmeier, Alan R. Millard and Gary 
A. Rensburg (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2016), 157–58. Cf. 143–44. Averbeck also finds a literary 
framing in repetitions between Exod 19 and Deut 25 (Averbeck, “Framing and Shaping of the Mosaic 
Law,” 144–49). Sprinkle has argued that the placement of the manumission instructions at the beginning of 
the BC, in Exod 21:2–11, should be understood as rooted in the Exodus deliverance narrative. It contrasts 
with other ANE legal collections, which never give slave instructions such a prominent position (Joe M. 
Sprinkle, 'The Book of the Covenant': A Literary Approach, ed. David J. A. Clines and Philip R. Davies. 
JSOTSup 174 (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1994), 62). For similar arguments seeing BC as linked to the 
surrounding narrative, see Wright, Inventing God's Law, 322-23, 327, 332-45. Cf. Wright, Inventing God's 
Law, 149–51 for an argument that the primacy of the concern for the poor in BC depends upon LH, and this 
concern again dictates the initial position of the slave-laws in BC. Otto also sees the concern for the poor as 
central to BC (Otto, “Aspects of Legal Reforms,” 189). 
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instructions introduce the BC. But Averbeck points out how manumission instructions 
also conclude the Sinai Instructions in Lev 25:39–55.137 He sums it up succinctly with 
“there would be no Law without the exodus.”138 This is not the place to enter into the 
discussion about the character of divine instructions prior to Sinai. Gen 26:5, for 
example, raises many questions in that direction. The point here is simply that given the 
                                               
137 Averbeck writes: “Furthermore, not only does the Book of the Covenant begin with debt-slave 
law, but the whole of the laws given at Sinai also end with the debt-slave law in Lev 25:39-55, just before 
the blessings and curses of the covenant in Lev 26. This latter point is not often taken into account in 
discussions of the Sinaitic Law. Perhaps this is because the Laws of Hammurapi, for example, do indeed 
conclude with slave laws, so an ANE law collection ending this way is in fact not unique to the biblical 
Law, in contrast to the fact that no such collection begins with slave laws. Or perhaps it is because the 
overall canonical shape and frame of the Law is often not given full consideration; the emphasis tends 
toward the literary shape of the units of law within it. Or perhaps it is due to a combination of these and 
other factors. In any case, from the point of view of the text as it stands, Hebrew debt slave and release is 
‘the beginning and end’ of the Law at Sinai, literally” (Averbeck, “Framing and Shaping of the Mosaic 
Law,” 158–59). He continues: “In reality, therefore, there are a good number of instances seeded through 
the Law in which the call for good and fair treatment of resident aliens is based on Israel’s past experience 
in Egypt. One could say that it is essential to the ethos of the whole Law, Exodus through Deuteronomy, 
from beginning to end, and in between. Whether laying foundations or coming to conclusions, the lawgiver 
gravitated toward the founding event and its implications for the good life in ancient Israel” (Averbeck, 
“Framing and Shaping of the Mosaic Law,” 161). Cf. p. 163. 
138 Averbeck, “Framing and Shaping of the Mosaic Law,” 166. Lohfink writes: “Der Pentateuch 
als ganzer präsentiert sich nicht als rhetorische Vermittlung von recht an seine Leser, und erst recht nicht 
als Rechtskodifizierung. Als ganzer ist er kein rechtsstiftender Sprechakt. Er ist eine Erzählung, Die 
Gestaltung als Erzählung ist auch keine Verkleidung einer Absicht, die sofort auf Rechtskodifizierung 
ginge” (Norbert Lohfink, “Prolegomena zu einer Rechtshermeneutik des Pentateuch,” in Das 
Deuteronomium, ed. Georg Braulik (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2003), 42). See also pp. 12–15 for a 
discussion on the relation between Exodus-Numbers and Deuteronomy. See also his Norbert Lohfink, “The 
Priestly Narrative and History,” in Theology of the Pentateuch: Themes of the Priestly Narrative and 
Deuteronomy (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), 136–72 where he discusses the historiography of the so-
called ‘priestly’ narrative (Pg), and concludes that its “vision is so differentiated that the former alternative 
of ‘law and history’ no longer exist” (p. 172). Watts writes: “The narrative context of Pentateuchal law 
confirms that the Torah is intended to be read as a whole and in order. Unlike law, narrative invites, almost 
enforces, a strategy of sequential reading, of starting at the beginning and reading the text in order to the 
end. The placement of law within narrative conforms (at least in part) the reading of law to the conventions 
of narrative” (Watts, Reading Law, 29. Cf. p. 11, 91). At the same time, according to him, “the 
relationships between legal collections do not seem to be governed primarily by narrative considerations” 
(Watts, Reading Law, 77. See also pp. 85–87). And Watts sums up the function of the motivation clauses 
used in Torah as follows: “Motive clauses create links between the lists of laws and the stories of the 
Pentateuch” (Watts, Reading Law, 66). For further analyses of motivation clauses in Torah see Gemser, 
“The Importance of the Motive Clause in Old Testament Law,” 50–66; Sonsino, Motive Clauses in Hebrew 
Law; Mogensen, Israelitiske leveregler og deres begrundelse; S. Amsler, “Les documents de la loi et la 
formation du Pentateuque,” in Le Pentateuque en question, ed. A. de Pury (Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1989), 
242–43; Watts, Reading Law, 65–67. 
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way in which Torah is formulated, as we now have it, the covenantal instructions are 
inextricably intertwined with the exodus event. According to Joosten, “the theme of the 
Exodus underpins the entire discourse of H. . . . there is not one single subject treated in 
H that is not directly connected in some way with that momentous event from the 
past.”139 Nihan has recently argued for the narrative coherence of the Exodus–Numbers 
account, simultaneously seeing the divisions into separate books as following the logic of 
the Pentateuchal narrative.140 He observes that the so-called ‘formula of self-presentation’ 
/ ֲאִני ְיהָוה) ֶכםֲאִני ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֵהי ) within the exhortations and laws themselves, found especially 
in Lev 17–26 but also in the other legal corpora, points to a close and  
inseparable relation between the instructive material and the narrative covenantal 
setting.141 
                                               
139 Joosten, People and Land in the Holiness Code, 101. Cf. his discussion of this point on pp. 93–
101. 
140 Nihan, From Priestly Torah to Pentateuch, 69–95. For an argument as to how the literary 
polyphonic discourse is connected to the narrative in the Pentateuch, see Stahl, Law and Liminality in the 
Bible. For other discussions on the relation between instructions and narrative in Torah see Gordon J. 
Wenham, Story as Torah: Reading Old Testament Narrative Ethically (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Academic, 2004); Berman, Created Equal, 141, 149–51; Noel K. Weeks, Sources and Authors: 
Assumptions in the Study of Hebrew Bible Narrative (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2011). For other 
approaches, where the purely literary relations between law and narrative in Torah are emphasized, see 
Gershon Hepner, Legal Friction: Law, Narrative, and Identity Politics in Biblical Israel, StBibLit 78 (New 
York: Peter Lang, 2010); C. M. Carmichael, Law and Narrative in the Bible (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1985). See Altman, The Historical Prologue for how the Hittite suzerain could impose a 
version of history upon his vassal subjects. It was a subjective historiography, not like ours aspiring to 
objectivity. History itself was legal, as argued by Jiří Moskala and Felipe Masotti, “The Hittite Treaty 
Prologue Tradition and the Literary Structure of the Book of Deteronomy,” in Exploring the Composition 
of the Pentateuch, eds. L. S. Baker, Jr. et al., forthcoming). This might relate to the composition of Torah 
and the prophets, through which and whom God presents his own version of history to be accepted by his 
willing subjects. Cf. Mendenhall, “Covenant Forms in Israelite Tradition,” 45. 
141 Nihan writes: “As a matter of fact, it is worth noting that the reconstruction of an earlier form 
of Lev 17–26 entirely free from any reference to the wilderness setting is not only arbitrary, it was also 
never entirely successful. Even after removing all the elements manifesting most clearly this code’s 
dependence on P, such as the introductions to the divine speeches and any mention of Mt Sinai, the 
remaining material still presupposes a situation in which Israel has just left Egypt (cf. 18:3; further 22:33; 
25:55; 26:13, 45) and is on the point of entering the promised land (cf. 18:3; 18:24–30; 20:22–26). Besides, 
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Ninth, passages outside the instructive material of Torah seems to corroborate a 
concept of Torah as normative covenantal instruction, such as the covenants in the 
patriarchal cycles (e.g. Gen 21:22–33; 26:26–31, 44–54) and the prophetic indictment of 
the people on the basis of Torah.142 
While Torah should not be understood as legislative law, based on the above 
observations I will propose that a better characterization is to see it as normative 
covenantal instruction.143 And again, the concept of covenantal instruction is important 
                                               
this narrative context is not limited to H’s parenetic framework in Lev 18–25. Not only is it explicitly 
mentioned in some laws, in particular in Lev 25 (see 25:2ff., and further 19:23; 23:10), but it is consistently 
presupposed by the grand exhortation of Lev 26:3–45 describing life inside the settled land according to 
Israel’s obedience or disobedience to Yahweh (cf. 26:3–13 and 14–39, and compare with Deut 28)” (Nihan, 
From Priestly Torah to Pentateuch, 400. Cf. p. 399). Cf. Joosten, People and Land in the Holiness Code, 
94 for a cautious, but similar point. The following passages in Exodus–Deuteronomy include the phrase 
 ;Exod 6:2, 6-8, 29; 7:5, 17; 8:18; 10:2; 12:12; 14:4, 18; 15:26; 16:12; 29:46 :ֲאִני ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֵהיֶכם/ ֲאִני ְיהָוה
31:13; Lev 11:44-45; 18:2, 4-6, 21, 30; 19:2-4, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 25, 28, 30-32, 34, 36-37; 20:7-8, 24, 26; 
21:8, 12, 15, 23; 22:2-3, 8-9, 16, 30-33; 23:22, 43; 24:22; 25:17, 38, 55-26:2; 26:13, 44-45; Num 3:13, 41, 
45; 10:10; 14:35; 15:41; 35:34; Deut 29:5. As will be easily seen from this distribution, within instructive 
material, the phrase is found predominantly in Leviticus. 
142 Cf. Berend Gemser, “The Rîb- or Controversy-Pattern in Hebrew Mentality,” in Wisdom in 
Israel and in the Ancient Near East, eds. Martin Noth and D. Winton Thomas, VTSup 3 (Leiden: Brill, 
1960), 120–37. In his dissertation from 1974 Bergren argued that an analysis of the individual passages 
show “that prophetic accusation presuppose a standard to which those whom the prophets accuse are 
bound” (Bergren, The Prophets and the Law, 49). He also shows how the audience to the prophets seemed 
to know their guilt in regard to the law (Bergren, The Prophets and the Law, 60-62). Having argued above 
that Torah was not presented as a source in the human court, the concept of covenantal lawsuit raises the 
question how Torah was used in a divine courtroom with the prophet presenting the divine accusation 
against the people. This discussion needs to be left for another occasion. The divine-prophetic diatribe 
against the people reusing Torah, seems to presuppose a normativity of Torah. For further studies on the 
concept of covenantal law-suit see Weeks, Adminition and Curse, 159; Richard M. Davidson, “The Divine 
Covenant Lawsuit Motif in Canonical Perspective,” Journal of Adventist Theological Society (JATS) 21, 
no. 1–2 (2010): 45–84; Shalom E. Holtz, “The Prophet as Summoner,” in A Common Cultural Heritage: 
Studies on Mesopotamia and the Biblical World in Honor of Barry L. Eichler, ed. Grant Frame (Bethesda, 
MD: CDL Press, 2011), 19–34; Job Y. Jindo, “The Divine Courtroom Motif in the Hebrew Bible: A 
Holistic Approach,” in The Divine Courtroom in Comparative Perspective, eds. Ari Mermelstein and 
Shalom E. Holtz, BibInt 132 (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 76–93. For how prophets are part of the divine 
courtroom, and how the divine courtroom appoints human rulers and judges for the maintenance of cosmic 
order see Jindo, “The Divine Courtroom Motif,” 81–82. 
143 Fitzpatrick-McKinley’s characterization of Torah as “moral advice of scribes,” based on 
analogies with the Babylonan concept of kittum and the ancient Indian concept of dharma (Fitzpatrick-
McKinley, The Transformation of Torah, 21), therefore becomes too weak a conceptualization to 
adequately explain the phenomena of Torah. There seems to be a normativity, even if this is not a 
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for the present study as it helps us understand the dual phenomena of close proximity and 
creativity in the reuse of Torah-instructions. The non-legislative character of covenantal 
instruction help us understand why we do not find the exact verbal reuse we would 
expect in a legislative model, and the normativity of the instructions help us understand 
                                               
legislative concept of Torah. The above observations also problematize calling it ‘retrospective,’ ‘common 
law,’ or ‘descriptive.’ None of these designations embrace all the mentioned points, nor is viewing it as 
‘legislation’ adequate. 
The closest analogy to Torah-instructions within the biblical material itself might be the parent 
instructing his or her child through the Wisdom literature (e.g. Prov 1–7). The difference would be that as 
YHWH was seen as standing above the parents, so Torah transcended the parents’ instructions. Deut 8:5 is 
here relevant: “And you shall consider in your heart that as a man disciplines his son, YHWH your God 
disciplines you” ( ֱאֹלֶהיָך ְמַיְּסֶרּךָ  ְוָיַדְעָּת ִעם־ְלָבֶבָך ִּכי ַּכֲאֶׁשר ְיַיֵּסר ִאיׁש ֶאת־ְּבנֹו ְיהָוה ). While scholars differ in the 
extent they conflate and contrast Torah and Wisdom, this question needs to be addressed elsewhere (cf. 
Nielsen, Oral Tradition; Peter H. Davids, The Epistle of James: A Commentary on the Greek Text, The 
New International Greek Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1982), 52–53; Mogensen, 
Israelitiske leveregler og deres begrundelse, 257, 260; Moshe Weinfeld, Deuteronomy 1-11: A New 
Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB 5 (New York: Doubleday, 1991), 62–65; Weinfeld, 
Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School, 244–319; Roland E. Murphy, “Wisdom in the OT,” in Anchor 
Bible Dictionary (ABD), ed. David Noel Freedman (New York: Doubleday, 1992), 926; Jackson, Semiotics 
of Biblical Law, 70–92; Jackson, Wisdom-Laws, 23–39). However, if Fox is right in claiming about 
Proverbs that the individual precepts are pointers beyond Proverbs’ own precepts, then this resembles to a 
large extent the function of Torah as well: “The reason that the wisdom the author is seeking to impart is at 
once difficult and obvious is that it is not reducible to the book’s precepts. The author is aiming at a higher 
and harder goal: wisdom as a power. The knowledge of wisdom, once achieved, resides in the learner as a 
potential and must be activated by God in order to become the power of wisdom, an inner light that guides 
its possessor through life” (Michael V. Fox, Proverbs 1-9: A New Translation with Introduction and 
Commentary, AB 18A (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 347). Watts writes: “Both law and 
wisdom seek to persuade hearers/readers of the urgency of practicing their teachings. Both, in other words, 
aim to instruct their audience in a way of life” (Watts, Reading Law, 64). And further, that “whereas 
Wisdom’s stereotypical setting is private instruction within the family, reading law is usually depicted as a 
public activity addressing the whole people” (Watts, Reading Law, 66). Cf. William P. Brown, “The Law 
and the Sages: A Reexamination of Tôrâ in Proverbs,” in Constituting the Community: Studies on the Polity 
of Ancient Israel in Honor of S. Dean McBride Jr., eds. John T. Strong and Steven S. Tuell (Wiona Lake, 
IN: Eisenbrauns, 2005), 251–80; Bernd U. Schipper, “When Wisdom Is Not Enough! The Discourse on 
Wisdom and Torah and the Composition of the Book of Proverbs,” in Wisdom and Torah: The Reception of 
'Torah' in the Wisdom Literature of the Second Temple Period, eds. Bernd U. Schipper and D. Andrew 
Teeter, SJSJ 163 (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 55–79. According to Fitzpatrick-McKinley the clearest evidence for 
an identification of wisdom and Torah is found in Ben Sirach (Fitzpatrick-McKinley, The Transformation 
of Torah). Benjamin G. Wright III comments on Sir 34:8: “Ben Sira connects fulfilling the law with 
wisdom and being faithful, all of which are set against the deceptive nature of dreams” (in Louis H. 
Feldman et al., eds., Outside the Bible: Ancient Jewish Writings Related to Scripture (Philadelphia: Jewish 
Publication Society, 2013), 2297n). See also Sir 39:1; Bar 3:29–4:1. According to Perdue we find a similar 
identification in the earlier Ps 19 and 119 (Leo G. Perdue, “Cosmology and the Social Order in the Wisdom 
Tradition,” in The Sage in Isael and the Ancient Near East, eds. J. G. Gammie and Leo G. Perdue (Winona 
Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1990), 462). For the classic study of wisdom in ancient Israel see Gerhard von Rad, 
Wisdom in Israel (London: SCM, 1972). 
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why we nevertheless find a close attention to the formulations of the instructions. As we 
will see, the combination of exact correspondence and creativity is a hallmark rather than 
exception in the clearest cases of reuse between Torah and the Prophets. 
I have argued that the concept of normative covenantal instruction seems to best 
account for the dual phenomena—often seen in the same passages—of creative and exact 
reuse. The rejection of a legislative model for Torah helps us understand why cases of 
reuse of Torah in the HB do not seem to belong to the literalistic type of reuse we are 
used to in modern law. In Torah’s covenantal character, YHWH, not the literary 
formulations themselves, becomes the ultimate reference. Therefore, the Torah-
instructions do, therefore, not introduce a ‘rule of law,’ but find their origin and possible 
revisions with YHWH, and are thus contingent. Since the primary relation is between 
YHWH and his people where the instructions become an aid in this covenantal 
relationship, the final reference is not the instructions but YHWH. On the other hand, as 
the words of YHWH, the normativity of the instructions invite a close reading, and, at 
certain points, exact reuse of the Torah-instructions. The goal is a covenantal relationship 
between YHWH and his people, where the instructions function didactically to facilitate 
a holy and righteous way of life together with a holy and righteous God. They set the 
stage for the covenantal relationship by defining and indicating how it is to be lived out.  
As the Torah-instructions are not only concerned with regulating external 
conduct, but also with instructing the people about how to live a covenantal form of life 
with YHWH, they invoke love, joy, and gratitude as motivations for covenantal 
obedience. Torah addresses the heart. The form of life lived after reading or listening to 
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the Torah-instructions thus also becomes a disclosure of the thoughts of the heart.144 
Since the dynamics of this covenantal life cannot be reduced to just words and 
instruction, Torah takes the form of pointers and examples to this covenantal life. For 
example, Torah is thus not “fulfilled by the act of public reading itself.”145 Rather, Torah 
is only fulfilled through covenantal forms of lives. Torah sets the frame of such a 
covenantal life, but does not exhaust it. And it is within this frame that room is found for 
literary originality and innovation, where implications of previous Torah-instructions or 
additional revelation fills in or paints for the first time a part of the picture not yet seen. 
As poets and authors have known for a long time, words and instructions can never 
exhaust the dynamics of a personal relationship, or, more specifically, a covenantal life. 
As healthy relations have a stable root in the known and familiar, creating a basis for 
adventuring into the unknown, legal reuse finds its ‘home’ in exact correspondence of 
lexemes, phrases, or concepts, but also opens for exploring the covenantal relation 
through literary creativity, invention, and even revision where needed. 
                                               
144 As the character of the reader is disclosed in the reading, so Georg Savran makes the reverse 
point that the character of the speaker is disclosed in the writing: “Characterization is accomplished not by 
simple description but by drawing analogies between the repeated words and behaviors of various figures 
in the text and by judging the constancy of identity in the replication of thoughts and actions in speech, and 
the reverse” (Savran, Telling and Retelling, 5. Cf. p. 12, 49, 88, 92–93). And again: “It is unfortunate that 
there are so few cases of quoted direct speech in which a character presents, in essence, his thoughts about 
his thoughts, but self-consciousness is hardly a major facet of biblical characterization. Still, much of the 
fascination of biblical characters lies in the relative impenetrability of their personae in conjunction with 
activities, events, and a style of narration that invites, if not demands, interpretation of their motives” 
(Savran, Telling and Retelling, 51). Cf. Sternberg, The Poetics of Biblical Narrative, 388. Watts writes: 
“The stories that introduce lists of Mesopotamian and Israelite laws characterize the identity and authority 
of law-speaker through their past accomplishments, and the sanctions that conclude them characterize the 
speaker’s willingness to enforce their provisions. Direct second-person address within the codes reminds 
hearers and readers of their relationship to the speaker, while motive clauses link laws to the stories that 
precede them and the sanctions that follow. Repetition highlights the issues of most importance to the law-
speaker, but contradiction raises questions about the speakers’ reliability” (Watts, Reading Law, 91. Cf. pp. 
89–91). 
145 Jackson, Semiotics of Biblical Law, 139. 
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We may even claim that later literary compositions about covenantal forms of life 
have a creative imperative on the grounds that a mere repetition of Torah would be a poor 
expression of covenantal instructions. While rooted in the previous Torah-instructions, 
reuse needs to go beyond previous formulations, once more directing the readers and 
listeners to form lives in covenant with YHWH—even in settings not specifically 
addressed in Torah. Instead of seeing legal dissimilitude as a problem that needs a 
source-critical solution or harmonization, I want to propose instead that, given Torah as 
covenantal instruction and memorized reuse, such legal variation is something we should 
view as normative. Given the above characterization of Torah as normative covenantal 
instruction, we can now formulate the above contention in falsifiable terms: we should 
expect proto-halakhic reuse to be characterized by repetition with variation, or to put it 
differently, by the dual phenomenon of exact literary correspondence and literary 
creativity.146 The potential for problematizing—maybe even falsification of—this model 
is therefore seen if we can find textual cases within the HB where legal material is reused 
en toto literalistically, as we are used to in a legislative concept of law, or at least such 
cases might problematize negating a legislative characterization of Torah. Legal 
innovation and revision itself will not falsify the model. Therefore, I argue that the typical 
                                               
146 While most of the following cases appear to fit into this pattern of Torah being repeated with 
variation, we also realize that Jer 7 and Ezek 18—in many ways the simplest cases of reuse to be studied in 
this study—are also the most likely candidates for falsifying the above. This will be discussed further when 
discussing Jer 7 and Ezek 18. The relative exact reuse between the Decalogues of Exod 20 and Deut 5 
would be a key case. But both in Deut 5, Jer 7, and Ezek 18 we find literary variation that does not 
corroborate a legislative model. Instead of speaking of a dual phenomenon, of both pointillistic exact reuse 
and creative reuse, it seems better to speak in terms of a continuum between these two poles, where a text 
might be more or less either—even showing differences within a specific passage itself. Still, variation in 
reuse should be seen as normal rather than as a problem in need of a solution. 
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pattern is pointillistic exact reuse, where this pointillism parallels the form of specific 
locutions or concepts borrowed from previous instructions, combined with a certain free 
and creative reuse of Torah. I suggest that this may better account for legal tensions in 
Torah than the typical source-critical or traditional harmonizations do.147  
The Distinction between Ethical and Cultic Instructions 
Given the above, where we have seen that the combination of ethical and cultic 
material is unique to Torah in the ANE,148 a question to be asked is therefore if a 
distinction between ‘ethical’ and ‘cultic’ instructions in Torah is justified? This question 
is particularly relevant for the following discussion, given that I will focus upon 
instructions typically classified as ethical. To begin answering this question I will take a 
                                               
147 The above should also be qualified to some extent. As pointed out by Greenberg, the 
conception of Torah argued for above appears representative of how Torah is characterized within Torah 
itself and largely in the latter prophets. It is seen as “a body of divine instructions for the people at large 
(e.g. Exod. 24:12),” addressed to the people as a collective of individuals each held responsible (Greenberg, 
“Three Conceptions of the Torah,” 12–13). This contrasts with the conception found in the Book of Kings, 
where “the relationship between heaven and earth is narrowed simply to that between God and the kings,” 
where the king is held responsible for the covenantal disloyalty of the people (Greenberg, “Three 
Conceptions of the Torah,” 19–20). A third conception is that found most explicitly formulated in Jeremiah 
and Ezekiel, in passages like Jer 31:30–33 and Ezek 36:24–27, where the incapability of the people to live 
according to Torah is met with a divine intervention, inscribing Torah on the people’s hearts so they will 
live accordingly (Greenberg, “Three Conceptions of the Torah,” 19–20). Berman has argued that in Torah 
each individual Israelite takes the role of a vassal-king in the treaty relationship with God (Berman, 
Created Equal, 41–42). For the discussion of whether YHWH is or is not characterized as king in the 
Pentateuch see Watts, Reading Law, 101. Greenberg sees a possible transition from the conception in the 
Former Prophets into the Latter Prophets with “Elijah’s desire to reestablish the covenant between God and 
the people (18:37). . . . It may be a historical fact that with Elijah a turning point occurred because the 
subsequent classical prophets of the North (Amos, Hosea) continued to address the people and not 
primarily the king” (Greenberg, “Three Conceptions of the Torah,” 13.). This latter conception will be 
discussed further under “Scribal Enculturation and Embodied Torah.” 
148 Cf. Greenberg, “Some Postulates of Biblical Criminal Law,” 11; Kaufmann, The Religion of 
Israel, 171; Cassuto, A Commentary on the Book of Exodus, 259–63; Paul, Studies in the Book of the 
Covenant, 8–9. This is not the place to discuss the distinction between so-called ethical and civil laws. For 
an argument how these are likewise intermixed see Watts, Reading Law, 158. 
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brief look at two approaches for seeing a distinction between ritual and moral laws, 
represented by Jonathan Klawans and Benjamin Kilchör.149 
Jonathan Klawans has outlined criteria to differentiate laws relating to ritual 
impurity from those concerning moral impurity. He has given three characteristics that 
identify ritual impurity laws: (1) “The sources of ritual impurity are generally natural and 
more or less unavoidable,” (2) “It is not a sin to contract these impurities,” and (3) “these 
impurities convey an impermanent contagion.”150 By contrast, he outlines five 
characteristics of moral impurities: (1) they are a “direct consequence of sin,” (2) “there 
is no contact-contagion with moral impurity,” (3) “moral impurity leads to a long-lasting, 
if not permanent, degradation of the sinner and, eventually, of the land of Israel,”151 (4) 
moral impurity cannot be ameliorated by rites of purification, and (5) while טמא is used 
for both ritual and moral impurity, ּתֹוֵעָבה and נףח  are used exclusively for moral 
impurity.152 
Even though Klawans’ work forms a point of departure in distinguishing textually 
                                               
149 Cf. how Patrick distinguishes cultic and ethical laws. His rationale is that the cultic laws deal 
with holiness, while the ethical laws with justice and righteousness (Patrick, Old Testament Law, 190). But 
in my view, this distinction in not sustainable. Both portions seem to deal with both holiness and 
justice/righteousness. Lev 19 for example, commonly acknowledged as a mixture of ethical and cultic 
instructions, opens with an admonition to be holy (19:2). 
150 Jonathan Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), 23. 
151 Klawans writes: “With regard to the loci of impurity, certain sins can defile the land, while no 
ritual impurity can do so” (Klawans, Impurity and Sin, 37). 
152 Klawans, Impurity and Sin, 26. Moskala has analyzed the dietary laws of Gn 1–3; Lev 11; and 
Deut 14 and concludes that they belong to what he terms ‘natural/hereditary uncleanness,’ being linked to 
the creation order (Jiři Moskala, “The Laws of Clean and Unclean Animals in Leviticus 11: Their Nature, 
Theology, and Rationale (An Intertextual Study)” (Ph.D. diss., Andrews Universty, 1998)). For arguments 
against seeing moral impurity as metaphorical or figurative see Klawans, Impurity and Sin, 32–36. Cf. 
Maccoby, Ritual and Morality, 67, 92–94, 163, 202. 
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between moral and ritual laws, several arguments point to the interrelationship between 
them: (1) terminological overlap between laws relating to ritual and moral impurity in the 
word טמא being used for both systems, (2) the use of  ַאתּטָ ח  for the offering cleansing both 
from ritual and moral faults (Lev 4:2–3, 14; 5:1–8; 12:6; Num 6:14; 15:21–24, 27), (3) 
the close intermixture of so-called ethical and cultic material, as for example in Lev 19, 
and (4) borderline cases like the dietary laws (Lev 11; Deut 14:3–21),153 Sabbath (e.g. 
Exod 20:8–11; Deut 5:12–15),154 Levirate marriage (Deut 25:5–10), and Jubilee (Lev 25) 
that do not lend themselves easily to being characterized either as moral or cultic 
instructions. Klawans himself admits that he has not been able to conceptualize the 
overlap between the two systems, and for his purpose he is satisfied with emphasizing 
them as two separate systems:  
There can be no doubt, of course, that the two systems overlap in various ways. . . . 
The systems of impurity should not be associated so closely and at the same time 
removed too far from their greater context. . . . In the end, one cannot eliminate the 
possibility that the two impurity systems are connected on some deeper level. Yet 
none of the arguments in favor of such a view is persuasive. . . . It is best, therefore, 
to take the two systems on their own terms, especially since they are too often 
confused as it is. For now, it is best to let the emphasis fall on the distinction that 
ought to be made between ritual and moral defilements.155 
                                               
153 Cf. Klawans, Impurity and Sin, 32. 
154 Sabbath seems to belongs to moral (Exod 20:10; Deut 5:14–15 and letting those subject to 
oneself rest), cultic (Num 28:9–10 with additional sacrifice and Exod 25:30; Lev 24:7–8 with change of 
bread), civil (Exod 31:14–15; 35:2; Num 15:32–36), as well as animal welfare (Exod 23:12 and ox/donkey 
refreshed). Cf. Roy E. Gane, Old Testament Law for Christians: Original Context and Enduring 
Application (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2017), 175. See also pp. 173–78. 
155 Klawans, Impurity and Sin, 38. The reason why Klawans seems satisfied with holding the two 
systems apart is that he sees them as belonging to two separate compositions: “a scholarly consensus views 
Leviticus as a composite work. Leviticus 1–16, roughly, stems from the priestly source (P), while Leviticus 
17–26 (again, roughly) stems from the Holiness Code (H). Thus the two purity systems are articulated in 
two distinct literary constructs, and perhaps emerged in different milieus” (Klawans, Impurity and Sin, 41–
42. For the relative chronology of the origin of the two systems see Klawans, Impurity and Sin, 35). For 
critiques of Klawans’ view see David P. Wright, The Disposal of Impurity, SBLDS 101 (Atlanta: Scholars 
Press, 1987); Maccoby, Ritual and Morality; Jay Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement: The Priestly 
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While Klawans makes a good case for seeing distinctions between the ritual and 
moral impurity systems, his analysis still leaves the question of how to understand the 
textual overlap between the two unresolved. His analysis is therefore not entirely 
satisfactory. 
Other scholars have attempted to see a differentiation between ethical and cultic 
laws in the use of the lexemes ֻחִּקים and ִּמְׁשָּפִטים. I will here take Benjamin Kilchör’s 
discussion of this as representative. Following Dillmann, Weinfeld wrote: “The miṣwah 
seems to correspond to the basic stipulation of allegiance known to us from the treaties, 
or rather loyalty oaths, in the ancient Near East.” He saw Deut 5–11 as “devoted” to and 
to “constitute” the ִמְצָוה, in the meaning of a “basic demand for loyalty”, while ַהֻחִּקים
 included both the ִמְצָוה ,as beginning in 12:1.156 According to Braulik ְוַהִּמְׁשָּפִטים
paraenetic (Deut 6–11) and legal corpora (Deut 12–26).157 Kilchör brings the discussion 
of Weinfeld and Braulik on ִמְצָוה together with discussion of other scholars claiming that 
the ֻחִּקים refer to cultic regulations and ִּמְׁשָּפִטים to judicial matters.158 
                                               
Conceptions, Hebrew Bible Monographs 2 (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2005); Saul M. Olyan, 
Social Inequality in the World of the Text: The Significance of Ritual and Social Distinctions in the Hebrew 
Bible Journal of Ancient Judaism Supplements 4 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011). Cf. Israel 
Knohl’s thesis that the HS broadened the scope of holiness to integrate ethics and ritual in one sphere 
(Knohl, The Sanctuary of Silence). 
156 Weinfeld, Deuteronomy 1-11, 326–27. 
157 Georg Braulik, “Die Ausdrücke für 'Gesetz' im Buch Deuteronomium,” Biblica 51 (1970): 56. 
158 Kilchör summarizes: “Die מצוה beinhaltet also die חקים und מׁשפטים, ist aber grosser als jene 
und umfasst auch die paränetischen Kapitel Dtn 6–11. Die חקים und םמׁשפטי  beginnen mit Dtn 12,1, wobei 
der Zweiteilung חקים und מׁשפטים die Zweiteilung von Dtn 12,2–26,15 in Gesetze, die auf die 
Kultzentralisation bezogen sind (Dtn 12–18) und solche, die es nicht sind (Dtn 19–26) entsprechen dürfte. 
 .die Rechtsordnung” (Kilchör, Mosetora und Jahwetora, 6. Cf מׁשפטים ,bezeichnet die Kultsatzungen חקים
p. 329). Cf. Gordon H. Matties, Ezekiel 18 and the Rhetoric of Moral Discourse, SBLDS 126 (Atlanta, GA: 
Scholars Press, 1990), 179; Christoph Levin, “Über den 'Color Hieremianus' des Deuteronomiums,” in Das 
Deuteronomium und seine Querbeziehungen, ed. Timo Veijola (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
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There are some challenges with making this claim the rationale for singling out 
the ‘ethical’ instructions in this present study. First, the ִּמְׁשָּפִטים of the BC (Exod 21:1; 
24:3) include also cultic regulations (22:19, 28–30; 23:14–19; cf. 21:6; 22:7–8, 10, 17, 
27; 23:10–13, 25–33), and thus blurs the mentioned distinction between ֻחִּקים and 
 Neither is it clear how the HI fit into this picture. A case for making a distinction .ִּמְׁשָּפִטים
between ֻחִּקים and ִּמְׁשָּפִטים as referring to separate collections of cultic and ethical 
instructions only seems possible for the book of Deuteronomy, and even there it is based 
on a conjectural claim that ֻחִּקים correspond to Deut 12–18 and ִּמְׁשָּפִטים to Deut 19–26. 
Clear evidence seems wanting. 
Second, a further challenge with using ֻחִּקים and ִּמְׁשָּפִטים to demarcate cultic and 
ethical laws is that they are not used consistently in the legal material. Key passages 
speaking of  ְָּפִטיםִּמׁש  and ֻחִּקים/ ֻחֹּקת  are Exod 15:25 (cf. 24:12); Lev 18:4–5, 26, 19:37; 
20,22; 25:18; 26:15, 43, 46; Num 9:3; 35:29159; Deut 4:1, 5, 8, 14; 5:1; 11:32–12:1; 
26:16. But besides the singular uses of the terms we also find them with some variation in 
other couplets (ֻחֹּקת/ֻחִּקים and ִמְצֹות [Exod 15:26; Lev 26:3 Deut 4:40; 6:2; 10:13; 27:10; 
 Gen] ּתֹוָרה and ,ֻחֹּקת ,ִמְצֹות) Num 36:13]), and triplets] ִמְצֹות and ִּמְׁשָּפִטים ;[30:10 ;45 ,28:15
 ,ִמְצֹות Deut 5:31; 6:1; 7:11; 8:11; 26:17; 30:16]; and] ִּמְׁשָּפִטים and ,ֻחֹּקת/ֻחִּקים ,ִמְצֹות ;[26:5
 Deut 4:45; 6:20]), and quatrains] ִּמְׁשָּפִטים and ,ֻחִּקים ,ֵעְדֹות ;[Deut 6:17] ֻחִּקים and ,ֵעְדֹות
 .([Deut 11:1] ִמְצֹות and ,ִּמְׁשָּפִטים ,ֻחֹּקת ,ִמְׁשַמְרּת ;[Lev 26:15] ְּבִרית and ,ִמְצֹות ,ִּמְׁשָּפִטים ,ֻחֹּקת)
                                               
1996), 118; Udo Rüterswörden, “Die Dekalogstruktur des Deuteronomiums - Fragen an eine Annahme,” in 
Die Zehn Worte. Der Dekalog als Testfall der Pentateuchkritik, ed. Christian Frevel (Freiburg: Herder, 
2005), 114; Jack R. Lundbom, Deuteronomy. A Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2013), 235. 
159 In Num 35:29 we find the construct ְלֻחַּקת ִמְׁשָּפט. Should this combination be understood as an 
amalgamation of cultic and civil law, in that the life-span of the high priest becomes the temporal limit for 
how long a non-premediated murderer needs to stay in a city of refuge? 
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Given such variation it seems difficult to insist that the ֻחִּקים are the cultic laws while 
 .the ethical laws ִּמְׁשָּפִטים
Third, in the Sinaitic and post-Sinaitic passages where it seems possible to decide 
based on the context whether ֹחק refers to cultic or non-cultic regulations, Exodus–
Deuteronomy seems to use ֹחק consistently for cultic regulations (Exod 29:28; 30:21; Lev 
6:11, 15; 7:34; 10:11, 13–16; 24:9; Num 18:8, 11, 19; 30:17; Deut 16:12; cf. Gen 47:21; 
Exod 12:24), even if there are some pre-Sinaitic passages where ֹחק seems to be used of 
other regulations than strictly cultic (Gen 47:26; Exod 5:14; 18:16, 20). On the other side, 
 -seems to be used primarily for what we would term ethical instructions in both pre ִמְׁשָּפט
and post-Sinaitic passages (Gen 18:19, 25; 40:13; Exod 15:25; 21:1, 9, 31; 23:6; 24:3; 
Lev 19:15, 35; 24:22; 25:18; 26:15, 43, 46; Num 27:5, 11; 35:12, 24, 29; Deut 1:17; 5:1, 
31; 10:18; 16:18-19; 17:8-9, 11; 19:6; 21:17, 22; 24:17; 25:1; 27:19; 32:4, 41; 33:10, 21), 
but there are some uses of ִמְׁשָּפט with regulations that pertain to the cultic domain (Exod 
26:30; Lev 5:10; 9:16; Num 9:3, 14; 15:16, 24; 29:6, 18, 21, 24, 27, 30, 33, 37; Deut 
18:3) and the breastpiece of judgment (ֹחֶׁשן ִמְׁשָּפט) used for oracular judgment (Exod 
28:15, 29–30; Num 27:21). In Deut 12–26, even if ֹחק is only used in 16:12 and thus in 
the cultic section Deut 12–18, based on the use of ִמְׁשָּפט for regulations in Deut 16:18–19 
and 17:8-9, 11 it is not possible to maintain that ֻחִּקים is consistently characteristic of 
Deut 12–18 and ִּמְׁשָּפִטים to Deut 19–26. 
Therefore, we seem to be forced back to the observation that the combination of 
‘cultic’ and ‘ethical’ material in Torah is unique in the ANE. Paul Shalom writes 
regarding ANE sources: “There is a complete separation of secular and religious law: 
dīnu (law), kibsu (moral rules), and parṣu (religious orders) are never combined in a 
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single corpus. Legal rules, moreover, have no didactic purpose; they do not serve as a 
goal for pedagogic instruction.”160 This contrasts to Torah according to Cassuto, where 
we find “religious and ritual regulations alongside legal ordinances without 
differentiation, which is not the case . . . in codes of the neighbouring nations.”161 Again, 
this is supported by Kaufmann: “Peculiar to Israel was the organic blend of what 
elsewhere constituted three separate realms: the judicial, the moral, and the religious.”162 
Such comparative uniqueness of Torah deserves serious reflection. Before separating 
cultic and ethical laws, the phenomenon of their combination in Torah deserves proper 
attention. Whether they originally belonged to two separate sources or not, the fact that 
we find them already combined is unique when compared to ANE sources. According to 
Greenberg, it is YHWH as the transcendent referent in Torah—discussed above as an 
essential part of the biblical concept of covenantal instruction—that explains the 
intermingling of ‘ethical’ and ‘cultic’ material in Torah.163 
                                               
160 Paul, Studies in the Book of the Covenant, 8–9. 
161 Cassuto, A Commentary on the Book of Exodus, 263. Matties writes: “In both Priestly and 
Ezekiel traditions, holiness is undifferentiated in terms of ethical and cultic actions” (Matties, Ezekiel 18, 
202). 
162 Kaufmann, The Religion of Israel, 171. Cf. William W. Hallo, “New Moons and Sabbaths: A 
Case Study in the Contrastive Approach,” HUCA 48 (1977): 16; Berman, Created Equal, 100. 
163 Greenberg writes that “in the biblical theory the idea of the transcendence of the law receives a 
more thoroughgoing expression. Here God is not merely the custodian of justice or the dispenser of ‘truths’ 
to man, he is the fountainhead of the law, the law is a statement of his will. The very formulation is God’s; 
frequently laws are couched in the first person, and they are always referred to as ‘words of God’, never of 
man. Not only is Moses denied any part in the formulation of the Pentateuchal laws, no Israelite king is said 
to have authored a law code, nor is any king censured for so doing. The only legislator the Bible knows of 
is God; the only legislation is that mediated by a prophet (Moses and Ezekiel). This conception accounts 
for the commingling in the law corpora of religious and civil law and for the even more distinctively 
biblical combining of legal enactments and moral exhortations. The entire normative realm, whether in law 
or morality, pertains to God alone. So far as the law corpora are concerned there is no source of norm-
fixing outside of him. Conformably, the purpose of the laws is stated in somewhat different terms in the 
Bible than in Babylonia. To be sure, observance is a guarantee of well-being and prosperity (Exod. 
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Maccoby writes: “Ritual is about holiness, not about morality; yet it is also about 
morality at a second remove, for holiness is for the sake of morality.”164 And in the 
reverse, moral failure is dealt with through cultic cleansing (e.g. Lev 4–5). A question is 
whether the distinction between life and death helps us to understand better the 
interrelation of ‘ethical’ and ‘cultic’ elements in biblical law. Casting the question in such 
existential terms, life in Torah is defined as a holy and righteous life with a holy and 
righteous God (e.g. Lev 19). Instead of creating and imposing terminology such as 
‘cultic’ and ‘ethical’ and making them primary in our description of biblical law, 
beginning with concepts like ‘life’ and ‘death’, ‘holiness’ and ‘righteousness,’ might 
prove more fruitful in understanding the interrelation between the various instructions. 
The danger inherent to making a distinction between cultic and moral instructions is that 
we might lose the larger and more vital sense of a life lived in communion with a holy 
and righteous God. The two need to be kept in a constant dialectic, as each paints distinct 
yet complementary perspectives of life lived with YHWH. It is not a question of 
neglecting one for the other, not even of discarding their distinct domains. This is not to 
deny that they can be distinguished to a certain degree and said to describe different 
                                               
23:20ff.; Lev. 26; Deut. 11:13ff., etc.), but it is more: it sanctifies (Exod. 19:5; Lev. 19) and is accounted as 
righteousness (Deut. 6:25). There is a distinctively religious tone here fundamentally different in quality 
from the political benefits guaranteed in the cuneiform law collections” (Greenberg, “Some Postulates of 
Biblical Criminal Law,” 11). As noted above, Greenberg should here only be modified by the observations 
of Cassuto and LeFebvre, showing that persons in authority in ancient Israel could pass laws and 
regulations, even if they should be seen as ‘secular law,’ or better as ‘human law,’ in contrast to Torah as 
divine instruction (cf. Cassuto, A Commentary on the Book of Exodus, 260–1; LeFebvre, Collections, 
Codes, and Torah, 55–145). See also the discussion in LeFebvre, Collections, Codes, and Torah, 55–145. 
164 Maccoby, Ritual and Morality, 204. Of course, we could ask if holiness is for the sake of 
morality or vice versa. This needs to be left for another discussion. 
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aspects of the life with YHWH. Still, we always need to keep in mind that the two are 
fundamentally united in the covenantal instructions of Torah.165  
In the end, maybe a separation between the cultic and ethical laws is unavoidably 
anachronistic.166 As previously explained, I have chosen to primarily speak of proto-
                                               
165 For a discussion making the concepts of life and death central to an understanding of the so-
called cultic laws, see Maccoby, Ritual and Morality. He writes regarding the importance of retaining a 
distinction between ritual and morality, while not neglecting one for the other: “Yet neither the Hebrew 
Bible nor the rabbinic literature supports the abandonment of the distinction between ritual and morality” 
(Maccoby, Ritual and Morality, viii). And again: “A question for the twenty-first century is whether the 
erosion of ritual leads to a more focused morality or to the return of the demons” (Maccoby, Ritual and 
Morality, vii). 
Karel van der Toorn finds two categories throughout the ANE: what he calls ethics and etiquette, 
where the latter deals with proper behavior in regards to the gods—typically cultic matters (van der Toorn, 
Sin and Sanction, 27). On this basis, Fitzpatrick-McKinley finds that “the mixture of cultic rules (rules of 
religious etiquette) and behavioural rules (ethics) in the BC is in conformity with the wisdom-moral 
teaching of the ancient Near East and would not have appeared as odd to the ancient compilers” 
(Fitzpatrick-McKinley, The Transformation of Torah, 140–41). While this might be true, the distinction 
between ‘ethics’ and ‘etiquette’ are just different names for the more common distinction between ‘ethics’ 
and ‘cult’. Further, Fitzpatrick-McKinley’s conflation of ANE wisdom-moral teachings and BC seems to 
ignore the uniqueness of Torah in combining the two categories into one document. Clearly, their 
combination seemed more natural in an Israelite tradition when compared to other ANE traditions. 
Westbrook and Wells wrote: “In ancient legal systems, where deities were regarded as part of the system 
and divine sanctions were deemed as efficacious as human sanctions, the distinction between law and 
morality cannot be so sharply defined” (Westbrook and Wells, Everyday Law in Biblical Israel, 3). 
Christophe Nihan has pointed out how attempts to divide the material of Leviticus between ‘cultic 
laws’ and ‘holiness laws,’ or maybe we could say ‘moral laws,’ and between ‘law’ and ‘narrative’ have not 
proven to be satisfactory (Nihan, From Priestly Torah to Pentateuch, 77–78). This also corroborates seeing 
Torah as covenantal instruction. Further: “The two pairs sacred/profane and clean/unclean are not 
equivalent but form the basic coordinates of the entire cultic system of Leviticus” (Nihan, From Priestly 
Torah to Pentateuch, 93). And again: “As the center of a social and moral order that is divinely instituted, 
the sanctuary, with its internal divisions and boundaries, is the model, or even the scale, of all ethics: only 
inadvertent (בשגגה) transgressions of this divine order may be forgiven, while deliberate transgressions 
have no place in the community” (Nihan, From Priestly Torah to Pentateuch, 615). See also pp. 31, 69–79, 
108–10 for the larger literary and narrative unit the laws are inseparable from. For others who have also 
pointed out how the cultic and moral materials are intertwined see Christopher J. H. Wright, Living as the 
People of God: The Relevance of Old Testament Ethics (Leicester: Inter-Varisty Press, 1983), 152; 
Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 50; Milgrom, Leviticus, 6; Paul Grimley Kuntz, The Ten Commandments in 
History: Mosaic Paradigms for a Well-Ordered Society (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004), 6-9; Roy E. 
Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, ed. Terry Muck. NIVAC (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2004), 309; Roy E. 
Gane, "Covenant of Love: Syllabus for OTST620 Study of Covenant, Law, and Sabbath in the Bible," 
(Berrien Springs, MI: Seventh-day Adventist Theological Seminary Andrews University, 2007), 70. 
166 Martin Heidegger tried to revitalize a pre-socratic understanding of man, where ethics was not 
understood as a human product but something received from what man (Dasein) belongs to (Martin 
Heidegger, Brev om humanismen, trans. Eivind Tjønneland (Oslo: Cappelens, 2003), 46). Emmanuel 
Lévinas was influenced by Heidegger, but argued that ethics does not find its grounds in what man belongs 
to, but rather what man is separate from, what is different from us. For Lévinas ‘ethics’ is no longer one of 
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halakhic reuse, i.e. the reuse of instructions addressing the question of how to walk in 
YHWH’s ways. Still, the emphasis upon laws that are commonly called ‘ethical’ is 
apparent. The most reasonable justification for such a delimitation is grounded upon 
purely textual, rather than conceptual, parameters. I have chosen to focus on parallel 
passages between a selection from Torah (Decalogues in Exod 20 and Deut 5, the BC, HI 
and Deut 12–26) and the Prophets. Whether the passage would be classified as cultic or 
moral is therefore downplayed. We will see how the prophets often bring so-called 
‘cultic’ passages into the ‘ethical’ domain. For them, as well, there appears to be a 
fundamental connection between the two. 
Indicators of Reuse and Direction of Dependence 
Above I have argued that Torah should primarily be understood as normative 
covenantal instruction. This helps us understand the repetition with variation in proto-
halakhic reuse. I have also argued that there is an inner dynamic or dialogue between a 
holy and righteous life and the holy and righteous YHWH, and that we cannot artificially 
and reductively separate ‘ethical’ and ‘cultic’ instructions. This gives us a key to 
understand the interplay between ‘cultic’ and ‘ethical’ elements in proto-halakhic reuse. 
They belong together in a covenantal dialectic. 
Given the combined phenomenon of close correspondence and creativity in proto-
                                               
the classic disciplines of philosophy. He maintains that the ‘Other’ constitutes the original difference, and 
thus precedes all reflection. Thus Lévinas called ethics a ‘first philosophy.’ Cf. my Kenneth Bergland, 
“Den andre i det samme” (Cand. phil. thesis, University of Oslo, 2003). Cf. Martin Heidegger’s discussion 
on the pre-socratic concept of ethics in his “Letter on Humanism.” Emanuel Levinas has also challenged 
the understanding of ethics as one of the disciplines within philosophy, and instead called for viewing 
ethics as a First Philosophy. Cf. my Kenneth Bergland, “Den andre i det samme.” Levinas reveals a need 
for further awareness and study within biblical studies of the history of western ethics and how our ethical 
concepts influence our understanding of Hebrew cultic moral instruction. 
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halakhic reuse, we must, nevertheless, begin by establishing clear linguistic evidence of 
reuse before moving on to consider the direction of dependence or influence. 
Furthermore, without a firm basis for claiming literary reuse and direction of dependence 
between parallel passages, we cannot move on to the vital questions regarding the manner 
of appropriation, and the creative or inventive reuses of a literary source. 
Meir Malul distinguished between four types of possible sources for parallel 
passages:167 
1. Direct connection: A direct dependence of text B (borrower) upon text A 
(contributor). The question here is how to establish the direction of dependence. 
2. Mediated connection: Text B does not borrow from text A, but text C (mediating 
text or collection of texts) which in turn draws from text A. 
3. Common source: Text B1 and B2 both borrow from a common text A. 
4. Common tradition: Text B1 and B2 exhibit similar traits that can be attributed to a 
common tradition, be it literary, religious, legal, historiographic, etc.. This may 
resemble phenomenon 3, but is differentiated on the basis of the nature of the 
connection. 
In the following I will focus on direct literary dependence and reuse, meaning that it is 
points 1–3 that will be of interest. In regard to point 3 it is of course a major question 
whether the alleged common source is extant or simply hypothetical.168 
Regarding the question as to whether we should have a list of criteria or indicators 
for direction of dependence and reuse, we find that some scholars are reluctant to do so  
while others are more  
                                               
167  Malul, The Comparative Method, 89–91. He writes on p. 91: “It is not always possible to 
provide an answer to all the above-raised questions and to reach fine distinctions as to the nature and type 
of connection. In most cases one can determine only the existence of a connection, without being able to 
determine its direction, nature, or type. Also, in the actual process of comparison, it is not necessary that 
each of the above questions suggest itself separately; it is more natural that all, or most, of them are under 
study all the time, and one has to bear them in mind and examine the sources under comparison in their 
light.” 
168 Cf. Kilchör, Mosetora und Jahwetora, 40. 
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affirmative. Jeffrey Stackert belongs to the former group, and writes: 
Though my analysis considers many of the measures developed by other scholars in 
their considerations of literary dependence among various ancient texts, I have chosen 
not to apply any existing set of criteria for characterizing the legal revisions examined 
here. Instead, I will focus upon the particularities of each example of proposed 
literary reuse, and my method of analyzing legal parallels will grow out of these 
textual comparisons. Put differently, this study presumes no litmus tests for 
determining literary dependence. While my analysis exhibits a certain methodological 
consistency . . . , it also confirms that the contingencies of each example of revision 
necessitate a slightly different approach.169 
Richard Schulz reminds us that “no criteria are adequate to prove infallibly that 
borrowing has occurred in one direction rather than the other.”170 We are unavoidably 
dealing with “degrees of probability.”171 
While a reluctance for establishing criteria for reuse and direction of dependence 
is understood, at the same time, we are not well served by failing to reflect upon what 
textual elements should constitute a strong case for reuse and direction of dependence. 
Without such reflection a reader might find specific or isolated parallels very convincing 
that in a more general light would appear weak. As Carr formulates it: “Any such tools 
must still be used with care by someone conscious of a broad range of data and texts 
relevant to the case at hand. Still, as we have seen – not all tools used by scholars in the 
past appear equally useful. At the minimum, we should start with tools that have some 
justification in clear or relatively clear cases of dependence. The burden of proof lies on 
those who would argue for a wholly intuitive approach.”172 What, at times, appears to be 
                                               
169 Stackert, Rewriting the Torah, 25. 
170 Schultz, Search for Quotation, 112. 
171 Schultz, Search for Quotation, 231. 
172 David M. Carr, “Method in Determination of Direction of Dependence: An Empirical Test of 
Criteria Applied to Ex 34:11–26 and Its Parallels,” in Gottes Volk am Sinai. Untersuchungen zu Ex 32–34 
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intractable disagreement over reuse and direction of dependence between HI and D 
illustrates the danger of operating without a generally agreed-upon set of textual 
principles regarding direction of dependence. 
Rather than imposing ‘criteria’ as a set of rules to which literary parallels need to 
conform to in order to be determined as verifiable cases of reuse and direction of 
dependence, I rather adopt certain ‘indicators’ that can aid us in becoming more sensit ive 
to textual phenomena that might imply reuse and the direction of dependence. The 
sensitivity to the unique characteristics of each passage and parallel, of which Stackert 
speaks, should be a constant reminder as we deal with the various passages. Literary 
dependence can take subtle forms, and it is necessary to exercise sensitivity to textual 
nuances.173 There is a case to be made for not establishing rigid sets of criteria or 
checklists in order to determine literary reuse and direction of dependence prior to a close 
reading of the texts. Our limited knowledge of ANE literary reuse, the infancy of studies 
on ANE and inner-biblical literary reuse, and the fluidity and elusiveness of literary 
influence and reuse are all reasons we should be careful not to pre-determine or set in 
stone what inner-biblical reuse should look like. 
I would also point out that there has been a reciprocal and dynamic relationship 
between the analysis of the parallel passages, and the question as to how to determine 
which cases actually represent instances of reuse and direction of dependence. As 
                                               
und Dtn 9–10, eds. Matthias Köckert and Erhard Blum (Gütersloh: Gütersloher, 2001), 126. 
173 Cf. Kilchör, Mosetora und Jahwetora, 34–35; Richard B. Hays, Echoes of Scripture in the 
Letters of Paul (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 29–32. 
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Tooman states, “It should be stressed, however, that my evaluation of the data was not 
driven entirely by my methodology. The methodology was, in equal measure, informed 
by the data. In other words, the criteria discussed below were used as preliminary 
criteria.”174 It follows that there has been a kind of circularity in the process of 
identifying the indicators of reuse and direction of dependence, given that the objective or 
“preliminary” criteria are, themselves, identified by on-going observations of reuse and 
direction of dependence in the textual material. These observations are, in turn, used to 
identify further cases of reuse which, again, can expose further possible indicators of 
reuse and direction of dependence. It follows that the emergence of such indicators of 
reuse and direction of dependence assumes a process of trial and error in which some 
indicators have been invalidated when tested against concrete textual cases, while other 
indicators appear to stand such tests in an open ended process of gradual elimination or 
affirmation. 
For purposes of establishing the direction of dependence, I concur with Benjamin 
Kilchör’s following six principles:175 
 
1. No model of textual composition should be presupposed. 
                                               
174 William A. Tooman, Gog of Magog: Reuse of Scripture and Compositional Technique in 
Ezekiel 38–39 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 24. 
175 Kilchör, Mosetora und Jahwetora, 35–36. For an earlier version of this lists see Benjamin 
Kilchör, “The Direction of Dependence between the Laws of the Pentateuch: The Priority of a Literary 
Approach,” Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 89 (2013): 4. Here he writes: “Any theory about the 
relationship of the different laws and legislations in the Pentateuch should start with comparisons of all 
available texts on a literary level. Any approach that starts either from theories won out of the narratives of 
the Pentateuch or from religio-historical development models as well as any approach that starts not by 
comparing all available texts, is less objective than the approach presented here” (Kilchör, “The Direction 
of Dependence,” 13). 
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2. No theory of the history of religion should be used to determine the direction of 
dependence. A theory of the history of religion should be determined by a study 
of the text, not the reverse.176 
3. The study of direction of dependence should take as its departure the final form of 
the text, not a reconstruction of a text that is not attested among the 
manuscripts.177 
4. Given a case where more than two passages are parallel, all should be studied 
together in determining the direction of dependence. 
5. The literary relationships between two texts should be determined prior to the 
relationship of their content, since observations on content in principle can be 
explained in both directions. 
6. Attention should be given to context to see whether the order of texts could be 
explained through the order of one or more other texts. 
A close and broad reading of the textual material is thus primary, while the reader 
attempts to bracket out presuppositions—whatever they might be—that might hinder him 
or her from seeing the whole picture. 
I have found the grouping of what I prefer to call “indicators” of reuse and 
direction of dependence proposed by Michael Lyons and William Tooman to also be 
                                               
176 Kilchör quotes Stackert at this point: “My historical determinations, however, are based upon 
the available evidence, i.e., the texts themselves, and not upon a reconstructed history of Israel and its 
religion. While the latter may appear helpful for interpreting texts, and may even be useful in the 
formulation of theories concerning the relationship between the legal corpora, to rely upon a reconstruction 
of the history of Israel and its religion is to rely upon a scholarly construct and not upon real, tangible 
evidence. The most reliable foundation, therefore, from which to proceed is one that is squarely centered in 
the biblical text itself. Moreover, if the relationship between the pentateuchal legal corpora can be 
established at the literary level, reconstructions of Israelite history can proceed from such analyses with 
greater certainty” (Stackert, Rewriting the Torah, 19). Cf. Kilchör, Mosetora und Jahwetora, 36. 
177 Kilchör here gives another thoughtful quote, this time by Van Seters: “I do not believe that 
redactors should be at the arbitrary disposal of exegetes in order to solve problems of compositional history 
that are inconvenient to one’s theory. That some redactional activity is evident within the law codes I am 
quite willing to affirm. But invoking the presence of redactional activity in any particular text may not be 
the only or the best explanation of its compositional history. This means that I do not begin the 
investigation of the compositional history of CC by an analysis of its structure and the form critical 
differentiation of its individual units. This may be useful at some stage, but it has so consistently prejudiced 
the whole inner-biblical comparison of codes that it should be postponed. Pattern seems to be much more in 
the eye of the beholder than instrinsic to the document. There can be no compositional history of CC until 
its relationship with DC and HC, as well as other relevant texts of the Old Testament, is clearly 
established” (John Van Seters, “Cultic Laws in the Covenant Code and their Relationship to Deuteronomy 
and the Holiness Code,” in Studies in the Book of Exodus. Redaction – Reception – Interpretation, ed. Marc 
Vervenne, BETL  (Leuven: University Press, 1996), 312). 
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helpful,178 even if I have also found it necessary to modify them somewhat based on my 
analysis of the concrete textual cases that I have considered. If we are sensitive to the 
nuances and unique features of the individual passages we are studying,179 the following 
indicators can be helpful for establishing a case of reuse: 
1. Uniqueness: an element, i.e. a lexeme, morpheme, or syntax, is unique to the two 
parallel passages. 
2. Distinctiveness: an element may not be exclusive to two parallel texts, but it is 
demonstrable that it is specifically associated with a particular antecedent text.180 
3. Inversion: According to ‘Seidel’s law’ inversion may be a sign of reuse.181 
4. Availability of options: if various ways of formulating an idea is attested in a 
language, a shared specific formulation may indicate reuse. 
5. Thematic correspondence: similar subject, theme, or argument between two 
passages. 
6. Multiplicity: extensive parallels, even of common elements, may add support to a 
case for reuse. 
For the direction of dependence I use the following indicators: 
1. Reference to a source: one passage introduces the parallels with a citation formula 
or some kind of indication that it is borrowing from a source text, a text with a 
profile significantly similar to the parallel text. 
2. Modification: one of the passages appropriates another passage by modifying it to 
its own context. 
3. Lack of integration: elements might also be insufficiently integrated in the 
borrowing text. Person, number, gender and other syntactical issues might remain 
unaltered, creating syntactical disruptions in the dependent text.182 
                                               
178 Lyons, From Law to Prophecy, 47–75; Tooman, Gog of Magog, 23–35. 
179 Cf. Stackert, Rewriting the Torah, 25. 
180 There seems to be a certain overlap between ‘distinctiveness’ and ‘thematic correspondence’. 
The former sees how a lexeme is used semantically in context, or in other words, how the lexeme is used 
thematically. 
181 Literary structure might also be an indicator for identifying a case of reuse. In the following we 
will study Jer 7 and Ezek 18, where the internal structure of the passage seems to support seeing the 
individual allusive elements as reuse. This relates to Seidel’s law, as the order of elements might play a 
part. Both parallel order and reversed order might be of significance. 
182 Some scholars use PNG(Person, Number, Gender)-shifts as argument for direction of 
dependence. Cf. Stackert, Rewriting the Torah, 47, 126, 128, 146–47, 152, 161; Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 
23–27: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB (New York: Doubleday, 2001), 2155–
 
 104 
4. Conflation and recombination: if one passage appears to enrich parallels from one 
or more other passages in the HB, may indicate dependence of the former upon 
the sources that are conflated and/or recombined.183 
5. Lexical dependence: a lexeme or phrase might not be used by an author any other 
place than where the text parallels another, indicating influence from the source 
text. 
6. Conceptual dependence: the meaning and implications of one text might not be 
understandable unless information from the other is supplied. 
7. Linguistic dating: as language may differ between texts clearly belonging to 
different periods, and some characteristics of a language may disappear or occur 
over time, use of linguistic elements to date texts to different periods can be an aid 
in establishing the relative chronology between parallel texts.184 
8. Metaphor and wordplay: when a case of reuse has already been established, and 
one of the texts uses a concept metaphorically that is meant literally in the other 
text, this might indicate that the former is dependent on the latter. Further, if reuse 
between two passages is established, word play in one of the texts on key 
concepts in the other could indicate dependence. 
9. Multiplicity: the accumulation of several indicators of a direction of dependence 
pointing in the same direction strengthen the overall argument. 
Simply put, when studying parallel passages to determine whether there is a case for 
reuse, we are always looking to assess the degree of similarity. But, once a case for reuse 
has been identified, it is especially important to also note the dissimilarities, since it is the 
dissimilarities that often prove most helpful in determining the direction of dependence. 
In this chapter I have focused on how to characterize the instructive material of 
the Torah. I have argued that by employing the concept of covenantal instruction, we are 
                                               
56; Kilchör, Mosetora und Jahwetora, 140. For the phenomena of PNG-shifts in Hittites treaties see 
Weeks, Adminition and Curse, 71, 87, 139–40. 
183 Cf. Carr, “Method in Determination of Direction of Dependence,” 126. In some cases 
conflation can just as well be explained as an elaboration by the other text. Then conflation/elaboration is 
only an indicator of reuse, not direction of dependence. In other cases, it may be difficult to explain it as an 
elaboration. In such cases it seems reasonable to explain it as a conflation, and as an argument for the 
direction of dependence. The clearest case of such conflation is seen when two sources are combined in a 
third, in a manner that cannot be reasonably explained as having the other direction of dependence. But 
there might also be examples of conflation from only one source text. This is the reason why in the second 
part of this study I will list conflation sometimes as an indicator of reuse and other times as an indicator of 
the direction of dependence. 
184 Cf. relevant studies by Avi Hurvitz, Aaron Hornkohl and Jan Joosten in the bibliography. 
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better prepared to appreciate both the close parallels or similarities as observed in cases 
of reuse, and, also, the evidence of creative or free innovation in proto-halakhic reuse. In 
the next chapter I turn to what can be gleaned from the textual material in order to 
understand how ancient authors and readers related to the various means whereby revered 
texts were received. I will argue that the practice of memorization and embodiment of 
revered texts also help us understand the purpose of the dual phenomenon of close 










SCRIBAL ENCULTURATION AND EMBODIED TORAH 
 
“Why should I memorize something  
I can so easily get from a book?” 
(Albert Einstein) 
In the previous chapter I argued that the legal material of Torah should best be 
understood as normative covenantal instruction. I argued that the concept of normative 
covenantal instruction seems to best account for the dual phenomenon—often seen in the 
same passages—of creative and exact reuse. It can also be described as repetition with 
variation. Instead of explaining this phenomenon by means of source criticism as 
representing different redactional layers by scribes with different standards for reuse, or, 
alternatively, through more traditional harmonizations that reduce the multifaceted 
perspective of the texts to a unified ideological system, I have rather suggested that it 
should be understood as reflecting the characterization of Torah as normative covenantal 
instruction. 
By rejecting the legislative model as an appropriate standard for Torah, we can 
better understand why cases of reuse of Torah in the HB do not belong to the literalistic 
type of reuse we are accustomed to in applications of modern jurisprudence. In Torah’s 
covenantal character, YHWH becomes the ultimate reference, not the literary 
formulations themselves. The Torah-instructions do therefore not introduce a “rule of 
law,” but find their origin, transcendental referent, and even possible revisions with 
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YHWH, thus they are contingent upon YHWH. Put differently, the individual Israelite is 
primarily obliged to maintain his covenantal relation to YHWH; the instructions function 
didactically to facilitate a holy and righteous way of life together with a holy and 
righteous God. The instructions are never an end in themselves. The goal is a covenantal 
form of life between YHWH and his people not a praxis of law-keeping for its own sake.  
In the following I would like to propose that this dual phenomenon of exact 
repetition with creative variation belongs to an integrated scribal technique and along an 
exact-creative reuse continuum. A scribe would thus be entitled—and even expected—to 
move freely in-between the two poles of exact and creative reuse. Of course, an ancient 
Israelite scribe and reader would likely not think in terms of such poles, since we see that 
the normative literary strategy in ancient times was repetition with variation. Our own 
preferred modern standard for exact quotation clearly does not find expression in the HB. 
It therefore would appear that we should not be put-off or bothered by creative reuse 
when we discover it alongside relatively exact reuse in the HB.1 Furthemore, if we accept 
that repetition with variation was normative in the HB, it follows that a new burden of 
proof rests upon those who insist that a phraseological variation represents an ideological 
or sociological conflict behind two passages.2 
                                               
1 Even in cases of extensive verbatim citation in the HB, like the Decalogues (Exod 20; Deut 5) 
and the parallels between Kings and Chronicles, we do find alterations, as well. These examples rather tend 
to confirm the claim that biblical scribes did not feel constrained to reproduce their source verbatim. 
Rather, the norm appears to have involved the alteration of the source where the scribe saw this was 
needed. It therefore seems reasonable to take modification as the norm in reuse in the HB, and we should 
rather be surprised when we do find extensive exact reuse and then ask what special reasons the scribe 
might have had for doing so—the reverse of our expectation according to modern biblical criticism. 




While it would be problematic to attempt to identify a case of reuse without a 
certain degree of substantial evidence in the form of parallel lexemes or phrases; this does 
not mean it is assumed that all cases of reuse must strictly conform to a pre-determined 
set of objective criteria. Nevertheless, I will exclude less clear cases from consideration 
on the practical grounds that they would not provide the requisite basis for securing a 
scholarly concensus. It therefore appears advisible to limt the discussion to cases of 
relatively clear exact reuse since it is at this end of the exact-creative continuum of reuse 
where we find the clearest indicators of reuse. 
In addition to examining the question as to how Torah should be characterized, as 
in the previous chapter, I want also to approach the dual phenomenon from the question 
of the literary culture of ancient Israel. This makes relevant the question as to how scribes 
worked with revered texts and how their audience would perceive and receive their 
literary productions. We will see how revered texts were to be memorized and embodied, 
again shedding light on how we find creative and exact reuse of Torah. I believe this 
complements the discussion of the dual phenomenon of reuse in the previous chapter. 
I will begin with a brief survey of scribal enculturation in the ANE, before I turn 
to the question of orality, writing, and memorization in ancient Israel. My aim is again 
not to be exhaustive or comprehensive, but rather to include observations that might 
sensitize us, as readers, to the literary culture that informed the cases of reuse that will be 
discussed in the present study. Additionally, in a way similar to how I identified possible 
‘indicators’ for reuse and dependence direction as found in the previous chapter, I will 
end this section by discussing possible indicators for memorized covenantal instruction.  
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Scribal Enculturation in the ANE 
David Carr has argued that the ANE scribal culture both in Mesopotamia and 
Egypt was to use written texts as an aid to preserve, memorize, and be initiated into the 
culture represented by the ancient revered texts.3 In Plato’s Phaedrus we find a reflection 
on the relation between writing and memory, placed in the mouth of Socrates. He 
recounts how the inventor god Theuth came to the supreme god Thamus to present his 
inventions, the art of writing as one of them: 
 The story goes that Thamus said much to Theuth, both for and against each art, which 
it would take too long to repeat. But when they came to writing, Theuth said: “O 
King, here is something that, once learned, will make the Egyptians wiser and will 
improve their memory; I have discovered a potion for memory and for wisdom.” 
Thamus, however, replied: “O most expert Theuth, one man can give birth to the 
elements of an art, but only another can judge how they can benefit or harm those 
who will use them. And now, since you are the father of writing, your affection for it 
has made you describe its effects as the opposite of what they really are. In fact, it 
will introduce forgetfulness into the soul of those who learn it: they will not practice 
using their memory because they will put their trust in writing, which is external and 
depends on signs that belong to others, instead of trying to remember from the inside, 
completely on their own. You have not discovered a potion for remembering, but for 
reminding; you provide your students with the appearance of wisdom, not with its 
reality. Your invention will enable them to hear many things without being properly 
taught, and they will imagine that they have come to know much while for the most 
part they will know nothing. And they will be difficult to get along with, since they 
will merely appear to be wise instead of really being so.4 
                                               
3 Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart. For memorization of dharma, indicated by the form of 
composition, see Lingat, The Classical Law of India, 18. Cf. Fitzpatrick-McKinley, The Transformation of 
Torah, 149. Projecting our concepts of the relative instability of an oral culture in contrast to a written, 
many have questioned the ability to preserve texts orally over time. Recent studies have shown the possible 
stability of oral transmission. E.g. Nielsen, Oral Tradition, 18–19; Albert Lord, The Singer of Tales 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960); Frank H. Polak, “Book, Scribe, and Bard: Oral 
Discourse and Written Text in Recent Biblical Scholarship,” Prooftexts 31, no. 1–2 (2011): 132. See also 
Niditch, Oral World and Written Word, 4–9, 78–88; Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 6–7. 
4  Plato, “Phaedrus,” in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 
1997), 551–52 (274c–75b). Cf. §275d as well. Socrates continues a little later, comparing the ‘seed’ of the 
“just, noble, and good” to a farmer planting his seed, stating that the author “won’t be serious about writing 
them in ink, sowing them, through a pen, with words that are as incapable of speaking in their own defense 
as they are of teaching the truth adequately. . . . When he writes, it’s likely he will sow gardens of letters for 
the sake of amusing himself, storing up reminders for himself ‘when he reaches forgetful old age’ and for 
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Thamus’ warning is uncomfortably symptomatic of our educational systems these days; 
reminders without memory, knowledge without wisdom, and fame without virtue. The 
question to be addressed here, however, is whether or not there is a necessary mutual 
exclusion between memory and writing. When for example Deut 6:6–9 and 11:18–19 
encourage to keep the Torah-instructions on the heart and inscribe them on hand, 
forehead, and objects in the external surrounding, does this signal Torah’s own undoing? 
Does the composition of Torah undermine the living memory of Torah? Does Torah’s 
wisdom regarding how to live become more distant with its own inscription, and, 
likewise, does the inscription of covenantal instructions degrade the actual covenantal 
relationship? Whether Plato’s or the Torah’s understanding of writing aids or detracts 
from memory is not the question here. As will be argued below, according to ANE and 
biblical culture, memory and writing do not seem to be perceived as mutually exclusive 
practices, instead writing appears to be used as an aide-memoire in order to further a text-
supported living memory and embodiment of a Torah-form of life.5 
                                               
everyone who wants to follow in his footsteps, and will enjoy seeing them sweetly blooming. . . . But it is 
much nobler to be serious about these matters, and use the art of dialectics. The dialectician chooses a 
proper soul and plants and sows within it discourse accompanied by knowledge—discourse capable of 
helping itself as well as the man who planted it, which is not barren but produces a seed from which more 
discourse grows in the character of others. Such discourse makes the seed forever immortal and renders the 
man who has it as happy as any human being can be” (Plato, “Phaedrus,” 553 (276c–77a). While authors 
the HB and Plato might thus have different views of the efficiency of texts as aide-memoire, there 
nevertheless seems to be a commonality in the dialectical approach of the two aiming at producing fruits in 
the characters of persons from the verbal seeds sown. 
5 Regarding the idea of development or not with the invention of writing, Nielsen’s comment is 
worth pondering: “Cult and religion are always rather immune to technical improvements, are always 
wedded to tradition” (Nielsen, Oral Tradition, 24). Carasik picks up the debate on the relationship between 
writing, orality, and memory, and describes writing as possibly relating to memory in opposite ways: “As a 
method of processing information, writing may be the ally of memory or its enemy” (Carasik, Theologies 
of the Mind, 56). William W. Hallo supports the claim that writing can support memory in that “the fixation 
of the order [of the alphabet] . . . was in fact a mnemonic device which helped the rapid spread of the West 




In the following I try to describe the presuppositions that appear to inform proto-
halakhic reuse of Torah in order to better understand the dual phenomenon of exact and 
creative reuse of the instructive material. It appears to be the case that the biblical authors 
saw writing as a necessary aid to memorizing or learning by heart previous instructions, 
contrary to Plato, as will be explained further. 
We can begin with a few statements taken from Mesopotamian compositions 
describing its scribal culture. The Mesopotamian edubba, i.e. the scribal school, is 
evoked in a riddle found in some of their educational texts: 
A house based on a foundation like the skies, 
A house one has covered with a veil like a (secret), tablet box, 
A house set on a base like a ‘goose’, 
One enters it blind, 
Leaves it seeing. 
Answer: The School.6 
The “opened eyes” were conceived in terms of forming humanity within, as a Sumerian 
student says to his teacher: “Master god who (shapes?) humanity, my god you (verily) are 
Like a puppy you have opened my eyes, you have formed humanity in me.”7 Gadd finds 
this statement to reflect “the intellectual snobbery of the scribes” even denying “the name 
                                               
6 Miguel Civil, “Sumerian Riddles: A Corpus,” Aula Orientalis 5 (1987): 20. Carr, Writing on the 
Tablet of the Heart, 31 renders the last lines as “With eyes closed one enters it, With opened eyes one 
comes out, Riddle answer: the Edubba.” 
7 In the original publication of this text Van Dijk renders it as follows: “Maître, dieu! qui [. . . ] à 
l'homme, vous êtes mon dieu! Comme un petit chien vous m’avez ouvert les yeux, vous avez formé en moi 
l’Homme! (humanitatem mihi fecisti!)” (J. J. A. van Dijk, La Sagesse Suméro-Accadienne: Recherches sur 
les Genres Littéraires des Textes Sapientiaux (Leiden: Brill, 1953), 24). Here I give the translation in C. J. 
Gadd, Teachers and Students in the Oldest Schools: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered on 6 March 1956 
(London: School of Oriental and African Studies of the University of London, 1956), 15–16. Cf. Carr, 
Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 17. Relevant for the question of social control and sanctions, as touched 
upon in the previous chapter, the use of physical abuse seems to have been a common ingredient in 
Mesopotamian educational philosophy (Gadd, Teachers and Students, 22). 
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of men” to “the laity, untutored masses.”8 I’ll return to the question of scribal elitism 
below. In Mesopotamian educational culture the ideal appears to have been to learn 
revered texts thoroughly; to know them by heart. In the “Erra and Ishum” we read: “The 
scribe who learns it [i.e. the present text] will survive even in enemy country, and will be 
honored in his own, In the shrine of craftsmen where they ever proclaim my name, I shall 
make them wise [Lit. ‘I shall make them open their ears’].”9 The same ideal is found in 
tablet VII of “Enūma Elish,” where pondering the fifty names of Marduk is encouraged: 
“The wise and knowledgeable should ponder (them) together, The Master should repeat, 
and make the pupil understand.”10 This corroborates the idea of repetition and reflection 
of compositions whether written or oral. In Assurbanipal’s hymn for Shamash the ideal of 
memorizing—or learning by heart—the revered texts is made more explicit: “Whoever 
learns this text by heart and honors the judge of the gods, Shamash may he bring into 
esteem his [words], make good his command over the people.”11 
                                               
8 Gadd, Teachers and Students, 13. 
9 "Erra and Ishum," trans. Stephanie Dalley (COS 1: 1.113:416). Cf. Nielsen, Oral Tradition, 19. 
Even if we have above seen that LH was not used as source in court, still in the epilogue we find an 
encouragement to read the collection out to a plaintiff: “Let any wronged man who has a lawsuit come 
before the statue of me, the king of justice, and let him have my inscribed stela read aloud to him, thus may 
he hear my precious pronouncements and let my stela reveal the lawsuit for him; may he examine his case, 
may he calm his (troubled) heart, (and may he praise me)” (Martha T. Roth, Law Collections from 
Mesopotamia and Asia Minor, WAW (Atlanta, GA: SBL, 1995), 134). 
10 "Epic of Creation (Enūma Elish)," COS 1 1.111:402. Cf.  Nielsen, Oral Tradition, 20. 
11 "An Assurbanipal Hymn for Shamash," trans. Alasdair Livingstone (COS 1: 1.143:474). Cf. 
Nielsen, Oral Tradition, 20. On the lack of innovation among Assurbanipal’s scribes see Fitzpatrick-
McKinley, The Transformation of Torah, 169. For how Hammurabi in the prologue of LH is called an 
emqum, a wise man, a designation usually used for scribes rather than judges, see F. R. Kraus, “Ein 
zentrales Problem des altmesopotamischen Rechts: Was ist der Kodex Hammurabi?,” Genava 8 (1960): 
284–90; Jackson, “From Dharma to Law,” 497; Roth, Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor, 
79; Fitzpatrick-McKinley, The Transformation of Torah, 114–15. 
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Speaking of “Erra and Ishum” and “Enūma Elish,” we find the mention of the 
divine book Tablet of Destinies, so craved by the gods due to its potency. Eggleston 
claims that the descriptions here portray the gods as authors and editors and the divine 
books as open for revision: “Scribes portrayed divine books such as the Tablets of 
Destinies as documents in flux, open for revision when their divine holders deemed such 
a course of action necessary. . . . In spite of the fact that the tablet was ‘unchangeable,’ 
the king prays for divine favor in the shape of a beneficial inscription.”12 He quotes 
Marduk from “Erra and Ishum”: “Babylon, whom I have taken in my hands like the 
Tablet of Destinies and will not deliver to anyone else.”13 Also relevant is the mention in 
“Enūma Elish” of Tiamat who illegitimately gave Qingu the Tablet of Destinies (I:157, 
II:43, III:47, 105), and how Marduk took it away from him (IV:121), finally stating 
(V:69–70): “[The tablet] of destinies, which he [Marduk] took from Qingu and brought 
away, As the foremost gift he took away, he presented (it) to Anu.”14 Also in “The 
Akkadian Anzu Story” we hear of the monstrous bird Anzu stealing the Tablet of 
Destinies from Enlil. Regarding the motivation for his usurping of divine power he states: 
“I myself will take the gods’ Tablet of Destinies and gather the assignments of all the 
gods. I will win the throne, be the master of the offices! I will give command to all the 
Igigi!”15 This is exactly what he does much to the terror of the gods. Although not made 
                                               
12 Eggleston, "See and Read All These Words", 84. 
13 "Erra and Ishum," COS 1 1.113:413. 
14 "Epic of Creation (Enūma Elish)," COS 1 1.111:393–99. 
15 "The Akkadian Anzu Story," trans. Marianna Vogelzang (COS 3: 3.147:328). 
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explicit in the narrative, the possessor of the Tablet of Destinies appears to be able to edit 
the tablet and thus able, as well, to determine the destinies of both gods and men. As will 
be seen, this concept of fluidity within divine texts is also relevant for Torah and its 
historical trajectory.16 
The following passages from Egypt also stress memorization and embodiment of 
revered texts. In the Egyptian “Satirical Letter,” describing an educated scribe, it is 
written: “You are, of course, a skilled scribe at the head of his fellows, and the teaching 
of every book is incised on your heart.”17 Even if the description is here given in satirical 
terms, it illustrates how a scribal ideal was to have books written on one’s heart. In the 
Egyptian Instruction of Any we find that Any asked his son to memorize written wisdom, 
to “study the writings, put them on your heart” (20.4–5). At the same time the instruction 
ends with a reflection by Any’s son, Khonsuhotep, where he points out how 
memorization without understanding and embracing them is deficient: 
The son, he understands little 
When he recites the words in the books. 
But when your words please the heart, 
The heart tends to accept them with joy. 
Don’t make your virtues too numerous, 
That one may raise one’s thoughts to you; 
A boy does not follow the moral instructions, 
Though the writings are on his tongue!18 
                                               
16 For a study of literary variation in Sumerian compositions see (Delnero, “Variation in Sumerian 
Literary Compositions,” 1848–49). 
17 As translated by Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 8. Hans-Werner Fischer-Elfert, Die 
satirische Streitschrift des Papyrus Anastasi I: Übersetzung und Kommentar (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 
1986), 94 renders it: “Du bist doch der erfahrene Schreiber an der Spitze seiner Kollegen. Die Lehre aller 
Bücher ist eingraviert in dein Herz.” 
18 "Instruction of Any," trans. Miriam Lichtheim (COS 1: 114). Cf. Carr, Writing on the Tablet of 
the Heart, 75. This also relates to Muffs’ point in Love and Joy, discussed in the previous chapter, showing 
the importance of a voluntary embrace of the instructions of Torah. Cf. Michael V. Fox, “Wisdom and the 
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A scribe’s task therefore consisted not only of inscribing a text on clay tablets, skin, 
papyrus, or other material, but also on one’s own lips and heart.19 Orality and writing 
functioned together so the scribe could both transmit but also perform and embody the 
treasured tradition.20 
Carr writes: “Prospective members of the ruling class were inducted into that 
class through having these cultural texts ‘in their heart’. Doing so made one, for the first 
time, into a full human being.”21 As with the Mesopotamian student mentioned above, it 
seems to have been an ideal in both Mesopotamia and Egypt that having the revered texts 
memorized initiated one into true humanity. In other words, the one who knew the 
cultural ‘canon’ was seen as belonging to true humanity. Carr finds differences between 
Egypt and Mesopotamia, whereas with Egypt “we find a culture that is, if anything, even 
more textually oriented than the cultures of ancient Mesopotamia. . . . Indeed, writing had 
immense prestige in Egypt. It was seen as a means of overcoming the faults of memory 
and as a tool from the gods.”22 And given the philosophical discussion about the visual 
versus the audible, the lack of any skepticism in Egypt towards writing is worth noting: 
“There is no Egyptian critique of writing, such as that found in Chinese or Greek 
                                               
Self-presentation of Wisdom Literature,” in Reading from Right to Left: Essays on the Hebrew Bible in 
Honour of David J. A. Clines, eds. J. Cheryl Exum and H. G. M. Williamson, JSOTSup 373 (Sheffield: 
Sheffield Academic Press, 2003), 153–72. 
19 Nielsen, Oral Tradition, 28. 
20 Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 7, 18. Cf. pp. 53, 74. For more on the Egyptian scribal 
culture see Alan H. Gardiner, “The Mansion of Life and the Master of the King's Largess,” The Journal of 
Egyptian Archaeology 24, no. 1 (1938): 83–91; Eyre, The Use of Documents in Pharaonic Egypt, 9–10, 21. 
21 Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 64. 
22 Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 63. 
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philosophical systems. Indeed, other cultures, like Greece, saw Egypt as the prototypical 
written culture, occasionally lampooning Egyptian claims to textually based wisdom.”23 
While memorization and embodiment belong to the question of how a text is 
received, relevant for the following is also the manner in which Egyptian legal texts were 
composed as a procès verbal, i.e. presented as a dictate of an oral discourse. Eyre writes: 
The primary role of an Egyptian document, in legal process, was one of witness: a 
procès verbal, transcribing oral declarations and an aide-memoire, with no more and 
possibly less force than an oral witness. The document as a written instrument—as 
guarantee of a transaction—is a much stronger use of writing. A direct development 
from the aide-memoire, it marks a strong culture of formal process, and a legal-
administrative system with a high degree of functional impersonality.24 
This raises the question whether in ancient Israel prophetic speech (orality) was invested 
with greater authority than the written record of those same speeches in Torah and the 
Prophets even as the written record still retained its legal force? We cannot answer this 
question here. What we do observe are further parallels to Torah. First, the result is a 
more fluid concept of genre due to the focus on continuous recitation. Genre-distinctions 
tended to be blurred, as the primary focus was upon a faithful record of what was said.25 
Second, the manner in which writing creates a more impersonal and distant relationship 
                                               
23 Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 64. For memorized public presentation in Greece, see 
Yehoshua Gitay, “Deutero-Isaiah: Oral or Written?,” JBL 99, no. 2 (1980): 191. 
24 Eyre, The Use of Documents in Pharaonic Egypt, 101. The question about the relation between 
how the text was perceived and how the scribal culture was, both need more elaborate studies than what is 
here possible. 
25 Eyre, The Use of Documents in Pharaonic Egypt, 44. Eyre writes: “Egyptian words do not so 
much define specific genres, or classes of documents, but focus on the written result of oral declarations 
and administrative process. For instance, the common term mỉty, literally ‘copy’, refers at least as often to 
‘copying out’ an oral declaration—a procès verbal—as the copy of another written text” (Eyre, The Use of 
Documents in Pharaonic Egypt, 35–36). Cf. Deut 17:18 and the copy the Israelite king is to write for 
himself ( ֹ הַ  ֹוָרהּתהַ  ֵנהׁשְ ְוָכַתב לֹו ֶאת־מִ  םּיִ ַהְלוִ  ֲהִניםּכֹ הַ  ְפֵניּלִ ַעל־ֵסֶפר מִ  אתּז ). 
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from the immediate face à face encounter, is paralleled by the movement in the HB from 
the immediate personal encounter between YHWH and his prophet to the more 
impersonal quest into the words of YHWH and his prophets in the reception history of 
Torah. Interpretation and appropriation become an increasing preoccupation.26 Third, the 
frequent use of 2ms characterizes the procès verbal of letters, a form we saw in the 
previous chapter that dominates Torah-instructions.27 Fourth, the royal decree as a procès 
verbal both authorized its bearer and the decree itself, and it could function as a written 
instrument and an archival record.28 Again, this parallels the authorization of Moses (e.g. 
                                               
26 Cf. Bergland, “Interpretation of the Written,” 1–19. 
27 Eyre writes: “The writer visualizes himself speaking to his correspondent, and this vocabulary 
of oral communication reflects how the letters were used. Address is direct to the correspondent, so that 
even in reported speech there is a tendency to refer to the addressee with second person pronouns” (Eyre, 
The Use of Documents in Pharaonic Egypt, 95). Cf. pp. 15, 90, 92, 94, 101, 106, 108, and 117 for further 
discussions of the concept of procés verbal. 
28 Eyre writes: “The royal decree, committed to writing, served partly as a symbol of authorization 
for its bearer, and partly as a procès verbal of the decree. It had within it the potential for both use as a 
written instrument and for archival record as documentary proof, but there is a strong element of hindsight 
in these definitions. In practice it was simply a royal letter of instruction: an assertion of hierarchical 
authority for particular actions” (Eyre, The Use of Documents in Pharaonic Egypt, 101). He sums up his 
studies as follows: “The value of written text lay explicitly in the role it played in preserving knowledge, 
but in practice the medium of writing was key to extended memorizing, and the knowledge it represented 
was the key to oral communication and social hierarchy, and not the publication or dissemination of 
knowledge through reference. This seems to be as true a reflection of the culture of documents as of 
cultural texts in the pharaonic period” (Eyre, The Use of Documents in Pharaonic Egypt, 353–54). For the 
document as aide memoire cf. pp. 12, 31, 45, 47, 49, 51, 252. 
Here Kitchen’s observations are also pertinent. Having studied prophecy in the ANE, he 
concludes: “Thus, throughout the centuries, across the biblical world, the firsthand external evidence shows 
clearly and conclusively that the record of prophecies among contemporaries and their transmission down 
through time was not left to the memories of bystanders or to the memory-conditioned oral transmission – 
and modification – by imaginary ‘disciples’ of a prophet or their equally imaginary successors for centuries 
before somebody took the remnants at a late date to weave them into books out of whole new cloth, having 
little or nothing to do with a reputed prophet of dim antiquity whose very name and existence might thus be 
doubted. For the mass of highly ingenious guesswork and scholarly imagination along these lines, poured 
out of the presses for over a century now, and never more than in recent decades, there is not one 
respectable scintilla of solid, firsthand evidence. Not one . . . . The fact is that the ultimate test of prophecy 
was its fulfilment. Thus an accurate, independent, and permanent record of prophecies was needed, to stand 
as lasting witness for when possible fulfilment might occur or be required to be checked” (Kitchen, On the 
Reliability of the Old Testament, 392-93). And again: “So the picture is of individual prophecies quite 
promptly written down, which subsequently can be brought together into collective tablets for future 
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Exod 19:9) and the instructions in Torah, to assert the normative authority of the 
instructions given by YHWH. 
Some space should also be given to the phenomenon of scribal elitism. As seen 
above, memorization of revered texts was perceived as an initiation into true humanity.29 
In contrast to the egalitarian focus in passages like Deut 6:6–9; 11:18–20,30 where 
everyone was called upon to be educated in the revered texts, Carr points out the elitism 
of ANE scribal culture: 
The literacy that most counted in these ancient societies often was not a basic ability 
to read and write. Rather it was an oral-written mastery of a body of texts. Moreover, 
this “literacy” was something that separated the members of an elite from their 
contemporaries. Such mastery of written texts, then, was not widespread. For it to 
perform its social function, it had to be a limited competency used to mark off a 
cultural and (often) social elite.31 
                                               
reference” (Kitchen, On the Reliability of the Old Testament, 391). Schellenberg on her side sees a 
difference in practice between Mesopotamian and Israelite prophecy: “The prophetic texts from ancient 
Mesopotamia differ from the OT ones in that they remain close to the oral prophets and the situations that 
triggered a recording of their messages” (Annette Schellenberg, “A 'Lying Pen of the Scribes' (Jer 8:8)? 
Orality and Writing in the Formation of Prophetic Books,” in The Interface of Orality and Writing: 
Speaking, Seeing, Writing in the Shaping of New Genres, eds. Annette Weissenrieder and Robert B. Coote, 
Biblical Performance Criticism Series  (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2015), 289). Cf. 292. As with other 
comparative material, it is not clear how this applies to the HB, and here we can only note a disagreement 
on the question of the timespan between oral performance and written composition for the prophets of the 
HB. 
29 According to Carr, the king, not the scribe, was seen as embodying the me (Sumerian “order”), 
and as “the fullest humanity in the Sumero-Akkadian world” (Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 31). 
Greenberg writes that the king should embody the cosmic ideal: “However, the actual authorship of the 
laws, the embodying of the cosmic ideal in statutes of the realm, is claimed by the king” (Greenberg, 
“Some Postulates of Biblical Criminal Law,” 9). 
30 Cf. Stackert’s claim that the Torah instructions were only “reflecting not the historical realia of 
ancient Israelite social practice but instead a particular intellectual engagement with the religious and 
cultural (textual) tradition. Those who attempt to reconstruct actual, historical practice through these texts 
fail to recognize their scholastic nature and that of their legal patrimonies” (Stackert, Rewriting the Torah, 
164). For a similar perspective see Fitzpatrick-McKinley, The Transformation of Torah, 23–53. 
31 Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 13. Italics original. Cf. 12–13, 65–66, 68, 82, 103–4, 
108–9. For scribal elitism in ancient Greece, see Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 103–4, 108–9. 
Berman as well sees a scribal elitism in ANE in contrast to the Pentateuch emphasizing that all should be 
familiar with its instruction (Berman, Created Equal, 111). See also Gadd, Teachers and Students, 23. 
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Frank Polak criticizes Carr for looking too narrowly at the educational centers, 
arguing that ancient texts had a cultural and religious role that went beyond the scribal 
elite. He writes that, “of course, the authors and poets of written texts were members of 
an educated elite. But this does not mean that their work was confined to and nourished 
by the matrix of scribal instruction and curriculum alone.”32 It is not possible to discuss 
the issue of scribal elitism and the popularity of the revered texts thoroughly here. There 
appears, however, to be a close parallel between the family setting of instruction in Torah 
(e.g. Deut 6:4–9, 20–25), and the ANE scribal schools which were often located in 
private quarters and which frequently involved a kind of informal apprenticeship of 
children to parents.33 
As pointed out by Jack Goody, memorized law tends to a “greater flexibility” than 
written law, given the potential for greater fluidity in its oral context. He continues: 
“Writing greatly increases the amount of information held in store, and in this sense 
enhances the potentialities of the human mind, it also makes the problem of erasure much 
more difficult, in other words, deletion represents the other side of the storage coin.”34 A 
relevant question here is whether the ancient authors felt as restrained as we do when 
faced with the possibility of modifying an existing written source when reusing it in a 
                                               
32 Polak, “Book, Scribe, and Bard,” 131. For a similar perspective see Van De Mieroop, 
Philosophy before the Greeks, 82–83, 198–99, 206–7. Gagarin has made an argument that Greek law was 
written for the population at large, thus going counter to an elitism (Gagarin, Writing Greek Law). 
33 Gadd, Teachers and Students, 22–23, 25; Assmann, “Verschriftung rechtlicher und sozialer 
Normen,” 74–76; Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 53, 65–67, 82.  
34 Jack Goody, The Logic of Writing and the Organization of Society (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986), 136. Cf. Fitzpatrick-McKinley, The Transformation of Torah, 72, 75. 
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new composition. This may be just another instance of the anachronistic fallacy. It is not 
clear that the biblical authors felt the kind of strictures against modifying their sources 
that Goody identifies.35 While we have seen that Plato problematizes Goody’s 
assumption that writing “enhances the potentialities of the human mind,” the following 
study will indicate that biblical authors did not share Plato’s skepticism towards writing 
as a medium to enhance memory. It may therefore not be possible to describe ancient 
attitudes to writing, orality, and memory in a uniform manner. In contrast to Plato, 
writing for the biblical authors did not seem to be perceived as being in conflict with 
orality or, indeed, as competing with it. Rather, writing was a procès verbal of and an 
aide-memoire to the covenantal instructions, complementing their oral performance and 
execution. Carasik writes: “Writing preserves information which re-enters the memory 
when it is spoken out loud.”36 Writing becomes the medium by which memory is 
invoked. 
 By using the notion of ‘language-game,’ borrowed from the Austrian philosopher 
Ludwig Wittgenstein,37 I would like to propose that memorization of revered texts came 
to be constitutive of the language-game of the ANE scribes. Through the program or 
literary strategy of ‘placing texts on the heart,’ locutions from source texts could easily be 
reused exactly or creatively in new literary compositions. Revered texts would enjoy 
                                               
35 Cf. Pakkala, Omitting God’s Word. 
36 Carasik, Theologies of the Mind, 65. On p. 66 he speaks of “the activation of written text in the 
mind by speaking.” 




renewed life via new literary adaptions by becoming part of the ‘language-game’ of a 
scribe. The woodenness often associated with the visual consultation of texts might not 
have been necessary, as they could recall them from memory—even playfully and 
extemporaneously combining passages from different sources into a new matrix.38 
Orality, Writing, and Memory in Torah and the Prophets 
In the well-known Lachish letter 3, we find archaeological and extra-biblical 
evidence for the ideal of memorization of texts in ancient Israel. Here a military official 
writes that not only is he fully capable of reading, but he is also capable of performing a 
detailed recollection of the content of what he has read: “And now, please explain to your 
servant the meaning of the letter which you sent to your servant yesterday evening. For 
your servant has been sick at heart ever since you sent (that letter) to your servant. In it 
my lord said: ‘Don’t you know how to read a letter?’ As Yahweh lives, no one has ever 
tried to read me a letter! Moreover, whenever any letter comes to me and I have read it, I 
can repeat it down to the smallest detail.”39 
                                               
38 Cf. Niditch, Oral World and Written Word, 7, 111–13, 117, 120, 122, 128, 134; Carr, Writing 
on the Tablet of the Heart, 40. 
39 "Lachish 3: Complaints and Information," trans. Dennis Pardee (COS 3: 79). Cf. Nielsen, Oral 
Tradition, 55–56 on the need to show care not to postulate a general literacy in Israel on the basis of the 
letter. Niditch comments that the official is proud of “his oral-world ability to repeat the letter verbatim 
after having read it only once, a skill typical of those who rely on reading less than we do” (Niditch, Oral 
World and Written Word, 53). For scholars arguing for an early literacy in  ancient Israel see Gabriel 
Barkay, “Iron Age II–III,” in The Archaeology of Ancient Israel, ed. Amnon Ben-Tor (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1992), 302–73; Eggleston, "See and Read All These Words", 39, 43. Cf. Niditch, Oral 
World and Written Word, 39ff. For the possibility of writing in the Late Bronze Age and Moses writing 
Torah, see Hoffmeier, Ancient Israel in Sinai: The Evidence for the Authentiticy of the Wilderness 
Tradition, 178–81. Cf. Weeks on the possibility of an oral stage of composition (Weeks, Adminition and 
Curse, 144). For an argument that the oral-written dichotomy should not be understated, see Schniedewind, 
How the Bible Became a Book, 11–17. 
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My present purpose is not to draw up a historiography of the relation between oral 
and written culture in ancient Israel, i.e. to determine whether any of the books in the HB 
were originally composed orally or in writing.40 The following is not a comprehensive 
                                               
40 The question of the relative development of orality and writing in ancient Israel relate to the 
traditional claim that Hebrew thought is more oral while Greek thought more visual. Hans W. Wolff writes 
in his classic book on anthropology in the HB: “Since human life is reasonable life, the hearing ear and the 
properly directed tongue are the essential organs for man. . . . Thus the supreme importance of the ear and 
of speech for true human understanding is unmistakable” (Hans Walter Wolff, Anthropology of the Old 
Testament, trans. Margaret Knohl (London: SCM, 1974), 75). Cf. Torleif Boman, Hebrew Thought 
Compared with Greek (London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1970), 58–68, 74–122. James Barr refuted 
many of the claims in this approach (James Barr, Biblical Words for Time, Studies in Biblical Theology 
(London: SCM Press Ltd, 1962); Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language). Carasik points to the 
untenability of Wolff’s view, pointing out that mere statistics (ראה (“to see”) is used 1299 times in the HB 
compared to  שמע (“to hear”) used 1159), indicating such a claim does not hold against the evidence 
(Carasik, Theologies of the Mind, 37). He is even willing to reverse the traditionally claimed relation 
between seeing and hearing in the HB, stating “that in the Israelite understanding of how we acquire 
knowledge about the world, seeing, and not hearing, had the central place” (Carasik, Theologies of the 
Mind, 38). And again: “Seeing was by far the most important sense, according to all biblical understandings 
of the mind” (Carasik, Theologies of the Mind, 52). He sums up: “The distinction between the ‘Hebrew’ 
and ‘Greek’ methods of learning about the world vanishes into nothingness. In the view of the biblical 
writers, the real distinction is between דעת—that knowledge whose ultimate source is God—and 
knowledge that is ‘created’ by some other source” (Carasik, Theologies of the Mind, 43). See also Jacques 
Ellul, The Humiliation of the Word, trans. Joyce Main Hanks (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmands, 1985), 5–47. 
Carr says he is not familiar with “a single artistic image of a Mesopotamian scribe working with 
more than one text” (Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 40). He claims that the role of texts shifted 
sometime between the second and first millennium B.C., where in the second millennium “writing appears 
to have played a supporting role alongside other modes of textual performance and transmission,” while 
“by the first millennium, texts increasingly serve another role as well: as authoritative reference points for 
the checking of scribal memory” (Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 38). Karel van der Toorn 
challenges Niditch’s and Carr’s claim that there is no evidence of scribes working with multiple 
manuscripts simultaneously (van der Toorn, Scribal Culture, 140). While Niditch has emphasized the 
inextricability of orality and writtenness in an especially forceful way, her notion of an oral-literate 
continuum nevertheless creates an unnecessary polarity. Why must a text be more oral than literate or vice 
versa? No simple distinction between written text and spoken word may be maintained, especially when a 
spoken or read text is in view. Moreover, the question of whether a text may be recognized as originally 
oral or originally written remains vexed, since scribes could easily imitate spoken rhetorical forms in the 
literature they produced. Even if the claim by Sigmund Mowinckel and the ‘Scandinavian schools’ that an 
oral tradition largely explains the textual parallels in the prophets has not gained general support among 
scholars, their theory of schools of disciples preserving and developing traditions around individual 
prophets has. Had they been correct about the oral tradition it could have “terminated the quest for 
prophetic quotation” (Schultz, Search for Quotation, 50–52). 
Here we can also note Eggleston’s critique of Niditch for operating with a too polarized view 
between orality and writing, in his opinion: “While she has emphasized the inextricability of orality and 
writtenness in an especially forceful way, Niditch’s notion of an oral-literate continuum nevertheless 
creates an unnecessary polarity. Why must a text be more oral than literate or vice versa? No simple 
distinction between written text and spoken word may be maintained, especially when a spoken or read text 
is in view. Moreover, the question of whether a text may be recognized as originally oral or originally 
written remains vexed, since scribes could easily imitate spoken rhetorical forms in the literature they 
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survey of the scholarly discussions on the topic. It suffices to show that there is an 
analogy between ANE text-supported memorized reuse and the type of reuse found in the 
passages to be studied. Furthermore, it is not important here to identify the sociological 
context of this text-supported memorized reuse,41 or to determine whether literacy and a 
text-supported oral culture was a phenomenon limited to a scribal elite or found, as well, 
in a wider population in ancient Israel.42 I will limit myself to what seems most helpful 
for a better appreciation of the relation between orality, memorization, and writing as 
found in the passages to be studied, even though I will, occasionally, touch upon 
questions deserving far more discussion than is possible here. I will briefly and generally 
discuss references to orality, memorization, and writing in the books under study here, 
Exodus, Leviticus, Deuteronomy, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel.43 
                                               
produced” (Eggleston, "See and Read All These Words", 33). Cf. 133. 
41 Cf. Nielsen, Oral Tradition, 16, 32; Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 4–8, 73–74, 95–96, 
104–106, 126–28, 132–33, 138, 144–47, 149, 288, 303–4 for the interplay between writing and orality in 
the ANE. Nielsen differentiates between two types of interplay between writing and orality, namely first “a 
writing down of the tradition while it is still flourishing, so that the two methods of transmission run side 
by side, possibly so that the written one represents an aid or support of the oral one,” and second the 
theoretical possibility that “one long chain of tradition stretching through many generations with one or 
more links that have been entirely of a written nature, so that the oral tradition has been broken off for 
shorter or longer periods” (Nielsen, Oral Tradition, 34–35. Cf. p. 28). Nielsen on p. 28 refers to 
Widengren’s Literary and Psychological Aspects of the Hebrew Prophets p. 91n who claimed “that the 
texts—which were perhaps often dictated, and possibly sometimes from memory—were nevertheless 
always written, and that this was the way in which they were transmitted; and further, that the practice of 
committing texts to memory was certainly in existence in Mesopotamian education, but that this tells us 
nothing about the real transmission of the texts, ‘for these were handed down from one generation to the 
next in written form’.” Widengren’s observation seems appropriate and should temper too strong 
statements on the orality of the ANE cultures. Still, Nielsen is correct in pointing out that there is evidence 
for transmission by dictation, among them in Jer 36:4, 18 (Nielsen, Oral Tradition, 29).  
42 For studies on the sociological background of the prophetic books see e.g. Polak, “Book, Scribe, 
and Bard,” 118–40; Schellenberg, “A "Lying Pen of the Scribes" (Jer 8:8)?,” 285–309. Cf. Fitzpatrick-
McKinley, The Transformation of Torah, 23–53; van der Toorn, Scribal Culture, 11–14. 
43 Carasik distinguishes between books where writing is prominent, while memory plays a minor 
role (Book of Kings, Ezra, Esther, and Daniel), books where reference to memory is common, but those to 
writing sparse (Genesis, Isaiah, Psalms, Job, Ecclesiastes), and those where both writing and memory play 
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Susan Niditch argues that we also find in the biblical material evidence of reuse 
based on memorized texts.44 She finds this question to be related both to the question of 
literary reuse (which she calls ‘intertextuality’) within the HB and the composition of the 
Pentateuch: “This approach to recurring biblical language not only challenges the scholar 
to look in new ways at biblical intertextuality but also raises questions about the whole 
source-critical enterprise.”45 
                                               
a prominent role (Exodus, Deuteronomy, Jeremiah, and Nehemiah) (Carasik, Theologies of the Mind, 57–
72). Niditch writes: “Perhaps the most important writing in all of Jewish tradition that underscores the 
tensions and continuities between oral and literate mentalities is the Torah itself. Surely the Bible’s most 
prominent act of dictation is when Moses is commanded by God to write down the commandments on 
tablets (Ex. 24:4; 34:28), the ‘words of the Torah on a writing surface’ (sēper, a more generic term than 
‘tablet’ or ‘scroll’; Deut. 31:24). . . . these images of Moses as God’s scribe do lie closer to the literate end 
of the continuum than God’s own writing. On the other hand, attitudes to written Torah evidence the oral 
mentality as well, especially in the various echoes or imitations of the first setting down of the law. One 
thinks, for example, of Deut 27:3” (Niditch, Oral World and Written Word, 86). 
44 Niditch argues that archaeological finds, or lack thereof, inform us about the scribal culture in 
ancient Israel: “Lengthy texts—a collection of prophecies or some version of the narrative that runs from 
Genesis to Numbers—are difficult to use. A lengthy papyrus or leather scroll may be rather heavy when 
unopened, unwieldy when fully opened. Indeed we have no evidence that Israelites used long tables either 
to write or to read and we assume that for either activity only a small portion of the scroll would be exposed 
at one time. This being the case one faces a real challenge if one wants to turn efficiently to a passage in the 
middle of a scroll, or if one wishes to compare two passages. One cannot simply turn to the tenth folio to 
reach a particular passage or use a bookmark to move back and forth between texts. . . . Hence Dawson’s 
suggestion that references to passages from books in antiquity, even the citing of specific texts, are 
frequently from memory” (Niditch, Oral World and Written Word, 76). Cf. p. 61). For Niditsch’s critique 
of the common assumption among biblicists that a “literate mentality shapes the Bible,” cf. Niditch, Oral 
World and Written Word, 109–10. 
45 Niditch, Oral World and Written Word, 19. On the basis of this written-oral scribal culture, 
where the scribes would more or less know the revered texts by heart, Niditch questions the concept of 
textuality presupposed in the Documentary Hypothesis, finding it to impose foreign concepts of text and 
redaction upon the composition of the Torah: “At the heart of documentary hypothesis, either Wellhausen’s 
or modern versions that tend to date the sources later in the monarchic or postmonarchic period, is the cut-
and-paste image of an individual pictured like Emperor Claudius of the PBS series, having his various 
written sources laid out before him as he chooses this verse or that, includes this tale not that, edits, 
elaborates, all in a library setting. If the texts are leather, they may be heavy and need to be unrolled. 
Finding the proper passage in each scroll is a bit of a chore. If texts are papyrus, they are read held in the 
arm, one hand clasping or ‘supporting’ the ‘bulk’ of the scroll, while the other unrolls. Did the redactors 
need three colleagues to hold J, E, and P for him? Did each read the text out loud, and did he ask them to 
pause until he jotted down his selections, working like a secretary with three tapes dictated by the boss?” 
(Niditch, Oral World and Written Word, 113). Cf. also pp. 7, 111–13, 117, 120, 122, 128, 134. Carr writes 
in a similar fashion, critiquing biblical scholarship that presumes that the biblical texts we know “form 
stable data on the basis of which they can reconstruct highly precise differentiations of potential precursor 
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literary strata, relationships of literary dependence of various texts on one another, and the presence of 
more or fewer groups of secondary additions. On the contrary, building on studies of ancient literatures 
near and far, we would be on much firmer ground to see in our various editions of Hebrew Scriptural texts 
the distillate of a transmission-historical process, shaped to varying extents by the exigencies of memory 
and performance. To exaggerate somewhat, it is as if past scholars presupposed that earlier layers of 
biblical texts were written in stone, when in fact it is more likely they were written in (or at least accessed 
and reproduced by means of) the shifting sands of memory. As a result, we have far less data in our present 
text(s) for the hypothetical reconstruction of the Bible’s prehistory than we might presuppose or wish” 
(Carr, Formation of the Hebrew Bible, 36). Cf. Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 40. See also 
Pakkala, God's Word Omitted. Karel van der Toorn challenges Niditch’s (and Carr’s) claim that there is no 
evidence of scribes working with multiple manuscripts simultaneously, referring to editorial activity 
attested in Mesopotamia from the end of the second millennium B.C. (van der Toorn, Scribal Culture, 140).  
To me Carasik’s criticism of Niditch, leaning on a review by Robert C. Culley contrasting oral and 
literate ‘mentalities’, appear imprecise (Carasik, Theologies of the Mind, 8). She explains that ‘oral register’ 
“refers not to modes of composition but to the style of compositions whether the works were created orally 
or in writing, whether they are performed or read to oneself” (Niditch, Oral World and Written Word, 10). 
Niditch does not see a basis for demonstrating that a text originally was composed orally. Instead she 
prefers to speak of an “oral register,” where a given text shows more or less evidence in the oral or written 
end of an oral-literary continuum (Niditch, Oral World and Written Word, 78–107). Cf. pp. 10, 120, 125. 
When analyzing biblical texts she claims it is possible to uncover an oral register or oral aesthetics having 
left marks on the written composition of the biblical texts. There are two ways in which to analyze and 
demonstrate the “oral register” and an “oral-literary continuum,” significant for detecting memorized and 
embodied Torah: (1) We can look at how the biblical authors describe the relation between orality and 
written compositions; and (2) we can be attentive to indications of such an “oral register” and “oral-literary 
continuum” in the written compositions of the HB. Cf. Niditch, Oral World and Written Word, 6; Raymond 
F. Person, From Conversation to Oral Tradition: A Simplest Systematics for Oral Tradition (New York: 
Routledge, 2016), 11. William M. Schniedewind operates with an oral-written dichotomy, writing about 
“the movement from orality to textuality, from a pre-literate toward a literate society” (William M. 
Schniedewind, How the Bible Became a Book: The Textualization of Ancient Israel (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1). Lord also saw a dichotomy between the “written technique” and 
“oral technique,” denying the possibility of an intermediate “’transitional’ technique” between the two 
(Lord, The Singer of Tales, 129; Albert Lord, The Singer Resumes the Tale (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1995), 212–37). Cf. Nielsen, Oral Tradition, 12; Patrick, Old Testament Law, 189. Schniedewind’s 
view is seen as problematic by Polak: “Since Schniedewind does not attend to how the style and language 
of the written text is affected by its presumed oral background, his account of the transition from oral to 
written remains problematic” (Polak, “Book, Scribe, and Bard,” 121. Cf. p. 130). And arguing against 
Schniedewind’s claim of a rather late transition to written culture, Polak writes concerning the Mesha Stele: 
“Notably, unlike most Assyrian royal inscriptions, this stele includes a few instances of direct discourse. If 
written narrative did exist in Moab, which was an Israelite dependency for two generations, one can hardly 
maintain that in Israel and Judah such narrative could not yet have taken on ‘a written garb’ [Schniedewind, 
How the Bible Became a Book, 63] in the period preceding Hezekiah. Thus, in the present reviewer’s 
opinion, the symbiosis of oral and written literature probably antedates the eighth century by far, and was 
much more fruitful for narrative in writing than indicated by the book [i.e. Schniedewind’s] at hand” 
(Polak, “Book, Scribe, and Bard,” 121–22). For scholars criticizing false dichotomies between orality and 
writing, see Egbert Bakker, “How Oral is Oral Composition?,” in Signs of Orality: The Oral Tradition and 
Its Influence in the Greek and Roman World, ed. E. Anne MacKay (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 31–32; Michael 
H. Floyd, “'Write the Revelation!' (Hab 2:2): Reimagining the Cultural History of Prophecy,” in Writings 
and Speech in Israelite and Ancient Near Eastern Prophecy, eds. Ehud Ben Zvi and Michael H. Floyd, 
SBL Symposium Series 10 (Atlanta: SBL, 2000), 103; David Berliner, “The Abuses of Memory: 
Reflections on the Memory Boom in Anthropology,” Anthropological Quarterly 78, no. 1 (2005): 197–
211; Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 6–7. 
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Both Berman and Paul have emphasized how Torah is presented as being  
publicized in ancient Israel. Berman states that this publication also had a mimetic 
function: 
Literacy in ancient Israel was probably always the purview of professional scribes. 
But passages in Deuteronomy, Exodus, and the prophetic writings of the eighth and 
seventh centuries suggest that such texts should be produced for the masses, read to 
them, remembered by them, and transmitted by them. . . . Whereas in Mesopotamia 
and in Egypt writing was turned inward as a guarded source of power, in Israel it was 
turned outward and reflected the Bible’s egalitarian impulse. The dissemination of 
such texts to the masses through writing and reading accords with other biblical 
emphases—the domestication of national religion, the shift from a cult of objects to a 
cult of words and ideas, and the rise of a national vernacular literature.46 
And as I have already indicated, Paul finds that “publicity, not secrecy, is the hallmark of 
the law, which is proclaimed openly to the entire society and is not restricted to any 
professional class of jurists, lawyers, or judges.”47 While the scribal elite were all 
expected to memorize authoritative texts in the ANE, the Mesopotamian kings were seen 
as the custodian of cosmic truths, and Pharaoh as incarnating ma’at,48 in Torah the entire 
                                               
46 Berman, Created Equal, 11–12. Cf. pp. 114–16, 124–25. As in Lev 19:15–16 and Deut 16:19–
20 the judges in the Egyptian The Tale of the Eloquent Peasant are exhorted to “ignore class distinctions 
and to concentrate, rather, on what is right” (VerSteeg, Law in Ancient Egypt, 29).But why was not a 
system set up to teach all the people literacy if they were all to know Torah? Berman answers: “Today we 
would assume that literature is available only to the literate, but in premodern times this was hardly the 
case. Those who were exposed to texts and shaped by them numbered far more than those who had the 
actual capacity to read them” (Berman, Created Equal, 116). He reminds us here that קרא in BH means 
both “to call” and “to read,” while the two are separate in our terminology (Berman, Created Equal, 117). 
Having denied that Torah should be understood “as a rational response to social change” (cf. esp. 
Fitzpatrick-McKinley, The Transformation of Torah, 23–53), Fitzpatrick-McKinley argues instead that 
“these torah texts were influenced more by a literary tradition shared by Israel’s neighbours and mediated 
through the scribal schools than by any special Israelite practical knowledge common to all Israelites” 
(Fitzpatrick-McKinley, The Transformation of Torah, 142. Cf. p. 146). Levinson writes “that there should 
be any attempt at all to reflect on the origins of the system for administering justice represents a 
distinctively Israelite concern” (Levinson, “The First Constitution,” 1866). 
47 Paul, Studies in the Book of the Covenant, 38. Cf. p. 39. 
48 For the Mesopotamian kings as the custodian of cosmic truths see Greenberg, “Some Postulates 
of Biblical Criminal Law,” 9; Van De Mieroop, Philosophy before the Greeks, 100, 111, 155, 176–78, 181. 
And for and Pharaoh as incarnating ma’at see  
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people were expected to memorize and inscribe Torah on the heart. However, as we have 
already seen, a clear distinction between scribal elitism in the ANE and Israel’s literary 
egalitarianism might not be as clear as suggested by Berman. Nevertheless, a core feature 
of the biblical text shows a clear emphasis upon the popular dissemination of texts. 
Greenberg makes a similar point regarding the prophetic assumption that Torah was 
presented orally and publically to the people and that the people knew the Torah. He 
writes: “Publication is manifestly of the essence of lawgiving.”49 According to 
Greenberg, the publication of Torah is interlinked with the priestly form of life all of 
Israel is called upon to live: “Israel as a whole is to live in dedication to God after the 
manner of priests” (e.g. Exod 22:30; Lev 20:26, and Deut 14:2). Thus, Torah “is to 
function as a pedagogue, a trainer in a course of life.”50 
In the following I will briefly survey the question of orality, writing, and memory 
in the six books containing the passages here under study, namely Exodus, Leviticus, 
Deuteronomy, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel. 
Exodus 
I will begin with the Book of Exodus. We find mention of writing at several 
                                               
Assmann, “Verschriftung rechtlicher und sozialer Normen,” 66–68. 
49 Greenberg, “Three Conceptions of the Torah,” 14–15. 
50 Greenberg, “Three Conceptions of the Torah,” 16. He then goes on to explain how 
Deuteronomy more than the other Pentateuchal books explicates how public instructions should take place. 
It situates the primary locus of instruction in the family (Deut 6; 11), then speaks of the instruction of the 
king (Deut 17), and finally the public reading every seventh year (Deut 31) (Greenberg, “Three 
Conceptions of the Torah,” 17–18). He contrasts this with e.g. LH, which even if displayed public, was 
limited to an elite able to read it. 
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points in Exodus (Exod 17:14; 21:14; 24:4, 7; 34:1, 27–28; 39:30).51 In Exod 17:14, after 
the Israelites had defeated the Amalekites, YHWH instructs Moses:  ֶפרַּבּסֵ  רֹוןּכָ זֹאת זִ  ֹתבּכְ  
ָמִיםּׁשָ הַ  ַחתּתַ ֶכר ֲעָמֵלק מִ ֶאְמֶחה ֶאת־זֵ  י־ָמֹחהּכִ  עַ ׁשֻ ְיהֹו ְזֵניְּבָא יםׂשִ וְ   (“Write this memory in a book, 
and recite [lit. ‘place’] it in the ears of Joshua: ‘I will utterly wipe out the memory of 
Amalek under the heavens”; cf. Deut 25:17–19). There is a fascinating irony in this 
passage; namely, a memory employed to wipe out another memory, as it were. Further, it 
is a written document to be placed audibly in the ears of Joshua.52 
In the above we also saw how the different instructive corpora of Torah all 
frequently use the 2. sing. discursive address. Torah-instructions are given to the 
individual Israelite, represented by the head of the household. In Exod 18:20 we read: 
ןׂשּוַיעֲ  רׁשֶ אֲ  הׂשֶ עֲ ּמַ ְוֶאת־הַ  ּהבָ  ּוֵיְלכ ֶרְךּדֶ ָלֶהם ֶאת־הַ  ּתָ ְוהֹוַדעְ  ֹוֹרתּתְוֶאת־הַ  יםּקִ ֶאְתֶהם ֶאת־ַהחֻ  הּתָ ְוִהְזַהְר   
(“and enjoin upon them the regulations and instructions, and make known to them the 
way they are to go and the actions they are to do”). Jethro here states that Moses should 
continue to enjoin (ְוִהְזַהְרָּתה) the laws and instructions upon the people. Even if Moses 
functions as the Torah-expert, all the people are to be instructed in them. LeFebvre writes 
referring to Exod 18: “It is not for judicial guidance that Moses formulates these law 
teachings; it is for the guidance of the public: ‘You will warn them [i.e. the people] about 
the statutes and the laws and teach them the way in which they should walk . . .’ (v. 
20).”53 And Paul puts it as follows: “Law, then, becomes a body of teaching directed to 
                                               
51 Cf. Nielsen, Oral Tradition, 41–42, 45. 
52 Berman refers to Exod 13:8–9 as evidence for “the use of text in the education of children” 
(Berman, Created Equal, 125), but to me it is not clear that a text strictly need to be implied in this case. 
53 LeFebvre, Collections, Codes, and Torah, 46. Italics original. He writes: “It was, after all, ‘to 
the sons of Israel’ (not to the elders or judges) that Moses was said to address the precepts noted by 
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the entire community. Each member of the community knows prospectively of his 
individual and communal obligations. Since law serves as an instrument of education, a 
didactic aim is to be found only in biblical legislation. . . . God desires ‘men who confirm 
them inwardly.’”54 
Further, in Exod 24:7 we read: ַוִּיַּקח ֵסֶפר ַהְּבִרית ַוִּיְקָרא ְּבָאְזֵני ָהָעם (“And he [Moses] 
took the Book of the Covenant and read it in the ears of the people”). If nothing else, the 
immediate writing down of the content of the BC followed by a public reading fits the 
concept of a text-supported oral instruction.55 
I have already mentioned the concept in the ANE of gods as authors and divine 
texts as editable. In Torah this aspect appears even more apparent than it does in the 
ANE. Commenting on Exodus, Eggleston writes: “Indeed, one of the most important 
interactions YHWH has with Israel takes place in writing at Mount Sinai. There, in the 
delivery of the two tablets, YHWH is the writer par excellence. None other than Moses 
himself describes the scribal activity of YHWH when, in an intercessory plea on Israel’s 
                                               
Westbrook. It might actually be suspected that these statements of law were composed for popular 
instruction rather than judicial education” (LeFebvre, Collections, Codes, and Torah, 34). He continues: 
“Laws are published for national exhortation, but are not assigned to the court as legislation” (LeFebvre, 
Collections, Codes, and Torah, 47). 
54 Paul, Studies in the Book of the Covenant, 39. 
55 I do not find Carasik’s argument from the alleged “impracticality of scattering blood ‘upon the 
people’ [Exod 24:8] and of leaving half the blood to congeal in bowls while a long text is read” a strong 
basis for claiming “that it was the concept of reading the written text aloud in a ritual situation that was 
significant” (Carasik, Theologies of the Mind, 65). Likewise I find his claim strained that in Exod 34 “it is 
the existence of the tablets that is important, not their contents. . . . the written tablets are nothing more than 
props” (Carasik, Theologies of the Mind, 65). Do these passages really give a basis for saying much about 
the importance of writing relative to orality? In the moral document The Eloquent Peasant we find a 
combination of narrative frame and wisdom sayings ("The Eloquent Peasant," COS 1 1.43:98), interesting 
as we compare with Torah combining narrative and instruction. 
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behalf, he tells YHWH to ‘wipe me out of the record (ספר) that you have written’ (Exod  
32:32).”56 In certain cases, YHWH can apparently also edit his ‘Tablet of Destinies’ (cf. 
Deut 32:26). 
Leviticus 
Moving to the book of Leviticus, we note the absence of the root כתב (“to write”), 
except in the prohibition against making any incision (ְכֹתֶבת) on the body in Lev 19:28. 
In contrast the opening words of Leviticus is  ְַיהָוה ֵאָליו ֵמֹאֶהל מֹוֵעד  רּבֵ ַוְידַ  הׁשֶ ֶאל־מֹ  ְקָראּיִ ו
 ,And he called to Moses and YHWH spoke to him from the tent of meeting“) ֵלאֹמר
saying”).57 This opening passage is the only time in the book the verb קרא (“to call”) is 
used of YHWH, possibly indicating YHWH’s summons from the somewhat distant tent 
of meeting for Moses to appear before him. Otherwise the typical pattern is the use of the 
word דבר in the phrase  ַאֹמרּלֵ  הׁשֶ ְיהָוה ֶאל־מֹ  רּבֵ ַוְיד  (“And YHWH spoke to Moses, 
saying”) or variants.58 
Frank Polak has recently published a paper on the syntactic-stylistic aspects of the 
so-called ‘Priestly’ source in Torah. He distinguishes between syntactical features 
characteristic of “voiced, lean, brisk style (VoLB)” and the “intricate elaborate style 
                                               
56 Eggleston, "See and Read All These Words", 86. See also p. 87 on YHWH as writer. Cf. Watts, 
Reading Law, 104–7, 118–21. 
57 Cf. the proclamations (קרא) by the people of holy convocations in Lev 23:2, 4, 21, 37, or liberty 
on such a holy convocation (25:10). 
58 Lev 1:1; 4:1; 5:14, 20; 6:1, 12, 17; 7:22, 28; 8:1; 10:8; 11:1; 12:1; 13:1; 14:1, 33; 15:1; 16:1; 
17:1; 18:1; 19:1; 20:1; 21:16, 24-22:1; 22:17, 26; 23:1, 9, 23, 26, 33; 24:1; 24:13; 25:1; 27:1. Cf. Lev 
10:12, 19; 23:44; 24:23. Leviticus uses only the root זכר (“to remember”) for YHWH remembering his 
covenant with the people (Lev 26:42, 45). 
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(IES)”. Voiced, Lean, Brisk style is “characterized by the predominance of extremely 
short paratactic clauses, consisting of predicate with implicit subject (and/or object 
suffix), or predicate with one additional slot, such as explicit subject, object or indication 
of place/time, subordinate clauses are rare and so are noun groups.”59 He further 
subdivides VoLB into type-1 and type-2 style: “I distinguish between the type-1 style 
(48–60% short clauses), and the type-2 style (39–47% short clauses).”60 Intricate 
Elaborate Style is “characterized by the low frequency of short paratactic clauses (around 
25–35% of the text) and the high frequency of subordinate clauses and long noun 
groups.”61 He summarizes: 
On the one hand, several text groups reveal a mixture of two styles. A number of 
sections in these groups are characterized by syntactic-stylistic patterns that are close 
to spontaneous spoken language and thus suggest oral roots or close contacts with the 
oral arena, such as, in narrative, Gen 1; 9; 17; Lev 9–10; Num 4; and in the parenetic-
cultic-legal realm, Lev 11–13; 18–21; 25–27. However, these groups also include 
large sections in an intricate, elaborate style that is characteristic of the scribal desk: 
in narrative Gen 6–8; 28:1–9; Exod 6–7; and in the parenetic-cultic-legal sphere: 
Exod 12; Lev 14–15; 17; 22–24. 
  
 Other groups of texts are strongly dominated by the intricate style, but nevertheless 
reveal certain signs of underlying orality. I find these features in the cultic precepts 
(Lev 1–4; 16) and the instructions for the miškān (such as Exod 25; 28; 29).62 
                                               
59 Frank H. Polak, “Syntactic-Stylistic Aspects of the So-Called 'Priestly' work in the Torah,” in 
Le-ma'an Ziony: Essays in Honor of Ziony Zevit, eds. Frederick E. Greenspahn and Gary A. Rendsburg 
(Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2017), 349. For writing in Numbers, see Num 5:23; 11:26; 17:17–18; 21:14; 
33:2. Cf. Cf. Nielsen, Oral Tradition, 41–42, 45. 
60 Polak, “Syntactic-Stylistic Aspects,” 350. 
61 Polak, “Syntactic-Stylistic Aspects,” 350. The question occurs if it is preferable to operate with 
his three suggested categories, thus enabling classification of different passages into these categories, or 
whether we should instead speak in terms of an oral-written continuum, like Niditch, where a specific text 
shows more or less of “spontaneous spoken discourse” and an “elaborate style.” 
62 Polak, “Syntactic-Stylistic Aspects,” 345–46. For how Polak sees different socio-cultural 
backgrounds behind the styles, see pp. 352–53. 
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And more specifically for the HI: 
Both H and the Purity Code include significant VoLB sections, both in the type-1 
style (Lev 11:2–8; 13; 18–19; 21; 27) and the type-2 style (ch. 20; 25; 26:1–33). 
Other passages are dominated by the intricate style: ch. 11:9–47; 12; 14–15; 17; 22–
24; 26:34–45.63 
Deuteronomy 
We now come to the most significant book in Torah for the question of orality, 
writing, and memory, namely Deuteronomy. Like the more oral discourse representative 
of Exodus–Leviticus, Sonnet has argued that Deuteronomy as well presents itself 
primarily as an oral document. As with Leviticus, the opening of Deuteronomy stresses 
the oral delivery of the content: 
“These are the words that Moses spoke (דבר)” (Deut 1:1). Deuteronomy’s opening 
ushers in a distinctively oral communication. . . . In Deuteronomy’s scheme, as can be 
surmised from Deut 1:1, (oral) speech is the leading medium. Speech is to be 
understood here as “represented speech,” that is, as Deuteronomy’s way of 
(re)presenting Moses’ ultimate “words.” . . . Outside of the Bible, for instance, no 
mention has been found indicating that, in the ancient Near East, collections of laws 
were promulgated orally (“orally” meaning here “without the mediation of a written 
record”). Yet Moses does precisely that, conveying orally, without any written 
reminder, an extensive collection of laws (that YHWH revealed to him at Horeb forty 
years ago!).64 
This is an important point, where Moses’ speeches do not seem to have been 
accompanied by a written reminder. Here the text is not presented as an aide-memoire, 
but a procés verbal. According to Sonnet, Deuteronomy therefore presents itself largely 
                                               
63 Polak, “Syntactic-Stylistic Aspects,” 372. Cf. pp. 361–63 also for a summary. 
64 Sonnet, The Book within the Book, 27–28. Cf. pp. 96, 112. He writes: “Since a narrative text 
presumably delivers what it promises, it is in Deuteronomy’s narrative, and not behind it, that the rationale 
for the combination of oral and written media is primarily to be sought” (Sonnet, The Book within the Book, 
8). Cf. Block, Deuteronomy, 36–37. 
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as oral performance later written down.65 We could, however, ask the question whether 
Moses’ instructions themselves might have been memorized oral performance? It is not 
clear whether we can answer this question based on the text of Deuteronomy itself. 
Deuteronomy can be divided into Moses’ three speeches (Deut 1:1–43; 4:44–
26:19; 29:2–31:13, with some material in-between [27:1–29:1]), the Song of YHWH 
(31:14–32:47), and Moses’ benediction (32:48–34:12).66 In other words, Deuteronomy 
itself is presented as an oral speech, transmitted to us in written form. We find the 
mention of the Ten Words written on tablets being archived inside the ark (4:13; 5:22; 
10:1–5), a monumental instruction of “this Torah” (10–8 ,4–27:1 ,ַהּתֹוָרה ַהּזֹאת), “this 
Torah” having been written down in “this book” (28:58 ,ַהּתֹוָרה ַהּזֹאת ַהְּכתּוִבים ַּבֵּסֶפר ַהֶּזה), 
curses of the covenant written (ָאלֹות ַהְּבִרית ַהְּכתּוָבה) in this book of Torah ( ְּבֵסֶפר ַהּתֹוָרה
 YHWH’s commandments and decrees written in this book of Torah ,(26 ,20–29:19 ,ַהֶּזה
( יו ְוֻחֹּקָתיו ַהְּכתּוָבה ְּבֵסֶפר ַהּתֹוָרה ַהֶּזהִמְצֹותָ  , 30:10), the writing down of “this Torah” ( ַהּתֹוָרה
–to be read every seventh year to all the people at the Feast of Booths (Deut 31:9 (ַהּזֹאת
13), the writing down by Moses of the Song of YHWH as he also taught them the song 
itself (Deut 31:19, 22, 30), and the completion of “this Torah”  
                                               
65 Sonnet, The Book within the Book, 173–74. Sonnet claims that the first time in Deuteronomy 
Moses is said to author a text is in Deut 31:9 (Sonnet, The Book within the Book, 135. Cf. p. 249), even if 
writing is mentioned before in the book. He also observes that Deuteronomy does not refer to itself as 
Torah, but as referring to the Torah given orally (Sonnet, The Book within the Book, 258). He also argues 
that the book of Deuteronomy aims at overcoming Moses, in order to speak to later generations (Sonnet, 
The Book within the Book, 145–46). 
66 Given the point made above, that Torah prefers the 2ms address, Sonnet writes that in 
Deuteronomy (and presumably in Exodus–Leviticus as well) this is an address directed at Moses’ 
contemporaries, and not at the readers as such: “No doubt, the reader will learn countless lessons from 
Moses’ address, but never as the prophet’s direct addressee. Moses never turns to Deuteronomy’s reader, 
even when he mentions future addressees, ‘who [are] not there with us’ (29:14)” (Sonnet, The Book within 
the Book, 11). 
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 being archived beside the ark (Deut 31:24–26).67 (ַהּתֹוָרה־ַהּזֹאת)
As we saw in the case of Exod 18, the focus upon the people knowing the 
instructions is again found in Deut 5:1:  ַוִּיְקָרא ֹמֶׁשה ֶאל־ָּכל־ִיְׂשָרֵאל ַוּיֹאֶמר ֲאֵלֶהם ְׁשַמע ִיְׂשָרֵאל
ָתם ּוְׁשַמְרֶּתם ַלֲעֹׂשָתםֶאת־ַהֻחִּקים ְוֶאת־ַהִּמְׁשָּפִטים ֲאֶׁשר ָאֹנִכי ֹּדֵבר ְּבָאְזֵניֶכם ַהּיֹום ּוְלַמְדֶּתם אֹ   (“And 
Moses called upon all Israel and said to them: Hear, Israel, the laws and rules which I 
speak in your ear today! Learn them and observe them so as to do them!”). Deuteronomy 
does not sponsor a scribal elitism which would reserve intimate knowledge of the revered 
texts for the social elite.68 It lays the foundation for a common knowledge of Torah 
among the individual members of all classes within society. As McConville states: “The 
aim of Torah is to create a righteous community.”69 
In all of the instructive corpora of Torah we see an emphasis upon embodiment of 
its instructions through enactment in lived life. While the personal knowledge of Torah 
found throughout the instructive material might have implied memorization, and the 
responsibility of parents to educate their children in Torah, this mandate for 
memorization is explicitly stated in Deut 6 and 11.70 Both Deut 6:6–9 and 11:18–21 
                                               
67 Cf. Deut 6:9; 11:20; 17:18 as well. For more detailed discussions on orality, writing, and 
memory in Deuteronomy see Nielsen, Oral Tradition, 41–42, 45, 57–58; Carasik, Theologies of the Mind, 
66–68, 72–73, 81–82, 181–215. 
68 The “continuous study of the law” as prescribed to the leaders of the people in Deut 17:19 and 
Josh 1:8 is here also relevant (Watts, Reading Law, 21), as an extended meditation resulting in a thorough 
knowledge of the Torah. 
69 J. G. McConville, Deuteronomy, Apollos Old Testament Commentary 5 (Leicester, England: 
Apollos, 2002), 43. According to Sonnet the king is supposed to be Torah’s arch reader: “The ‘royal law’ 
casts the king as the model Israelite . . . the Torah’s arch reader” (Sonnet, The Book within the Book, 71. Cf. 
pp. 73, 78, 234). 
70 Cf. Carasik, Theologies of the Mind, 196–97. 
 
 135 
testify that the goal is an inscription on the heart and in actions of each individual 
member of the community, not just a literate elite (cf. Prov 3:1, 3; 7:1, 3; 22:18).71 Sonnet 
points out that the resumption of the reception injunctions in Deut 11:18–21 and forms an 
inclusio with 6:6–9.72 
While Deut 6 and 11 speak of having the words upon one’s heart (ַעל־ְלָבֶבָך . . . 
ְוַׂשְמֶּתם ֶאת־ְּדָבַרי ֵאֶּלה ) placing them upon one’s heart and person ,(6:6 ,ְוָהיּו ַהְּדָבִרים ָהֵאֶּלה
 73,(6:7 ,ְוִׁשַּנְנָּתם ְלָבֶניָך) and imprinting them on one’s children (11:18 ,ַעל־ְלַבְבֶכם ְוַעל־ַנְפְׁשֶכם
                                               
71 And as already mentioned, instead of all the venerated texts in the ANE about ancient sages, 
bygone deities, and poems, Torah instructs the people to take Torah itself to heart, a conglomerate of 
various genres found in the ANE like narratives, instructions, and wisdom. Cf. Carr, Writing on the Tablet 
of the Heart, 54–55, 141–42. 
72 Sonnet, The Book within the Book, 69. 
73 “Take to heart these instructions with which I charge you this day. Impress them upon your 
children. Recite them when you stay at home and when you are away, when you lie down and when you 
get up. Bind them as a sign on your hand and let them serve as a symbol on your forehead; inscribe them on 
the doorposts of your house and on your gates” (Deut 6:6–9); “Therefore impress these My words upon 
your very heart: bind them as a sign on your hand and let them serve as a symbol on your forehead, and 
teach them to your children — reciting them when you stay at home and when you are away, when you lie 
down and when you get up; and inscribe them on the doorposts of your house and on your gates — to the 
end that you and your children may endure, in the land that the LORD swore to your fathers to assign to 
them, as long as there is a heaven over the earth” (Deut 11:18–21). 
Deut 6:6–9 begins by injuring the 2ms to let the words of Torah be upon “your” heart ( ְוָהיּו
 In Deut 11:18 we find an analogous instruction, instructing the .(ַהְּדָבִרים ָהֵאֶּלה ֲאֶׁשר ָאֹנִכי ְמַצְּוָך ַהּיֹום ַעל־ְלָבֶבָך
2mpl to place the words of Torah upon “your” heart and soul ( ְפְׁשֶכםְוַׂשְמֶּתם ֶאת־ְּדָבַרי ֵאֶּלה ַעל־ְלַבְבֶכם ְוַעל־נַ  ). 
Deut 6:7a continues with the instruction of the children (ְוִׁשַּנְנָּתם ְלָבֶניָך ְוִדַּבְרָּת ָּבם) always wherever one 
might be (  Deut 11:18b, however, continues with binding these .( ּוְבֶלְכְּתָך ַבֶּדֶרְך ּוְבָׁשְכְּבָך ּוְבקּוֶמָךְּבִׁשְבְּתָך ְּבֵביֶתָך
words upon one’s hand and having them as a sign upon one’s forehead (  ּוְקַׁשְרֶּתם ֹאָתם ְלאֹות ַעל־ֶיְדֶכם ְוָהיּו
 bringing the statements upon having the Torah upon one’s heart, soul, hand, and ,(ְלטֹוָטֹפת ֵּבין ֵעיֵניֶכם
forehead together. We here see an inversion between the two passages, as Deut 6:8 now gives the binding 
upon one’s hand and forehead (ּוְקַׁשְרָּתם ְלאֹות ַעל־ָיֶדָך ְוָהיּו ְלֹטָטֹפת ֵּבין ֵעיֶניָך), while 11:19 gives the command 
to instruct one’s children (ְוִלַּמְדֶּתם ֹאָתם ֶאת־ְּבֵניֶכם ְלַדֵּבר ָּבם) always wherever one might be ( ְּתָך ְּבֵביֶתָך ְּבִׁשבְ 
 The instruction to write them on the doorpost and gates are then added in .(ּוְבֶלְכְּתָך ַבֶּדֶרְך ּוְבָׁשְכְּבָך ּוְבקּוֶמָך
parallel in Deut 6:9 (ּוְכַתְבָּתם ַעל־ְמזּוֹזת ֵּביֶתָך ּוִבְׁשָעֶריָך) and 11:20 ( יֶתָך ּוִבְׁשָעֶריָךּוְכַתְבָּתם ַעל־ְמזּוזֹות ּבֵ  ). Deut 
11:18–21 adds a motive clause,  ֶָהם ִּכיֵמי ֲאֹבֵתיֶכם ָלֵתת לָ ה לַ ְלַמַען ִיְרּבּו ְיֵמיֶכם ִויֵמי ְבֵניֶכם ַעל ָהֲאָדָמה ֲאֶׁשר ִנְׁשַּבע ְיהו
ַעל־ָהָאֶרץַהָּׁשַמִים   (“to the end that you and your children’s days will multiply upon the land which YHWH 
swore to give to your fathers, as long as there is a heaven over the earth”), not found in Deut 6:6–9. 
For the understanding of the hapax legomena ְוִׁשַּנְנָּתם as piel in the sense of “repeat” see Weinfeld, 
Deuteronomy 1-11, 330, 332–33; Carasik, Theologies of the Mind, 50, 182. Cf. André Lemaire, “Education 
(Israel),” in ABD, ed. David Noel Freedman (New York: Doubleday, 1992), 2:305–12. Cf. Carr on the 
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what we would locate as their inner dimensions, there is also a strong focus upon more 
‘external’ acts, like speaking about them ( ְָוִדַּבְרּת), teaching one’s children to speak them 
 ,(11:18 ,ּוְקַׁשְרֶּתם/6:8 ,ּוְקַׁשְרָּתם) binding as a sign ,(11:19 ,ְוִלַּמְדֶּתם ֹאָתם ֶאת־ְּבֵניֶכם ְלַדֵּבר ָּבם)
having them as a symbol (11:18 ;6:8 ,ְוָהיּו), and writing (11:20 ;6:9 ,ּוְכַתְבָּתם) upon more 
‘external’ objects. It therefore seems more precise to speak of ‘memorization’ of texts in 
order to ‘appropriate,’ ‘embody,’ and ‘enact’ them in lived life, instead of speaking of an 
‘internalization’ of Torah. Care should be exercised if using the term ‘internalization,’ as 
this presupposes an anthropological distinction between the ‘internal’ and ‘external.’74 In 
these passages we also see an interplay of the oral and written Torah, the spoken and the 
inscribed, as discussed above.75 The immediate goal is a memorized Torah that becomes 
an embodied Torah that, in turn, results in a living Torah.76 
                                               
difference between Deut 6 and 11 (Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 135). 
74 Niditch speaks of “internalizing Israelite ethics” (Niditch, Oral World and Written Word, 100). 
Cf. Sonnet’s “interiorization of the Mosaic teaching” (Sonnet, The Book within the Book, 58). For a 
discussion of the development of the internal/external distinction in the history of ideas see Charles Taylor, 
Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
Cf. Block, The Gospel According to Moses, 6 where he speaks of the reading of Deuteronomy intended to 
result in a lived life, “embodying the covenant fidelity.” For how Jesus becomes the perfect embodiment of 
Torah, see Block, The Gospel According to Moses, 11–12; Keener, John, 339–63. Commenting on Deut 
6:4–9 and Deut 11:13–21 in relation to literacy, Niditch writes: “The words, moreover, are to be repeated 
and spoken. The oral world provides their elaborate and living context” (Niditch, Oral World and Written 
Word, 100). 
75 Underlining the symbiotic relationship between the written and spoken Torah in Deut 6:6–9, 
Carasik makes the following observations: “First, the אות and the טטפת represent writing as a symbolic, not 
a literal, reminder. It is the existence and display of the writing that serves to remind, not the reading of its 
contents. Second, in accordance with a pervasive concern in Deuteronomy, the commandments must be ‘on 
your mind’ (על־לבבך). Here, though the word זכר is not used . . . , writing is put directly in the service of 
awareness. Its purpose is to make sure that one is actually thinking about the commandments” (Carasik, 
Theologies of the Mind, 66–67). Deut 30:6, 10 echo lexemes and themes particularly from Deut 6 and 11. 
76 Cf. Niditch, Oral World and Written Word, 70, 99; Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 
121. For other passages discussed by Niditch showing the interplay between orality and writing see Exod 
17:14–16 (Niditch, Oral World and Written Word, 84–85); Deut 27:3; 31:19, 24–26 (Niditch, Oral World 
and Written Word, 86–87); Josh 1:8 (Niditch, Oral World and Written Word, 95). Fishbane writes: “The 
cultural archive must become a living voice, and the written formulations must become direct address; 
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Above I argued that the function of ritual uses of Torah according to Deut 31:9–
13 were primarily didactic. The public recitation of Torah therefore has a similar purpose 
as the private recitation and inscription mentioned in Deut 6:6–9 and 11:18–21. The 
didactic media used are both orality and writing. The people hear the public reading of 
“this Torah” (11 ,31:9 ;ַהּתֹוָרה ַהּזֹאת) for the purpose that they may “hear and learn so they 
will fear YHWH your God and observe to do all the words of this Torah” ( ְלַמַען ִיְׁשְמעּו
ַהּתֹוָרה ַהּזֹאת ּוְלַמַען ִיְלְמדּו ְוָיְראּו ֶאת־ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֵהיֶכם ְוָׁשְמרּו ַלֲעׂשֹות ֶאת־ָּכל־ִּדְבֵרי ; 31:12). And their 
children who “do not know will hear and learn to fear YHWH your God” ( לֹא־ָיְדעּו ִיְׁשְמעּו
 .just as their parents do (31:13 ;ְוָלְמדּו ְלִיְרָאה ֶאת־ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֵהיֶכם
Carasik comments: “The written and the oral fuse for the purpose of transmitting 
and preserving דעת. Only in the combination of the two can the past live on reliably in 
present awareness. . . . writing augments living memory rather than obviating it.”77 In this 
way “Deuteronomy presents its own teaching as providing the ability of cultural self-
replication.”78 This “idea that the laws must be the basic content of the mind, to be 
maintained through the ages by transmission from one generation to the next, is 
                                               
one’s life and the life-world presented in the text must coincide in a dynamic way” (Michael Fishbane, 
Sacred Attunement: A Jewish Theology (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008), 63). 
Just one caveat here. Even if some see in Deut 6:6–9 a basis to argue for a general literacy in the 
Israelite population, the text of course only states what the goal is, not what was actual practice became. 
Still, Sonnet is correct in that the text does project a covenantal world where “the people is capable of 
writing” (Sonnet, The Book within the Book, 56). 
77 Carasik, Theologies of the Mind, 68. Thus, Deuteronomy seems to see a complementary role of 
memory and writing, contrary to Plato in Phaedrus quoted above. Cf. Niditch, Oral World and Written 
Word, 87–88; Sonnet, The Book within the Book, 70. On how the people should acquire an analogous fear 
as the Sinai generation according to Deut 31 see Sonnet, The Book within the Book, 145. Cf. p. 181. 
78 Carasik, Theologies of the Mind, 181. 
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fundamental to Deuteronomy.”79 We could add that while Deut 6 and 11 emphasize oral 
recitation of the instructions to the children, invoked by written representations of these 
instructions, Deut 31 focuses upon reciting the instructions to the people and children.80 
In the previous chapter I discussed how Deuteronomy invokes responses in love 
and joy by the people.81 Here I want to point out how the disposition of the heart is to be 
disclosed. According to Sonnet the heart is the “faculty of memory.”82 Memorization and 
imprinting Torah on the heart, however, is not an end in itself. “Taking Torah to heart” is 
a means, not an end. Rather, it should lead to them being embodied and then lived. 
Moreover, Deuteronomy speaks of testing the people to expose what is truly in their 
heart. In Deut 13 we find that the false prophets will be a test to the people in order to see 
what is truly in their hearts. 13:4 states that “YHWH your God is testing you to know if 
you love YHWH your God with all your heart and all your soul” ( ְמַנֶּסה ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֵהיֶכם ֶאְתֶכם
 As Carasik states, “God is .(ָלַדַעת ֲהִיְׁשֶכם ֹאֲהִבים ֶאת־ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֵהיֶכם ְּבָכל־ְלַבְבֶכם ּוְבָכל־ַנְפְׁשֶכם
curious, he wants to know.”83 The false prophet will test whether the people will follow 
YHWH’s prohibition against serving other gods or not. Deut 8:2 makes the link between 
the test, the heart, and obedience even clearer: “Remember the entire way which YHWH 
                                               
79 Carasik, Theologies of the Mind, 183. He also finds Deut 31 to form an inclusio with 4:10, both 
presenting the book itself as something to be heard, learned, and taught the children (Carasik, Theologies of 
the Mind, 186). The audio-visual encounter at Horeb is retold, and thus made cognitive consciousness, to 
the children. The immediateness of the visual encounter is reproduced through the oral retelling (Carasik, 
Theologies of the Mind, 183, 195). 
80 In Deut 32:46 we find another encouragement to memorize all of Torah. Cf. Sonnet, The Book 
within the Book, 179. 
81 Cf. Muffs, Love and Joy, 121–93; Carasik, Theologies of the Mind, 201, 213. 
82 Sonnet, The Book within the Book, 158. 
83 Carasik, Theologies of the Mind, 210. 
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your God made you walk these forty years in the desert, in order that he might humble 
you and test you to know what was in your heart, whether you would keep his 
commandments or not” (  רּבָ דְ ַּבּמִ  ָנהׁשָ  ִעיםּבָ ְר ַאֹהִליֲכָך ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֶהיָך ֶזה  רׁשֶ אֲ  ֶרְךּדֶ ל־הַ ּכָ ֶאת־ ּתָ ְוָזַכְר 
ִמְצֹוָתו ִאם־לֹא ֹמרׁשְ ֲהתִ  ְלָבְבָךּבִ  רׁשֶ ָלַדַעת ֶאת־אֲ  ְתָךּסֹ ְלנַ  ְתָךּנֹ ן עַ ְלַמעַ  ). YHWH wants to expose what 
is truly in the hearts of the people. With the heart as the locus where Torah truly belongs, 
this testing will therefore disclose whether the heart really harbors Torah or not. Having 
spoken of the delight YHWH will take in blessing the people with what is good, Moses in 
Deut 30:10–14 turns to a focus upon Torah, speaking of how the written word should be 
heard, and how “the word is very close to you [ִּכי־ָקרֹוב ֵאֶליָך ַהָּדָבר ְמֹאד], in your mouth 
and in your heart [ְּבִפיָך ּוִבְלָבְבָך], to observe it.”84 
Isaiah 
Having looked at the question of orality, writing, and memory in the Torah, I now 
turn to the prophets, more precisely Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel.85 I will begin with 
Isaiah. Mowinckel writes: “Isaiah provides the earliest information about a prophet 
writing something or having something written. In two cases he had a symbolic, 
enigmatic prediction written on a tablet to prove that he had predicted the coming event 
(Isa 8:1–8; 30:7–8).”86 In Isa 8:16–18 we read: 
                                               
84 A similar focus is found in the prophets. Cf. Isa 8:16; Jer 31:31–34. While Jer 31:31–34 picks 
up the idea of inscribing Torah on the heart from Deut 6:6–9, 20–25; 11:18–21; these Deuteronomic 
passages place the responsibility for the embodiment of Torah upon the individual Israelites, while God 
takes this responsibility upon himself in Jeremiah. It is possible that Jeremiah found this idea in Deut 30:4. 
85 For a general discussion of orality, writing, and quotation in ANE prophecy see Nissinen, 
“Spoken, Written, Quoted, and Invented,” 235–71. 
86 Sigmund Mowinckel, The Spirit and the Word: Prophecy and Tradition in Ancient Israel, trans. 
K. C. Hanson (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2002), 54. For the close parallels between Isa 36–39 and 2 Kgs 18–
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Bind up the testimony, seal the instruction [ ֹוָרהּת ] among my students [ ָדיּמֻ לִ ּבְ  ]. And I 
will wait for YHWH, who is hiding his face from the house of Jacob, I will hope in 
him. Behold, I and the children whom YHWH gave me as signs and portents in Israel 
from YHWH of hosts, the one dwelling on Mount Zion. 
As pointed out by Carr, it is not clear whether the students were Isaiah’s own children or 
mere students, but this injunction is nevertheless analogous to the emphasis in 
Deuteronomy upon training the next generation in Torah. Further, it is clear from the 
passage that the “educational process” indicated “was both written and oral.”87 
Having commented on the relative frequency of terms such as זכר (‘to 
remember’) and כחׁש  (‘to forget’) when compared, for example, to Genesis, Carasik 
writes: “Second Isaiah, at least, certainly dates from a time and a mileu where awareness 
of writing must have been commonplace. Yet the preservation of factual data was no part 
of what interested this prophet. . . . there is a focus not on facts (for whatever purpose), 
but on awareness.”88 Given “a high level of complexity in his use of sources,” Sommer 
has challenged the common assumption among scholars that the so-called Deutero-Isaiah 
was originally delivered orally and later committed to writing. He also argues that it is 
                                               
21 see Mowinckel, The Spirit and the Word, 58–59. Schellenberg refers to the following references to 
writing in the book of Isaiah: Isa 4:3; 8:1; 10:1, 19; 29:11-12, 18; 30:8; 37:14; 39;1; 44:5; 50:1; 65:6 
(Schellenberg, “A "Lying Pen of the Scribes" (Jer 8:8)?,” 294). 
87 Carr writes: “First, such ‘instruction’ and ‘torah’ mentioned in Isa 8:16, 20, was often written as 
well as oral in the ancient world, and 8:16 uses metaphors for handling scrolls—‘wrap up’ and ‘seal’—to 
talk of the process of inculcating this teaching in students. Second, this passage is itself a written text, 
following on an authorizing other written texts. Indeed, the passage occurs toward the conclusion of an 
often-posited early collection of Isaianic prophecy, the testimony book (Isa 6–8). . . . Moreover, there is 
another Isaiah text, Isaiah 30:8, that refers explicitly to the writing of prophecy amid references to the 
people’s rejection of the prophet’s prophecy as a rejection of the instruction/torah of YHWH (30:9–11), 
who is the true teacher (30:20) and wise one (31:2)” (Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 144. Cf. 
145). 
88 Carasik, Theologies of the Mind, 62. Cf. pp. 61, 85–86. For the oral/written debate regarding the 
so-called Deutero-Isaiah see Gitay, “Deutero-Isaiah,” 185–88. For further discussions on the question of 
the oral and written in the classical prophets, see Menahem Haran, “From Early to Classical Prophecy: 
Continuity and Change,” VT 27 (1977): 385–97. 
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possible that Deutero-Isaiah reused sources from memory: 
It initially seems likely that he knew his sources in written form. Deutero-Isaiah 
repeatedly displays knowledge of a large number of passages from his sources. It 
follows that his knowledge was based on collections to which he could have made 
frequent references, and such a reference work, one assumes, must have been written. 
But this assumption is not incontrovertible. . . . It is not inconceivable that Deutero-
Isaiah memorized earlier prophetic collections or that he studied them, and referred to 
them, in an oral form. . . . Stylistic features (especially the split-up pattern and 
identical word order) and the length of some passages to which he alludes indicate a 
high level of complexity in his use of sources. . . . Thus, while one should not 
discount the possibility that Deutero-Isaiah knew his sources as oral texts, it remains 
more likely that he consulted them in written form. Of course, these two possibilities 
are not incompatible.89 
Yehoshua Gitay wrote a thoughtful article on the question of whether prophetic 
texts should be classified as originally having been composed orally or in writing. He 
contends that the criteria often used to argue either side are not unequivocal, since 
ancients tended to write their compositions with the intention that they be read publicly 
and thus received orally. Instead pursuing further the oral/written question, he proposes 
that a study of ancient rhetorics would be a more fruitful approach: 
A study of DI [Deutero-Isaiah] shows that phenomena considered to be characteristic 
of oral composition are found in his prophecy. However, these characteristic 
phenomena are not peculiar just to oral literature and may be employed also in written 
composition. In any event, the question of oral or written composition is not the 
proper question for such a literature as DI’s. That is because in the ancient period 
even written material was designed to be heard and to be read in public. The writer’s 
goal was to reach the audience through hearing devices. Consequently, even writers 
employed in their work the devices utilized in oral performance. Hence, the question 
should not be: DI oral or written? The proper question has to be: What are the 
rhetorical means utilized in DI’s work and through which the prophet, speaking or 
writing, tried to appeal to his audience?90 
                                               
89 Sommer, A Prophet Reads Scripture, 170–71. 
90 Gitay, “Deutero-Isaiah,” 197. He writes: “His prophecies [Deutero-Isaiah’s] are clearly designed 
and presented in speech-form. . . . As a rule, poetic address is always in the form of speech-address” (Gitay, 
“Deutero-Isaiah,” 188). And again: “In modern culture, it is rather easy to distinguish between written and 
oral literature. . . . In ancient times this was not the situation since even written material was written to be 




As Deuteronomy was the most significant book for the question of orality, 
writing, and memory in Torah, Jeremiah occupies a similar position in the prophetic 
literature.91 This is also reflected in the cases to be studied in part two, where both 
Deuteronomy and Jeremiah will play major roles. Regarding orality in Jeremiah, Annette 
Schellenberg writes: 
In the call narrative of Jeremiah, for example, one learns that Jeremiah is called by 
YHWH to “speak” (דבר pi.) everything he commands (cf. Jer 1:7), and it is 
Jeremiah’s “mouth” (פי) in which God puts his words (cf. 1:9). The prophet is asked 
by God to “speak” (אמר) to the people and to “proclaim in the hearing of Jerusalem” 
 cf. 2:2; similarly 11:6; 17:19f; 19:2; 26:2). Through the voice of ;באזני ירוׁשלם + קרא)
Jeremiah the words of God are delivered orally, as are additional words from the 
prophet himself. Accordingly, these words are often introduced with a call to “hear”. 
While the verb “to hear/listen” (שמע) often is synonymous with “to pay attention” and 
“to obey” in the book of Jeremiah and other OT writings, its basic meaning still 
reflects the understanding that words of God and humans were received through 
hearing, i.e. orally.92 
                                               
techniques employed by oral literature in order to reach his audience” (Gitay, “Deutero-Isaiah,” 191–92). 
According to Gitay on p. 195 this would also result in an attempt to treat the audience (and oneself as 
author) as participants of a dialogue, using 1. and 2. person forms, as observed occurring frequently in 
Torah as well. For a rhetorical analysis of Torah see Watts, Reading Law. 
91 Cf. Schellenberg, “A "Lying Pen of the Scribes" (Jer 8:8)?,” 286n. 
92 The high frequency of the lexeme ָּדָבר in Jeremiah speaks to the discursive setting of the book. 
Cf. Georg Fischer, Jeremia 1–25, Herders Theologischer Kommentar zum Alten Testament (HThKAT) 
(Freiburg: Herder, 2005), 75; Schellenberg, “A "Lying Pen of the Scribes" (Jer 8:8)?,” 287. For a 
discussion on the relation between  ְָבִריםּד  and ֹוָרהּת  in the book of Jeremiah, see Udo Rüterswörden, “Es 
gibt keinen Exegeten in einem gesetzlosen Land (Prov 29,18 LXX): Erwägung zum Thema: Der Prophet 
und die Thora,” in Prophetie und geschitliche Wirklichkeit im alten Israel, ed. R. Liwak and S. Wagner 
(Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1991), 334; Christl Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer der Tora: Soziale Gebote des 
Deuteronomiums in Fortschreibungen des Jeremiabuches (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2002), 
302–4, 353–55; Eggleston, "See and Read All These Words", 113–14). Fischer writes: “Jer ist das Buch, 
das mit 158 Belegen (von 1159 im AT) bei weitem am meisten Vorkommen von שמע, hören’ aufweist. . . . 
Kein anderes Buch der Bibel zeigt so häufig und massiv wie Jer Verfehlungen gegen diese Grundforderung 
des Hörens auf Gottes durch die Propheten vermitteltes Reden auf” (Fischer, “Der Einfluss des 
Deuteronomiums auf das Jeremiabuch,” 264). This is significant for understanding the oral register of 
Jeremiah. Cp. this with Jeremiah also being the HB book that most clearly writes about writing. 
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Further, she organizes the passages mentioning writing in Jeremiah into four groups: (1) 
two prophetic letters (29:1–23, 24–32), (2) scrolls with collections of Jeremiah’s oracles 
(25:13; 30:2; 36:2, 28, 32; 45:1; 51:60), legal documents (3:8; 32:10–16, cf. 32:44), and 
writing metaphors (17:1, 13; 22:30; 31:33).93 In part two I will take a closer look at the 
case of the  ְּכִריֻתתֵסֶפר  (“bill of divorce”) in Jer 3:8, and also touch upon the   ִּמְקָנההַ  ֵּסֶפר
(“deed of purchase”) signed in Jer 32 as it strengthens the Jubilee background of Jer 34. 
Eggleston does not claim it is possible to prove that the book of Jeremiah was 
intended for public reading, but that it is “the more plausible possible context in which 
one can understand the book.”94 He writes: “In Jeremiah, one finds a prophet-priest who 
is not only a speaker but frequently also a writer. This is especially true of the second half 
of Jeremiah (chaps. 26–52), where the personification of the prophet increasingly points 
toward this role.”95 If so, this raises the interesting question of why then we find the 
strongest cases of legal reuse in the first part of the book. As this is not a study of the 
book of Jeremiah per se, I will not attempt an answer here. Further studies of reuse in the 
book of Jeremiah might want to pursue this question. Building on Watts’ study discussed 
above, Eggleston observes that rhetorical repetition and variation might better explain the 
supposed ‘incoherent’ composition of the book of Jeremiah than traditional source-
                                               
93 Schellenberg, “A "Lying Pen of the Scribes" (Jer 8:8)?,” 292–94. Eggleston writes: “There are 
numerous audiences in the book of Jeremiah, but their primary characteristic is that they are most often at 
worship. Moreover, those who receive texts in Jeremiah do not commonly read on their own but instead 
have texts read to them by scribes. Audiences hear the word of YHWH as conscious receivers of a word 
whose oral transmission comes via a written counterpart” (Eggleston, "See and Read All These Words", 8). 
94 Eggleston, "See and Read All These Words", 161. 
95 Eggleston, "See and Read All These Words", 76. For Eggleston on the textual aurality of the 
Book of Jermiah, see pp. 151–53. 
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critical explanations do: “Repetition and variation in the book of Jeremiah may also 
indicate an original context of public reading and indeed may provide the simplest 
explanation for the book of Jeremiah’s ‘incoherent’ composition.”96 
Jer 36 is one of the most elaborate cases showing the scribal culture in which the 
HB participated. Jeremiah receives a word from YHWH (v. 1), and is immediately 
commanded to “take a scroll and write on it all the words” which YHWH spoke to him 
(v. 2).97 Then these same words are to be orally communicated to the people since they 
might listen (אּוַלי ִיְׁשְמעּו; v. 3). Baruch, Jeremiah’s scribe, writes on the scroll all the 
words YHWH spoke to the prophet by dictation from the mouth of Jeremiah ( ִמִּפי ִיְרְמָיהּו
 v. 4). Jeremiah is banned from and unable to go to the ;ֵאת ָּכל־ִּדְבֵרי ְיהָוה ֲאֶׁשר־ִּדֶּבר ֵאָליו
Temple, so he sends Baruch instead to read in the scroll (ְוָקָראָת ַבְּמִגָּלה) he has written by 
dictation of Jeremiah (ֲאֶׁשר־ָּכַתְבָּת־ִמִּפי ֶאת־ִּדְבֵרי ְיהָוה) in the ears of the people and all Judah 
 .(v. 6), and this is something Baruch does (vv. 8–10 ;ְּבָאְזֵני ָהָעם . . . ְּבָאְזֵני ָכל־ְיהּוָדה)
Michaiah hears all the words of YHWH from the scroll (ַוִּיְׁשַמע ִמָכְיהּו ֶבן־ְּגַמְרָיהּו ֶבן־ָׁשָפן ֶאת־
 v. 11), and reports them to the royal officials (vv. 12–13). These ;ָּכל־ִּדְבֵרי ְיהָוה ֵמַעל ַהֵּסֶפר
again take action and have Baruch read the words a second time to them (vv. 14–15). As 
the words create fear, they realize their responsibility to report the words to the king (v. 
                                               
96 Eggleston, "See and Read All These Words", 160. He writes: “Additional human parties 
interrupt the YHWH-prophet-audience pattern of transmission, as the written word provides a further 
intermediary between the original prophetic pronouncement and its audience. This is especially the case in 
the second half of the book of Jeremiah, where the audience shifts from one that hears a word that typically 
exists as an oral pronouncement to an audience that hears a publicly proclaimed text” (Eggleston, "See and 
Read All These Words", 138). 
97 Mowinckel understood the purpose of the scroll in Jer 36:1–2 as an aide-memoire: “The 
recording then was to serve as a support to memory, as ‘the words’ on a special occasion were to be recited 
to the cultic congregation” (Mowinckel, The Spirit and the Word, 55). 
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16). They inquire of Baruch regarding the composition of the scroll (v. 17). Baruch 
answers that he wrote by dictation from the mouth of Jeremiah, and even specifies that he 
wrote with ink (ִמִּפיו ִיְקָרא ֵאַלי ֵאת ָּכל־ַהְּדָבִרים ָהֵאֶּלה ַוֲאִני ֹּכֵתב ַעל־ַהֵּסֶפר ַּבְּדיֹו; v. 18). The 
officials instruct Baruch and Jeremiah to hide (v. 19), leave the scroll in the chamber of 
Elishama, and rush off to the king and report “all the words in the ears of the king” 
 might indicate it was (ָּכל־ַהְּדָבִרים) ”v. 20). “All the words ;ַוַּיִּגידּו ְּבָאְזֵני ַהֶּמֶלְך ֵאת ָּכל־ַהְּדָבִרים)
an exact oral reproduction, while it may also simply have been a summary.98 The king 
orders the scroll brought to him and the scroll is read out loud a third time, now by 
Yehudi (v. 21).99 But as the king listens he cuts off piece by piece what has been read 
from the scroll and throws it into the fire (vv. 22–23). In contrast to the first group of 
officials, neither the king nor his other officials fear when they hear the words read, even 
when the first officials plead with the king not to burn the scroll (v. 24–25). 
Niditch writes: “But, of course, in this world of inspired improvisation and 
memorization, the contents of the scroll have not been destroyed; they are in Jeremiah’s 
mind and mouth.”100 Even if the king seems to attribute a magical power to the scroll 
                                               
98 Cf. Eggleston, "See and Read All These Words", 144. 
99 For the use of written documents in the transmission of a prophetic message, and how Jer 36 fits 
in to the pattern of similar letters at Mari, cf. Nissinen, “Spoken, Written, Quoted, and Invented,” 249. 
100 Niditch, Oral World and Written Word, 105. Cf. Fischer who claims that the book of Jeremiah 
shows evidence of partaking in a developed scribal culture, testified through its reuse of sources (Fischer, 
Jeremia 1–25, 74).  
The differences between the MT and LXX in Jeremiah has been much studied. Some have seen 
MT and LXX as stemming from the two versions of the book mentioned in Jer 36. If so, and this is a major 
‘if,’; the differences between the two versions could also be studied in light of the question how memorized 
reuse might produce certain textual variations. For references in the book of Jeremiah to earlier versions of 
itself and it’s compositional process, see Jer 25:13; 29:1; 30:2; 36:2,28,32; 45:1; 51:60. Cf. Schellenberg, 
“A "Lying Pen of the Scribes" (Jer 8:8)?,” 303. 
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itself,101 and therefore burns it to undo its message, he also needs to kill those in whom 
the words reside, Jeremiah and Baruch.102 The words not only reside in writing, they are 
alive and in the memory of persons. But YHWH hides them (v. 26). At the command of 
YHWH, Jeremiah, with the help of Baruch, is able to reproduce a similar scroll, once 
more by dictation of Jeremiah (ִמִּפי ִיְרְמָיהּו), with all the words of the former scroll that 
was burned (ָּכל־ִּדְבֵרי ַהֵּסֶפר ֲאֶׁשר ָׂשַרף ְיהֹוָיִקים ֶמֶלְך־ְיהּוָדה ָּבֵאׁש), even adding some more 
words this time, likely including the judgment upon Jehoiakim and his sons mentioned in 
vv. 29–31 (ְועֹוד נֹוַסף ֲעֵליֶהם ְּדָבִרים ַרִּבים ָּכֵהָּמה; v. 32).103 The details of Jer 36 appear to be 
written to underline the respective roles of writing and orality in the book of Jeremiah. 
They also demonstrate the practice of the memorized text and the openness to 
augmenting an existing instruction. As Carasik puts it, “a written text . . . is 
simultaneously akin to a living and growing thing.”104 This chapter also emphasizes the 
autonomy of the scrolls of Jeremiah as part of an  
                                               
101 Cf. Carasik, Theologies of the Mind, 70. For a similar magical view of text see Jer 29:24:32; 
51:59–64 (Carasik, Theologies of the Mind, 71–72; Schellenberg, “A "Lying Pen of the Scribes" (Jer 
8:8)?,” 294). Referring to the letter in Jer 29 Schellenberg claims that “with its ‘oral’ style the letter shows 
how easy it is to imitate an oral communication in writing” (Schellenberg, “A "Lying Pen of the Scribes" 
(Jer 8:8)?,” 293). Gitay has pointed out that Jer 29:29, as well as 2 Kgs 20:12–13, show that the normal was 
for a written composition to be read out aloud (Gitay, “Deutero-Isaiah,” 193). 
102 Cf. Nielsen, Oral Tradition, 69, 72–73, 76, 77–78. 
103 Carasik writes: “Note that God condemns the king not for failing to heed him, but for burning 
the scroll” (Carasik, Theologies of the Mind, 70). 
104 Carasik, Theologies of the Mind, 71. Given his view of Torah as representing a more fixated 
view of the text, something I have questioned above, he contrasts the concept of Torah as represented in the 
narrative about the discovery of the Scroll of Torah in 2 Kgs 22 with Jer 36: “The different resolutions of 
the two stories point to the differing notions of Torah on the one hand and prophecy on the other. In the 
one, God’s word is fixed and preserved, but detached from the immediate experience of revelation. In the 
other, it retains the immediacy of theophany, but also its volatility” (Carasik, Theologies of the Mind, 71). 
In my opinion LeFebvre has adequately shown that Torah was not perceived as fixated in 2 Kgs 22 
(LeFebvre, Collections, Codes, and Torah, 55–95). 
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increased focus upon texts that, in turn, affects us as we read through the book.105 
Jer 8:8–9 has been much discussed among scholars as well. It reads: 
 ט ֶׁשֶקר ֹסְפִרים׃ָכִמים ֲאַנְחנּו ְותֹוַרת ְיהָוה ִאָּתנּו ָאֵכן ִהֵּנה ַלֶּׁשֶקר ָעָׂשה עֵ ֵאיָכה תֹאְמרּו חֲ 
 ֹהִביׁשּו ֲחָכִמים ַחּתּו ַוִּיָּלֵכדּו ִהֵּנה ִבְדַבר־ְיהָוה ָמָאסּו ְוָחְכַמת־ֶמה ָלֶהם׃
“How can you say: ‘We are wise and the Torah of YHWH is with us’? Surely, for a 
lie has the lying pen of the scribes labored! The wise shall be put to shame, they shall  
be dismayed and captured. See, they have rejected the word of YHWH. What wisdom 
do they then have?”106 
Many have interpreted these verses as operating with a dichotomy between the oral word 
of YHWH versus the written word of the scribes.107 Schniedewind takes it as a “protest 
against the authority of the written texts that were understood as subverting oral 
tradition and the authority of the prophet.”108 Schellenberg does not find any of 
these claims convincing. She offers a more straightforward reading of the passage: 
“The question of orality and writing is not important at this point. Lies can be 
spread with all different means of communication, besides orally . . . and in 
                                               
105 Eggleston, "See and Read All These Words", 97. See also p. 68, 144. This resonates with 
Sonnet’s similar point in Deuteronomy, with an increased focus upon the role of the text itself towards the 
end of the book. Cf. Otto, “Jeremia und die Tora,” 526–31. 
106 Fischer points out that Jer 8:8 might be a reversal of Deut 4:6, 8 (Fischer, “Der Einfluss des 
Deuteronomiums auf das Jeremiabuch,” 253). Commenting on Jer 43:1–7; 45, Eggleston writes: “Unlike 
false prophets whose oracles come from their own heart and are therefore immediately available (23:16), 
Jeremiah receives an oracle ten days after the peoples’ request” (Eggleston, "See and Read All These 
Words", 68). 
107 E.g. Robert P. Carroll, “Inscribing the Covenant: Writing and the Written in Jeremiah,” in 
Understanding Poets and Prophets: Essays in Honour of George Wishart Anderson, ed. A. G. Auld, 
JSOTSup 152 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993), 61–76; Karel van der Toorn, “From the Mouth 
of the Prophet: The Literary Fixation of Jeremiah's Prophecies in the Context of the Ancient Near East,” in 
Inspired Speech: Prophecy in the Ancient Near East; Essays in Honor of H. B. Huffmon, eds. J. Kaltner and 
L. Stulman (T&T Clark: Edinburgh, 2004), 199. Cf. Edward Silver, “The Prophet and the Lying Pen: 
Jeremiah's Poetic Challenge to the Deuteronomic School” (Ph.D. diss., The University of Chicago, 2009); 
Schellenberg, “A "Lying Pen of the Scribes" (Jer 8:8)?,” 285. 
108 Schniedewind, How the Bible Became a Book, 117. Cf. Schellenberg, “A "Lying Pen of the 
Scribes" (Jer 8:8)?,” 285. 
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writing (cf. 8:8; 29:24–32) also in symbolic actions (cf. 28:10–11).”109 
Schellenberg points out that Jer 26:17–19 refers to what might be a memorized 
reuse of a former prophetic passage by the elders of the land.110 The literal quotation here 
of Mic 3:12 might also be understood as a reuse reflecting a fixation through writing even 
if here we also find a minor variation (with  ִיןּיִ ע  (“heap of ruins”) in Mic 3:12 and  ִיםּיִ ע  
(“heaps of ruins”) in Jer 26:18). 
The idea of embodied Torah is also represented in the well-known promise of Jer 
31:31–33. Here YHWH promises that he will place his Torah in their midst and write it 
upon their heart (31:33 ,ָנַתִּתי ֶאת־ּתֹוָרִתי ְּבִקְרָּבם ְוַעל־ִלָּבם ֶאְכֲּתֶבָּנה). Carasik comments: 
“Writing upon the heart—that is, into the mind—eliminates the impermanence of 
memory without reducing it to a text which can be folded up and stored away, lost or 
forgotten. Instead, a Torah that is written on the heart marries the permanence of writing 
                                               
109 Schellenberg, “A "Lying Pen of the Scribes" (Jer 8:8)?,” 307. Cf. Fischer arguing that Jeremia 
possibly assume a written version of Torah (Georg Fischer, “ותפשי התורה לא ידעוני: The Relationship of the 
Book of Jeremiah to the Torah,” in The Formation of the Pentateuch, eds. Jan C. Gertz et al., FAT 111 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016), 891–912). Graffy points out that “Jer 8,8, shows the structure of 
quotation followed by refutation” (Adrian Graffy, A Prophet Confronts His People: The Disputation 
Speech in the Prophets (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1984), 6). 
Eggleston writes that Jer 8:8 is “notoriously difficult to translate” and how “scribes can be a threat 
to the chain of transmission unless their words are carefully controlled, as they are in the narrative of 
Jeremiah 36 by the dictation model of transmission from prophet to scribe. Jer 8:8, then, demonstrates the 
need for a careful chain of transmission from the divine to the written word” (Eggleston, "See and Read All 
These Words", 63, 65). And he continues: “With the lone exception of Jer 8:8, the tradents of Jeremiah 
depict scribes such as themselves as valid participants in the transmission of God’s word to the world” 
(Eggleston, "See and Read All These Words", 70). Nissinen writes: “Since meanings of words emerge 
within a sociolinguistic context, there is no repetition of a message without an interpretative adaptation 
corresponding to the perception of the ones who are supposed to hear it. The intermediaries, addressees, 
and interpreters of the prophetic messages, hence, are not mere instruments and objects of the divine word, 
but active participants whose needs and preferences keep the process advancing. Without their participation 
there is no meaningful message to be heard and heeded, no communication, no prophecy” (Nissinen, 
“Spoken, Written, Quoted, and Invented,” 270–71). 
110 Cf. Schellenberg, “A "Lying Pen of the Scribes" (Jer 8:8)?,” 305. 
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to the awareness of the mind.”111 This raises the question whether the writing upon the 
heart in Jer 31 should be understood exclusively in terms of memorization as a cognitive 
strategy, or if it should not rather be viewed as a process of intimate learning whereby the 
divine agency counters mere human agency such that the process of reading is described 
as God writing upon the heart. 
Carasik summarizes orality, writing, and memory in Exodus, Deuteronomy, and 
Jeremiah. He finds an  
increasing reliance, from Exodus through Deuteronomy to Jeremiah, on the 
preservation of God’s word in written form. At the same time, we saw an increasing 
reluctance to let a written text substitute for vital awareness of what the text contains. 
In Exodus, it was enough to inscribe the commandments on stone tablets. In 
Deuteronomy, they must be presented in the voice of Moses, on the plains of Moab 
just before the Israelites enter the land; Moses is also given the poem of Deuteronomy 
32 to write down, teach to the people and “put it in their mouth” (Deut 31:19). In 
Jeremiah, we saw that the message had power that outlasted the destruction or 
disappearance of the medium that carried it. Indeed, the physical destruction of the 
text would do no more than portend the power inherent in the word.112 
                                               
111 Carasik, Theologies of the Mind, 72. For the idea of remembering and forgetting in Jeremiah 
see p. 79, 85–86. Fischer writes on Jer 31: “The inscription of his תורה on the heart ‘overwrites’ the sin 
engravings of Jer 17:1, and it also signifies that God goes beyond the writing of his commandments on 
scrolls or stones on Mount Sinai (Exod 24:4; 31:18)” (Fischer, “The Relationship of the Book of Jeremiah 
to the Torah,” 898). Cf. Greenberg, “Three Conceptions of the Torah,” 19–20; Schellenberg, “A "Lying 
Pen of the Scribes" (Jer 8:8)?,” 308–9; Eggleston, "See and Read All These Words", 101. 
112 Carasik, Theologies of the Mind, 88. Wellhausen wrote: “It is a thing which is likely to occur, 
that a body of traditional practice should only be written down when it is threatening to die out, and that a 
book should be, as it were, the ghost of a life which is closed” (Wellhausen, Prolegomena, 405). While 
Eggleston takes Wellhausen as representing the view of writing as degeneration, this stands in contrast to 
the creativity I find in biblical reuse. Eggleston writes further, how Wellhausen is challenged by Jeremiah: 
“Jeremiah is said to have been an ally of Josiah and thus must have supported the legal codification behind 
2 Kings 22–23. How can the prophet be both a supporter of prophetic inscription and a powerful speaker 
full of religious power?” (Eggleston, "See and Read All These Words", 21). Note how Wellhausen tried to 
avoid this problem. 
For further studies on writing, orality, and memory in the book of Jeremiah see J. Andrew 
Dearman, “My Servants the Scribes: Composition and Context in Jeremiah 36,” JBL 109, no. 3 (1990): 
403–21; Carroll, “Inscribing the Covenant: Writing and the Written in Jeremiah,” 61-76; Robert P. Carroll, 
“Manuscripts Don’t Burn—Inscribing the Prophetic Tradition: Reflections on Jeremiah 36,” in Dort Ziehen 
Schiffe dahin: Collected Communications to the XIVth Congress of the International Organization for the 
Study of the Old Testament, ed. G. L. Prato, International Organization for the Study of the Old Testament 




The final book I will look at in this chapter is Ezekiel. Eggleston writes: “Ezekiel, 
of course, remains the most well-known prophetic writer. The prophet eats the scroll 
(Ezek 2:9–3:11) and thereby ingests the word of YHWH in written and not spoken form. 
His particular, peculiar vision of the prophetic word is that of a written word. Ezekiel’s 
prophecy is Schriftgelehrte, informed by and commenting upon the texts he himself has 
already received.”113 Ezekiel’s swallowing the scroll in Ezek 2:9–3:11 supplies a good 
example of the idea of embodying YHWH’s words.114 Ezek 2:9 is the only time in the 
book the term ֵסֶפר is used, in the phrase  ִת־ֵסֶפרּלַ ְמג . Thrice Ezekiel is instructed to speak 
to Israel. In 3:1 he is instructed to eat the scroll and then to go to speak to the house of 
Israel ( ֹ הַ  הּלָ גִ ּמְ ֱאכֹול ֶאת־הַ  ָרֵאלׂשְ יִ  יתּבֵ ֶאל־ רַּדּבֵ ְוֵלְך  אתּז ). As Polak puts it: “When Ezekiel 
has to swallow a scroll, it is in order to speak (Ezek. 2:9–3:3).”115 In 3:4 he is again 
instructed to speak to the house of Israel “my words” ( ֹ ֶלְך־  ּתָ ְר ּבַ ְודִ  ָרֵאלְׂש יִ  יתּבֵ ֶאל־ אּב
                                               
Practice of Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Phillip Davies, “'Pen of Iron, Point of 
Diamond' (Jer 17.1): Prophecy as Writing,” in Writings and Speech in Israelite and Ancient Near Eastern 
Prophecy, eds. E. Ben Zvi and M. H. Floyd (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 2000), 65–81; Silver, “The Prophet 
and the Lying Pen: Jeremiah's Poetic Challenge to the Deuteronomic School,”; Georg Fischer and Norbert 
Lohfink, “Das Jeremiabuch als Spiegel der Schrift- und Lesekultur in Israel,” ZKT 132, no. 1 (2010): 25–
46. 
113 Eggleston, "See and Read All These Words", 76. For references to writing in the book of 
Ezekiel see Schellenberg, “A "Lying Pen of the Scribes" (Jer 8:8)?,” 294. 
114 Cf. Niditch, Oral World and Written Word, 83. See Carasik, Theologies of the Mind, 85–87 on 
Ezek 16. 
115 Polak, “Book, Scribe, and Bard,” 133. Comparing how Jeremiah and Ezekiel are entrusted with 
YHWH’s words, Nielsen writes: “To be sure there is a characteristic difference between the way in which 
Jeremiah is entrusted with the words of YHWH, and the way in which Ezekiel is charged with them (Jer. 
1.9; Ezek. 2.8–3.9)” (Nielsen, Oral Tradition, 61). Nielsen does not state explicitly what he refers to, but 
seems to be thinking of the contrast between passages like Jer 1:9,  ִִפיָךּבְ ְדָבַרי  יּתִ ָנתַ  הּנֵ ה  (“Behold, I place my 
words in your mouth”), and Ezek 2:8–3:9. 
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 presumably those contained in the scroll just eaten. And finally, he is ,(ִבְדָבַרי ֲאֵליֶהם
instructed to “receive in your hear” (ַקח ִּבְלָבְבָך) and “hear with your ears” (ּוְבָאְזֶניָך ְׁשָמע) 
all the words of YHWH, thus embodying them as he speaks them to the exiles: 
ְוֵלְך ּבֹא ֶאל־ ְבָאְזֶניָך ְׁשָמע׃ּוַוּיֹאֶמר ֵאָלי ֶּבן־ָאָדם ֶאת־ָּכל־ְּדָבַרי ֲאֶׁשר ֲאַדֵּבר ֵאֶליָך ַקח ִּבְלָבְבָך 
 ְיהִֹוה ִאם־ִיְׁשְמעּו ְוִאם־ֶיְחָּדלּו׃ָני ַהּגֹוָלה ֶאל־ְּבֵני ַעֶּמָך ְוִדַּבְרָּת ֲאֵליֶהם ְוָאַמְרָּת ֲאֵליֶהם ֹּכה ָאַמר ֲאדֹ 
And he said to me: “Son of man, all my words which I speak to you receive in your 
heart and hear with your ears. And go, approach the exiles, to the sons of your people, 
and speak to them and say to them: ‘Thus says the Lord YHWH,” whether they hear 
or refuse.” 
Analogous to Jeremiah’s writing Torah on the heart (Jer 31:30–33), Ezek 36:24–
27 speaks of YHWH making the people walk in his rules and do his judgments (  יִתיׂשִ ְועָ 
 Ezekiel is not as explicit as Jeremiah on 116.(ֵאת אֲ ׁשֶ ר־ּבְ חֻ ּקַ י ּתֵ ֵלכּו ּומִ ְׁשּפָ ַטי ִּתׁשְ ְמרּו ַועֲ ִׂש יֶתם
inscribing Torah on the heart, but YHWH does promise in the same context that “I will 
give you a new heart and place a new spirit in your midst” (  חַ ּוְור ׁשָלֶכם ֵלב ָחדָ  יּתִ ְוָנתַ 
ֶכםּבְ ִקְר ּבְ  ןּתֵ אֶ  הׁשָ ֲחדָ  , v. 26). The two passages could therefore be said to reflect a similar 
idea. 
In Ezek 9:2, 11 one of the divine executioners is described as a scribe, having a 
writing case at his waist.117 And it is only those who have a mark (ּתָ ו) in the forehead that 
are spared according to 9:4. In Ezek 13:9 we find the notion of erasing the false prophets 
from the register of the house of Israel. Graffy writes: “One of the notable features of 
the speeches of the prophet Ezekiel is the frequency with which he reports what 
the people are saying and goes on to refute their opinion. Proud words of those left 
                                               
116 Cf. Greenberg, “Three Conceptions of the Torah,” 19–20. 
117 Cf. Greenberg, Ezekiel 1-20, 176. 
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in Jerusalem receive unambiguous replies. Despondent laments of the exiles are 
answered by words of encouragement.”118 According to Polak’s analysis, the Temple 
Vision contain both oral and scribal elements: 
One may also note that the mini-legislation of Ezekiel contains both oral and scribal 
elements. The scribal affiliation is obvious in the sections concerning the Levites 
(Ezek 44:1–14), and the sacrifices (Ezek 46:1–15). Some VoLB [voiced, lean, brisk 
style] traces may be discerned in the sections concerning the altar (43:18–27), the 
proposals for priestly clothing and behavior (44:16–31), and the legislation 
concerning the landed property of the nāśī’ and the cooking boils (46:16–24). Still, in 
view of the figures for grouped nouns, elaborate clauses and hypotaxis (particularly 
complex hypotaxis), the profile of these sections fits the IES [intricate elaborate 
style], and thus the Judean corpus.119 
Generally speaking, the memorization and embodiment of covenantal 
instructions, discussed above, resulted in active participation by later tradents. They did 
not remain mere observers. The irony is that their vested interest in preserving allegiance 
to the covenantal instructions could well have invited innovation and creative reuse of the 
instructions themselves in order to once more make them alive to the audience. Fishbane 
puts it as follows: “They were, in fact, both students of and even believers in the 
materials which they transmitted, and so were far from simple bystanders in matters 
relating to their clarity, implication, or application.”120 And McKinley-Fitzpatrick writes 
in a similar fashion, emphasizing how embodied text imply innovation:  
While the wisdom-torah rules may have been internalized by generations of scribes 
and rabbis, and eventually by the population as a whole, such internalization is never 
                                               
118 Graffy, A Prophet Confronts His People, 1. He continues: “This prophetic device, though 
common in Ezekiel, is by no means limited to him. This technique has often been given the name 
‘disputation speech’, but this term is used for other kinds of speech besides the clearly recognisable 
sequence of quotation of the people and refutation of their words.” 
119 Polak, “Syntactic-Stylistic Aspects,” 375. 
120 Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 37. 
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straightforward but involves renewed interpretations of the original intentions of the 
original author/s. New interpretations of the original authors’ intentions may result in 
renewed understanding of the function and meaning of the original rules. The texts in 
themselves may remain in their original verbal form, but how they are interpreted and 
internalized (by scribes, rabbis and the population as a whole) will always be in a 
state of change.121 
Indicators of Memorized Reuse 
A study of biblical rhetorical strategies may prove more fruitful than insisting on 
either an original oral or written composition, as pointed out by Gitay and Watts. Niditch 
and Polak have argued that texts in the HB should be understood within a matrix of 
characteristics often associated with oral performance and written compositions.122 
Biblical authors seem to have composed their written compositions by using oral rhetoric 
devices in order to accommodate the intended public reading for which their works were 
written. In the following, the key question is not that of orality versus writing per se. We 
are rather looking for significant textual indicators that reveal the scribal culture in which 
reuse occurred, more specifically memorized reuse, in order to help us understand the 
                                               
121 Fitzpatrick-McKinley, The Transformation of Torah, 181. Cf. p. 174. For studies on variation 
in the Late Second Temple Period see Helmer Ringgren, “Oral and Written Transmission in the O.T.: Some 
Observations,” in Studia Theologica, 1949), 34–59; Shemaryahu Talmon, “Aspects of the Textual 
Transmission of the Bible in the Light of the Qumran Manuscripts,” Scripta Hierosolymitana 4 (1961); 
Shemaryahu Talmon, “Synonomous Readings in the Textual Traditions of the Old Testament,” Scripta 
Hierosolymitana 8, no. 8 (1961); Edward L. Greenstein, “Misquotation of Scripture in the Dead Sea 
Scrolls,” in The Frank Talmage Memorial Volume, ed. Barry Walfish (Haifa: Haifa University Press, 
1993), 71–83; Raymond F. Person, Jr., “The Ancient Israelite Scribe as Performer,” JBL 117, no. 4 (1998): 
601–9; Teeter, Scribal Laws. 
122 According to Niditch there are two ways in which to analyze and demonstrate the “oral 
register” and an “oral-literary continuum,” significant for detecting memorized and embodied Torah: (1) 
We can look at how the biblical authors describe the relation between orality and written compositions; and 
(2) we can be attentive to indications of such an “oral register” and “oral-literary continuum” in the written 
compositions of the HB. Cf. Niditch, Oral World and Written Word, 6. Cf. Person, From Conversation to 
Oral Tradition, 11. 
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dual phenomenon of exact and creative reuse found in the textual material.123 Memorized 
reuse might be indicated by a scribal culture in which oral performance of a literary 
composition, where the ANE orator frequently seems to have memorized the text, was 
the standard. Looking for indicators of memorized reuse presuppose “the idea that 
traditions transmitted via memorization manifest a different sort of variation from 
traditions transmitted in a purely literary context.”124 Visual errors like random 
omissions, haplography (“writing once”), homoioleuton (“identical ending”), 
homoioarcton (“identical beginning”), dittography (“writing twice”), some doublets, or 
interchange of similar letters are examples of unintentional visual errors of the copyist 
regularly observed by text critical studies.125 It is therefore not these types of phenomena 
we are looking for. Following Milman Parry’s study of variants in Homeric literature, 
Carr rather draws attention to “good variants”. While the above-mentioned text-critical 
variants do “not make sense,” by looking for indicators of memorized reuse we are, in 
effect, looking exclusively for variants that do “make sense.”126 
Based on previous research it is possible to describe some possible indicators of 
                                               
123 Ian Hunter has shown how the human brain is not able to retain memorization of a text longer 
than 50 words without written or other type of support (Ian M. L. Hunter, “Lengthy Verbatim Recall (LVR) 
and the Myth and Gift of Tape-Recorder Memory,” in Psychology in the 1990's, ed. P. Niemi (Amsterdam: 
North Holland, 1984), 425–40; Ian M. L. Hunter, “Lengthy Verbatim Recall: The Role of Text,” in 
Psychology of Language, ed. A. Ellis (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1985), 207–35). Cf. Carr, Writing on the 
Tablet of the Heart, 7; Carr, Formation of the Hebrew Bible, 16–17 . 
124 Carr, Formation of the Hebrew Bible, 13. 
125 Cf. Emanuel Tov, Textual Criticism of the Hebrew Bible (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2001), 236–
58. 
126 Carr, Formation of the Hebrew Bible, 13. Cf. p. 17–18. See also Milman Parry, “Studies in the 
Epic Technique of Oral Verse-Making. I. Homer and Homeric Style,” Harvard Studies in Classical 
Philology 41 (1930): 73–147, here esp. 75–76. 
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memorized reuse. As with the indicators of literary reuse and direction of dependence, 
they do not constitute a univocal criteria proving memorized reuse. Rather, they are 
indicators of probable or likely memorized reuse of a source text. The indicators of 
memorized reuse can be classified as a subcategory of the more general indicators of 
reuse mentioned above. The question here is therefore whether it is possible to detect a 
specific type of literary reuse, namely reuse based on recollections of the source text from 
memory, in contrast to reuse based on visual consultation of a source text. It is important 
here to distinguish between a text written to facilitate easy memory, using for example 
“formulae, rhyming, link of text to music and movement, use of overarching themes, 
memory techniques, and so on,”127 from a borrowing text reusing a source text from 
memory. The reason why memorized reuse is of interest in this study is because it might 
help us to better understand the repetition with variation found in our passages. If the 
source text was committed to memory, the scribe would be able to cite it exactly or 
nearly exactly, as well as create a play upon lexemes and concepts from different 
memorized sources.128 The indicators of memorized reuse can be listed as follows: 
                                               
127 Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 7. 
128 Compare the following with Delnero’s list of “the types of errors that are likely to have resulted 
while copying from memory” in Sumerian compositions: “1) Significant omissions, additions, or 
substitutions (i.e. variants involving more than one sign, grammatical element, or lexeme). 2) Mechanical 
errors such as dittography, haplography, metathesis, and paralepsis. 3) Incorrect divisions of words or 
forms (fusion and separation). 4) Errors resulting from confusion between graphemes that look similar, 
elements or parts of forms that were pronounced alike, or lexemes that have an analogous meaning. 5) 
Mistakes that were influenced by signs, elements, forms, or lexemes, that bear resemblance to the intended 
sign, element, form, or lexeme occurring either in close proximity within the same composition, or in an 
identical context in another composition (inversion/metathesis, preservation, and anticipation)” (Delnero, 
“Variation in Sumerian Literary Compositions,” 1849–50). To me it is not clear that all these phenomena 
necessarily should be understood as errors likely resulting from a setting where the source was copied from 
memory. They could also be explained as resulting from errors  
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1. Modifications of lexemes or phrases in similar contexts: Where parallel passages 
bearing marks of literary reuse may use alternate lexemes or phrases in similar 
contexts.129 A scribe may have introduced variants from the original composition, 
while still seeing himself as faithful to it.130 These variants may not in themselves 
be significant, but they testify to reuse of texts that are memorized rather than 
visually consulted.131 
2. Word-order alteration: A borrowing text may alter the word or phrase order while 
preserving much the same meaning.132  
3. Amalgamation/blending of source texts: A new composition may weave together 
previous texts in dynamic ways, thus presupposing an intimate familiarity with 
the source texts.133 Of course, this sort of blending is also possible in cases of 
reuse based on visual consultation of a source. But it seems reasonable to assume 
that a blending based upon a visual consultation of the source would be less 
dynamic. 
4. Omissions presupposing the source text is memorized: A radical example is where 
Carr mentions an early manuscript with texts from the Hebrew prophets that have 
been found, where only the first word of each verse is given followed by the first 
letter of each succeeding word.134 The manuscript clearly presupposes that 
                                               
while visually reading or audibly listening to a text read aloud. 
129 Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 42. This memorized mastery of revered text had an 
effect on how they reused such texts. An indication of such memorized reuse is that it is “not incorporated 
precisely. Though the scribe may well have had virtually total recall of the tradition, he (or she) was not 
consulting one tablet after another in order to copy various parts into the new composition. Rather he was 
composing a new work out of a store of older works that constitute the authorized building blocks of the 
new. He was not ‘exegeting’ or ‘citing’ older works in the way a later biblical interpreter might do. Rather, 
the scribe was trained from the outset to think by means of blocks of tradition and express himself through 
those tools” (Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 36). 
130 Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 41. 
131 Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 159. Cf. p. 79. Carr writes: “In cases like these, the 
Mesopotamian scribes were not always pouring over earlier manuscripts to make sure they had written each 
word and phrase exactly correctly (though they did occasionally claim to have done so). Rather, the textual 
data suggests that in crucial cases they reproduced texts from memory, with startling, though not exact, 
verbal accuracy. And, as in the case of musical performance, each scribal reproduction of the text is unique, 
while being recognized by native speakers and audiences as “the same”” (Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the 
Heart, 44). As Carr and Niditch points out this has consequences for textual criticism (Carr, Writing on the 
Tablet of the Heart, 44, 292; Niditch, Oral World and Written Word, 75–76). Cf. also p. 292. 
132 Carr, Formation of the Hebrew Bible, 33. 
133 Carr: “Many Egyptian and Mesopotamian texts are a patchwork of distant and closer echoes of 
other texts, a product of an educational system where people learn to write new texts by internalizing 
ancient ones” (Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 159). 
134 Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 4–5. For this document and a comment on it see Ernst  
Würthwein, The Text of the Old Testament: An Introduction to the Biblia Hebraica (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1994), 170–71. Würthwein writes there: “This manuscript is also remarkable for presenting the 
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whoever would read it would actually know the text largely by heart, only using it 
as a reminder. For the present study, this point can be formulated as follows: 
lexical or conceptual dependence on a source text, where information from this 
text needs to be supplied for the borrowing text to make sense, might therefore 
not only be an indicator of the direction of dependence, as argued above, but also 
of memorized reuse. 
5. Oral register: As mentioned above, it appears anachronistic to insist on 
classifying the Torah and the prophets as originally composed as oral or written 
compositions.135 While the compositions were written out, they still participated 
in an oral culture where the normal expectation would be that all compositions 
would enjoy a public reading. Thus, biblical authors seem to have intentionally 
incorporated oral rhetorical devices in their writing. This complicates any attempt 
to draw a strict differentiation between orality and writing in biblical texts. The 
following indicators are not, therefore, meant to maintain a distinction between a 
possible oral versus written stage of the compositions under study. All the same, 
remaining sensitive to what Niditch calls the “oral register” in the reading of our 
texts can help us to retain a sense of the importance of orality in the scribal 
culture, where oral performance of a written composition would often have 
presumed memorization on the part of the orator. It is within this context that I 
supply some possible indicators of the “oral register” in a given text:136 
a. Relatively simple syntactic structure, reference, and clause length: While 
a literary composition appears to involve more complicated uses of 
language practice, oral and memorized reuse may tend to more simple 
language for mnemonic purposes.137 However, as discussed above, we 
                                               
Hebrew text in an abbreviated form. Only the first word of each verse is written in full, and each of the 
following words is represented by a single (not always the first) letter together with vowel point and accent. 
. . . They were probably designed as memory aids for synagogue lectors and school students.” He refers to 
the older claims by Felix Perle and G. R. Driver that argue that “abbreviations were the cause of corruption 
in numerous passages in the pre-Masoretic text of the Bible.” Carr writes: “Indeed, classicists long ago 
noted that the oldest Greek manuscripts, written as they are all in capitals and without word separation or 
other marks, were constructed for reading by people who had already mastered the relevant text. . . . most 
manuscripts in the Greek context were not designed to provide a first-time introduction to a given textual 
tradition but instead stood as a permanent reference point for an ongoing process of largely oral recitation” 
(Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 4). The same lack of word separators are of course testified in the 
DSS as well. For other possible marks of orality like organization of text into blocks, sometimes indicated 
by initial red marks or words, lack of vowels, see Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 77–78. Cf. 
Pakkala, God's Word Omitted. 
135 Cf. Ruth Finnegan, “What is Orality—if Anything?,” BMGS 14 (1990): 130–49; Davies, “'Pen 
of Iron, Point of Diamond' (Jer 17.1): Prophecy as Writing,” 65–81; Eggleston, "See and Read All These 
Words", 33, 71n, 72, 133, 171. 
136 Nielsen, Oral Tradition, 36; Niditch, Oral World and Written Word, 10–11. Even if all these 
features do not have to be present in any given text composed in the oral register, these indicators help us 
be more attentive to the phenomena in case we come across it. Cf. Niditch, Oral World and Written Word, 
14. 
137 Cf. Frank H. Polak, “The Oral and the Written: Syntax, Stylistics and the Development of 
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need to be careful not to underestimate the stability an oral culture can 
achieve in transmitting culturally revered texts. 
b. Repetition: Repetition unifies a work and reiterates essential messages and 
themes. While repetition is typical of orally composed works, it can also 
be found in texts participating in a text-supported oral culture.138 
c. Use of formulas and epithets: An author might use standardized formulas 
or epithets that are current in a given culture to express similar ideas or 
images. An epithet evokes “a full range of a character’s personality in the 
tradition, qualities beyond those emphasized in the context at hand.139 
d. Use of wordplay, proverbs, and dirge: Oral sayings or play upon well-
known sayings in a culture.140 
e. Wiederaufnahme as an adaptation of oral restarts: In conversations a 
speaker might repeat a word or words within an utterance to catch the 
attention of the addressee, to overlap the speech when having gotten such 
attention, or in relation to the speaker having interrupted him or herself 
with an interjection and parenthetical comment.141 
f. PNG shifts as indicating an actual discourse setting: Abrupt Person-
Number-Gender(PNG) shifts can disrupt the readability of a text. Lack of 
textual markers to identify speaker and audience may indicate that the 
author was so absorbed in an actual discourse (possibly while recording it 
or imagining it) that he simply forgot to identify the speaker and the 
                                               
Biblical Prose Narrative,” Journal of the Ancient Near Eastern Society 26 (1998): 59, 61, 101, 349–51. 
138 Nidtich mentions three different types of repetition: (1) Repetition of sentences, like “And God 
said, ‘Let there be x,” and “And God called the x y. And there was evening and there was morning, the nth 
day” in Gen 1, (2) Repetition of full sentences, where a narrative for example has one participant giving a 
message then afterwards repeated by a second participant, and (3) the use of Leitwort, or key word (cf. 
Niditch, Oral World and Written Word, 13). Cf. Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 105. 
139 Niditch, Oral World and Written Word, 16–17. See pp. 14–17 for her discussion of formulas 
and epithets. For the character of the author being disclosed through repetition see also Savran, Telling and 
Retelling, 5, 12, 49, 88, 92–93; Sternberg, The Poetics of Biblical Narrative, 388; Watts, Reading Law, 97. 
Cf. Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 105 on formulaic density as indicator of orality. 
140 Niditch, Oral World and Written Word, 38. See also all of the discussion in her chapter 2. 
141 Person, From Conversation to Oral Tradition, 142–43, 158–62. Person writes how 
Wiederaufnahme was initially believed to give signs of different sources and redaction, while such an 
approach is now seen as more problematic (Person, From Conversation to Oral Tradition, 160). He argues 
that structurally literary Wiederaufnahme and restarts in conversation may have the exact same structure, 
and Wiederaufnahme should not be taken as a redactional marker (Person, From Conversation to Oral 
Tradition, 160–61, 163). And he concludes: “The question as to the origin of Wiederaufnahme now has an 
obious answer: the ancient authors and redactors simply adapted, most likely unconsciously, a feature 
common in their everyday conversation (that is, restarts) to serve much the same purpose” (Person, From 
Conversation to Oral Tradition, 160–61, 163). Ring compositions (also called chiasm) has often been taken 
as a sign of a literate culture. Person, however, finds that such conclusions are unwarranted. Instead he 
argues that ring composition should be understood “as a ‘literary’ adaptation of restarts, although one that 
is more elaborate” than Wiederaufnahme (Person, From Conversation to Oral Tradition, 164). 
 
 159 
audience. It could also be the case that he simply took their identities for 
granted with the result that the identity of the speaker and audience were 
not made sufficiently clear in the text.142 
6. Accumulation: it may become problematic to determine whether a single variation 
reflects memorized reuse or not. It is rather the accumulation of evidence in a 
given passage that indicates memorized reuse, just as with the indicators of reuse 
and direction of dependence.143 This is why I have included a brief survey of the 
relevant books above. It is in this light that we will discuss the relevant variations 
in the passages to be studied below. 
It is interesting to note that there is a certain overlap between the indicators of 
memorization reuse and the indicators of reuse and direction of dependence mentioned 
above; specifically, in instances of modification—exactly the phenomenon that has 
created so much debate regarding legal reuse in Torah. Being aware of such indicators 
can make us more attentive to scribal reuse in ANE contexts. When we come across 
similar phenomena in the biblical material we should ask ourselves whether it might 
indicate memorized reuse there as well. 
The concept of covenantal instruction argued above attempts to account for the 
dual phenomenon both of a certain exact repetition with creative variation. I have also 
argued that Torah belonged to a scribal culture where text-supported memorized reuse 
was commonly practiced. This, too, allows for a degree of fluidity, as a scribe would 
usually not visually consult a manuscript when reusing it in later compositions, but rather 
reuse it from memory. Again, this would easily result in a blending of both fluidity and 
close parallels between source text and borrowing text. These two approaches to legal 
                                               
142 Cf. Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 98. For a discussion on PNG shifts in the book of 
Jeremiah see Oliver Glanz, Understanding Participant-Reference Shifts in the Book of Jeremiah: A Study of 
Exegetical Method and Its Consequences for the Interpretation of Referential Incoherence (Leiden: Brill, 
2013), 346–47. For PNG shifts in the Dead Sea Scrolls see Noam Mizrahi, “Liturgy, Hebrew of the Dead 
Sea Scrolls,” in Encyclopedia of Hebrew Language and Linguistics, ed. Geoffrey Khan (Leiden: Brill, 
2013), 2:560. 
143 Cf. Carr, Formation of the Hebrew Bible, 27. 
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reuse in Torah question former attempts to explain legal dissimilitude in Torah by either 
source criticism or harmonization. Yet, the concept of ‘embodied covenantal instruction’ 
may not be adequate to explain all aspects of cases of legal reuse in Torah. In several 
cases there is simply not enough evidence at present to support strong conclusions. Thus, 
in such cases, our readings cannot avoid a certain tentativeness. But I do want to suggest 
that ‘embodied covenantal instruction’ as well as ‘text-supported memorized reuse’ 
provide a more adequate way of approaching the dual phenomenon of simultaneous exact 
and creative reuse between the legal corpora in the Torah, and between the Torah and the 














DIVORCE AND REMARRIAGE IN DEUT 24:1–4  
AND JER 3:1–10 
 
Introduction 
Since Winfried Thiel’s two-volume work Die deuteronomistiche Redaktion von 
Jeremia, the majority of scholars see Jer 3:1–10 as dependent upon Deut 24:1–4.1 
However, the textual support provided for this claim is often weak.2 The purpose of the 
                                               
1 Winfried Thiel, Die deuteronomistische Redaktion von Jeremia 1-25, Wissenschaftliche 
Monographien zum Alten und Neuen Testament [WMANT] 41 (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 
1973), especially 280–82; Winfried Thiel, Die deuteronomistische Redaktion von Jeremia 26-45: Mit einer 
Gesamtbeurteilung der deuteronomistischen Redaktion des Buches Jeremia, WMANT 52 (Neukirchen-
Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1981). 
2 Cf. Fishbane, “Revelation and Tradition,” 351; William L. Holladay, Jeremiah 1: A Commentary 
on the Book of the Prophet Jeremiah, Chapters 1-25, Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986), 112–16; 
Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 307–12; Fischer, Jeremia 1–25, 185; Georg Fischer, 
Jeremia: Der Stand Der Theologischen Diskussion (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgeseelschaft, 
2007), 134–36; Jack R. Lundbom, Jeremiah 1–20: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, 
AB 21A (New York: Yale University Press, 2008), 300–301, 303–4, 307; Mastnjak, Textual Authority in 
Jeremiah, 165–72; Schmid, “Compositional Harmonization,” 849. Fischer sees all the books of Torah as 
available to the author of Jeremiah, with strong ties to Exodus and particularly Deuteronomy (Fischer, 
Jeremia 1–25, 68. Cf. 71. According to him the book of Jeremiah values and orients itself in light of this 
tradition. He mentions the Sabbath restrictions in Jer 17:19–27 and the manumission of slaves in Jer 34:8–
22 as strong examples of this (Fischer, Jeremia 1–25, 68). For representatives of those who do not see reuse 
and dependence between Jer 3:1-5 and Deut 24:1-4, but rather a common legal inheritance, see T. R. 
Hobbs, “Jeremiah 3:1–6 and Deuteronomy 24:1–4,” ZAW 86 (1974): 23–29; James D. Martin, “The 
Forensic Background to Jeremiah 3:1,” VT 19 (1969): 82–92; Edwin Firmage, “Jeremiah, Deuteronomy, 
and the Priestly Corpus: Origins & Dating (Unpublished work),” 62–64. Firmage sees the connection 
between Jer 3 and Deut 24 as “common law,” i.e. a common source, while he sees Jer 3 to explicitly 
borrow from Hos 1:2–4; 2:9–25; 3:1. His arguments are only thematic, and therefore rather loose. Davidson 
points out differences between Jeremiah’s and Hosea’s description (Richard M. Davidson, Flame of 
Yahweh: Sexuality in the Old Testament (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2007), 414). For studies on the 
relation between Hosea and Deuteronomy, and how this may relate to Jeremiah, see Weinfeld, 




following discussion is to evaluate the textual basis for claiming that Jer 3:1–10 reuses 
and depends upon the prohibition against a husband remarrying his formerly divorced 
wife in Deut 24:1–4 and to demonstrate how the latter is incorporated into the line of 
thought of the former. For scholars who view Deuteronomy as having developed 
gradually from the 7th–8th century and into the 6th century and the book of Jeremiah as 
having developed from the 6th century and into the Persian period, it is not immediately 
clear which was the original text and which was the borrowing text.3 First, I want to 
argue that a case for reuse between Jer 3:1–10 and Deut 24:1–4 can be made. Second, I 
will point out textual indicators for why Jer 3:1–10 seems to be dependent upon Deut 
24:1–4, and not vice versa. Third, I will explain the role that Deut 24:1–4 seems to play 
in Jer 3:1–10. 
John Bright commented that the book of Jeremiah “makes, at least on first trial, 
extremely difficult reading,” and that one’s impression is that it is “a hopeless 
hodgepodge thrown together without any discernible principle of arrangement at all.”4 
Stulman finds that the prose and poetry of Jeremiah work dialectically such that the wild 
and untamed poetry is tamed and codified by the prose. The poetry “testifies to the 
disintegration of all social and cosmic structures,” while the prose testifies to God’s 
                                               
Deuteronomy: A Prophetic Reworking of a Deuteronomic Concept?,” Tyndale Bulletin 62, no. 2 (2011): 
173–94; Carsten Vang, “When a Prophet Reads Moses: On the Relationship between the Book of Hosea 
and Deuteronomy,” in Sepher Torath Mosheh: Studies in the Composition and Interpretation of 
Deuteronomy, eds. Daniel I. Block and Richard L. Schultz (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2017). 
3 Konrad Schmid, The Old Testament: A Literary History, trans. Linda M. Maloney (Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 2012), 99–103, 126–30, 138–39,169–74. 
4 John Bright, Jeremiah: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB (New York: 




restoration of the order of morality amid this chaos.5 He sums up: 
While the prose discourses, for instance, achieve ample structure and ideological 
coherence, they still never wholly domesticate the turbulent and dangerous world of 
the poetry. Orderly prose arrangements cannot silence the dissonant and discordant 
screams of protest and pain. Nor can they nullify the chaotic and liminal state of the 
text. This ‘failure’, I suggest, attests in the first place to the wild and undomesticated 
God who refuses to be imprisoned by any closed system. It likewise attests to the bold 
courage of the developing prose tradition which looks moral ambiguity and gratuitous 
suffering right in the eye without flinching. And so, there is no cover-up in Jeremiah. 
No denial of the many faces of evil. As a result, the text’s jumbled appearance and 
disturbing character in many respects leave their indelible mark on the final form of 
the book.6 
Jeremiah 2:1–4:4 appears to be a single literary unit within the book of Jeremiah 
with the dominant theme of calling the people to repent and return.7 In Jer 2, God has 
accused the people of having turned away from him. Judah has whored both with gods 
(see ַהְּבָעִלים in 2:23), apparently on the ‘bare heights’ (ְׁשָפִים in 3:2) and with foreign 
                                               
5 Stulman summarizes his analysis of what he calls the first scroll (Jer 1–25) as follows: “The first 
and lasting impression rendered by the Jeremianic poetry of the first scroll is its jumbled and dissonant 
character. It is wild, untamed verse that testifies to the disintegration of all social and cosmic structures. . . . 
the so-called ‘C’ material of Jeremiah 1–25 introduces equilibrium and stabilization into this messy world 
and witnesses univocally to order and nomos (while at the same time reflecting its own sense of 
contingency and danger). . . . ‘C’ tames and ‘codifies’ the wild and multipohonic voices of the poetry” 
(Louis Stulman, Order Amid Chaos: Jeremiah as Symbolic Tapestry (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 
1998), 52). Cf. p. 101. According to him, the ‘C’ material “insists that Judah has rejected the prophetic 
word spoken by Jeremiah, who is represented as the last in the succession of spokespersons that originated 
with Moses” (Stulman, Order Amid Chaos, 53). In this perspective it is also easier to understand why 
Jeremiah reuses Moses as his predecessor. Cf. Louis Stulman, The Prose Sermons of the Book of Jeremiah: 
A Redescription of the Correspondences with the Deuteronomistic Literature in the Light of Recent Text-
critical Research, SBLDS 83 (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1986), 56–58. 
6 Stulman, Order Amid Chaos, 187. Cf. pp. 20–21. On a note of what can be learned from 
Jeremiah for today he writes: “Indeed, the many distorted postures of evil, the randomness of suffering, and 
the deafening silence of God should never be denied or covered up. Easy answers and airtight systems only 
trivialize and anesthetize us to our fissured and troubled world. In a bold act of faith and with no collapse of 
moral courage, the book of Jeremiah offers neither. Its enduring testimony bears witness to order amid 
chaos and to a suffering God who sculpts new beginnings and fresh shapes out of the rubble of fallen 
worlds” (Stulman, Order Amid Chaos, 188). 
7 Fischer, Jeremia 1–25, 184; Lundbom, Jeremiah 1–20, 299. Stulman sees Jer 2:1–6:30 as on 




nations such as Egypt and Assyria (2:18, 36).8 As we come to Jer 3, God informs the 
people that there are some problems attached to their returning, illustrated through a 
metaphorical use of certain standards relating to remarriage after a divorce has taken 
place. In 3:12, God nevertheless says he does not “bear a grudge for all time,”9 thus 
opening an invitation for the people to return. In 3:22 he further encourages the people to 
turn back. At the end of this literary unit, in 4:1–2, God holds up the Abrahamic promise 
(“Nations shall bless themselves by you”) on the condition that the people return to God 
(“If you return, O Israel” and “if you return to me”). Thus, 3:1–10 seems not so much to 
emphasize the legal difficulties associated with God’s acceptance of the people, as it 
illustrates how far God is willing to go in order to receive his people back, as 
communicated by the metaphorical reuse of the restrictions upon return after divorce in 
Deut 24:1–4.10 Rather than a negative thrust, the passage in context is characterized by an 
invitation to and hope in the possibility of a return. Jer 3:1–10 should not, therefore, be 
seen as a legal exegesis of Deut 24:1–4. Rather, it employs the instruction relating to  
 
                                               
8 See Christl M. Maier, Daughter Zion, Mother Zion: Gender, Space and the Sacred in Ancient 
Israel (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2008), 104. The rape of 3:2 is probably not done by the ַהְּבָעִלים, but rather by 
Egypt and Assyria (see Schmid, The Old Testament, 127). Stulman finds the descriptions to “become more 
scathing and passionate” as we proceed through Jer 2:1–4:4 (Stulman, Order Amid Chaos, 39). 
9 This comes as a response to the people in 3:5 asking whether God will bear a grudge for all time. 
10 McKane comments: “Although Yahweh in exiling her issued her with a bill of divorce, he is not 
bound by legal protocol as are husbands who divorce their wives” (William McKane, A Critical and 
Exegetical Commentary on Jeremiah, International Critical Commentary [ICC] [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1986], 66). Fishbane elaborates: “It is just because the meaning and force of the civil Rechtspraxis is not in 
doubt that the prophet is able to achieve such a striking theological tension and reversal. And yet it may be 
argued that Jeremiah is not at all innovative in implying a double standard of justice here—one civil, for 
humans, the other theological, for YHWH—but that he is merely giving a theological reflex to a common 




divorce and remarriage metaphorically to define the precise nature of the current 
relationship between God and his people.11 
In chapter three I surveyed the views on orality, writing, and memorization in the 
books of Deuteronomy and Jeremiah. Here we can remind ourselves that Jer 3:8 mentions 
a written certificate of divorce, one of two uses of legal documents in the book of 
Jeremiah. The other is the  .deed of purchase”) signed in Jer 32:10–16; cf“)  ִּמְקָנההַ  ֵּסֶפר
32:44.12 I now turn to the analysis of the textual basis for speaking of a case of reuse 
between Deut 24 and Jer 3, and what indicators we find to determine the direction of 
dependence.13 
 
                                               
11 Cf. Roy E. Gane, “Old Testament Principles Relating to Divorce and Remarriage,” JATS 12 
(2001): 51; Fischer, “Der Einfluss des Deuteronomiums auf das Jeremiabuch,” 260. Since the discourse on 
divorce and return in Jer 3 is only metaphorical, it is not possible to state as Fischer does, that YHWH de 
facto violates his own law. The covenantal relationship between YHWH and his people is not identical, 
only analogical, to the relationship between the first husband and a wife. 
David Aaron argues against those claiming that metaphor is necessary in order to speak of God, as 
well as those arguing that metaphor is an inbuilt structure of our language. In contrast he argues that 
metaphor is a rhetorical technique, presupposing a certain maturity in the understanding of language both 
on the part of author and reader. See Aaron, Biblical Ambiguities, 9–11, 13, 30–32, 101–24. He writes: 
“Some metaphors appear to be paradigmatic within biblical culture: tree imagery as indicative of stability 
and piety, the whoring wife as an allegory for religious waywardness, natural catastrophes as divine wrath, 
and so forth” (Aaron, Biblical Ambiguities, 13). In Jer 3 we find the metaphor of “the whoring wife as an 
allegory for religious waywardness.” Further, by its nature there is a certain “logical incongruity or 
nonequivalence” involved in a metaphor (Aaron, Biblical Ambiguities, 28). He argues that we should free 
ourselves from the binary question whether a statement is metaphoric/figurative or not, and rather accustom 
ourselves to “gradient judgment”: “Thus, instead of focusing exclusively on the question, Is that statement 
metaphorical or not? we can consider whether one comment is more metaphorical than another comment; 
put differently, we can discuss the degree to which a statement is metaphorical and what cases the 
metaphoricalness” (Aaron, Biblical Ambiguities, 29. Cf. p. 194. Italics original). 
12 Schellenberg, “A "Lying Pen of the Scribes" (Jer 8:8)?,” 293. 
13 This portion of Jeremiah is not attested in the Dead Sea Scrolls (DSS). The document giving the 
first verse of Jeremiah is 4QJerc, beginning with Jer 4:5. It is therefore outside the literary unit of Jer 2:1–
4:4 that our passage belongs to. We do have four DSS documents covering parts of Deut 24:1–4. There are 
no significant variations for the present discussion between the manuscripts MT, 4QDeuta, 4QDeutf, and 
4QDeutk2, except attesting ] לאשה וכֿת]ב  where MT only has ְלִאָּׁשה, indicating some kind of writing. It is 




A Case for Reuse 
Table 1 gives an overview of parallels between Deut 24:1–4 and Jer 3:1–10. 
Distinctiveness: First, the phrase ֵסֶפר ְּכִריֻתת (“bill of divorce”) is only found in Deut 24:1, 
3; Isa 50:1; and Jer 3:8. In the same contexts (Deut 24:1, 3–4; Isa 50:1; Jer 3:1, 8), we 
also find the pi‘el of ׁשלח in a technical usage referring to dismissal of a wife.14 Although  
                                               
14 Cf. Francis Brown et al., “Brown-Driver-Briggs Hebrew and English Lexicon,”1019; Ludwig 
Koehler et al., eds., The Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament [HALOT] (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 
1999), 1514–15); Davidson, Flame of Yahweh, 394; Lundbom, Jeremiah 1–20, 301. 
David Instone-Brewer points out that “there is no equivalent to the divorce certificate in any 
ancient Near Eastern culture outside Judaism” (David Instone-Brewer, Divorce and Remarriage in the 
Bible: The Social and Literary Context (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002), 32). 
I here allow myself a brief excursus to the Elephantine Documents of Wifehood as they might 
shed some light on the practice of divorce in Jewish communities. Porten and Szubin claim that ׂשנא in the 
Elephantine Documents of Wifehood should not be identified with divorce (Bezalel Porten and Zvi Henri 
Szubin, “The Status of a Repudiated Spouse: A New Interpretation of Kraeling 7 (TAD B3.8),” Israel Law 
Review 35, no. 1 (2001): 57, 59–60; Bezalel Porten and Zvi Henri Szubin, “The Status of the Handmaiden 
Tamet: A New Interpretation of Kraeling 2 (TAD B3.3),” Israel Law Review 29, no. 1-2 (1995): 50–51; 
Bezalel Porten, “Elephantine and the Bible,” in Semitic Papyrology in Context: A Climate of Creativity. 
Papers from a New York University Conference Marking the Retirement of Baruch A. Levine, ed. Lawrence 
H. Shiffman (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 65; "Document of Wifehood (3.63)," trans. Bezalel Porten (COS 
3:155n); "Document of Wifehood (3.70–71)," trans. Bezalel Porten (COS 3:172n). Botta, on the other hand, 
has argued that ׂשנא constitutes an unqualifiedly divorce-clause (Alejandro F. Botta, The Aramaic and 
Egyptian Traditions at Elephantine: An Egyptological Approach, Library of Second Temple Studies 64 
(New York: T&T Clark International, 2009), 59–60). A middle-position is argued by Nutkowicz to the 
effect that the public declaration of hatred cannot in itself be seen as constitutive of divorce. It is only an 
initial step in divorcing, but does not complete it (Hélène Nutkowicz, “Concerning the Verb śn’ in Judaeo-
Aramaic Contracts from Elephantine,” Journal of Semitic Studies 52, no. 2 (2007): 219). In my view, the 
documents do not appear to reflect a common conception of ׂשנא in their contemporary society (see my 
Kenneth Bergland, “Marriage, Hate and Death in the Elephantine Documents of Wifehood Compared to 
the Hebrew Bible,” 1–18). They are not only a reflection of contemporary values, but also a response to 
them. In a society where both polygamous and monogamous marriages existed, the parties—presumably 
especially the father or master of the woman—was intent on specifying the concrete terms that should 
govern in that particular marriage. In that sense, even if the documents do not exclude the possibility that 
the husband could take another wife, they prescribe that if he by doing this also demotes the woman 
mentioned in the document to a secondary status, that will be seen as an act of ׂשנא. I have stated that 
further comparative studies would be needed in order to determine whether ׂשנא should be seen as the 
technical legal term for divorce per se, or simply the initial step in the process leading to divorce. My 
preliminary conclusion is that ׂשנא in the Elephantine documents of divorce should be seen as de jure the 
technical legal term for divorce. The verb ׂשנא is used according to them in the sense of demotion to a 
secondary status in various relational contexts. It could be a preliminary stage to divorce when between 
husband and wife, but it is the terms תרך (TAD B3.3:14) in our documents, and ׁשגר  and ׁשלח among others 
in the biblical sources, that constitute expulsion and divorce de facto (for other biblical expressions for 




Table 1. Deut 24:1–4 and Jer 3:1–10 
Deut 24:1–4 Jer 3:1–10 
 כי־יקח איׁש אׁשה 1
ובעלה והיה אם־לא 
תמצא־חן בעיניו כי־מצא 
וכתב לה  ערות דברבה 
בידה  נתןוספר כריתת 
 ה מביתו׃ׁשלחו
 והלכהויצאה מביתו  2
 ׃והיתה לאיׁש־אחר
 איׁש האחרוןוׂשנאה ה 3
ספר כריתת וכתב לה 
מביתו  ׁשלחהבידה ו נתןו
 האחרון איׁשאו כי ימות ה
 אׁשר־לקחה לו לאׁשה׃
 לא־יוכל בעלה הראׁשון 4
 ׁשובל ׁשלחהאׁשר־
 אׁשהלקחתה להיות לו ל
כי־ הטמאהאחרי אׁשר 
תועבה הוא לפני יהוה 
 תחטיא את־הארץולא 
אׁשר יהוה אלהיך נתן לך 
 נחלה׃ ס
 לאמר 1
 והלכה מאתו   איׁש את־אׁשתו יׁשלחהן 
 אליה עוד ׁשובהי   והיתה לאיׁש־אחר
 ההיא הארץ   הלוא חנוף תחנף
 אלי נאם־יהוה׃ ׁשובו   ואת זנית רעים רבים
 איפה לא ׁשגלת  ׂשאי־עיניך על־ׁשפים וראי  2
 ערבי במדברכ  על־דרכים יׁשבת להם 
 בזנותיך וברעתך׃  ותחניפי ארץ 
 ומלקוׁש לוא היה   וימנעו רבבים 3
 מאנת הכלם׃  ומצח אׁשה זונה היה לך 
 אלוף נערי אתה׃  הלוא מעתה קראתי לי אבי  4
 לנצח אם־יׁשמר  הינטר לעולם  5
 הרעות ותוכל׃ פ  הנה דברתי ותעׂשי 
 מׁשבהויאמר יהוה אלי בימי יאׁשיהו המלך הראית אׁשר עׂשתה  6
יׂשראל הלכה היא על־כל־הר גבה ואל־תחת כל־עץ רענן ותזני־
 ׁשבהולא־ תׁשובואמר אחרי עׂשותה את־כל־אלה אלי  7 ׁשם׃
וארא כי על־כל־אדות אׁשר נאפה  8 ותראה בגודה אחותה יהודה׃
אליה ולא יראה  את־ספר כריתתיה אתןו ׁשלחתיהיׂשראל  מׁשבה
ותחנף והיה מקל זנותה  9 בגדה יהודה אחותה ותלך ותזן גם־היא׃
 ׁשבהוגם־בכל־זאת לא־ 10 ותנאף את־האבן ואת־העץ׃ את־הארץ
 אלי בגודה אחותה יהודה בכל־לבה כי אם־בׁשקר נאם־יהוה׃ פ
 
1 When a man takes a wife 
and marries her, but it 
happens that she does not 
find favor in his eyes 
because he found 
1 . . . saying: 
If a man divorces his wife   and she leaves him, 
And becomes [wife] to another man,   can he return to her again? 
Would this not certainly pollute    the land? 
But you have whored with many lovers,   so [can you] return to me? says 
                                               
conceptions of marriage and divorce here. But we can note the comment by Porten and Szubin as they 
write: “The Philistines of Gerar ‘hated’ Isaac (Gen. 26:27), the leaders of Gilead ‘hated’ Jephthah (Ju. 
11:7), Samson allegedly ‘hated’ his Philistine wife (Ju. 15:2), and God ‘hated’ his inheritance – Israel, 
Judah and Jerusalem (Jer. 12:7-8; Hos. 9:15; Is. 60:15). The term is often coupled with šlḥ ‘send away’ 
(Gen. 26:27), grš, ‘expel’ (Ju. 11:7; Hos. 9:15), ‘zb ‘abandon’ (Jer. 12:7-8; Is. 60:15; cf. Ezek. 23:28-29), 
nṭš, ‘desert’ (Jer. 12:7-8), or m’s, ‘spurn’ (Am. 5:21). When juxtaposed to ‘hb, ‘love’ (= promotion to status 
of primacy), it often conveys the meaning of demotion, reduction of status—Israel (Hos. 9:15), Esau vis-à-
vis Jacob (Mal. 1:2-3), and the ‘hated’ wife vis-à-vis the ‘beloved’ wife. Though demoted, her children’s 
inheritance rights were preserved (Deut. 21:15-17), as was the inheritance vouchsafed to the ‘beloved’ of 
God (Prov. 8:21)” (Porten and Szubin, “The Status of a Repudiated Spouse,” 59). They also take Prov 
30:21-23 and Jud 19:1-3 as confirmation of their argument (Porten and Szubin, “The Status of a Repudiated 
Spouse,” 64 and 66). I do not see that settling the pecuniary issues were constitutive of divorce as such. To 
me the hatred and going out seem to indicate divorce, while the pecuniary issues had to be resolved as an 




Table 1 — Continued. 
 
 
Deut 24:1–4 Jer 3:1–10 
something unseemly with 
her , and he writes a letter 
of divorce to her and gives 
[it] in her hand, and he 
sends her from his house,  
2 and she leaves his house 
and she goes and becomes 
[the wife] of another man, 
3 then this latter man hates 
her, and writes her a letter 
of divorce and gives [it] in 
her hand, and he sends her 
from his house, or if the 
latter man who took her as 
wife dies; 4 the first 
husband, who sent her  
away, cannot return to take 
her to be his wife, after she 
was defiled. For this is an 
abomination for YHWH, 
and you must not bring sin 
upon the land which 
YHWH your God gives 
you as an inheritance.  
YHWH. 
2 Lift your eyes to the bare heights and see:   Where have you not been 
ravished? 
You were sitting along roads [waiting] for them,   as an Arab in the desert. 
And you polluted the land   with your whoring and your wickedness.  
3 When showers were withheld   and there was no late rain,  
you had the forehead of a whore.   You refused to be ashamed.  
4 Have you not now called to me “My father!   You are the companion of 
my youth?  
5 Does one hate forever?   Does one guard forever?”?  
That is what you said.   But you did evils, and you still can.  
6 Now YHWH said to me during the days of King Josiah: Have you seen 
what faithless Israel has done, going to every high mountain and under 
every green tree and whored there? 7 And I said: After she has done all this, 
she will return to me. But she did not return. Rather her treacherous sister, 
Judah, saw [her/it]. 8 And I viewed [it such], because of all which faithless 
Israel had committed adultery, I sent her away, and I gave her her letter of 
divorce. But treacherous Judah did not fear, and went away and whored she 
also. 9 And from all her whorings she defiled the land, and she committed 
adultery with the stone and with the tree. 10 And even in all this her 
treacherous sister, Judah, did not return unto me with all her heart, except 
with a lie, says YHWH. 
 
Isa 50:1 is similar to Deut 24 and Jer 3 in that it uses ֵסֶפר ְּכִריֻתת + the pi‘el of 15,ׁשלח the 
closer similarity between the clauses ְוָהְלָכה ֵמִאֹּתו ְוָהְיָתה ְלִאיׁש־ַאֵחר in Jer 3:1 and ְוָהְלָכה
 in Deut 24:2 provide a stronger basis for identifying possible reuse ְוָהְיָתה ְלִאיׁש־ַאֵחר 
between them. These two sets of clauses are identical, with the exception of Jer 3:1 
adding ֵמִאֹּתו. It is possible that this might relate to the presence of ְוָיְצָאה ִמֵּביֹתו in the 
preceding clause of Deut 24:2, both identifying the location from where the woman is 
                                               
15 The strongest evidence for reuse between Deut 24 and Isa 50 is the technical phrase ֵסֶפר ְּכִריתּות, 
together with the piel of ׁשלח. Further we find 3 + ׁשלחfs suffix in both cases (ְוִׁשְּלָחּה in Deut 24:1, 3 and 
 in Isa 50:1). This possible reapplication should be studied further. The difference ֻׁשְּלָחה and ִׁשַּלְחִּתיהָ 
between the spelling of ֵסֶפר ְּכִריתּות and ֵסֶפר ְּכִריֻתת might also be a sign of late dating, where LBH tended to 




expelled. The two clauses ְוָהְלָכה ֵמִאֹּתו ְוָהְיָתה ְלִאיׁש־ַאֵחר in Jer 3:1 could either be seen as a 
possible conflation of the three clauses ְוָיְצָאה ִמֵּביֹתו ְוָהְלָכה ְוָהְיָתה ְלִאיׁש־ַאֵחר in Deut 24:2, 
or the latter as an elaboration of the former.16  
Second, we also find an indication in the LXX that the translators saw a reuse 
between Jer 3:1–10 and Deut 24:1–4. Jer 3:8 LXX reads εἰς τὰς χεῖρας αὐτῆς where MT 
has  ֵָאֶליה. If LXX rendered proto-MT here, similar to MT, this would not be a precise 
translation. Alternatively, perhaps the LXX had a different Vorlage. As the Greek can be 
retroverted into Hebrew with the phrase ְּבָיָדּה, it is difficult to ignore that this is the exact 
phrase we find in Deut 24:1 MT,17 where LXX also has εἰς τὰς χεῖρας αὐτῆς. In this 
instance, the LXX translator seems to have recognized the reuse and to have taken the 
liberty to make the link even clearer. The fact that the prepositional phrase ְּבָיָדּה is not 
frequent in the HB18 makes it even more likely that the translator of Jer 3:8 LXX recalled 
                                               
16 Fishbane writes: “It is notable that the lexical variations between the Pentateuchal [Deut 24:1–4] 
and prophetic [Jer 3:1-5] passages of the MT occur in the hortatory-paraenetic conclusion, not in the 
technical and operative sections of the legal topos” (Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 
308). Hobbs has a point when arguing that Jer 3:1 is characterized by non-legal language (Hobbs, 
“Jeremiah 3:1–6 and Deuteronomy 24:1–4,” 24), even if I would disagree that this rules out the possibility 
of dependence upon legal material. There is no reason why other genres could not reuse legal material as 
well. Also, James Martin’s criteria that Jer 3:1 needs to mirror the “exact legal wording” in Deut 24:1–4 
including “all three of the legal conditions of the law” found there is too rigid a criteria for identifying reuse 
(Martin, “The Forensic Background to Jeremiah 3:1,” 88). As seen in chapter two, this rather seems to 
anachronistically project a legislative model upon ANE law. It is not unexpected that the clear hortatory 
context of the verse would flavor it. On the other side, Burke Long has shown against Hobbs that Jer 3:1 
does reflect language found in legal disputes over the law (Burke O. Long, “The Stylistic Components of 
Jeremiah 3:1–5,” ZAW 88 (1976): 388–89). 
17 Even though ְּבָיָדּה is also used in Deut 24:3, it seems to me that Deut 24:1 was in the mind of the 
LXX translator. The close proximity between βιβλίον ἀποστασίου and εἰς τὰς χεῖρας αὐτῆς in Jer 3:8 LXX, 
just as with ֵסֶפר ְּכִריֻתת and ְּבָיָדּה in Deut 24:1 indicates this connection. 




Deut 24:1.19 It is of course possible that LXX had a Vorlage different from Jer 3:8 MT. 
Nevertheless, this does not undermine the observation in regard to reuse. Whether LXX 
altered a Vorlage similar to Jer 3:8 LXX to εἰς τὰς χεῖρας αὐτῆς or had a Hebrew Vorlage 
with ְּבָיָדּה in Jer 3:8, the inclusion of this phrase seems to indicate that either the LXX 
translator or its Hebrew Vorlage included this additional link between Deut 24:1 and Jer 
3:8 as compared to the MT.20 
Third, the phrase ׁשִאי  :is found in Gen 29:19; Lev 27:20; Deut 20:5–7; 24:2 ַאֵחר + 
28:30; 1 Sam 10:6; 2 Sam 18:26; 1 Kgs 20:37; Jer 3:1, but only in Deut 24:2 and Jer 3:1 
is it in relation to the issue of marriage to “another man.” There might be a link between 
the curse  ְִׁשָּגֶלָּנהיִ  ַאֵחר ׁשְוִאי ָאֵרׂשתְ  ָּׁשהא  (“You shall betroth a woman, but another man 
ravish her”) in Deut 28:30 and  ּוְרִאי ְׁשָפִיםַעל־ ְׂשִאי־ֵעיַנִיְך. . .  ׁש־ַאֵחרְוָהְיָתה ְלִאי ּתֹוְוָהְלָכה ֵמאִ 
ֻׁשַּגְלּתְ ֵאיֹפה לֹא   (“and she leaves him and becomes [wife] to another man . . . Lift your eyes 
to the bare heights and see: Where have you not been ravished?”) in Jer 3:1–2, in the 
parallels between the phrase ׁשִאי  The link would, however, need to be .ׁשגל and ַאֵחר + 
stronger to give confidence to such a claim. 
Thematic correspondence: Jer 3:1–10 MT seems to contain more parallels to Deut 
24:1–4 than Jer 3:1–10 LXX does. Christl Maier points out that Jer 3:1–10 MT reflects 
Deut 24:1–4 in having the husband returning to the wife. This contrasts to Jer 3:1–10 
                                               
19 A similar point has been made by McKane, Jeremiah, 65. 
20 Another difference here is that the phrase ְוָכַתב ָלּה is dropped and not reused in Jer 3. Thus, ֵסֶפר
 in Jer 3. This again ֵאֶליהָ  + ָוֶאֵּתן as in Deut 24, but of ְוָכַתב ָלּה does not become the indirect object of ְּכִריֻתת
means that the verb ָוֶאֵּתן/ְוָנַתן) נתן) is not followed by the prepositional phrase ְּבָיָדּה as in Deut 24, but by 




LXX, where the woman returns to the husband.21 I will come back to this difference 
below. For now, the important point is that the return of the husband to the former wife in 
Jer 3:1–10 MT again establishes a parallel with Deut 24:1–4.22 Further, Lundbom points 
out that the MT’s idea of the defilement of the land in Jer 3:1–2, 9 MT also reflects the 
idea of the defilement of the land in Deut 24:2, in contrast to the LXX, which only views 
the woman as defiled.23  
                                               
21 Commenting on the woman’s defilement in Jer 3:1 Craigie, Kelley, and Drinkard argue that it 
reflects more the legal tradition in Deut 24:1–4, while the LXX “reflects an attempt to continue the surface 
logic of the preceding lines” (Peter C. Craigie et al., Jeremiah 1-25, Word Biblical Commentary [WBC] 26 
(Dallas, TX: Word Books, 1991), 49). Cf. William Holladay, “Elusive Deuteronomists, Jeremiah, and 
Proto-Deuteronomy,” CBQ 66 (2004): 65. Deut 24:4 uses the strange form pual ֻהַּטָּמָאה. The expression 
 ,lit. “after which she was defiled”) implies that she was defiled by the second marriage) ַאֲחֵרי ֲאֶׁשר ֻהַּטָּמָאה
and if she then returns to the first husband it is ֹתוֵעָבה, (“an abomination”) and  ָָאֶרץְולֹא ַתֲחִטיא ֶאת־ה  (“and 
brings sin upon the land”). 
22 Maier, Daugther Zion, Mother Zion, 105. 
23 Lundbom, Jeremiah 1–20, 301. Jonathan Klawans has shown that defilement of the land is 
particularly associated with moral impurity in contrast to ritual impurity: “Whereas ritual impurity results 
in an impermanent defilement, moral impurity leads to a long-lasting, if not permanent, degradation of the 
sinner and, eventually, of the land of Israel” (Klawans, Impurity and Sin, 26). See also p. 27 where he notes 
the mention of defilement of the land in Jer 3:1, though in a footnote he expresses uncertainty whether 
Jeremiah here is primarily thinking of idolatry or adultery. On the meaning of חנף in Jer 3:1 as “a more 
extreme term,” with the idea of resisting the sacred, as compared to טמא in Deut 24:4, see Holladay, 
Jeremiah 1–25, 113. Num 35:33 is the only verse in Torah using חנף. It is written in the context of murder: 
“You shall not pollute [חנף] the land in which you live; for blood pollutes the land, and the land can have 
no expiation for blood that is shed on it, except by the blood of him who shed it. You shall not defile the 
land in which you live, in which I Myself abide, for I the LORD abide among the Israelite people” (Num 
35:33–34). Might it be that Jeremiah chooses to use this word precisely because the overtones of permanent 
pollution that it has? As argued here, in Jer 3:1–10 I see idolatry and illegitimate political alliances as in the 
foreground, with adultery as a metaphor. Dalit Rom-Shiloni has recently made an argument that there is a 
link between ֶאֶרץ + חנף in Jer 3:1–2, 9 and Num 35:33–34. To me it is not entirely clear whether she thinks 
the author of Jer 3 intentionally reused ֶאֶרץ + חנף from Num 35, or whether the author simply exploited an 
ambivalence in a phrase that happen to be analogical to Num 35. She writes that “at a crucial point, the 
prophecy purposefully detached from its Deuteronomic source and chose Priestly terminology that opens 
up a whole different, and harsher, conceptual world. Hence, this unit suggests an intentional collation of D 
and P” (Rom-Shiloni, “Compositional Harmonization,” 928–29). She elaborates explaining that Jer 3 is 
“echoing the Priestly legal phraseology and terminology of Num 35:33–34,” instead of reusing the lexemes 
 ,to defile,’ ‘to bring sin,’ and ‘abhorent’)” from Deut 24 (Rom-Shiloni‘) תועבה and ,החטיא ,טמא“
“Compositional Harmonization,” 930–31). She finds both meaning of חנף present in Jer 3:1–5, the verb 
used for sexual sins as sources of pollution in 3:1–2 and the concept of “to deceive, to behave 
hypocritically,” without the use of the term itself, in 3:4–5. She writes: “the Deuteronomic threat  ולא




Holladay’s comment on the use of ׁשוב in Jer 3:1 is also worth noting: 
Jrm presses the verb “return” (ׁשוב) in the fourth colon beyond the usage in 
Deuteronomy. In Deut 24:4* we read, “Her first husband . . . cannot turn (ׁשוב) to take 
her [i.e., cannot again take her] to be a wife to him”: the verb ׁשוב carries here the 
idiomatic meaning “do something again.” But Jrm says, “Would he (re)turn to her 
again?” Here is the adverb “again” (עֹוד), implied by ׁשוב in Deuteronomy, while ׁשוב 
carries its full value “(re)turn.” The result in Jrm’s metaphor is that Yahweh is the 
active agent, as the husband is in the Deuteronomic law, but the meaning of the verb 
here suggests a kind of humbling action on Yahweh’s part, as if Israel is the stable 
one and Yahweh contemplates moving back to her.24 
Beyond such a possible reworking of ׁשוב in Jer 3:1 and dependence upon Deut 24, it may 
also be a further wordplay on ׁשוב in the rest of the passage. Could  ְְׂשָרֵאליִ  ֻׁשָבהמ  in Jer 3:6, 
8 also be a play on the verb ׁשוב from Deut 24? Note how the same consonantal form ָׁשָבה 
                                               
( ףיחנה  serve as the linguistic pivots between the Deuteronomic law and the Priestly contexts. These ,חנף (/
clear terminological connections show Jeremiah’s knowledge of P phrases, which he reframes in a legal 
context of sexual sin that seems much closer conceptually to the HL view of the land (Lev 18 and 20)” 
(Rom-Shiloni, “Compositional Harmonization,” 932). She then adds the disclaimer: “Although Jeremiah 
quotes the language of Deut 24:1–4, to the extent that we can safely assume that he refers to this specific 
Deuteronomic law of divorce in its present literary form, there is no way to presume that the prophet knows 
or uses the Priestly text of Num 35 or the HL passages of Lev 18 and 20” (Rom-Shiloni, “Compositional 
Harmonization,” 933). In her earlier article presenting a very similar discussion of Jer 3, Deut 24 and Num 
35, this sentence pointed out Jeremiah’s knowledge of Priestly terminology and conceptions: “While we 
can safely assume that Jeremiah uses this specific Deuteronomic law of divorce in its present literary form; 
and we may furthermore assume that Jeremiah knows the Priestly terminology and conceptions and uses 
them; nevertheless, there is no way to argue that the prophet knows or uses the literary context of the 
Priestly source of Numbers 35” (Dalit Rom-Shiloni, “Actualization of Pentateuchal Legal Traditions in 
Jeremiah: More on the Riddle of Authorship,” ZABR 15 (2009): 266). As I understand her, she argues that 
the author of Jer 3:1–5 is familiar with the so-called Priestly terminology and conceptions of Lev 18; 20; 
and Num 35, but without reusing them intentionally in his composition of Jer 3:1–5. I do agree that an 
argument for reuse between Lev 18; 20; and/or Num 35 is too weak to make strong conclusions. 
24 Holladay, Jeremiah 1–25, 112–13. He continues on p. 113 arguing that this also becomes an 
argument for the priority of MT over LXX: “The perspective is so startling, given the status of women in 
the culture, that G reverses the gender references, μὴ ἀνακάμπτουσα ἀνακάμψει πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔτι, ‘Will she 
really return again to him?’ ( ָּתׁשּוב ֵאָליו עֹוד ֲהׁשֹוב ). M is thus clearly the lectio difficilior and is followed by 
V and T (S paraphrases a bit, translating “if she returns to him again,” and taking the fifth colon as a 
statement rather than a question). Many commentators (Cornill, Duhm, Giesebrecht, Rudolph) elect to 
follow G and emend the text to ֵאָליו עֹוד ֲהׁשֹוב ; this reading is more “logical” but leaves unanswered how the 
M text could have arisen if secondary, unless by the most unlikely of lapsus calami. M is thus to be 
accepted; in the last colon the gender references are the expected ones, so that Jrm has directed the hearer 
to the assumption of parity between Yahweh and Israel in ‘turning’.” Fishbane writes that the phrase ָלׁשּוב 
in Deut 24:4, where it means ‘return,’ “undergoes a semantic transformation [in Jer 3:1–5], and refers to 




is used in Jer 3:7, 10. The instruction in Deut 24 dealt with the possibility of a return 
 while they ,(ָׁשָבה/ׁשוב) In Jer 3:7 YHWH expressed his desire for Israel to return .(ׁשוב)
did not return. Likewise, in Jer 3:10 Judah is said not to have returned (ָׁשָבה/ׁשוב), with 
the result that the people in Jeremiah’s days have become faithless ( ֻׁשָבהמְ  ). 
 
Direction of Dependence 
Modification: Having argued for a reuse between Deut 24:1–4 and Jer 3:1–10, I 
now turn to making the case for why I believe it was Jeremiah that borrowed from 
Deuteronomy, and not vice versa.25 Firstly, there is something awkward about the 
sequence of actions in Jer 3:8. In Deut 24:1 we find the formulation  ְוָכַתב ָלּה ֵסֶפר ְּכִריֻתת
 and he shall write a letter of divorce to her and give it into her“) ְוָנַתן ְּבָיָדּה ְוִׁשְּלָחּה ִמֵּביֹתו
hand and send her from his house”).26 These same clauses, in identical form, are repeated 
in 24:3 in relation to the second husband’s divorce of the woman. This repetition 
highlights these clauses as describing the technical procedure of divorce. The sequence of 
events here follows the natural and expected order. First the husband would write the bill 
                                               
25 Michael Fishbane takes the disputed ֵלאֹמר in Jer 3:1 as a ‘citation formula’ introducing the 
reinterpretation of Deut 24:1–4 (Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 284, 307). 
26 Thiel sees little reuse of Deuteronomic language in Jer 3:6–12, but he takes the phrases ֵסֶפר
-in 3:10 to indicate Jeremiah’s dependence upon Deuteronomy (Thiel, Jeremia 1 ְּבָכל־ִלָּבּה in 3:8 and ְּכִריֻתת
25, 88–89). Craigie, Kelley, and Drinkard emphasize the marital language and the use of the word ׁשוב as 
possible links, and finds it “unwise to press the opening analogy of marital law” any further than this 
(Craigie et al., Jeremiah 1-25, 51). But as I show, the links seem to go beyond such strict limitations. It 
could be asked whether the use of ְרִביִבים (see Deut 32:2) and ַמְלקֹוׁש (see Deut 11:14) in Jer 3:3 could be 
pointing back to Deuteronomic language.  
Craigie, Kelley, and Drinkard deny that Jeremiah is dependent on Hosea as the latter writes about 
remarriage in the context of “an anticipation of the new covenant” while Jeremiah’s focus is “on the 
possibility and necessity of repentance” (Craigie et al., Jeremiah 1-25, 51). Fishbane on his side sees 





of divorce, then give it to the wife, and finally send her off. But when we come to Jer 3:8 
we read  ִָׁשַּלְחִּתיָה ָוֶאֵּתן ֶאת־ֵסֶפר ְּכִריֻתֶתיָה ֵאֶליה (“I sent her and I gave her letter of divorce to 
her”). Here the metaphorical wife, apostate Israel, is first sent off, and then given a bill of 
divorce. This could be an example of Seidel’s law of inversion,27 in which case it would 
indicate Jeremiah’s reuse of Deut 24:1–4 due to the awkward sequence of events 
introduced in Jer 3:1–10 MT. I cannot see another reason for why he should alter an 
otherwise natural flow of events.28 If this is a case of intentional inversion, I list it here as 
an indication of the direction of dependence rather than reuse, since the modification in 
the context of Jer 3:8 creates an awkward sequence.29  
                                               
27 See M. Seidel, “Parallels between Isaiah and Psalms,” Sinai 38 (1955–56): 149–72, 229–40, 
272–80, 333–55 (Hebrew). Cf. Levinson, Deuteronomy, 18–20; Nihan, “The Holiness Code between D and 
P. Some Comments on the Function and Significance of Leviticus 17–26 in the Composition of the Torah,” 
96–97; Michael A. Lyons, “Marking Innerbiblical Allusion in the Book of Ezekiel,” Biblica 88 (2007): 
245–46. 
28 Jan Joosten writes that a wayyiqtol following a qatal in discourse usually will take over the 
temporal perspective of the qatal, namely implying “an event time preceding the reference time” (Joosten, 
The Verbal System of Biblical Hebrew, 182). In that case we could expect that the qatal+wayyiqtol 
represented a sequence. Still, it is also possible to read the ָוֶאֵּתן of  ָָוֶאֵּתן ֶאת־ֵסֶפר ְּכִריֻתֶתיָה ֵאֶליה in the 
epexegetical (“in the sense that I gave her a bill of divorce”) or pluperfect (“having given her a bill of 
divorce”) sense. In both cases this clause would explicate what was seen as implicit in  ִָׁשַּלְחִּתיה (Bruce K. 
Waltke and M. O'Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 
1990), 551–53). This could be taken to weaken the use of these clauses to argue for the direction of 
dependence. Still, combined with the other evidence for reuse between Jer 3:1–10 and Deut 24:1–4 in other 
parts of the passages, and the reversal in verbal sequence between נתן and ׁשלח in the two passages that 
invites an explanation. Further, reading ָוֶאֵּתן in an epexegetical or a pluperfect sense can be taken as 
compatible with the idea that the author of Jer 3:8 wanted to mark dependence on Deut 24 by inverting the 
sequence, while still retaining a logical sequence of events. Another possibility is to understand  ׁשלח in a 
literal sense in Deut 24:1 for sending off, but a technical sense in Jer 3:8 for divorce. If so, the altered order 
could make better sense. In Jer 3:8 the husband would first divorce his wife, by for example a public 
statement “You shall not be my wife,” and then afterward he would write her a divorce certificate and send 
her off. However we explain the altered verbal sequence in Jer 3:8, it is at least likely that it was meant as 
an intentional inversion of Deut 24:1. 
29 The additional verb ַוּתּוָכל in Jer 3:5 has posed a challenge for interpreters. Why is it included? It 
is interesting to note that the apodosis of Deut 24:4 begins with ּוַכללֹא־י . Might it be that Jeremiah picks up 
this key word from Deut 24:4? There it introduces the prohibition. In Jer 3:5, however, it is used in the 




Wordplay: There seems to be a word play in Jer 3:2 that, as far as I can determine, 
has not been commented upon in the scholarly literature. In Deut 24:1 ֶעְרַות ָּדָבר 
constitutes the legitimate ground for divorce. The debate regarding the meaning of this 
phrase by later commentaries is well known, and needs no recitation here.30 In Jer 3:2 the 
                                               
evidence is not sufficient to be conclusive, but given the reuse between the two passages it is worth noting 
this possible additional link. 
30 Cf. Jacob Neusner, The Rabbinic Traditions about the Pharisees before 70, Part 2: The Houses 
(Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 1971), 37–39; Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 309; 
Instone-Brewer, Divorce and Remarriage, 110–14. Richard Davidson takes the phrase ֶעְרַות ָּדָבר as “sexual 
activity but less than illicit sexual intercourse” (Davidson, Flame of Yahweh, 392). Anthony Phillips takes 
the phrase to mean “anything else [than adultery] which the husband found distasteful in his wife” and as a 
phrase that “has no moral connotation” based on Deut 23:14. He adds that childlessness was probably the 
chief ground for divorce (Anthony Phillips, Deuteronomy, eds. P. R. Ackroyd, A. R. C. Leaney and J. W. 
Packer. The Cambridge Bible Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 160). 
Kenneth Kitchen mentions the provision made at the marriage between Laqipum with lady Hatala in the 
Assyrian ‘colony’ at Anatolian Kanesh where it said: “If within 2 years she does not produce children for 
him, she herself may buy a slave-woman. Then after she [the latter] has had a child by him, then he may 
sell her off where he wishes” (Kitchen, On the Reliability of the Old Testament, 325). In the somewhat later 
laws of Hammurabi, in LH §144 and 146, stipulations were also made for cases where a barren wife gave a 
slave-woman to her husband so that she could bear children for the couple (Roth, Law Collections from 
Mesopotamia and Asia Minor, 108–9). This practice is also attested with the patriarchs in the HB (Gen 
16:1–4; 30:1–13). David Daube points out that divorce might not have been as easy as it might look in the 
eyes of modern exegetes (David Daube, Studies in Biblical Law (New York: Ktav, 1969), 305–6n6). 
According to Deut 24:4 the woman “has been defiled” (ֻהַּטָּמָאה) by her second marriage. Jonathan 
Klawans summarizes this and similar cases as follows: “In these situations, the woman does not defile 
ritually, but she is still defiled in that she suffers a permanent and degrading change in status” (Klawans, 
Impurity and Sin, 29). Richard Davidson sees in the rare hotpaal form ֻהַּטָּמָאה an implication of the first 
husbands divorcing his wife: “The first husband’s putting away of his wife has in effect caused her to defile 
herself in a second marriage in a similar way to committing adultery” (Davidson, Flame of Yahweh, 397). 
Eve Feinstein has surveyed and discussed the various interpretations of Deut 24:1–4 and the meaning of the 
phrase ֶעְרַות ָּדָבר. The law has been interpreted as intended to prevent wife-swapping, divorce, or incest, 
unjust enrichment, as a protection of the second marriage, as a punishment for adultery, or as a restriction 
based on the analogy between this case and adultery. She finds these explanations wanting a satisfactory 
account of the different descriptions of why the two husbands divorce the wife, taking the protasis as 
normative, or reading too much into the instruction and phrases ֶעְרַות ָּדָבר drawing illegitimate analogies 
from ANE sources or other biblical passages (Eve Levavi Feinstein, Sexual Pollution in the Hebrew Bible 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 54–64). Based on the reuse in Jer 3:1 she argues that reading 
Deut 24:1–4 as for example concerned with unjust enrichment through the dowry is untenable, and that Jer 
3:1 in its context make it more likely that the law restricted the return to the first husband on analogy with 
adultery. She writes: “Jeremiah’s metaphorical use of the law assumes that the woman is prohibited to her 
first husband because of her sexual relationship with another man, not because of financial considerations. 
The prophet’s comparison is an argument a minori ad majus: If a man’s former wife is prohibited to him 
after having sex with a second man to whom she is legally married, for a wife to be reunited with her 
husband after committing adultery with many men would surely be worse” (Feinstein, Sexual Pollution, 




promiscuous people are seen as ַּכֲעָרִבי ַּבִּמְדָּבר (“like an Arab in the desert”). Why this 
comparison? It is used as a simile to the preceding clause that describes the people, which 
reads ַעל־ְּדָרִכים ָיַׁשְבְּת ָלֶהם (“you were sitting by roads [waiting] for them”). Prostitutes 
would typically sit waiting along roads (e.g. Gen 38:14; Prov 7:10–12).31 The phrase 
 would therefore seem to have a sexual connotation. The consonantal and ַּכֲעָרִבי ַּבִּמְדָּבר
phonetic similarity to ֶעְרַות ָּדָבר is striking. In both cases the phrases are used for 
something objectionable, possibly also a sexual offense. As Feinstein has shown, the 
phrase ֶעְרַות ָּדָבר (lit. “naked thing”) in Deut 24:1 does not necessarily imply a fault with 
the wife, but rather something more general and unspecific that the husband found that he 
disliked in his wife. She says it might simply be understood as “buyer’s remorse”.32 The 
phrase ֶעְרַות ָּדָבר does not need to imply a real moral fault with the wife. It could even 
                                               
Jeremiah draws between the legal scenario of remarriage and the metaphorical scenario of adultery rests on 
the assumption that the effect of the two situations on a woman’s status vis-à-vis her husband is the same in 
essence, if not in severity” (Feinstein, Sexual Pollution, 63). Jer 3:1, 8 and Hos 2:4 both seem to see 
adultery, or the analogy to adultery, as the problem behind Deut 24:1–4. However, reading Deut 24:1–4 as 
addressing the analogy between adultery and the specific case of return of a divorced wife has the weakness 
that it is only restricting the first husband’s right to return his former and now divorced wife. If the case-
law really addressed the problem of the analogy between adultery and the given case, we would expect that 
it would restrict any remarriage after divorce. However, it does not do so. This is a weakness Feinstein 
herself mentions: “Several commentators have called attention to the fact that the woman’s pollution 
appears to apply only to her first husband, since she is evidently free to marry any other man. In a sense, 
this is true: It is only from the perspective of the first husband that the woman can properly be described as 
having been polluted. However, this is not technical language, and it may not in fact have the function of 
demarcating a specific legal or ritual state that prohibits the woman to her first husband while permitting 
her to others. . . . The expression is rather of a rhetorical nature, suggesting to men that they ought to be 
repelled by sexual contact between their former wives and other men” (Feinstein, Sexual Pollution, 64–65). 
While addressing the objection, Feinstein’s explanation does really not answer it convincingly. The precise 
problem seen in the return of the wife to the first husband is still in want of an adequate explanation, even if 
the analogy with adultery—strengthened by Jer 3:1, 8 and Hos 2:4—seems to come closest. 
31 Fischer, Jeremia 1–25, 186; Lundbom, Jeremiah 1–20, 302. 
32 Cf. Feinstein, Sexual Pollution, 63. Cf. pp. 53–65. Cf. Anthony Phillips, Deuteronomy, eds. P. 
R. Ackroyd, A. R. C. Leaney and J. W. Packer. The Cambridge Bible Commentary (Cambridge: 




simply indicate any kind of objection the husband found he had with his wife.33 The use 
of the same phrase in Deut 23:15—even if it here seems to be an offense inherent in the 
object itself—does not justify seeing ֶעְרַות ָּדָבר in Deut 24:1 as an inherent moral offense 
in the woman.  
If we read Deut 24:1–4 in this manner, the word play in Jer 3:1 intensifies the 
situation on several levels. While the Deuteronomic instruction prohibits the husband 
                                               
33 A major difference would be if we see ֶעְרַות ָּדָבר in Deut 24:1 as constituting a legitimate legal 
ground for divorce, represented in the later thought of rabbi Hillel, or simply as descriptive. In the latter 
case, it would mean that the husband found something objectionable with his wife, without stating whether 
this was a legitimate legal ground for divorce or not. As Deut 24:1 belongs to the protasis of the instruction, 
I read it as the latter. The verse simply tells us that the husband found something objectionable with his 
wife and divorced her, without discussing the moral value of the husbands action or attributing a real moral 
offense to the wife. In m. Giṭ. 9:10 (Jacob Neusner, The Mishnah: A New Translation (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1988), 487) we read:  
“A The House of Shammai say, “A man should divorce his wife only because he has found 
grounds for it in unchastity (דבר ערוה), 
B “since it is said, Because he has found in her indecency in anything (ערות דבר; Dt. 24:).” 
C  And the House of Hillel say, “Even if she spoiled his dish, 
D “since it is said, Because he has found in her indecency in anything (ערות דבר). 
E  Aqiba says, “Even if he found someone else prettier than she, 
F “since it is said, And it shall be if she find no favor in his eyes (Dt. 24:1).” 
The phrase posed two challenges to the rabbis: (1) ֶעְרַות (‘indecency/nakedness’) is in the construct 
rather than ָּדָבר (‘matter’), and (2) ָּדָבר (‘matter’) seems superfluous (cf. Instone-Brewer, Divorce and 
Remarriage, 111). The house of Shammai solved these challenges by reversing the order of the two words, 
placing ָּדָבר in the construct (ָּדָבר ֶעְרָוה; “a matter of indecency”), while at the same time quoting  ֶָּדָברְרַות ע  
from Deut 24:1 to show that they acknowledged how it appeared in the text (cf. Instone-Brewer, Divorce 
and Remarriage, 111). The house of Hillel on the other side took ֶעְרַות (‘indecency/nakedness’) and ָּדָבר 
(‘matter’) as two separate grounds for divorce. They could be thinking of one out of two rabbinic 
assumptions about the biblical text: either (1) the principle of unusual form, in which an unusual 
construction or word was seen to contain a hidden meaning, or (2) the principle of no redundancy, which 
assumed that there was no superfluous or redundant phrases (Instone-Brewer, Divorce and Remarriage, 
20–21). They therefore concluded that ֶעְרַות referred to ‘indecency,’ while ָּדָבר referred to ‘any matter’. The 
‘any matter’ would thus imply all other reasons beside adultery a husband might have for divorcing his 
wife. If we do not adopt Hillel’s reading of Deut 24:1 as normative, i.e. as providing legitimate grounds for 
divorce, I believe he was the closest when claiming that ֶעְרַות ָּדָבר means “any matter.” Still, if we speak in 
normative terms, Shammai seems justified by Jesus in reading the legitimate grounds for divorce as more 
restricted. In general Jesus does not take Deut 24:1–3 as a command to divorce, but as a concession (Matt 
5:31–32; 19:9; Mark 10:11–12; Luke 16:18). Cf. Craig S. Keener, The Gospel of Matthew: A Socio-
Rhetorical Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009), 465–66. Jesus rebuked the hard-heartedness 
of his contemporaries, and by taking the giving of a divorce certificate as an imperative, emphasised the 




from returning to a divorced wife that has, meanwhile, been married a second time; in Jer 
3:1 the Judah-wife has been sexually promiscuous through contact with “many lovers” 
( ִּביםֵרִעים ַר  ). Further, while ֶעְרַות ָּדָבר in Deut 24:1 may be understood as no real fault on 
the wife’s side, in Jer 3:1 ַּכֲעָרִבי ַּבִּמְדָּבר seems not only to imply sexual promiscuity and 
adultery, but also harlotry.34 The sexual offences in Jer 3 are liable to capital punishment, 
in contrast to Deut 24 where the remarried wife has only become defiled. In other words, 
while both the first husband in Deut 24 and the YHWH-husband in Jer 3 have formally 
divorced their wives, Jer 3 reverses culpability as compared to Deut 24: Deut 24 can be 
read as the first husband having the sole responsibility for the dissolution of the 
relationship and pollution, with the wife as morally innocent, while in Jer 3 it is the 
Judah-wife that has the sole responsibility for the dissolution of the relationship and the 
pollution; the YHWH-husband is morally innocent. The LXX apparently misunderstood 
the root and took it as I ֹעֵרב (‘a raven’) rather than ֲעָרִבי (‘an Arab/Bedouin’), showing 
that the translator missed the point of the wordplay in Hebrew.35 
                                               
34 It is also possible that the use of the words רעה ,ׁשגל ,חנף and זנה in Jer 3:1–10 are intended as 
an elaboration of the sexual offense of ֶעְרַות ָּדָבר in Deut 24:1. The LXX renders ְזנּות in Jer 3:2, 9 as 
πορνεία. This would also fit with Jesus’ rendering of ֶעְרַות ָּדָבר in Deut 24:1 as πορνεία in Matt 19:9. Even 
if Matt 19:9 would need to be studies closer to see whether Jesus might also have had Jer 3:2, 9 in mind, we 
could at least say that Jer 3:1–10 LXX would provide Jesus with a Scriptural basis for taking ֶעְרַות ָּדָבר in 
Deut 24:1 as πορνεία. Deuteronomy 24:3 LXX renders ֶעְרַות ָּדָבר as ἄσχημον πρᾶγμα (“something 
shameful”). A question is if it may be a link between ֶעְרַות in Lev 18 and 20 on the one side and  ַּכעֲָרִבי
 .in Jer 3:1 ַּבִּמְדָּבר
35 I will here also include a brief discussion related to the question of whether MT or LXX 
represents the earlier version. Maier argues that LXX in Jer 3:1–10 preserves “an earlier version” of the 
text, just as the LXX “in Jeremiah often preserves an older version of the text”. She writes: “The MT of Jer 
3:1 differs from the OG [LXX] in two instances that both allude to the rejection of remarriage in 
Deuteronomic law (Deut 24:1–4). Like Deut 24:4, Jer 3:1 (MT) states the question from the first husband’s 
point of view, ‘would he return to her?’ The second difference is that the Masoretic version declares the 
land to be the object of pollution, not the woman” (Maier, Daugther Zion, Mother Zion, 105). Emmanuel 
Tov sees two literary strata of Jeremiah, one represented by MT, Targums, Peshitta, and Vulgata and the 




Jonathan Kline writes in his study of paranomasia, or allusive wordplay, in the 
HB:  
What constitutes similarity of sound? Paranomasia can be (1) homonymic (referring 
to words that sound identical and are spelled identically but differ in meaning; e.g. 
‘bear’ as noun or verb) or (2) homophonic (referring to words that sound identical but 
differ in spelling and meaning; e.g., ‘bear’ and ‘bare’), or (3) can involve words that 
                                               
the text compared to the former. He sees the latter as an earlier version of the text, and the former as a later 
expansion (Emanuel Tov, The Text-Critical Use of the Septuagint in Biblical Research, JBS 8 (Jerusalem: 
Simor, 1997), 243–44). He does underline, however, that the variation in length between LXX and MT of 
Jeremiah (and Ezekiel) in itself is not an argument for which is the earlier (Tov, Text-Critical Use of the 
Septuagint, 261). Hornkohl writes that “the majority of those who have expressed an opinion on the topic 
[of the relative chronology between the MT and LXX of Jeremiah] maintain that the difference between the 
longer Masoretic version and the shorter Greek version stems from different Vorlagen, the Masoretic 
version basically reflecting a secondary, expanded edition of the Hebrew text behind the Greek of the 
Septuagint” (Hornkohl, “The Language of the Book of Jeremiah,” vi). Based on his own linguistic studies 
he concludes that “the results of the present study would seem to provide confirmation for the view that the 
material exclusive to the Masoretic text is (generally) of a later linguistic cast than the material common to 
both editions. However, the evidence also indicates that the literary expansion in question could not have 
been undertaken a great while after the composition of the material common to both versions, as both sets 
of material exhibit a linguistic profile characteristic of the late-pre-exilic, exilic, or early-post-exilic 
periods, i.e., of the 6th century B.C.E.” (Hornkohl, “The Language of the Book of Jeremiah,” vii). Cf. his 
translated and published dissertation in Aaron D. Hornkohl, Ancient Hebrew Periodization and the 
Language of the Book of Jeremiah: The Case for a Sixth-Century Date of Composition (Leiden: Brill, 
2014), 356–73. Maier would understand the LXX version with the woman returning to the husband and the 
woman being polluted, not the land, as the earlier version. A discussion of the general relation between 
LXX and MT on Jeremiah goes beyond this study. For a discussion on the relation between MT Jer and 
LXX Jer see Emanuel Tov, The Septuagint Translation of Jeremiah and Baruch: A Discussion of an Early 
Revision of the LXX of Jeremiah 29-52 and Baruch 1:1-3:8, HSM (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1976); 
Emanuel Tov, “The Literary History of the Book of Jeremiah in the Light of Its Textual History,” in 
Empirical Models for Biblical Criticism, ed. Jeffrey H. Tigay (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1985), 211–41; Alexander Rofé, “The Arrangement of the Book of Jeremiah,” ZAW 101, no. 3 
(1989): 390–98; Alexander Rofé, “The Arrangement of the Book of Jeremiah (MT and LXX) (in 
Hebrew),” Beit Mikra 56, no. 1 (2011): 126–37; Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer der Tora, 26–30, 252–54, 257–
60. Here I will first just point out that Maier does acknowledge the dependence of MT Jer 3:1–10 upon 
Deut 24:1–4. Further, I see two reasons to question Maier’s preference of LXX in this passage as the earlier 
and more original. Firstly, ὡσεὶ κορώνη ἐρημουμένη in Jer 3:2 seems to be a clear case where LXX tries to 
translate a Hebrew Vorlage similar to MT ַּכעֲָרִבי ַּבִּמְדָּבר. The image of ‘a deserted raven’ is somewhat 
obscure in the context of LXX. In contrast, the ‘Arab in the desert’ makes sense in the context of MT, as 
seen above. Recognizing that ‘a raven’ in Hebrew is I ֹעֵרב, close to the consonants of ֲעָרִבי (‘an Arab’), 
makes clear that LXX tried to render a Hebrew text similar to MT. Given this we also see how the 
translator of LXX simply ignored the final yod of ֲעָרִבי, reasonably read as a gentilic yod, as he did not find 
a way to account for it. Secondly, Maier seems to imply in the above quote that it was the later version, 
represented by MT, which reflected a priestly ideology closer to the text of Deut 24. Here I would only like 
to refer again to how LXX renders the MT  ֵָאֶליה with εἰς τὰς χεῖρας αὐτῆς. As argued above, this connects 
Jer 3:8 LXX closer to the terminology used in Deut 24:1 in both MT and LXX. It would therefore be 
difficult to argue that it is MT that subsequently introduces the reuse and dependence of Jer 3:1–10 on Deut 




sound similar but not identical and that differ in spelling and meaning (e.g., ‘bear’ 
and ‘pear’). These three categories are differentiated by increasing degrees of 
markedness: the first is unique in that examples can be identified only on the basis of 
semantics (but not visually or orally/aurally); examples of the second category can be 
identified on the basis of semantics as well as visually (though not orally/aurally); and 
examples of the third category can be identified on the basis of semantics, visually, 
and orally/aurally. Given these differences in markedness, a useful distinction can be 
made between homonymic paronomasia (the first category) and nonhomonymic 
paronomasia (the second and third categories).36 
The phrase ַּכֲעָרִבי ַּבִּמְדָּבר in Jer 3:2 sounds similar but differs in spelling and meaning 
from ֶעְרַות ָּדָבר in Deut 24:1. Thus, Jer 3:2 would belong to Kline’s third category. 
Edward Greenstein defines wordplay in the HB as follows: “Use in proximity of words 
that display similarity of sound with dissimilarity of meaning.”37 Kline refers to several 
recent studies that have demonstrated the phenomenon of allusive paranomasia to another 
passage not in its immediate context.38 Reading ַּכֲעָרִבי ַּבִּמְדָּבר in Jer 3:2 as a word play on 
 in Deut 24:1 would be an example of allusive wordplay crossing book ֶעְרַות ָּדָבר
boundaries within the HB. Greenstein elaborates further: “Because Hebrew words 
comprise a consonantal root interspersed with changing vocalic schemes, we generally 
demand of wordplay that at least half the consonants, usually two of the common root’s 
three, are identical or phonologically similar.”39 This is fulfilled with two consecutive 
consonants ער followed by a possibly similar sound created by the consonants ו and ב 
                                               
36 Jonathan G. Kline, Allusive Soundplay in the Hebrew Bible (Atlanta: SBL, 2016), 9. 
37 Edward L. Greenstein, “Wordplay, Hebrew,” in ABD, ed. David Noel Freedman (New York: 
Doubleday, 1992), 968. Regt stress that the words need to be in the same context: “Wordplay involves two 
(or more) words with different meanings, but almost coinciding in sound, that occur in the same context” 
(L. J. de Regt, “Wordplay in the OT,” in The New Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible, ed. Katharine Dob 
Sakenfeld (Nashville: Abingdon, 2006–9), 898). 
38 Kline, Allusive Soundplay, 11. Cf. p. 17. 24–29. He finds Sommer, A Prophet Reads Scripture 
especially noteworthy in this regard. 




between ֶעְרַות and ַּכֲעָרִבי, and the three consecutively following consonants דבר in ָּדָבר and 
 That we have two lexemes that in addition follow in the same order in the two .ַּבִּמְדָּבר
passages further strengthen the case. While a case like this without supportive evidence is 
weak, the similarity in consonants and order between the phrases together with additional 
evidence for reuse and direction of dependence mentioned in this chapter and a clear 
function of the paranomasia in Jer 3:2,40 makes this a potentially strong case of allusive 
sound-play. We can therefore formulate this in more general terms: If a passage shows 
additional evidence of reuse from a specific source, then similarity in sound and/or 
spelling with a different meaning is a most likely a case of allusive paronomasia. 
There might be another dimension as well to the possible wordplay of  ַּכֲעָרִבי
 in Deut 24:1. It is also ֶעְרַות ָּדָבר in Jer 3:2 and the much contested phrase ַּבִּמְדָּבר
significant to note, especially given the Deuteronomic flavor of Jeremiah as a whole, that 
Deut 1:1 opens the book with describing Moses as addressing the people ַּבִּמְדָּבר ָּבֲעָרָבה 
(“in the desert, in the Arabah”). There are other verses using ִמְדָּבר and ֲעָרָבה together, 
referring to a similar location, but not in as tight a combination as in Deut 1:1.41 A 
significant parallel is found in Jer 2:6, ַהּמֹוִליְך ֹאָתנּו ַּבִּמְדָּבר ְּבֶאֶרץ ֲעָרָבה ְוׁשּוָחה (“who led us 
in the wilderness, in a land of desert [ֲעָרָבה] and pit”). This seems to evoke Deut 1:1 and 
                                               
40 Kline writes: “The best way to demonstrate that a possible example of allusive paronomasia 
performs a clear function is to show that the word in the source text and its proposed patronym in the 
alluding texts are in close proximity with respect to the words or text-segment(s) that the alluding text 
reproduces from the source text and, even more importantly, that the similarity in sound and difference in 
meaning between the word in the source text and its proposed patronym in the alluding text combine to 
produce a striking effect in the message of the alluding text” (Kline, Allusive Soundplay, 29). See also p. 
28. 
41 Cf. Deut 1:1; 2:8; Josh 12:8; 1 Sam 23:24; 2 Sam 17:16; Isa 35:1, 6; 40:3; 41:19; 51:3; Jer 2:6; 




the experience in the desert. Jer 17:6 also compares the people to someone living in 
desert and wilderness, but, again, not in as tightly construed a phrase as in Deut 1:1 and 
Jer 3:2. While ַּכֲעָרִבי ַּבִּמְדָּבר in Jer 3:2 is the only place in the HB using ִּמְדָּבר + ֲעָרִבי, 
likely playing on ֶעְרַות ָּדָבר in Deut 24:1, it may simultaneously be drawing from motifs of 
the people in the desert, ַּבִּמְדָּבר ָּבֲעָרָבה, from the opening passage of Deuteronomy (1:1). 
The question here is why Jer 3:2 and 17:6 describe the people in terms of being in the 
desert? While Jer 17:6 simply states that the people were in the desert, Jer 3:2 goes a step 
further and personalizes the term, giving it sexual connotation with an allusion to an Arab 
prostitute sitting waiting for lovers in the desert. The phrase ַּכֲעָרִבי ַּבִּמְדָּבר in Jer 3:2 
appears to simultaneously draw upon ַּבִּמְדָּבר ָּבֲעָרָבה in Deut 1:1 and ֶעְרַות ָּדָבר in Deut 
24:1. If this is the case, it also means that Jer 3 very likely had a version of Deuteronomy 
similar to the received text we have, including the superscription of Deut 1:1–5. 
Conceptual dependence: Jeremiah uses literal divorce between a man and his wife 
as a metaphor for the relationship between God and his people.42 By definition, 
                                               
42 For the common view that Jer 3:6–11 is a later addition see Mastnjak, Textual Authority in 
Jeremiah, 169–71. Lundbom calls Jer 3:6–11 “a ‘pesher’ on the surrounding oracles”. In his opinion “much 
of the vocabulary is quarried from 3:1–5” (Lundbom, Jeremiah 1–20, 306). In his terms we could thus 
speak of reuse and direction of dependence within the two sections in 3:1–11 itself. I am not convinced by 
his division between vv. 5 and 6. The parallels within Jer 3:1–11 that he mentions could also be taken as 
signifying the unity of this passage: 
3:6 whoring 3:1 you have whored 
3:8 played the whore 3:2 your whorings 
3:9 her whoring 3:3 a whore 
3:7 she will return to me 3:1 
will he return?… would 
you 
 she did not return  return to me? 
3:8 I sent her away 3:1 he sends away 
3:9 she polluted 3:1 would not that land 
 
 
the land  be greatly polluted? 





metaphorical language is secondary. This in itself cannot establish that Jer 3:1–10 reused 
Deut 24:1–4, but the metaphorical use of divorce here presupposes that a certain norm in 
regard to divorce was well-known both by Jeremiah and his readers. Without such a norm 
as a benchmark for comparison, Jeremiah’s line of reasoning falls flat.43 Given that there 
is reuse between these two passages, the metaphorical or creative use of technical terms 
in Jer 3:1–10 also found in Deut 24:1–4 could, therefore, be taken as support for saying 
that Jeremiah is the one borrowing from the norm expressed in Deuteronomy, and not 
vice versa. 
Appropriation 
My line of argumentation began with evidence of reuse between Jer 3:1–10 and 
Deut 24:1–4. The close parallels between the clauses  ִיׁש־ַאֵחרְוָהְלָכה ֵמִאֹּתו ְוָהְיָתה ְלא  in Jer 
3:1 and ְוָהְלָכה ְוָהְיָתה ְלִאיׁש־ַאֵחר in Deut 24:2, where both passages use the phrase  ֵֶפר ס
 as a technical term for divorce, isolate the two ׁשלח bill of divorce”) and piel of“) ְּכִריֻתת
passages and strongly indicate a literary relation between the two, with a possible 
conflation of ְוָיְצָאה ִמֵּביֹתו ְוָהְלָכה ְוָהְיָתה ְלִאיׁש־ַאֵחר in Deut 24:2 by  ְָלָכה ֵמִאֹּתו ְוָהְיָתה ְלִאיׁש־ְוה
  .in Jer 3:1 ַאֵחר
Once reuse between the two passages has been established, the next question 
concerns the direction of dependence. I have mentioned three main reasons for seeing 
Jeremiah as dependent upon Deuteronomy: (1) the awkward sequence of  ִׁשַּלְחִּתיָה ָוֶאֵּתן
                                               
43 Craigie, Kelley, and Drinkard call Jer 3:1 a “paraphrase of the substance of the law also known 




 in ֶעְרַות ָּדָבר in Jer 3:2 on ַּכֲעָרִבי ַּבִּמְדָּבר in Jer 3:8, (2) the wordplay of ֶאת־ֵסֶפר ְּכִריֻתֶתיָה ֵאֶליהָ 
Deut 24:1, and (3) the metaphoric language in Jer 3:1–10 of the concept of divorce, used 
literally in Deut 24:1–4.44 Even if we are required to use word play and metaphor with 
care when attempting to argue for the direction of dependence, the use of word play and 
metaphor in Jer 3:1–10 to employ key concepts found in Deut 24:1–4 does likely point to 
the former’s dependence on the latter. This would suggest that the author of Jer 3:1–10 
was aware of a text like Deut 24:1–4, or something very similar to it, and not simply that 
the two passages shared a common legal inheritance. 
Reuse of Deut 24:1–4 can be seen both in Jer 3:1–10 MT and LXX. Still, marked 
differences between the two manuscripts can also be observed. On the one hand, Jer 3:1–
10 MT follows Deut 24:1–4 in having the first husband return to the wife, in contrast to 
the wife returning to the husband in LXX. The defilement of the land in Jer 3:1–2, 9 MT 
also reflects the idea of the defilement of the land in Deut 24:2, in contrast to LXX, 
which only regards the woman as defiled. On the other hand, the MT  ֵָאֶליה is rendered in 
Jer 3:8 LXX as εἰς τὰς χεῖρας αὐτῆς, which is also used in Deut 24:1 LXX. At this point 
the translator of Jer 3:1–10 LXX appears to have incorporated a phrase taken from Deut 
24:1–4 LXX itself, instead of simply providing a literal translation of a text like Jer 3:1–
10 MT. 
According to Jer 3:1, it was God who formally divorced his people due to their 
adulterous behavior. It was not the fornication, itself, that constituted the divorce. The 
 in Deut 24:1 did not necessarily imply a fault with the wife, but might simply ֶעְרַות ָּדָבר
                                               
44 For how later prophets like Zechariah and Haggai “use pentateuchal traditions metaphorically” 




denote that the husband had come to dislike the wife for some reason. Through the word 
play in Jer 3:1 the situation is intensified. While the Deuteronomic instruction prohibits 
the husband to take back a divorced wife who meanwhile has been married a second 
time, in Jer 3:1 the Judah-wife has had sexual contact with “many lovers” ( ִּביםֵרִעים ַר  ). 
Further, while ֶעְרַות ָּדָבר in Deut 24:1 may be understood as entailing no real fault on the 
wife’s side, in Jer 3:1ַּכֲעָרִבי ַּבִּמְדָּבר denotes not only adultery but also harlotry—deserving 
of capital punishment (e.g. Deut 22:22). According to the analogy with Deut 24:1–4 the 
people in Jeremiah’s day would have deserved to be wiped out. But as a metaphor, used 
to place the situation in relief, YHWH is not legally bound to Deut 24:1–4 regarding how 
to treat the promiscuous Judah. 
In Deut 24:4 the prohibition against bringing sin upon the land, ְולֹא ַתֲחִטיא ֶאת־
 is directed against the male. By reusing Deut 24:1–4 the implication would be that ,ָהָאֶרץ
the YHWH-husband, himself, would bring sin upon the land by taking back his people. 
Jeremiah, however, studiously avoids this connotation. First of all, in 3:1, 7, 10 it is the 
unfaithful people who are expected to return to God.45 Further, while Jer 3:1 MT does 
follow the legal lead of Deut 24:4 in speaking about the impossibility of the husband 
returning to his divorced wife, as this would pollute the land (ֲהֹלוא ָחֹנוף ֶּתֱחַנף ָהָאֶרץ ַהִהיא), 
in the rest of the passage the danger of polluting the land is defined in different tems. In 
 it is the adultery of the people (ַוֶּתֱחַנף ֶאת־ָהָאֶרץ) and 3:9 ( ַוַּתֲחִניִפי ֶאֶרץ ִּבְזנּוַתִיְך ּוְבָרעָ ) 3:2
                                               
45 It would have been easier if Jer 3:1–10 MT rather rendered it like LXX, only speaking of the 
woman being defiled and the woman returning to the husband. But as Jer 3:1–10 MT appears to be bound 





that has defiled the land. Jeremiah therefore places the sole blame for defiling the land 
upon the people.46   
In Jer 3:4–5a the people invoke the first love of God, as in their initial walk in the 
wilderness together (cf. 2:2); thereby posing a rhetorical question in order to affirm that 
God will not rage against the people forever: “Do you not now call to me: ‘My father, 
you are the companion of my youth! Does one hate forever? Does one rage forever?’ 
That is what you said.” But in 3:5b, God exposes this as vain talk: “But you did evils, and 
had your way.” As Georg Fischer points out, not only have they acted promiscuously 
with multiple lovers and, therefore, deserve the capital punishment of Deut 22:22, but by 
appealing to God to take them back, they also become guilty of setting Deut 24:1–4 
aside.47 Still, as pointed out above, this is exactly what God says he must do and is 
willing to do; namely, to receive the divorced and unfaithful people back again. 
When we compare the dating in v. 6 (“Now YHWH said to me during the days of 
King Josiah”) with the introductory statement in Jer 1:2, 3, “The word of the LORD came 
                                               
46 It is possible that the LXX translator imported the scenario from Jer 3:6–11 MT, with the wife 
returning to the husband, into his rendering of 3:1 (μὴ ἀνακάμπτουσα ἀνακάμψει πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔτι). A 
difference, however, is that LXX only has the wife being defiled (οὐ μιαινομένη μιανθήσεται ἡ γυνὴ 
ἐκείνη), as in Deut 24:4, not also the land. Jer 3:1–10 MT focus more upon the land being defiled. Hobbs 
argues that probably the “LXX reflects the original reading,” while the MT is a later edition (Hobbs, 
“Jeremiah 3:1–6 and Deuteronomy 24:1–4,” 23). He continues to argue that since Jer 3:1–5 “is from the 
early ministry of the prophet” it is unlikely “to have been directly dependent upon a written account of a 
law which had hardly, if at all, been published” (Hobbs, “Jeremiah 3:1–6 and Deuteronomy 24:1–4,” 24). 
But he does not provide convincing arguments for the choice regarding the relative priority of LXX over 
MT, and neither considers much of the evidence for reuse and direction of dependence provided in the 
above discussion. Holladay argues that since MT is the lectio difficilior it would be difficult to explain how 
it could have arisen as a secondary reading, and therefore prefers MT over LXX (Holladay, Jeremiah 1–25, 
113). To Craigie, Kelley, and Drinkard “the differences between LXX and MT . . . more probably reflect 
the varieties between two textual traditions” (Craigie et al., Jeremiah 1-25, 49). 




to him in the days of King Josiah son of Amon of Judah, in the thirteenth year of his 
reign, and throughout the days of King Jehoiakim son of Josiah of Judah, and until the 
end of the eleventh year of King Zedekiah son of Josiah of Judah, when Jerusalem went 
into exile in the fifth month” (NJPS, see also Jer 25:3), we find that the reference-time of 
3:6 would be from the thirteenth year of Josiah to his death.48 Edwin Thiele has dated 
Josiah’s reign to 641/40–609 BC and the beginning of Jeremiah’s ministry to 627 BC.49 
Saying that Jeremiah was dependent on Deuteronomy, would then place the composition 
of Deuteronomy, at least this part of Deuteronomy, prior to this time. 
Even if Jer 3:1–10 assumes knowledge of Deut 24:1–4, it should not be 
understood as a legal exegesis of the latter. Pushing the legal connection too much creates 
a legal issue with the incest laws (Lev 18:6–7), the prohibition against marrying two 
sisters (Lev 18:18), in addition to the question of God possibly violating his own 
                                               
48  Lundbom claims that Jer 3:6 is the only date given in chapters 1–20 (Lundbom, Jeremiah 1–20, 
306). This is possible to claim only by ignoring 1:2–3. Fischer is more cautious and says that it is the only 
date given in chapters 2–20. He also suggests that the mention of king Josiah at this point, speaking of 
Judah and Israel, might be due to this kings efforts (“Bemühungen”) to bring the nations together again as 
seen in 2 Kings 23:15–20 (Fischer, Jeremia 1–25, 188). Other references indicating Josiah’s attempted 
religious, and possibly political, unification of Israel and Judah are found in 2 Kings 23:22–23; 2 Chron 
34:33; 35:17–18. Rofé writes: “The first collection contains visions, prophecies of judgment and laments, 
mostly undated: chs. 1–24. Its specific character comes to light, if one compares the Deuteronomistic 
sermons of 7,1–8,4; 11,1–13; 17,19–27; 18,1–12; 19,1–20,6 with those of chs. 25; 27; 29; 32: while the 
latter bear exact dates, the former give none!” (Rofé, “The Arrangement of the Book of Jeremiah,” 394). 
49 Edwin R. Thiele, The Mysterious Numbers of the Hebrew Kings (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel 
Publication, 1983), 180–81, 217. Even if Lundbom finds it difficult to date the passage he sees no problems 
in dating this passage to the time of Josiah, despite that he sees vv. 6–11 as a later interpolation (Lundbom, 
Jeremiah 1–20, 308–9). The dating of Jer 3:1–10 on the basis of the historical information in v. 6 and the 
content of the context, is also supported by linguistic studies. Aaron Hornkohl concludes after having 
studied the linguistic phenomena in Jeremiah in light of diachronic dating of the book: “On the basis of a 
detailed examination of over forty linguistic features—representing the full spectrum of linguistic 
categories: orthography, phonology, morphology, syntax, and lexicon—the conclusion of the present study 
is that, though likely composite, the extant book of Jeremiah was written in a form of TBH, the literary 
medium employed in works composed in the span of time linking the First and Second Temple Period, 
probably approximately conterminous with the 6th century BCE” (Hornkohl, Language of the Book of 




restrictions of return after a divorce, as Jer 3 describes both Israel and Judah as wives and 
daughters in this passage. If so, YHWH is presented as married to his daughter(s), who 
also happen to be sisters. Instead Jer 3 seems to use the law of divorce and remarriage 
from Deut 24:1–4 metaphorically for the relationship between God and his people. We 
should therefore not use Jer 3:1–10 to expound the legal meaning of the law in Deut 
24:1–4. The reuse functions rather as a warning to Judah that exile threatens them similar 
to the way Israel was threatened before being exiled in 722 B.C. when God “divorced” 
the northern kingdom. Even more, the entire thrust of Jer 2:1–4:4 is a call to Judah to 
repent and return to God. It is an open invitation, describing how God is willing to cross 













SABBATH INSTRUCTIONS IN EXOD 20:8–11; DEUT  
5:12–15 AND JER 17:19–27 
 
Introduction 
We now turn to the reuse between Exod 20:8–11; Deut 5:12–15 and Jer 17:19–27 
dealing with Sabbath instructions. The majority of scholars see Jer 17:19–27 as reusing 
Deut 5:12–15, possibly also Exod 20:8–11.1 Before discussing the relationship between 
Exod 20:8–11and Deut 5:12–15 on the one hand and Jer 17:19–27 on the other, I will 
briefly discuss the variation between Exod 20:8–11and Deut 5:12–15. 
The Sabbath in the Versions of the Decalogue  
(Exod 20:2–17; Deut 5:6–21) 
Table 2 gives an overview over parallels between Exod 20:1–11 and Deut 5:12–
15. The parallels between Exod 20:2–17 and Deut 5:6–21 constitute striking examples of 
how not only uniqueness and distinctiveness can serve as indicators of reuse, but also 
how a significant accumulation of parallels between words and phrases that are common   
                                               
1 E.g. Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 131–34; Jerry A. Gladson, “Jeremiah 
17:19–27: A Rewriting of the Sinaitic Code?,” CBQ 62 (2000); Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer der Tora, 214–
15, 223–25; Fischer, Jeremia 1–25, 565; Lundbom, Jeremiah 1–20, 806. For others that are not as clear on 
the reuse of Deut 5 in Jer 17 see Holladay, Jeremiah 1–25, 508–11; Craigie et al., Jeremiah 1-25, 237–39. 
Fischer claims that the plural of Jer 17:22 is closer to Lev 23:3, 28, 31; Num 29:7. Further, he also points 
out a parallel between the tree-metaphor in Jer 17:8 and Ps 1:3, a psalm known for its Torah-motif, even if 
he does not see it as possible to determine the direction of dependence (Fischer, Jeremia 1–25, 552–54). Cf. 




Table 2. Exod 20:8–11 and Deut 5:12–15 
Exod 20:8–11 Deut 5:12–15 
 את־יום הׁשבת לקדׁשו  זכור 8
  ׁשׁשת ימים תעבד ועׂשית כל־מלאכתך 9
הׁשביעי ׁשבת ליהוה אלהיך לא־ ויום 10
אתה ובנך־ובתך עבדך כל־מלאכה  תעׂשה
 בהמתך וגרך אׁשר בׁשעריך ו ואמתך
ׁשׁשת־ימים עׂשה יהוה את־הׁשמים  כי 11
ואת־הארץ את־הים ואת־כל־אׁשר־בם 
את־ יהוהברך  על־כןוינח ביום הׁשביעי 
 ויקדׁשהו׃ס יום הׁשבת
צוך יהוה  כאׁשר את־יום הׁשבת לקדׁשו ׁשמור 12
 אלהיך
 ׁשׁשת ימים תעבד ועׂשית כל־מלאכתך׃ 13
 הׁשביעי ׁשבת ליהוה אלהיך לא תעׂשה ויום 14
 עבדך־ואמתךוכל־מלאכה אתה ובנך־ובתך 
 בהמתך וגרך אׁשר בׁשעריךכל־ווׁשורך וחמרך 
 למען ינוח עבדך ואמתך כמוך׃
־עבד היית בארץ מצרים ויצאך יהוה כי וזכרת 15
צוך  על־כןאלהיך מׁשם ביד חזקה ובזרע נטויה 
 ׃סאת־יום הׁשבתאלהיך לעׂשות  יהוה
 
8 Remember the Sabbath day to sanctify it. 9 
Six days you shall labor, and do all your 
work, 10 but the seventh day is Sabbath to 
YHWH your God. You shall not do any 
work, you, or your son, or your daughter, 
your male servant, or your female servant, or 
your cattle, or the stranger within your gates. 
11 For six days YHWH made the heavens 
and the earth, the sea, and all that is in them, 
and he rested on the seventh day. Therefore 
YHWH blessed the Sabbath day and 
sanctified it. 
12 Guard the Sabbath day to sanctify it, as YHWH 
your God commanded you. 13 Six days you shall 
labor, and do all your work, 14 but the seventh day is 
Sabbath to YHWH your God. You shall not do any 
work, you, or your son, or your daughter, or your 
male servant, or your female servant, or your ox or 
your donkey, or any of your cattle, or the stranger 
within your gates, so that your male servant and 
female servant may rest like you. 15 And remember 
that you were a slave in the land of Egypt, and that 
YHWH your God brought you from there by a strong 
hand and with an outstretched hand. Therefore 
YHWH your God commanded you to practice the 
Sabbath day. 
 
in the HB can do the same. Here it is the almost identical use of common words in longer 
parallel constructions that offers the strongest argument for reuse. While the similarities 
between Exod 20:2–17 and Deut 5:6–21 establish a case of reuse, the differences between 
the two may be our best clue to establishing the direction of dependence. However, this is 
not the place to discuss this relation extensively. I will only point out a few observations 
in that regard as they relate to the question of reuse between Exod 20:8–11 and Deut 
5:12–15 on one hand and Jer 17:19–27 on the other. For our present purposes, it is the 




possibly reuses the other two passages. Similar to my analysis of Jer 34, I have not found 
any evidence for a case of reuse between Exod 20 and Jer 17, except where we find 
similar parallels between Deut 5 and Jer 17. 
Since there are additional arguments that there was literary reuse between Deut 5 
and Jer 17, I have included the discussion about reuse between Exod 20 and Jer 17 under 
that of Deut 5 and Jer 17. In other words, since there are no reasons to claim exclusive 
reuse between Exod 20 and Jer 17, and since all the parallels between Exod 20 and Jer 17 
can be explained as reuse between Deut 5 and Jer 17 at points where Exod 5 and Deut 5 
are parallel, I subsume the discussion of Exod 20 under the discussion of the relation 
between Deut 5 and Jer 17. 
The major differences in the two versions of the Decalogue are found between 
Exod 20:8–11 and Deut 5:12–15. For example, we find alternative lexemes at several 
places, besides ָזכֹור in Exod 20:8 and ָׁשמֹור in Deut 5:12, ָׁשֶקר in Exod 20:16 while ָׁשְוא in 
Deut 5:20, ַתְחֹמד in Exod 20:17 with ִתְתַאֶּוה in Deut 5:21. A couple of times Deut 5 adds a 
reference to YHWH’s command, as ַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצְּוָך ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֶהיָך in 5:12, 16. Deuteronomy 5 also 
adds other words or phrases, as with ּוְלַמַען ִייַטב in 5:16 and ָׂשֵדהּו in 5:21. Further, the 
order of ֵּבית and ֵאֶׁשת is the inverse in Exod 20:17 and Deut 5:21. We see an emphasis in 
both versions upon the 1cs voice of YHWH speaking at the beginning of the Decalogue 
(Exod 20:2–6; Deut 5:6–10). But afterward the 1cs voice disappears, and while the 3. 
person reference to YHWH can be seen throughout both versions of the Decalogue, it is 
interesting to note that ִמְצֹוָתו in Deut 5:10 comes at the exact point where the 1cs voice 
disappears in the Decalogue. The 3ms suffix in ִמְצֹוָתו in Deut 5:10 and ְׁשמֹו in Exod 20:7 




The differences between the Sabbath instructions in Exod 20:8–11 and Deut 
5:12–15 can be summarized as follows: 
1. Exod 20:8 opens with ָזכֹור in contrast to ָׁשמֹור in Deut 5:12. 
2. Deut 5:12 adds ַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצְּוָך ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֶהיָך. 
3. While Exod 20:10 has ַעְבְּדָך, Deut 5:14 adds the waw in ְוַעְבְּדָך. 
ֶּתָךּוְבֶהמְ  .4  in Exod 20:10 in contrast to ְוׁשֹוְרָך ַוֲחֹמְרָך ְוָכל־ְּבֶהְמֶּתָך in Deut 5:12. 
5. The major difference is found in the end of the Sabbath commands, between Exod 
20:11 ( ם ַוָּיַנח ִּכי ֵׁשֶׁשת־ָיִמים ָעָׂשה ְיהָוה ֶאת־ַהָּׁשַמִים ְוֶאת־ָהָאֶרץ ֶאת־ַהָּים ְוֶאת־ָּכל־ֲאֶׁשר־ּבָ 
 in contrast to Deut 5:14d–15 (ַּבּיֹום ַהְּׁשִביִעי ַעל־ֵּכן ֵּבַרְך ְיהָוה ֶאת־יֹום ַהַּׁשָּבת ַוְיַקְּדֵׁשהּו
ְלַמַען ָינּוַח ַעְבְּדָך ַוֲאָמְתָך ָּכמֹוָך׃ ְוָזַכְרָּת ִּכי־ֶעֶבד ָהִייָת ְּבֶאֶרץ ִמְצַרִים ַוֹּיִצֲאָך ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֶהיָך ִמָּׁשם )
ֹרַע ְנטּוָיה ַעל־ֵּכן ִצְּוָך ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֶהיָך ַלֲעׂשֹות ֶאת־יֹום ַהַׁשָּבתְּבָיד ֲחָזָקה ּוִבזְ  ). 
While God is said to have rested on the seventh day after the six days of creation in Exod 
 it is the male and female slave that rest ‘like yourself’ on the ,(ַוָּיַנח ַּבּיֹום ַהְּׁשִביִעי) 20:11
seventh day after six days of work in Deut 5:14 (ָינּוַח ַעְבְּדָך ַוֲאָמְתָך ָּכמֹוָך). While ַעל־ֵּכן in 
Exod 20:11 is used to ground YHWH’s further act of blessing (and sanctifying) the 
Sabbath because of his rest on the seventh day, in Deut 5:15  ַל־ֵּכןע  is used to ground 
God’s command to do Sabbath (ַלֲעׂשֹות ֶאת־יֹום ַהַׁשָּבת), because (ַעל־ֵּכן) God led the people 
from Egypt with a mighty hand and outstretched arm. An irony here is that we are not to 
do (עׂשה) work on the Sabbath in Deut 5:14, but rather instead do (עׂשה) Sabbath in 5:15. 
To me it seems that the narrative contexts of these two versions might explain the 
differences. To illustrate, the use of זכר in both versions (Exod 20:8; Deut 5:15) seems in 
both cases to evoke a reality rooted in a distant past. The narrative setting of Exod 20 is 
the recent exodus after a long slavery. The people appear during this period to have 
forgotten the Sabbath as rooted in creation. The ָזכֹור of 20:8 is thus meant to evoke the 
Sabbath as rooted in the distant creation past. We would have expected the slavery-




exodus itself in Exod 20. But instead attention is drawn to the Sabbath as rooted in 
creation. In Deut 5:15  ְָוָזַכְרּת is instead evoking the slavery-exodus motif, according to the 
narrative setting now 40 years in the past. As the Sabbath apparently at this point was a 
well-known practice, Deut 5:12 does not need to instruct the people to remember (ָזכֹור) 
the Sabbath as such, but rather to keep it (2.(ָׁשמֹור Instead, there is now a need to evoke 
the remembrance of the reality of their own slavery. As Deut 5:15 grounds the Sabbath in 
the exodus reality, it evokes the past reality of slavery ( ְּבֶאֶרץ ִמְצַרִיםְוָזַכְרָּת ִּכי־ֶעֶבד ָהִייָת  ), 
and elaborates on the link already found between עבד and Sabbath in Exod 20:8–11. 
The theme of service and slavery seems to inform all the changes made in the 
Deuteronomic version of the Sabbath instruction. It is possible that we here see an 
elaboration of a specific feature within the source text, namely Exod 20:8–11. The clause 
 as YHWH your God commanded you”) in Deut 5:12 further“) ַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצְּוָך ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֶהיָך
underlines that this portion is reusing a previous instruction, even if this clause, in itself, 
does not allow us to conclude it was specifically the Decalogue in Exodus that was being 
reused. Exod 20:9 reads ַּתֲעֹבד ְוָעִׂשיָת ָּכל־ְמַלאְכֶּתָך ֵׁשֶׁשת ָיִמים  (“six days you shall labor (עבד) 
and do all your work”). It therefore establishes a link between the root עבד and Sabbath 
instructions. עבד belongs to the six days, and not the Sabbath. This section is kept in the 
Deuteronomic version in 5:13. Thus the basis for the link between עבד and Sabbath is 
reused almost verbatim in Deut 5. All the modifications in Deut 5:12–15 can thus be 
explained as an intentional decision to elaborate this link. In general, we see a concern for 
the vulnerable in society in Deuteronomy. The author of Deut 5:12–15 reiterates this 
                                               




concern via its Sabbath instruction. I have already pointed out how the verb זכר in Exod 
20:8 is replaced and moved to Deut 5:15 to underline this intent. Furthermore, the 
specification of ox and donkey besides all other animals ( ְּבֶהְמֶּתָךַוֲחֹמְרָך ְוָכל־ ׁשֹוְרָךוְ  ) in 
5:14— probably an elaboration in Deut 5:14 upon the animals (ּוְבֶהְמֶּתָך) mentioned in 
Exod 20:10—again stresses the idea of servitude, since these were the domestic beasts of 
burden. Moreover, although Deut 5:14 forbids the son, daughter, animals, stranger and 
servants from working, the passage reiterates and thus specifically highlights the 
command to give the male and female slave rest ( ְּדָך ַוֲאָמְתָך ָּכמֹוָךְלַמַען ָינּוַח ַעבְ  ), again 
stressing how the Sabbath gives freedom from servitude (𝔐Ex, ⅏ Ex, 𝔊Ex, PapNash does 
not have למען ינוח עבדך ואמתך כמוך). While the rationale for the Sabbath prohibitions is 
YHWH’s creation on six days and rest on the seventh in Exod 20:11, in Deut 5:14 the 
purpose of keeping the Sabbath is the rest not of YHWH at creation, but of the male and 
female slaves every week (ְלַמַען ָינּוַח ַעְבְּדָך ַוֲאָמְתָך ָּכמֹוָך). It is thus clear that even if 
Deuteronomy elaborates on the list of animals that were supposed to rest on the Sabbath 
 in Exod 20:10), the iteration of ּוְבֶהְמֶּתָך in Deut 5:14 compared to ְוׁשֹוְרָך ַוֲחֹמְרָך ְוָכל־ְּבֶהְמֶּתָך)
the Sabbath commandment in Deut 5:14 clearly focuses on providing rest for male and 
female slaves. Thus, it is more economical to explain Deut 5:12–15 as reworking Exod 
20:8–11 than the other way around.3 This also seems to be a case of a living Torah where 
the author reusing Torah builds into his own composition elements of the source text, 
while at the same time taking the liberty to go beyond and elaborate what may have been 
                                               
3 For recent arguments in this line of seeing the direction of dependence between Exod 20 and 
Deut 5 see Eckart Otto, Deuteronomium 4,44–11,32, HThKAT (Freiburg: Herder, 2012), 699–704; 




understood as hints in the source text of a broader application. 
The Pedagogics and Memorization  
of the Decalogue in Deut 5 
As Moses is introducing the following instructions he places them from the start 
in an educational context. He instructs the people ּוְלַמְדֶּתם ֹאָתם ּוְׁשַמְרֶּתם ַלֲעֹׂשָתם (“and you 
shall learn them and guard them to keep them”) in Deut 5:1. And since the Decalogue 
immediately follows, the text itself clearly encourages learning the Decalogue. The 
instruction ּוְלַמְדֶּתם ֹאָתם (“and learn them”) seems to imply that the commandments 
should be learned thoroughly, if not also memorized (cf. Deut 6:6). David Carr finds the 
form of the Decalogue to be especially well adapted for memorization: 
The Ten Commandments in Deuteronomy 5:6–21 are an excellent example of 
teaching structured for memorization. The rules focus on central values of ancient 
Israel. As Erhard Gerstenberger observed decades ago [Wesen und Herkunft des 
apodiktischen Rechts], their “apodictic” form most closely resembles that of gnomic 
instructions inside and outside Israel. In addition, the ordering of the list into ten 
items—however this is done in various streams of tradition—allows the beginning 
student to use his or her fingers to count off and see whether he or she has included 
all of the key elements of this fundamental instruction. This combination of 
elements—focus on central values, simplicity of form, and memorizability—has 
contributed to the ongoing use of the Ten Commandments in religious education up 
to the present, along with the focus on them as an icon of central values in 
contemporary cultural battles over the biblical tradition.4 
Jeremiah 17:19–27 
In Louis Stulman’s argument for an interplay between the untamed poetry and the 
taming prose of the book of Jeremiah, he sees Jer 11:1–13 and 17:19–27 as prose 
discourses bracketing the section Jer 11:1–17:27. He finds that “these prose sermons 
                                               




provide a covenant framework for the macro-unit as a whole.”5  
The majority of scholars see Jer 17:19–27 as a post-exilic supplement to the book. 
A minority see the passage as original with the prophet.6 The “mosaic” of forms of Jer 
17, as Thiel called it,7 is taken by many scholars to indicate various compositional strata. 
Gladson, however, argues that the mention of fire in the the first oracle (17:1–4), with the 
fire kindled against the people forms an inclusio with the last verse of the chapter in v. 
27, also mentioning the kindling of fire.8 For Fischer, who corroborates this view and 
sees ֵלב (“heart”) as a Leitwort with its attestation in Jer 17:1, 5, 9–10, the Sabbath 
(17:19–27) offers an anchor of rescue (“Rettungsanker”) against the deceptiveness of the 
human heart.9 With the change from poetry to prose and a messenger formula, it seems 
                                               
5 Stulman, Order Amid Chaos, 44. Christl Maier sees Jer 17:19–27 to a section demarcated by Jer 
16:1 as the beginning and 17:27 as the end (Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer der Tora, 207). She further points 
out parallels between this section and other passages in Jeremiah, indicating an integral post-exilic 
composition (Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer der Tora, 223–24). 
6  While Jer 17:19–27 is usually considered as part of Mowinckel’s “C” material, and therefore 
post-exilic, Peter Craigie et al. point out that there is nothing in the passage indicating such a dating 
(Craigie et al., Jeremiah 1-25, 238–39). Holladay sees the passage as a later supplement, partly because we 
do not find a concern with the Sabbath and “kings of Judah” in the rest of the book (Holladay, Jeremiah 1–
25, 509). Cf. Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer der Tora, 205, 211–18, 221, 224. Maier points out that there is a 
parallel between Jer 17 and 34 in their narrowing of a former instruction (Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer der 
Tora, 223). McKane concludes his overview of scholarly debate on the passage with emphasizing that 
whether the passage should be seen as exilic or post-exilic, it “reflects the importance attached to the 
Sabbath commandment in the post-exilic Jerusalem community and the belief that its future depended on 
whether or not it kept the Sabbath” (McKane, Jeremiah, 419). Cf. Weippert who sees a Jeremianic origin of 
Jer 17:19–27 as problematic (Helga Weippert, Die Prosareden des Jeremiabuches (Berlin: de Gruyter, 
1973), 234n). For an overview of the scholarly debate on the question of dating Jer 17:19–27 see Gladson, 
“Jeremiah 17:19–27,” 34; Stulman, The Prose Sermons of the Book of Jeremiah, 72–73. Gladson himself 
sees strong indications for Jer 17:19–27 being a late addition to the book, even if he concludes that “the 
provenance of this oracle, in my opinion, must be left open” (Gladson, “Jeremiah 17:19–27,” 34–35). 
7 Thiel, Jeremia 1-25, 202–203. 
8 Gladson, “Jeremiah 17:19–27,” 34. 
9 Fischer, Jeremia 1–25, 544–45, 554–55, 566–70. Fischer writes: “Die Dynamik des 
Erwerbslebens und das eigene Gewinnstreben beinhalten die gefährliche Tendenz, sich alles Oblige 
unterordnen zu wollen. Gegen diese Bedrohung menschlicher Freiräume und der Gesellschaft hilft der 




reasonable to take 17:19 as introducing a new section, even if connected to the context.10 
The structure of Jer 17:19–27 can be outlined as follows11: 
17:19 YHWH instructs Jeremiah to take his stand in the Gate of the Sons of the 
People and in the gates of Jerusalem 
17:20 YHWH instructs Jeremiah there to call the attention of all, from the king 
and the rest of the people 
17:21–27 The content of YHWH’s declaration 
 17:21–22 Injunction to guard the Sabbath 
 17:23 The rejection of Sabbath-instructions by the forefathers 
 17:24–26 Promise of welfare for the nation if they will heed the Sabbath 
instructions 
 17:27 Threat of destruction of city if they will not heed the Sabbath 
instructions 
As we shall see the reuse of Torah is seen particularly in 17:21–22, 24, 27. 
Jer 17:19–27 is presented as YHWH’s reported speech (cf. the messenger formula 
 in Jer 17:24). In Jer 17:19–20 God commands ְנֻאם־ְיהָוה in Jer 17:19, 21 and ֹּכה־ָאַמר ְיהָוה)
Jeremiah to take up his stand in the Gate of the Sons of the People through which the 
kings of Jerusalem pass (ְּבַׁשַער ְּבֵני־ָעם ֲאֶׁשר ָיֹבאּו בֹו ַמְלֵכי ְיהּוָדה ַוֲאֶׁשר ֵיְצאּו בֹו) as well as all 
the rest of the city’s gates (ּוְבֹכל ַׁשֲעֵרי ְירּוָׁשָלִם), to say: “Hear the word of YHWH, kings of 
Judah, and all of Judah, and all the inhabitants of Jerusalem entering through these gates” 
 Then comes .(ִׁשְמעּו ְדַבר־ְיהָוה ַמְלֵכי ְיהּוָדה ְוָכל־ְיהּוָדה ְוֹכל ֹיְׁשֵבי ְירּוָׁשָלִם ַהָּבִאים ַּבְּׁשָעִרים ָהֵאֶּלה)
the diatribe in 17:21–27 which will be the main focus in the following. 17:21 warns 
                                               
Der Verzicht darauf, die Welt völlig dem eigenen Planen und Machen zu unterwerfen, bewahrt ihr auch 
ihren Charakter als Schöpfung mit Eigenwert. In dem allem wird die Bereitschaft, den siebten Tag frei zu 
lassen, zum konkreten Zeichen des Vertrauens auf Gott . . . . Dies mag gleichfalls erklären, warum der 
Sabbat eine so wichtige Stellung ebenso bei anderen Propheten einnimmt (u. a. Jes 56,2-6; Ez 20,12-24; 
Am 8,5). Der freie siebte Tag bleibt ein Geschenk Gottes an den Menschen” (Fischer, Jeremia 1–25, 570). 
10 Fischer, Jeremia 1–25, 563. 




against carrying a load on the Sabbath through those very gates.12 The injunction ִהָּׁשְמרּו
 Guard your lives”) in Jer 17:21 also sets a very existential tone of the“) ְּבַנְפׁשֹוֵתיֶכם
following. It becomes a question of life and death.13 
Jer 17:21–22 include five injunctions: 
ְּבַנְפׁשֹוֵתיֶכם ָּׁשְמרּוהִ  (1)  (“Guard your lives”) 
 you shall not lift a load on the“) ְוַאל־ִּתְׂשאּו ַמָּׂשא ְּביֹום ַהַּׁשָּבת ַוֲהֵבאֶתם ְּבַׁשֲעֵרי ְירּוָׁשָלִם (2)
Sabbath day and bring it/enter the gates of Jerusalem”)14,  
 and you shall not remove a load from your“) ְולֹא־תֹוִציאּו ַמָּׂשא ִמָּבֵּתיֶכם ְּביֹום ַהַּׁשָּבת (3)
house on the Sabbath day”), 
  and you shall not do any work”), and“) ְוָכל־ְמָלאָכה לֹא ַתֲעׂשּו (4)
ַהַּׁשָּבת ְוִקַּדְׁשֶּתם ֶאת־יֹום (5)  (“but you shall sanctify the Sabbath day”). 
It is only here in all of the speech that the prohibition against removing a load from one’s 
house (3) is mentioned. It is all summed up as according to YHWH’s command to the 
fathers ( ת־ֲאבֹוֵתיֶכםַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצִּויִתי אֶ  ). 17:24 includes three of these injunctions:  
                                               
12 Fischer notes that some commandments in Torah receive special attention in the book of 
Jeremiah, like the Sabbath commandment (Fischer, “The Relationship of the Book of Jeremiah to the 
Torah,” 905). As mentioned above, others find this single mention of the Sabbath in the book of Jeremiah 
as a reason to take it as a later interpolation (e.g. Holladay, Jeremiah 1–25, 509). Cf. Ezek 20:10–26. 
13 Cf. Fischer, Jeremia 1–25, 564. A similar existential tone is set in Jer 17:25 for the city itself by 
the final remark in the blessing for obedience with ְוָיְׁשָבה ָהִעיר־ַהּזֹאת ְלעֹוָלם (“and this city will remain 
forever”). Lundom points out that this goes beyond the message in Deuteronomy, only promising that 
people will “live long in the land” (Lundbom, Jeremiah 1–20, 807). 
14 Jeremiah 17:21 reads: ְוַאל־ִּתְׂשאּו ַמָּׂשא ְּביֹום ַהַּׁשָּבת ַוהֲ ֵבאֶתם ְּבַׁשֲעֵרי ְירּוָׁשָלִם (“and do not carry a load 
on the Sabbath and enter the gates of Jerusalem”). This could be read as two commands ( ְוַאל־ִּתְׂשאּו ַמָּׂשא
 translated as “and do not carry a load on the Sabbath” and “or enter ,ַוֲהֵבאֶתם ְּבַׁשֲעֵרי ְירּוָׁשָלִם and ְּביֹום ַהַּׁשָּבת
the gates of Jerusalem [with “with a load on the Sabbath” elliptically implied]”) or one command (“and do 
not carry a load on the Sabbath and bring them in the gates of Jerusalem”). 17:24, however, seems to make 
clear that they should be understood as one instruction, ְלִבְלִּתי ָהִביא ַמָּׂשא ְּבַׁשעֲֵרי ָהִעיר ַהּזֹאת ְּביֹום ַהַּׁשָּבת (“not 
to bring a load in (through) the gates of this city on the Sabbath day”). 
Peter Craigie et al. point out a possible word play in the passage on ַמָּׂשא: “It is possible that this 
pericope hides an ironic word play. The word מּׂשא means both ‘burden’ and ‘oracle.’ Jeremiah uses the 
word both ways, meaning ‘oracle’ in 23:33 (2x), 34, 36 and 38 (3x). There might well be a bitter irony in 
that the people are breaking Sabbath observance by carrying burdens into the city and out of their houses, 
but simultaneously refuse to lift up or carry—or even hear—Yahweh’s oracle. Such a word play would be 




 not to bring a load in (through) the“) ְלִבְלִּתי ָהִביא ַמָּׂשא ְּבַׁשֲעֵרי ָהִעיר ַהּזֹאת ְּביֹום ַהַּׁשָּבת (2)
gates of this city on the Sabbath day”),  
  to sanctify the Sabbath day”), and“) ּוְלַקֵּדׁש ֶאת־יֹום ַהַּׁשָּבת (5)
  .(”not to do any work“) ְלִבְלִּתי ֲעׂשֹות־ֹּבה ָּכל־ְמָלאָכה (4)
17:27 only has two of these injunctions:  
  to sanctify the Sabbath day”), and“) ְלַקֵּדׁש ֶאת־יֹום ַהַּׁשָּבת (5)
תּוְלִבְלִּתי ְׂשֵאת ַמָּׂשא ּובֹא ְּבַׁשֲעֵרי ְירּוָׁשַלִם ְּביֹום ַהַּׁשּבָ  (2)  (“and not carry a load and enter the 
gates of Jerusalem on the Sabbath day”). 
A question is whether the rejection by the people in 17:23, speaking in 3mpl, is 
referring to a rejection of the original command by the ancestors (cf. ַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצִּויִתי ֶאת־
 in 17:22) or to a rejection of Jeremiah’s words by his contemporaries.15 The אֲ בֹוֵתיֶכם
conditionality in the continuation in 17:24 could be understood as indicating that 17:23 
referred to the forefather’s rejection of YHWH’s original command in contrast to 
Jeremiah’s contemporaries who he admonishes to listen. It still seems to be an open 
question as to how the people will respond. The sentence ְוָהָיה ִאם־ָׁשֹמַע ִּתְׁשְמעּון ֵאַלי ְנֻאם־
 But should you for sure listen to me, declares YHWH  . . .”) in 17:24 therefore“) ְיהָוה
seem to support the reading that 17:23 is referring to a rejection of YHWH’s previous 
command by the ancestors as opposed to Jeremiah’s contemporaries rejecting his words. 
Jeremiah 17:24 is the apodosis and condition—repeating the command not to 
bring a load through the city gates on the Sabbath, sanctifying the day, and not doing any 
work—upon which the blessing in 17:25 is promised, namely of kings and officials 
sitting on David’s throne passing the city’s gates, riding in chariots and on horses, 
together with the inhabitants of the city. Further, it is also  
                                               
15 Jeremiah 17:23 LXX clearly takes it to refer to the contemporaries’ rejection, intensifying the 




promised that the city itself will be established forever.  
Jer 17:26 further promises that the people of all of Judah ( ֵמָעֵרי־ְיהּוָדה ּוִמְּסִביבֹות
ָיִמן ּוִמן־ַהְּׁשֵפָלה ּוִמן־ָהָהר ּוִמן־ַהֶּנֶגבְירּוָׁשַלִם ּוֵמֶאֶרץ ִּבנְ  ) will come to Jerusalem as their cultic 
center with burnt offerings, sacrifices, meal offerings, and frankincense ( עֹוָלה ְוֶזַבח ּוִמְנָחה
 If the people will abstain from carrying burdens in and out of Jerusalem on the .(ּוְלבֹוָנה
Sabbath, the surrounding people will bring burdens, i.e. all kinds of sacrifices, to 
Jerusalem and the house of YHWH. In the reverse scenario (17:27), upon the condition 
that the people will not sanctify the Sabbath and instead carry a load through the city’s 
gates, YHWH will make fire go forth that cannot be extinguished and consume the 
fortresses of Jerusalem. Thus, the flourishing of society is presented as contingent upon 
guarding the Sabbath. 
Orality, Writing, and Memorization in Jer 17 
In Jer 17 there is a close relation between the oral and written words. The words 
YHWH spoke orally to Jeremiah (ֹּכה־ָאַמר ְיהָוה ֵאַלי in 17:19; ֹּכה ָאַמר ְיהָוה in 17:21)16 are 
now recorded in written form. In 17:20 Jeremiah is commanded to pass YHWH’s words 
on orally saying “and speak to them: ‘Hear the word of YHWH’” ( ְוָאַמְרָּת ֲאֵליֶהם ִׁשְמעּו
 (ַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצִּויִתי ֶאת־ֲאבֹוֵתיֶכם) It is here also a reference to a past address by YHWH .(ְדַבר־ְיהָוה
in 17:22. 17:23 makes it very clear that this was an oral address, reading “but they did not 
hear, nor turn their ear, but hardened their neck not to receive discipline” ( ְולֹא ָׁשְמעּו ְולֹא
 The same oral address, as .(ִהּטּו ֶאת־ָאְזָנם ַוַּיְקׁשּו ֶאת־ָעְרָּפם ְלִבְלִּתי ְׁשמֹוַע ּוְלִבְלִּתי ַקַחת מּוָסר
                                               




Jeremiah is standing speaking in the gates, is now given to the present generation: 
“However, if you verily listen to me, says YHWH” (ְוָהָיה ִאם־ָׁשֹמַע ִּתְׁשְמעּון ֵאַלי ְנֻאם־ְיהָוה) in 
17:24 and “but they did not listen to me” (ְוִאם־לֹא ִתְׁשְמעּו ֵאַלי) in 17:27.17 Whether our 
passage was written before or after this oral address in the gates is not stated. 
Given that the following arguments are correct regarding Jer 17 reusing Deut 5, 
the interplay between oral and written words in this passage might very well inform us 
about how the prophet also related and perceived the Torah-text. The innovative elements 
in Jer 17 might simply be part of a text-supported memorized scribal culture, where 
Torah is not seen as sedimented and closed, but, rather, as a living and dynamic 
phenomena. Susan Niditch points to “the iconic function of writing” allowing a 
metaphoric play in the opening of Jer 17 upon the scribal paradigm we discussed in 
chapter 1: ֹות ִמְזְּבחֹוֵתיֶכםַחַּטאת ְיהּוָדה ְּכתּוָבה ְּבֵעט ַּבְרֶזל ְּבִצֹּפֶרן ָׁשִמיר ֲחרּוָׁשה ַעל־לּוַח ִלָּבם ּוְלַקְרנ  
(“The sin of Judah is written with a stylus of iron, engraved upon the tablet of their heart 
and the horns of your altars,” 17:1).18 
A Case for Reuse 
Table 3 gives an overview over parallels between Deut 5:12–15 and Jer 17:19–27. 
The parallels between Deut 5:12–15 and Jer 17:19–27 can be summed up as follows: 
1. Both Deut 5:12 and Jer 17:21 open the divine discourse concerning the Sabbath with 
an admonition expressed through the verb מרׁש . Deut 5:12 has  ָתַׁשּבָ הַ  ֶאת־יֹום מֹורׁש  
                                               
 you know what went out of my lips, it was before your“) ַאָּתה ָיָדְעָּת מֹוָצא ְׂשָפַתי ֹנַכח ָּפֶניָך ָהיָה 17
face”) in Jer 17:16 is another reference to orality earlier in the chapter. 




Table 3. Deut 5:12–15 and Jer 17:19–27 
Deut 5:12–15 Jer 17:19–27 
את־יום הׁשבת  ׁשמור 12
ך יהוה צו כאׁשרו קדׁשל
 אלהיך
ׁשׁשת ימים תעבד  13
 ך׃כל־מלאכתת עׂשיו
הׁשביעי ׁשבת  ויום 14




בהמתך וגרך אׁשר 
למען ינוח יך ׁשערב
 עבדך ואמתך כמוך׃
וזכרת כי־עבד היית  15
בארץ מצרים ויצאך 
יהוה אלהיך מׁשם ביד 
חזקה ובזרע נטויה על־
כן צוך יהוה אלהיך 
 ׃סאת־יום הׁשבתלעׂשות 
בני־עם אׁשר יבאו בו  ׁשערכה־אמר יהוה אלי הלך ועמדת ב 19
 י ירוׁשלם׃ׁשערמלכי יהודה ואׁשר יצאו בו ובכל 
ׁשמעו דבר־יהוה מלכי יהודה וכל־יהודה וכל  ואמרת אליהם 20
 ים האלה׃ סׁשעריׁשבי ירוׁשלם הבאים ב
יום הׁשבת ו בנפׁשותיכם ואל־תׂשאו מׂשא בׁשמרכה אמר יהוה ה 21
 י ירוׁשלם׃ׁשערוהבאתם ב
ו עׂשלא ת כל־מלאכהויום הׁשבת ולא־תוציאו מׂשא מבתיכם ב 22
 תי את־אבותיכם׃צוי את־יום הׁשבת כאׁשרתם קדׁשו
ׁשמעו ולא הטו את־אזנם ויקׁשו את־ערפם לבלתי ׁשמוע ולא  23
 ולבלתי קחת מוסר׃
והיה אם־ׁשמע תׁשמעון אלי נאם־יהוה לבלתי הביא מׂשא  24
לבלתי  את־יום הׁשבת קדׁשוליום הׁשבת י העיר הזאת בׁשערב
 ׃כל־מלאכהת־בה עׂשו
י העיר הזאת מלכים וׂשרים יׁשבים על־כסא דוד ׁשערובאו ב 25
המה וׂשריהם איׁש יהודה ויׁשבי ירוׁשלם  רכבים ברכב ובסוסים
 ויׁשבה העיר־הזאת לעולם׃
ובאו מערי־יהודה ומסביבות ירוׁשלם ומארץ בנימן ומן־הׁשפלה  26
ומן־ההר ומן־הנגב מבאים עולה וזבח ומנחה ולבונה ומבאי תודה 
 בית יהוה׃
ולבלתי ׂשאת מׂשא את־יום הׁשבת  קדׁשואם־לא תׁשמעו אלי ל 27
יה ואכלה ׁשערוהצתי אׁש ב יום הׁשבתי ירוׁשלם בׁשערובא ב
 ארמנות ירוׁשלם ולא תכבה׃ פ
 
12 Guard the Sabbath day to 
sanctify it, as YHWH your 
God commanded you. 13 Six 
days you shall labor, and do 
all your work, 14 but the 
seventh day is Sabbath to 
YHWH your God. You shall 
not do any work, you, or 
your son, or your daughter, 
your male servant, or your 
female servant, or your ox or 
your donkey, or any of your 
cattle, or the stranger within 
your gates, so that your male  
19 Thus said YHWH to me: “Go and stand in the People’s Gate, where 
the kings of Judah enter and where they go out, and in all the gates of 
Jerusalem. 20 And say to them: “Hear the word of YHWH, kings of 
Judah and all Judah, and all inhabitants of Jerusalem, who enter these 
gates! 21 Thus says YHWH: Guard your lives, and do not carry a load 
on the Sabbath day and enter the gates of Jerusalem. 22 And do not 
remove a load from your houses on the Sabbath day, nor do any work, 
and sanctify the Sabbath day, as I commanded your fathers. 23 But 
they did not listen nor turn their ear and stiffened their neck and did 
not listen nor accept discipline. 24 But if you for certain will listen to 
me, declares YHWH, not to bring a load by the gates of this city on 
the Sabbath day, but sanctify the Sabbath day, not to do any work on 
it, 25 then kings and princes sitting on the throne of David will enter 
by the gates of this city, riding in chariots and on horses, they and  
                                               





Table 3 — Continued. 
 
Deut 5:12–15 Jer 17:19–27 
servant and female servant 
may rest like you. 15 And 
remember that you were a 
slave in the land of Egypt, 
and that YHWH your God 
brought you from there by a 
strong hand and with an 
outstretched hand. Therefore 
YHWH your God 
commanded you to practice 
the Sabbath day (Deut 5:12–
15). 
their princes, a man of Judah, and the inhabitants of Jerusalem, and 
this city will remain forever. 26 And they will come from the cities of 
Judah and the surroundings of Jerusalem, and from the land of 
Benjamin, and from the Shephelah, and from the hill [country] and 
from the Negev, bringing burnt offering, and sacrifice, and grain 
offering, and frankincense, and bringing thank offering to the house 
of YHWH. 27 But if you will not listen to me to sanctify the Sabbath 
day, and not carry a load and enter by the gates of Jerusalem on the 
Sabbath day, I will make fire go forth in her gates and it will consume 
the palaces of Jerusalem, and it shall not be extinguished (Jer 17:19–
27).  
 
(“guard the Sabbath day”) while Jer 17:21  ִֹוֵתיֶכםׁשַנפְ ּבְ  ּוְמרּׁשָ ה  (“guard your lives”). 
2. In both passages we find the phrase  ַתַׁשּבָ יֹום ה  the Sabbath day”). We find it in“) (ֶאת־)
Deut 5:12, 15; Jer 17:21-22, 24, 27.20 
3. Both passages have a clause with piel of ַׁשָּבת + קדׁש as object. This combination is 
only found in Exod 20:8, 11; Deut 5:12; Jer 17:22, 24, 27; Ezek 20:20; 44:24; Neh 
13:22. 
4. Both passages refer to a previous statement by YHWH concerning the Sabbath. We 
find ַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצְּוָך ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֶהיָך (“as YHWH your God commanded you”) in Deut 5:12 and 
 .as I commanded your fathers”) in Jer 17:22“) ַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצִּויִתי ֶאת־ֲאבֹוֵתיֶכם
5. Finally, both passages use the lexeme ַׁשַער. In Deut 5:14 it is used to refer to the 
stranger within the gates (21.(ְוֵגְרָך ֲאֶׁשר ִּבְׁשָעֶריָך In Jer 17:19–27 ַׁשַער becomes a 
                                               
20 The phrase יֹום ַהַׁשָּבת itself is not as common as could be expected in the HB. It only occurs in 
Exod 20:8, 11; 31:15; 35:3; Lev 24:8; Num 15:32; 28:9; Deut 5:12, 15; Jer 17:21-22, 24, 27; Ezek 46:1, 4, 
12; Ps 92:1; Neh 10:32; 13:15, 17, 19, 22. 
21 LXX as ὁ προσήλυτος ὁ παροικῶν ἐν σοί (“the convert who dwells in your midst”) instead of 




Leitwort. In Jer 17:19 it is used for the locations in which Jeremiah should preach 
 in 17:20 for the inhabitants of Jerusalem coming ,(ּוְבֹכל ַׁשֲעֵרי ְירּוָׁשָלִם/ְּבַׁשַער ְּבֵני־ָעם)
through the gates (ַהָּבִאים ַּבְּׁשָעִרים ָהֵאֶּלה), in 17:21 for those bringing loads through 
Jerusalem’s gates on the Sabbath (ַוֲהֵבאֶתם ְּבַׁשֲעֵרי ְירּוָׁשָלִם), in 17:24 for a prohibition 
against bringing loads through the gates on the Sabbath ( ְלִבְלִּתי ָהִביא ַמָּׂשא ְּבַׁשֲעֵרי ָהִעיר
 in 17:25 for a promise that if they will guard the Sabbath not to ,(ַהּזֹאת ְּביֹום ַהַּׁשָּבת
bring loads in through the gates on it, then kings and officers will enter through the 
gates (ּוָבאּו ְבַׁשֲעֵרי ָהִעיר ַהּזֹאת), and in 17:27 for a threatened judgement of fire in the 
gates (ְוִהַּצִּתי ֵאׁש ִּבְׁשָעֶריָה ְוָאְכָלה) if they do not heed the warning not to bring a load 
through the gates on the Sabbath (22.(ּובֹא ְּבַׁשֲעֵרי ְירּוָׁשַלִם ְּביֹום ַהַּׁשָּבת 
I will discuss these parallels more in detail below in order to clarify to what extent they 
help us answer the questions regarding reuse and direction of dependence. 
Uniqueness: ֶאת־יֹום ַהַׁשָּבת ְלַקְּדׁשֹו ַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצְּוָך ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֶהיָך (“to sanctify the Sabbath 
day as YHWH your God commanded you”) in Deut 5:12 and ְוִקַּדְׁשֶּתם ֶאת־יֹום ַהַּׁשָּבת ַּכֲאֶׁשר
 (”and you shall sanctify the Sabbath day as I commanded your fathers“) ִצִּויִתי ֶאת־ֲאבֹוֵתיֶכם
in Jer 17:22 are particularly close.23 Piel of קדׁש with ַׁשָּבת as object  
 .is unique to these two passages in the HB צוה + ַּכֲאֶׁשר +
Distinctiveness: First, piel of קדׁש with ַׁשָּבת as object is only found in Exod 20:8, 
11; Deut 5:12; Jer 17:22, 24, 27; Ezek 20:20; 44:24; Neh 13:22. Of these only Exod 
                                               
22 Cf. Kline showing that there is reuse and repetition with variation between Jer 17; 21; and 50 in 
regard to the idea of setting fire to the nation (Kline, Allusive Soundplay, 73–80). 




20:8–11; Deut 5:12–14; Jer 17:17–22, 24 has piel of קדׁש with ַׁשָּבת as object + עׂשה with 
 as object.24 This shows a distinct usage of the lexical set in Exod 20:8–11; Deut ָכל־ְמָלאָכה
5:12–14; Jer 17:19–22. In all three cases sanctification of the Sabbath is defined as 
refraining from work on the Sabbath. To sanctify the Sabbath is explicitly defined in Jer 
17:24 as not doing any work ( ַּׁשָּבת ְלִבְלִּתי ֲעׂשֹות־ֹּבה ָּכל־ְמָלאָכהּוְלַקֵּדׁש ֶאת־יֹום הַ  ). The same 
idea may be seen as more indirect and implied in the Decalogue. While neither Exod 
20:8–9 nor Deut 5:12 define as explicitly as Jer 17:24 the meaning of ְלַקְּדׁשֹו—i.e. what it 
means to sanctify the Sabbath—in both cases ְלַקְּדׁשֹו is followed by the clauses  ֵׁשֶׁשת ָיִמים
 six days you shall labor and do all your work”). This may“) ַּתֲעֹבד ְוָעִׂשיָת ָּכל־ְמַלאְכֶּתָך
therefore be read as an elaboration on the meaning of ְלַקְּדׁשֹו in the Decalogues. Human 
sanctification of the Sabbath is seen at least in part to be practiced by refraining from 
work. 
The idea of sanctification begins and ends the Sabbath commandment in Exod 
20:8, 11, forming an inclusio. Exod 20:8 prescribes the practice of humans sanctifying 
the Sabbath, and 20:11 describes YHWH having done it. With the different rationale 
given for the Sabbath in Deut 5:12–15, the secondary mention of YHWH sanctifying the 
                                               
24 In Lev 16 it is Yom Kippur being called 16:31) ַׁשָּבת), with the altar being cleansed, described 
with the piel of 16:19) קדׁש), and the ְמָלאָכה referring to the abstention from work. Both ַׁשָּבת and קדׁש are 
therefore used differently than in Exod 20; 31; Deut 5; Jer 17. The situation is similar in Neh 13. The 
lexeme ְמָלאָכה here refers to the work of the Levites and singers (13:10, 30). While piel of קדׁש with ַׁשָּבת as 
object is found in Neh 13:22, ְמָלאָכה refers to the work of the Levites and singers, and not the work to be 
abstained from on the Sabbath day (13:10, 30). ַׁשָּבת is used about the seventh day, as in Exod 20; 31; Deut 
5; Jer 17. The piel of קדׁש is used about sanctifying the Sabbath day, but this sanctification is described as 
guarding the city gates in 13:22 ( ִרים ַהְּׁשָעִריםֹׁשמְ  ), instead of being described as abstention from work. It 
seems to be an interesting play on ַׁשָּבת + ׁשמר + piel of קדׁש in comparison to Deut 5:12. In Deut 5:12 the 
Sabbath is to be guarded and sanctified, while in Neh 13:22 the Sabbath is to be sanctified by guarding the 




Sabbath is absent, and only the prescription for humans to sanctify the Sabbath is reused 
in Deut 5:12. The idea of sanctification of the Sabbath could thus be said to be more 
emphasized in Exod 20:8–11 than Deut 5:12–15.25 
A question that can also be raised in this context is to what extent ׁשמר can be 
used to establish a reuse between Deut 5:12–15 and Jer 17:19–27 in contrast to between 
Exod 20:8–11 and Jer 17:19–27.26 It is true that the use of ִהָּׁשְמרּו in Jer 17:21 evokes the 
opening word from Deut 5:12. But ׁשמר with ַׁשָּבת as object is only found in Exod 31:13, 
14, 16; Lev 19:3, 30; 26:2; Deut 5:12; Isa 56:2, 4, 6. Note that Jer 17:19–27 does not use 
 in this passage is in the ׁשמר as object. The only time we find the verb ַׁשָּבת with ׁשמר
imperative of ִהָּׁשְמרּו ְּבַנְפׁשֹוֵתיֶכם (“guard your lives”). Drawing a parallel between Deut 
5:12 and Jer 17:21 based on ׁשמר is thus largely based upon the syntactical role of the 
verb ׁשמר in both passages, being the opening verb used for the basic admonition in both 
                                               
25 The piel of קדׁש with ַׁשָּבת as object together with ַׁשַער is only found in Exod 20:8–11; Deut 
5:12–14; Jer 17:19–27; Neh 13:19–22. 
Given that volume of use is not a good indicator for direction of dependence, this evidence does 
not seem to warrant a claim that there is a reuse between Exod 20 and Jer 17 rather than between Deut 5 
and Jer 17. Interestingly, 4QDeutn seems to add the final section of the Sabbath instruction in Exod 20:8–11 
to its rendering of Deut 5:12–15. The LXX, Targums, Syriac Bible, and Vulgata also have לשמור in Deut 
5:15, while in the MT and Samaritan Pentateuch (SP) we find לעׂשות. Instead of finishing with ַלֲעׂשֹות ֶאת־
לשמור את יום השבת לקדשו כי ששת ימים עשה יהוה  as in MT Deut 5:15, 4QDeutn replaces this with יֹום ַהַׁשָּבת
ואת יום השבת לקדש יהוה ברך כן על השביעי ביום וינוח בם אשר וכול הים את את השמים ואת הארץ . This 
addition, or similar additions, are also found in MTEx, SPEx, LXXEx, but is missing in MT, SP, Targums, 
and Syriac Bible. LXX has καὶ ἁγιάζειν αὐτήν. 4Q129 Phylactery B Deut 5:15 ends with ֯יכה לעשות [אלוה
את יום  יהוה in MT andְיהָוה ֱאֹלֶהיָך ַלֲעׂשֹות ֶאת־יֹום ַהַׁשָּבת  somewhat like a combination of ,את יום השבת לקדֿשוֿ 
 (ָׁשמֹור ֶאת־יֹום ַהַׁשָּבת לְ ַקְּדׁשֹו) in 4QDeutn. The first part resembles the opening of Deut 5:12 MT השבת לקדשו
while the rest Exod 20:11 ( ל־ֲאֶׁשר־ָּבם ַוָּיַנח ַּבּיֹום ִּכי ֵׁשֶׁשת־ָיִמים ָעָׂשה ְיהָוה ֶאת־ַהָּׁשַמִים ְוֶאת־ָהָאֶרץ ֶאת־ַהָּים ְוֶאת־ּכָ 
ְיהָוה ֶאת־יֹום ַהַּׁשָּבת ַוְיַקְּדֵׁשהּו ַהְּׁשִביִעי ַעל־ֵּכן ֵּבַרְך ). 4Q134 Phylactery G is identical to Exod 20:11 MT, with 
only slight updating of orthography. The scribe of 4QDeutn thus seems to have conflated the two versions 
of the Sabbath instruction in Exod 20 and Deut 5. The formulation וזכרתה כי עבד היית בארץ מצרים ויציאך
 ,is found in 4QDeutn, MT יהוה אלוהיך משם ביד חזקה ובזרוע נטויה על כן צוך יהוה אלוהיך לשמור את יום השבת 
SP, LXX, Syriac Bible, and Vulgate, but missing in MTEx, SPEx, LXXEx, PapNash. 




cases. It can be mentioned here that זכר is used in Jer 17:2 as well, even if in a different 
context.27 The point here is that the simple presence or absence of terminology in this 
case is not determinative for the question of reuse. Given that ׁשמר is used differently in 
Deut 5:12 and Jer 17:21, we should show caution in how we use ׁשמר for the question of 
reuse.28 By first establishing reuse on the basis of other and stronger arguments, we are 
allowed to emphasize the respective roles of ׁשמר in the two passages. 
Thematic correspondence: The obvious thematic correspondence regarding the 
Sabbath and rest is so prominent that it could go unremarked. In both passages there is a 
focus upon abstention from work. A related question here is whether Jer 17 can be said to 
reflect the creation mentioned in Exod 20:11 or the exit from slavery in Deut 5:14d–15. It 
does not seem to be a clear reference either way; Jeremiah 17 appears to be concerned 
with carrying loads, and, thus, is closer to the commercial concern in Neh 13. Therefore, 
before proceeding it would be useful to clarify the likely direction of dependence 
                                               
27 As mentioned above there is an interesting use of the verbs ׁשמר and זכר when we compare 
Exod 29:8–11 and Deut 15:12–15. It seems that in both cases זכר is used to evoke a reality rooted in a 
distant past. While ָזכֹור in Exod 20:8 is used to evoke the Sabbath rooted in this distant past,  ְָוָזַכְרּת in Deut 
5:15 is instead used to evoke the slavery in Egypt, according to the narrative setting now 40 years in the 
past. 
28 Edwin Firmage’s observations regarding ׁשמר in Deut 5 and Jer 17 are worth listening to, even if 
his denial of a link between the two passages goes too far: “Also unconvincing is the supposed parallel 
between Jer 17:21-22 (prose) and Deut 5:12-14. Departing somewhat from the original formulation of the 
commandment to honor the Sabbath (zākôr ’et-yôm hašabbāt lĕqadšô, Exod 20:8), Deuteronomy here tells 
the people to ‘keep the Sabbath day holy’ (šāmôr ’et-yôm hašabbāt lĕqadšô, literally ‘watch the Sabbath 
day to keep it holy’). Jeremiah, for his part, warns the people, ‘Take care (literally, ‘put a watch on 
yourselves’) and don’t carry burdens on the Sabbath day’ (hišāmĕrû bĕnapšôtêkem wĕ’al-tiś’û maśśā’ 
bĕyôm hašabbāt). While both authors use the same verbal root, ŠMR, they do so with entirely different 
objects for that watchfulness, and the verb forms themselves are significantly different. In fact, šāmar and 
nišmar have nearly opposite meanings. Šāmar is used of things one is careful to do (commandments, laws, 
etc.), while nišmar is used of things one is careful to avoid. . . . Far from establishing a link between the 
chapters, the use of the verb šāmar/nišmar suggests that Jeremiah is not basing himself on the 




between Jer 17 and Neh 13, since parallels between the two have regularly appeared in 
scholarly discussions. 
Excursus on the Direction of Dependence 
between Jer 17 and Neh 13 
Regarding Neh 13 it can be argued that it appears to depend on Jer 17 and not vice 
versa.29 First, that there is reuse between the two passages is indicated by Jer 17 and Neh 
13 being the only passages in the HB speaking of bringing a ַמָּׂשא (“goods”) to Jerusalem 
on the Sabbath (Jer 17:21-22, 24, 27; Neh 13:15, 19).30 Jer 17:21–22 seems to have a 
broader scope than Neh 13, the latter focusing on commercial trade on the Sabbath. This 
is included in Jer 17, but the passage seems to formulate itself in more general terms 
about going in and out with any kind of load. 
 Second, direction of dependence is indicated by commercial activity being 
implicit in Jer 17 while this is explicated and clarified in Neh 13. We can state the 
relation in general terms as follows: Deut 5 speaks of not working on the Sabbath, 
possibly with the idea of not carrying a load for commercial purposes implicit. Jeremiah 
                                               
29 For an overview over scholarship and discussion on the relative chronology between Jer 17 and 
Neh 13 see Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer der Tora, 218–21, 223. She herself is open to the possibility that Neh 
13 was source to Jer 17, but I do not find the arguments for this direction of dependence convincing. 
30 While 𝔐 and 4QJera have מׂשא in the singular, 𝔊 and 𝔙 give a plural form in Jer 17:21–22, 24, 
27, except 𝔙 in 17:27 having a singular. For a helpful discussion on the meaning of ַמָּׂשא see Fishbane, 
Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 132n, 133n. And for an illuminating parallel to Exod 16 and 
bringing in manna see Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 133n. 
The word  ַָּׂשאמ  is used in three different ways in the Torah: (1) for the load carried by a donkey 
(Exod 23:5), (2) for the loads carried by the priest (Num 4:15, 19, 24, 27, 31-32, 47, 49), and (3) the load of 
the people carried by Moses (Num 11:11, 17; Deut 1:12). In none of the cases I can see a background to the 
use of  ַָּׂשאמ  in Jer 17:19–27. Exod 23:5 may be a related situation with a donkey carrying the load. Such 
type of carrying a  ַָּׂשאמ  by an animal is probably included in Jer 17, even if there seems to be no case for 




17 speaks of not working on the Sabbath, making the prohibition against carrying a 
burden explicit and leaving implicit that this was for commercial purposes. Neh 13 
speaks of not working on the Sabbath; making explicit the prohibition against carrying a 
burden for commercial purposes.  
Third, Neh 13:18 mentions that the bringing in of goods to Jerusalem was the 
reason for the exile, while Jer 17:27 presents such punishment as a conditional future 
possibility if the people desecrate the Sabbath.31 It therefore seems reasonable to see Neh 
13 as the borrowing text, reusing Jer 17, and not vice versa. 
Direction of Dependence 
Reference to a source: The clause ַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצִּויִתי ֶאת־ֲאבֹוֵתיֶכם (“as I commanded your 
                                               
31 Cf. Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 131–32. Fishbane writes concerning the 
restrictions outlined in Jer 17:21–22: “These secondary restrictions thus serve two purposes. They explicate 
aspects of the general decalogical command against labour on the Sabbath day, and so restrict behaviour—
by requiring that any and all burdens remain in the home—as to curtail any opportunity for the transport of 
goods to Jerusalem. While such transfer of goods would seem to be for the sake of sale, it must be noted 
that this particular element is not mentioned in Jer. 17:21–2. The fact that it is detailed in Neh. 13:15–16 
(and 10:32) has prompted the view that Jeremiah forbade the transfer of burdens to Jerusalem for storage 
only, and that it was Nehemiah who exegetically applied this prohibition to sales” (Fishbane, Biblical 
Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 133). Cf. Loring W. Batten, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the 
Books of Ezra and Nehemiah, ICC (New York: Scribner, 1913), 294–98; Kaufmann, The Religion of Israel, 
385; Jacob Martin Myers, Ezra. Nehemiah, AB 14 (New York: Doubleday, 1965), 178, 213–16; Niels-Erik 
A. Andreasen, The Old Testament Sabbath: A Tradition-Historical Investigation, Dissertation Series 7 
(Missoula, MT: SBL, 1972); H. G. M. Williamson, Ezra, Nehemiah, WBC 16 (Waco, TX: Word Books, 
1998), 334. 394–96; Fischer, Jeremia 1–25, 564; Jassen, Scripture and Law, 190–94. Batten points out that 
in Neh 13 Nehemiah was only concerned with buying and selling on the Sabbath day, not the harvesting 
taking place on the Sabbath day (Batten, Ezra and Nehemiah, 295). Jassen finds three fundamental 
modifications in Neh 13:15–19 of Jer 17:21–22, indicating the priority of the latter: (1) “The use of 
‘carrying’ (תשאו) with the ‘load’ in Jer 17:21b is modified in Neh 15:15b to ‘bringing’ (ומביאים), the same 
verbal root found in Jer 17:21c (2) ,”(והבאתם) “Neh 15:15b interjects a long list of items . . . that may not 
be carried (משא, ‘goods’). This passage adds the further qualification that this list is not exhaustive ( וכל
 on the‘ ,ביום השבת) and all sorts of goods’)”, and (3) “The time frame indicated in Jer 17:21b‘ ,משא
Sabbath day’) is transposed to the end of Neh 13:15c.” He concludes: “These three modifications should be 
understood as Nehemiah’s attempt to provide a functional definition for Jer 17:21–22 and the associated 




fathers”) in Jer 17:22 refers to a previous instruction,32 even if we on this basis cannot 
determine whether the source was written or oral, much less identify which source it 
refers to. However, given the case for reuse above, we can note that it parallels ַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצְּוָך
 as YHWH commanded you”) in Deut 5:12 itself.33 In both passages YHWH“) ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֶהיָך
is presented as the speaker of the Sabbath instruction. As with much of Deuteronomy, the 
divine speech is recounted in the voice of Moses, explaining the 3.-person referenceto 
YHWH in ַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצְּוָך ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֶהיָך (“as YHWH commanded you”) in Deut 5:12, in contrast 
to the more direct 1cs speech given with ֹוֵתיֶכםַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצִּויִתי ֶאת־ֲאב  in Jer 17:22 as in Jer 
17:19–27 in general. 
In Jer 17:22 we find the reference to a previous commandment ַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצִּויִתי ֶאת־
 as I commanded your fathers”). Similar statements are also found in the“) ֲאבֹוֵתיֶכם
Deuteronomic Decalogue. In Deut 5:12, 16 we find the repeated clause ַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצְּוָך ְיהָוה
 as YHWH your God commanded you”). A similar formulation is also found in“) ֱאֹלֶהיָך
the more elaborated ַעל־ֵּכן ִצְּוָך ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֶהיָך ַלֲעׂשֹות ֶאת־יֹום ַהַׁשָּבת (“therefore YHWH your 
God commanded you to practice the Sabbath day”) in Deut 5:15. In all four cases a clear 
reference to a previous instruction is stated. It implies that both Jer 17 and Deut 5 
presuppose a previous command by YHWH. The construction  ְצוה + ֲאֶׁשר + ּכ is rather 
common in the HB, found frequently both in Exodus and Deuteronomy.34 This clause, 
                                               
32 Jeremiah 17:22 LXX renders it close to MT, καθὼς ἐνετειλάμην τοῖς πατράσιν ὑμῶν. 
33 In MTEx, SPEx, LXXEx, PapNash does not have כאׁשר צוך יהוה אלהיך. 
34 Gen 6:22; 7:5, 9, 16; 21:4; 47:11; 50:12; Exod 7:6, 10, 20; 12:28, 50; 16:24, 34; 23:15; 29:35; 
31:11; 34:4; 39:1, 5, 7, 21, 26, 29, 31–32, 42–43; 40:16, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, 32; Lev 8:4, 9, 13, 17, 21, 
29, 31, 34; 9:7, 10, 21; 10:15, 18; 16:34; 24:23; Num 1:19, 54; 2:33-34; 3:16, 42, 51; 8:3, 20, 22; 9:5; 
15:36; 17:26; 20:9, 27; 26:4; 27:11, 22; 30:1; 31:7, 31, 41, 47; 32:25; 36:10; Deut 1:3, 19, 41; 4:5; 5:12, 16, 




therefore, does not help us to establish a bias towards Deut 5 in Jer 17. In Exodus-
Numbers it is common to have ְיהָוה as subject in such constructions, while a form of  ְיהָוה
 twice, in Jer 13:5 צוה + ַּכֲאֶׁשר is more typical in Deuteronomy. Jeremiah only uses ֱאֹלֶהיָך
) and 17:22 (ַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצָּוה ְיהָוה אֹוִתי) ֹוֵתיֶכםַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצִּויִתי ֶאת־ֲאב ). The lexemes צוה with ָאב as 
complement is found in Judg 2:20; 3:4; 1 Kgs 8:58; 17:13; Ps 78:5; Jer 7:22; 11:4; 17:22; 
cf. 2 Kgs 21:8; Jer 13:5. However, even if it is not possible to say that ַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצִּויִתי ֶאת־
 in Jer 17:22 necessarily has Exod 20 or Deut 5 in mind, at least it appears to refer ֲאבֹוֵתיֶכם
to a command quite similar to them.35 
Further, the book of Jeremiah only uses צוה + ַּכֲאֶׁשר twice, in Jer 13:5 ( ַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצָּוה
 while it is rather common in ,(ַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצִּויִתי ֶאת־ֲאבֹוֵתיֶכם) and 17:22 (ְיהָוה אֹוִתי
Deuteronomy.36 If the argument of volume of use should be given any weight, it could be 
said that the frequency in Deuteronomy compared to the sparsity in Jeremiah indicates 
that Jer 17:22 is here influenced by Deut 5:12. However, the argument from volume in 
favor of reuse can go both directions. A borrowing text can reuse a particular locution 
only once or a few times when in the source text the locution is used frequently and vice 
versa. We observe that this locution is embedded within a larger parallel, ֶאת־יֹום ַהַׁשָּבת
ְוִקַּדְׁשֶּתם ֶאת־יֹום ַהַּׁשָּבת ַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצִּויִתי  in Deut 5:12 compared to ְלַקְּדׁשֹו ַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצְּוָך ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֶהיָך
 in Jer 17:22 seems ְוִקַּדְׁשֶּתם ֶאת־יֹום ַהַּׁשָּבת in Jer 17:22. Since the clause ֶאת־ֲאבֹוֵתיֶכם
                                               
15, 20; 13:6; 14:2, 5; 21:8; 1 Sam 13:14; 17:20; 25:30; 2 Sam 5:25; 9:11; 13:29; 24:19; 1 Kgs 9:4; 2 Kgs 
11:9; 14:6; 16:16; 17:13, 34; 21:8; Jer 11:4; 13:5; 17:22; 26:8; 35:10, 18; 36:8; 38:27; 50:21; Ezek 9:11; 
12:7; 24:18; 37:7, 10; Ruth 3:6; Esth 2:20; 3:12; 4:17; 8:9; Ezra 4:3; Neh 8:1; 1 Chr 6:34; 14:16; 15:15; 
24:19; 2 Chr 7:17; 23:8; 25:4. 
35 The messenger formula ֹּכה ָאַמר ְיהָוה in Jer 17:21 should be taken as most likely an oral source in 
direct communication with Jeremiah, and is thus not relevant for our present discussion of sources. 




dependent upon ֶאת־יֹום ַהַׁשָּבת ְלַקְּדׁשֹו in Deut 5:12, as will be seen below, it therefore 
appears reasonable to see ַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצִּויִתי ֶאת־ֲאבֹוֵתיֶכם in Jer 17:22 as dependent upon Deut 
5:12. The clause ְלַקְּדׁשֹו ַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצְּוָך ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֶהיָך in Deut 5:12 would then refer to an 
instruction preceding it, likely Exod 20:8. 
Second, I pointed out above the various parallel lexemes, phrases, and clauses 
between Deut 5:12–15 and Jer 17:19–27, with some of them constituting some of the 
basic terminology of the respective passages, as with ֶאת־)יֹום ַהַׁשָּבת) (Deut 5:12, 15; Jer 
17:21-22, 24, 27), the clause piel of קדׁש with ַׁשָּבת as object (Deut 5:12; Jer 17:22, 24, 
27), and finally the lexeme ַׁשַער (Deut 5:14; Jer 17:19–21, 24–25, 27). In all these cases 
the lexeme, phrase, or clause is only used once or twice in Deut 5 while it is repeated 
more frequently in Jer 17. One way, if not the only way, to explain this would be that Jer 
17 reuses memorized lexemes, phrases, and clauses from Deut 5, integrating them in 
various ways in its own composition. As far as I can see these are used as is seen fit 
according to each respective context.  
Of particular interest are the parallels between Deut 5:12–13 and Jer 17:21–22. 
These are summed up in Table 4. Here Jer 17:21–22 seems to split up the opening 
command in Deut 5:12, ָׁשמֹור ֶאת־יֹום ַהַׁשָּבת to introduce its own legal novum into the 
original passage (ִהָּׁשְמרּו ְּבַנְפׁשֹוֵתיֶכם ְוַאל־ִּתְׂשאּו ַמָּׂשא ְּביֹום ַהַּׁשָּבת ַוֲהֵבאֶתם ְּבַׁשֲעֵרי ְירּוָׁשָלִם ְולֹא־
 .into this legal novum יֹום ַהַׁשָּבת Table 5 shows how it incorporates 37.(תֹוִציאּו ַמָּׂשא ִמָּבֵּתיֶכם
Here we see how Jer 17:21–22 split up the opening command in Deut 5:12,  ָׁשמֹור ֶאת־יֹום
 at the end of each of the two interpolations to bring the reuse back ְּביֹום ַהַּׁשָּבת using ,ַהַׁשָּבת
                                               
37 It is interesting to note that it is precisely the legal nova of Jer 17:21–22 that receive most 




Table 4. Deut 5:12–15 and Jer 17:21–22 
Deut 5:12–13 Jer 17:21–22 
יום הׁשבת את־ ׁשמור 12
ך יהוה צו כאׁשרו קדׁשל
 אלהיך
ׁשׁשת ימים תעבד  13
 ך׃כל־מלאכתת עׂשיו
יום הׁשבת ו בנפׁשותיכם ואל־תׂשאו מׂשא בׁשמרכה אמר יהוה ה 21
 והבאתם בׁשערי ירוׁשלם׃
ו עׂשלא ת כל־מלאכהויום הׁשבת ולא־תוציאו מׂשא מבתיכם ב 22
 תי את־אבותיכם׃צוי יום הׁשבת כאׁשרתם את־קדׁשו
 
12 Guard the Sabbath day to 
sanctify it, as YHWH your 
God commanded you. 13 Six 
days you shall labor, and do 
all your work . . . (Deut 
5:12–13). 
21 Thus says YHWH: Guard your lives, and do not carry a load on the 
Sabbath day and enter the gates of Jerusalem. 22 And do not remove a 
load from your houses on the Sabbath day, nor do any work, a 
sanctify the Sabbath day, as I commanded your fathers. 
 
 
Table 5. Modifications in Jer 17:21–22 
Deut 5:12–13 Jer 17:21–22 
ׁשמור את־יום הׁשבת  12
לקדׁשו כאׁשר צוך יהוה 
 אלהיך
ׁשׁשת ימים תעבד  13
 ועׂשית כל־מלאכתך׃
ביום הׁשבת בנפׁשותיכם ואל־תׂשאו מׂשא הׁשמרו כה אמר יהוה  21
 והבאתם בׁשערי ירוׁשלם׃
תעׂשו ביום הׁשבת וכל־מלאכה לא ולא־תוציאו מׂשא מבתיכם  22
 וקדׁשתם את־יום הׁשבת כאׁשר צויתי את־אבותיכם׃
 
 
to bring the reuse back to Deut 5:12.38 Then ֶאת־יֹום ַהַׁשָּבת resumes, as a Wiederaufnahme, 
the more direct reuse of ָׁשמֹור ֶאת־יֹום ַהַׁשָּבת ְלַקְּדׁשֹו ַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצְּוָך ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֶהיָך from Deut 5:12. 
Thus, if we exclude the legal novum of Jer 17:21–22 we get a very similar structure as to 
that of Deut 5:12. This is illustrated in Table 6: 
                                               
38 Further, as noted above we here also see a new use of ַׁשַער. In Deut 5:14 ַׁשַער is used to refer to 
the stranger within the gates (ְוֵגְרָך ֲאֶׁשר ִּבְׁשָעֶריָך), while in in Jer 17:21 it is used for those bringing loads 
through Jerusalem’s gates on the Sabbath (ַוֲהֵבאֶתם ְּבַׁשעֲֵרי ְירּוָׁשָלִם). Neh 13 is even closer to the prohibition 
for the stranger inside the gates. The ֵּגר (“stranger”) mentioned in Jer 17. As a matter of fact, Jeremiah 




Table 6. The legal novum excluded from Jer 17:21–22 
Deut 5:12–13 Jer 17:21–22 
  ׁשמור 12
  הׁשבתיום את־
 ו קדׁשל
 ך יהוה אלהיךצו כאׁשר
 ׁשׁשת ימים תעבד  13
 ך׃כל־מלאכתת עׂשיו
  ו ׁשמרה . . . 21
 . . . יום הׁשבת ב . . .
 יום הׁשבת ב . . . 22
 ו עׂשלא ת כל־מלאכהו
  יום הׁשבתתם את־קדׁשו
 תי את־אבותיכם׃צוי כאׁשר
 
Further, it may also be that we should understand the inverted order created between 
 in Jer 17:22 as an intentional ְוָכל־ְמָלאָכה לֹא ַתֲעׂשּו in Deut 5:13 and ְוָעִׂשיָת ָּכל־ְמַלאְכֶּתָך
inversion to mark reuse, according to Seidel’s law of inversion.39 This may explain why 
Jer 17:21–22 does not include  ִָמים ַּתֲעֹבדֵׁשֶׁשת י  from Deut 5:13, because it did not conform 
to the compositional logic used by the author when making Deut 5:12–13 ‘fan’ out into 
his own composition, only giving an inversion at the point where the more direct reuse is 
resumed. 
The result of this reuse is that the source-reference in Jer 17:22 (ַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצִּויִתי ֶאת־
 comes at the end of this closely-knit reuse. This leaves the impression that all of (ֲאבֹוֵתיֶכם
the preceding is drawn from the older reused source. This again has created major 
disagreement among scholars over how to understand the character of the reuse in Jer 
17:19–27. I will return to consider this debate below. 
While I have found the prohibition against doing work on the Sabbath and 
sanctifying the day as likely having been borrowed from Deut 5:12–15, a further question 
                                               
39 A weakness in seeing Jer 17:21–22 as a case of Seidel’s law of inversion is that it is only one 




to be pondered is whether Jer 17:21–22 might also have a literary precursor for what I 
have so far called the legal novum of this passage, ִהָּׁשְמרּו ְּבַנְפׁשֹוֵתיֶכם ְוַאל־ִּתְׂשאּו ַמָּׂשא ְּביֹום
ַׁשֲעֵרי ְירּוָׁשָלִם ְולֹא־תֹוִציאּו ַמָּׂשא ִמָּבֵּתיֶכםַהַּׁשָּבת ַוֲהֵבאֶתם ּבְ  . Possible candidates could be the 
instructions concerning manna in Exod 16, prohibiting its ingathering on the Sabbath, 
Num 15:32–36 with its sanctions against a man collecting wood, presumably intending to 
carry his load of wood back to his lodging-place to make a fire, and the prohibitions 
against doing one’s work in the Decalogues of Exod 20 and Deut 5.40 None of these 
passages seem to contain strong links to the language used within Jer 17. However, if we 
combine the ideas of not gathering manna on the seventh day but remaining in one’s 
place from Exod 16, the sanctions against gathering wood on the Sabbath in Num 15, 
with the prohibition against doing one’s work on the Sabbath in the Decalogues of Exod 
20 and Deut 5, we are not far from Jer 17:21–22’s prohibition against bringing loads in 
Jerusalem’s gates and out of one’s own homes. Even if the parallels, primarily thematic, 
do not give us a basis for claiming literary reuse, the claim  ֶת־ֲאבֹוֵתיֶכםַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצִּויִתי א  (“as I 
commanded your fathers”) in Jer 17:22 at least refers to a previous instruction. Jasson has 
                                               
40 We find a certain degree of parallels between Exod 16 and Jer 17: First, given that Jer 17:21–22 
reuses Deut 5:12–15, why does it read ִהָּׁשְמרּו ְּבַנְפׁשֹוֵתיֶכם and not something closer to  ֶאת־יֹום ַהַׁשָּבתָׁשמֹור  in 
Deut 5:12? In Exod 16 the people are first instructed to prepare the manna on the sixth day and keep 
 it for the Sabbath, and then afterwards they are instructed to keep an omer of the (16:23 ,ְלִמְׁשֶמֶרת ַעד־ַהֹּבֶקר)
manna for future generations (16:32 ,ְלִמְׁשֶמֶרת ְלֹדֹרֵתיֶכם), and Moses instructs Aaron to execute it ( ְלִמְׁשֶמֶרת
 Second, the context in both passages concern .(16:34 ,ְלִמְׁשָמֶרת) and Aaron does it ,(16:33 ,ְלֹדֹרֵתיֶכם
appropriate action and inaction on the weekly Sabbath. In Exod 16 the people should gather manna (ָמן) on 
the six days, a double portion on the sixth day, while each should remain in his place on the Sabbath ( ְׁשבּו
ִאיׁש ִמְּמֹקמֹו ַּבּיֹום ַהְּׁשִביעִ ִאיׁש ַּתְחָּתיו ַאל־ֵיֵצא   Exod 16:29). In Jer 17 the people could bring loads (ַמָּׂשא) in and 
out of the gates six days, but not on the Sabbath (ְוַאל־ִּתְׂשאּו ַמָּׂשא ְּביֹום ַהַּׁשָּבת ַוֲהֵבאֶתם ְּבַׁשֲעֵרי ְירּוָׁשָלִם ְולֹא־
 .Jer 17:21–22). Another possible source for Jer 17:21–22 might be Num 15:32–36 ,תֹוִציאּו ַמָּׂשא ִמָּבֵּתיֶכם
Here a man was caught collecting wood on the Sabbath, and presumably intended to carry his load of wood 





shown that scribes in Second Temple Judaism seem to have recognized an affinity 
between Exod 16 and Jer 17, using the prohibition against leaving (יצא) one’s dwelling in 
Exod 16:29 as a springboard to the prohibition against bringing out (יוצא/יוציא) items, 
showing that also ancient scribes may have seen such a possible link.41 It is possible that 
the concrete situation in Jeremiah’s days with the threat of death and exile informed the 
specific formulation ִהָּׁשְמרּו ְּבַנְפׁשֹוֵתיֶכם (“guard your lives”),42 loosely parallel to Deut 4:9, 
15, 23; Josh 23:11; Prov 13:3; 16:17; 19:16,43 in 17:21 and the busyness of the people 
bustling around with all kinds of loads gave rise to the response  ְוַאל־ִּתְׂשאּו ַמָּׂשא ְּביֹום
 and to not lift a load on the Sabbath“) ַהַּׁשָּבת ַוֲהֵבאֶתם ְּבַׁשֲעֵרי ְירּוָׁשָלִם ְולֹא־תֹוִציאּו ַמָּׂשא ִמָּבֵּתיֶכם
day and bring it in the gates of Jerusalem, and do not remove a load from your house”) in 
17:21–22.44 This would turn the Sabbath instruction (ָׁשמֹור ֶאת־יֹום הַ ַׁשָּבת, Deut 5:12a) into 
a more existential direction (ִהָּׁשְמרּו ְּבַנְפׁשֹוֵתיֶכם, Jer 17:21b). It is not only a question of 
                                               
41 Cf. Jassen, Scripture and Law, 181, 186–88, 208–9. Jassen discusses Neh 13:15–19; CD 11:7–9; 
4Q251 1–2 4–5; 4Q265 6 4–5; Jub 2:29–30; 50:8; m. Shabb. 1:1; B. Shabb. 96b; b. ‘Erub. 17b; b. Hor. 4a 
and their relation to the Sabbath carrying prohibition in Jer 17. Some of these use Exod 16:29; 36:6 instead, 
following the later rabbinic trend not to base halakhah upon non-Pentateuchal passages (Jassen, Scripture 
and Law, 172–215). 
42 May there be a connection between הִ ָּׁשְמרּו ְּבַנְפׁשֹוֵתיֶכם in Jer 17:21 and the capital punishment in 
Exod 31:12–17 on the  ֶׁשֶנפ  that works on the Sabbath? Even if it is conjectural to claim such a link, it is 
possible to imagine that an ancient scribe immersed in the Torah-tradition could make such links. 
43 The formulations that can be seen as parallel to the injunction ִהָּׁשְמרּו ְּבַנְפׁשֹוֵתיֶכם in Jer 17:21 are: 
ְמֹאד ְׁשָךַנפְ  ּוְׁשֹמרְלָך  ָּׁשֶמרַרק הִ   in Deut 4:9;  ִֹׁשֵתיֶכםְמֹאד ְלַנפְ  ְׁשַמְרֶּתםְונ  in Deut 4:15 (cf. 4:23); ְמֹאד  ְׁשַמְרֶּתםְונִ 
ֹׁשֵתיֶכםְלַנפְ   in Josh 23:11; ׁשֹוַנפְ  ֹׁשֵמר  in Prov 13:3; ׁשֹוַנפְ  ֹׁשֵמר  in Prov 16:17; and ׁשֹוַנפְ  ֹׁשֵמר  in Prov 19:16. As 
pointed out by Lundbom, among these passages the idea of Prov 19:16 might be particularly close to the 
basic idea in Jer 17:19. It reads ׁשֹוַנפְ  ֹׁשֵמרִמְצָוה  ֹׁשֵמר  (“The one guarding the commandment guards his life,” 
cf. Lundbom, Jeremiah 1–20, 806). Maier sees a link between ִהָּׁשְמרּו ְּבַנְפׁשֹוֵתיֶכם in Jer 17:21 and Exod 
31:14 on a more thematic level (Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer der Tora). Still, given the parallels with the 
Sabbath instruction in Deut 5, this reuse seems to be primary for the placement of ִהָּׁשְמרּו ְּבַנְפׁשֹוֵתיֶכם at the 
beginning of the list in Jer 17:21–22. Cf. Fischer, Jeremia 1–25, 564; Fischer, “Der Einfluss des 
Deuteronomiums auf das Jeremiabuch,” 253. 




guarding the Sabbath as something external, since the Sabbath-obedience is tied to one’s 
very existence. 
In other words, if YHWH wanted to address a situation in Jeremiah’s day where 
(1) the people were busying themselves with carrying various loads on the Sabbath, (2) 
where this could meet with sanctions like an enemy-attack—threatening the existence of 
the people (cf. 17:27), and (3) if he wanted to base this warning on themes from Exod 16; 
20; Num 15; and Deut 5, then Jer 17:21–22 can be seen as an acceptable summary and 
adaptation of the basic idea in the Torah-passages. The formulations ִהָּׁשְמרּו ְּבַנְפׁשֹוֵתיֶכם 
(“and guard your lives”) and  ִ ם ְולֹא־תֹוִציאּו ְוַאל־ִּתְׂשאּו ַמָּׂשא ְּביֹום ַהַּׁשָּבת ַוֲהֵבאֶתם ְּבַׁשֲעֵרי ְירּוָׁשָל
 and to not lift a load on the Sabbath day and bring it in the gates of“) ,ַמָּׂשא ִמָּבֵּתיֶכם
Jerusalem, and do not remove a load from your house”) in 17:21–22 seems to resonate at 
several points with locutions and themes in Exod 16; 20; Num 15; and Deut 5. 
Third, I have already mentioned the inversion of the elements parallel to Deut 5 in 
Jer 17. In 17:21–22 we find the order: 
ְּבַנְפׁשֹוֵתיֶכם ָּׁשְמרּוהִ  (1)  (“Guard your lives”) 
 you shall not lift a load on the“) ְוַאל־ִּתְׂשאּו ַמָּׂשא ְּביֹום ַהַּׁשָּבת ַוֲהֵבאֶתם ְּבַׁשֲעֵרי ְירּוָׁשָלִם (2)
Sabbath day and bring it/enter the gates of Jerusalem”)45,  
 and you shall not remove a load from your“) ְולֹא־תֹוִציאּו ַמָּׂשא ִמָּבֵּתיֶכם ְּביֹום ַהַּׁשָּבת (3)
house on the Sabbath day”), 
  and you shall not do any work”), and“) ְוָכל־ְמָלאָכה לֹא ַתֲעׂשּו (4)
ִקַּדְׁשֶּתם ֶאת־יֹום ַהַּׁשָּבתוְ  (5)  (“but you shall sanctify the Sabbath day”). 
                                               
45 Jer 17:21 reads: ְוַאל־ִּתְׂשאּו ַמָּׂשא ְּביֹום ַהַּׁשָּבת ַוֲהֵבאֶתם ְּבַׁשֲעֵרי ְירּוָׁשָלִם (“and do not carry a load on 
the Sabbath and enter the gates of Jerusalem”). This could be read as two commands ( ְוַאל־ִּתְׂשאּו ַמָּׂשא ְּביֹום
 translated as “and do not carry a load on the Sabbath” and “or enter the ,ַוֲהֵבאֶתם ְּבַׁשעֲֵרי ְירּוָׁשָלִם and ַהַּׁשָּבת
gates of Jerusalem [with “with a load on the Sabbath” elliptically implied]”) or one command (“and do not 
carry a load on the Sabbath and bring them in the gates of Jerusalem”). 17:24, however, seems to make 
clear that they should be understood as one instruction, ְלִבְלִּתי ָהִביא ַמָּׂשא ְּבַׁשעֲֵרי ָהִעיר ַהּזֹאת ְּביֹום ַהַּׁשָּבת (“not 




It is the final two (4 and 5) that most closely parallel Deut 5, with the first three (1–3) 
with more loose links to the Sabbath instructions in Torah. In 17:24 we find a similar 
order:  
 not to bring a load in (through) the“) ְלִבְלִּתי ָהִביא ַמָּׂשא ְּבַׁשֲעֵרי ָהִעיר ַהּזֹאת ְּביֹום ַהַּׁשָּבת (2)
gates of this city on the Sabbath day”),  
  to sanctify the Sabbath day”), and“) ּוְלַקֵּדׁש ֶאת־יֹום ַהַּׁשָּבת (5)
  .(”not to do any work“) ְלִבְלִּתי ֲעׂשֹות־ֹּבה ָּכל־ְמָלאָכה (4)
Again, the novum is placed at the beginning (2), with the two closer parallels to Deut 5 (5 
and 4) following at the end of the list. In both Jer 17:21–22 and 17:24 the people are 
positively encouraged to observe the Sabbath. Interestingly, when in 17:27 the reverse 
situation is described—the consequences if the people do not observe the Sabbath—the 
order between the close parallels to Deut 5 and the novum is reversed: 
  to sanctify the Sabbath day”), and“) ְלַקֵּדׁש ֶאת־יֹום ַהַּׁשָּבת (5)
 and not carry a load and enter the“) ּוְלִבְלִּתי ְׂשֵאת ַמָּׂשא ּובֹא ְּבַׁשֲעֵרי ְירּוָׁשַלִם ְּביֹום ַהַּׁשָּבת (2)
gates of Jerusalem on the Sabbath day”). 
Now the close parallel to Deut 5 (5) is given first, and then the novum (2) secondarily. It 
strengthens the case that both times the positive injunctions are given (17:21–22, 24) they 
are given in the same order, before the reverse order is given in the negative sanctions 
(17:27).46 If this observation is correct, it may be an authorial technique, where the form 
                                               
46 Lundbom writes: “Preaching a conditional covenant derives from Deuteronomy (Deut 8:18–20; 
11:13–17), where blessings and curses for compliance and noncompliance are also present (11:26–28; and 
especially chap. 28)” (Lundbom, Jeremiah 1–20, 808). Peter Craigie et al. sees parallels between the 
sanction in Jer 17 and Amos: “The terminology Jeremiah uses to describe the destruction of Jerusalem is 
precisely what Amos uses in chaps. 1–2 for the destruction of the nations surrounding Israel and Judah 
(Amos 1:4, 7, 10, 12, 14, 2:2; 2:5; cf. Amos 1:14 for “kindle”). The only difference is that Jeremiah speaks 
of the fire against the gate, while Amos speaks of the fire against the wall” (Craigie et al., Jeremiah 1-25, 
239). Cf. Hos 8:14. Might Amos 8:5 be a precursor to Jer 17? Cf. Jassen, Scripture and Law, 148. McKane 
does not see Amos 8:5 as warranting a pre-exilic dating of Jer 17:19–27 (McKane, Jeremiah, 417). 
It can be objected to the proposed reading there that the order of elements between 17:21–22 and 
17:24 as well is reversed. If this is emphasized, an alternative explanation to the one suggested here might 




and content go hand in hand. When a reverse situation is explained, the author reversed 
the order between his exact repetition and the creative variation as compared to his 
source(s). 
Appropriation 
I have argued that Jer 17:19–27 introduces a slight legal novum. No previous 
Sabbath instruction—at least as attested in writing—specifically addressed the question 
of carrying and moving a ַמָּׂשא on the Sabbath day. Two questions that need to be 
addressed are (1) how to understand this novum in relation to previous Sabbath 
instructions in the HB, and (2) whether what seems to be a reference to Deut 5:12–15 in 
Jer 17:21-22 (“as I [YHWH] commanded your fathers” (ַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצִּויִתי ֶאת־ֲאבֹוֵתיֶכם)) can be 
said to represent or misrepresent the Torah-passage. Before entering this discussion, I 
will just point out that while there is a close resemblance between ַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצְּוָך ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֶהיָך in 
Deut 5:12 and ַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצִּויִתי ֶאת־ֲאבֹוֵתיֶכם in Jer 17:22, the two appear to have different 
references. While Deut 5:12 refers back to Exod 20:8–11, Jer 17:19–27 can be said to 
refer to both Exod 20:8–11 and Deut 5:12–15 or Deut 5:12–15 alone. 
Michael Fishbane sees in ַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצִּויִתי ֶאת־ֲאבֹוֵתיֶכם (“as I commanded your fathers”) 
in Jer 17:22 that “the general Pentateuchal prohibition of Sabbath work is expanded in 
new ways, and the entire result is presented as Sinaitic in origin.”47 Commenting on the 
additions, or interpolations as he calls them, in Jer 17:21–22 to the Sabbath instruction of 
the Decalogues (Exod 20:8–11; Deut 5:12–15), he writes: “The effect of this 
                                               
47 Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 132. Jassen follows Fishbane, see Jassen, 




interpolation into the deuteronomic citation is transformative. Not only has the original 
Sabbath law been expanded and made more comprehensive, but the innovations have 
been raised to the level of Sinaitic prohibitions, and thereby legitimized.”48 He continues 
with an argument from silence: “The new teaching is thus authorized around a pseudo-
citation from the Pentateuch (‘as I commanded’): for it is nowhere stated there that one is 
forbidden to bear burdens into Jerusalem on the Sabbath, or to take them from the private 
to the public domain.”49 And finally,  
As noted, the pseudo-citation in Jer. 17:21–2 gives the exegetical expansion to Deut. 
5:12–14 Sinaitic, and so revelatory, status. Even more remarkable is the fact that the 
teaching given by Jeremiah is itself a divine revelation (‘thus says YHWH’, v. 21a), 
so that it is YHWH who putatively cites himself and his ancient teachings. . . . In 
sum, such a revelation by the Deity which presumptively cites regulations hitherto 
unrecorded as known and ancient is most remarkable. It points, at the very least, to 
the need in ancient Israel to camouflage and legitimate its exegetical innovations. . . . 
Indeed, inner-biblical legal exegesis contains many other instances whereby the old 
revelation is misrepresented to one degree or another; but there is none like Jer. 
17:21–2 where exegetical innovations are so brazenly represented as a citation of the 
old revelation by YHWH himself.50 
A question to be asked is if Jer 17 really is such a brazen pseudo-citation as 
Fishbane here claims? Does the ַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצִּויִתי ֶאת־ֲאבֹוֵתיֶכם (“as I commanded your fathers”) 
in Jer 17:22 necessarily claim to be a Sinaitic instruction? This is nowhere clear. It is 
something that Fishbane simply assumes. According to him, the exact formulation is 
claimed to be Sinaitic instruction. Calling Jer 17:20–21 a “pseudo-citation” that 
“presumptively cites regulations hitherto unrecorded” imposes, anachronistically, our 
                                               
48 Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 133. 
49 Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 133. 
50 Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 134. Bernard Levinson’s “rhetoric of 
concealment” when interpreting inner-Torah reuse seems to presuppose a similar understanding (Levinson, 




standards for what is to be considered a citation proper. Further, it is based upon an 
argument from silence. The passage can be read in at least two ways that cast doubt on 
the definitiveness of Fishbane’s reading. First, we cannot discount the possibility that the 
author of Jer 17—even YHWH himself who is presented as the speaker in both 
passages—simply claimed to bring out what he saw as implicit in the previous 
instruction. Second, ַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצִּויִתי ֶאת־ֲאבֹוֵתיֶכם in Jer 17:22 immediately follows after two 
cases of close reuse of Deut 5 ( ־ְמָלאָכה לֹא ַתֲעׂשּוְוָכל  (“and you shall not do any work”) and 
 but you shall sanctify the Sabbath day”). Would it not be possible“) ְוִקַּדְׁשֶּתם ֶאת־יֹום ַהַּׁשָּבת
that the author was simply referring to these two when writing ַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצִּויִתי ֶאת־ֲאבֹוֵתיֶכם?  
Jerry Gladson advocates the second reading of Jer 17:21–22, against Fishbane. He 
suggests that the novum is not claimed to be Sinaitic instruction, but that the text can be 
read to indicate that only the sanctification of the Sabbath and abstention from work were 
quoted. He writes  
that the writer, instead of, in effect, “rewriting” the earlier halakic text to justify a new 
expansion of it, has placed the Deuteronomistic text side by side with fresh halakic 
expansions having their origins in a new prophetic revelation identified by “Thus said 
Yhwh.” The prophetic author or editor maintains that this lies in continuity with the 
earlier revelation which he identifies by the phrase, “as I commanded your fathers” 
(Jer 17:22).51 
Gladson continues: “References to the Deuteronomistic Decalogue have now been 
                                               
51 Gladson, “Jeremiah 17:19–27,” 37–38. Using quotation marks and italics for reuse of Deut 5 
Gladson proposes the following reading: “Thus said Yhwh: ‘For the sake of your lives, take care that you 
do not bear a burden on the Sabbath Day or bring it into the gates of Jerusalem. And do not carry a burden 
out of your houses on the Sabbath or ‘do any work, but keep the sabbath day holy,’ as I commanded your 
ancestors . . . . But if you listen to me, says the Lord, and bring no burden by the gates of this city on the 
Sabbath Day, but ‘keep the sabbath day holy and do not work on it,’ then there shall enter by the gates of 
this city kings who sit on the throne of David, riding in chariots and on horses, they and their officials, the 




expanded or interpreted for a new situation by a further divine oracle; they have not been 
understood as casuistry originally included in the Deuteronomistic version of the Sinaitic 
Code. Construed in this way, such a reference is not a pseudo-citation at all.”52 Gladson 
suggests the possibility of an alternate reading of Jer 17:21–22 than that offered by 
Fishbane; namely, that Jer 17:21–22 combines a new prophetic revelation with the reuse 
of locutions from Deut 5.53 While to me it does not seem possible to determine whether 
or not ַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצִּויִתי ֶאת־ֲאבֹוֵתיֶכם in Jer 17:22 was intended to refer only to the two last 
injunctions in 17:21–22 and not all five, I will rather focus on the first alternative reading, 
namely that the author is claiming to bring out what he saw as implicit in the previous 
instruction. 
The ideas of the novum in Jer 17 could be gleaned from Exod 16 or Num 15:32–
36, as already mentioned. In this case they would either be pre- or post-Sinai, rather than 
Sinaitic, but the novum in Jer 17 would have possible literary precursors. It may even be 
                                               
52 Gladson, “Jeremiah 17:19–27,” 38. Gladson points out that in Fishbane’s approach “there is a 
great deal of subjectivity inevitably shaped by one’s understanding of the development of Hebrew 
literature. . . . He has not succeeded in overcoming the difficulties presented by an interpreter’s own biases. 
One’s own conceptions of the development of OT literature and of the history of Israel’s religion cast long 
shadows over the making of judgments about intratextuality” (Gladson, “Jeremiah 17:19–27,” 38). The 
question here is if it is realistic, even desirable, to attempt an escape away from a degree of subjectivity 
when reading the biblical text? He writes on the same page: “The distinction I am making is obviously a 
minor one, yet it calls attention to the crucial difficulty in discerning when a biblical author is quoting 
another passage carefully, according to the recension of that passage accessible to her or him, and when the 
author is glossing, annotating, or otherwise expanding the passage. Such a distinction may not have existed 
in the minds of the biblical writers and editors, at least not in as technical a sense as it does to us. Our 
distinctions—where we place the quotation marks—must usually be tentative and subject to differing 
opinion.” 
53 Gladson, “Jeremiah 17:19–27,” 37–38. Cf. Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer der Tora, 215. Gladson’s 
reading is supported by Mastnjak. He writes: “First, the legal innovation precedes the citation of Deut 5 and 
is immediately introduced only by the prophetic ‘thus says Yahweh.’ Second, Fishbane’s assumption that 
‘just as I commanded your ancestors’ applies to the innovative Sabbath-stipulations is belied by the fact 
that this clause is subordinated directly to a main clause that replicates the command ‘to sanctify the 




that the author of Jer 17 simply thought that a prohibition against carrying a burden was 
implied by the prohibition against doing one’s work on the Sabbath in Deut 5. But it 
might also be that it is meant as a reformulation of what to Jer 17 seemed implied in the 
prohibition against doing one’s work on the Sabbath in Deut 5.54 With respect, 
Fishbane’s claim that “the old revelation is misrepresented” in an attempt to 
“camouflage” the innovations may be the result of a projection of Fishbane’s own literary 
standards and conceptions upon the text. According to the self-testimonies of Deut 5 and 
Jer 17, both record YHWH’s speech. Rather than excluding this possibility per se, and 
interpreting the passages accordingly, we should allow for the possibility that whoever 
wrote the two did so according to this presupposition with an appropriate compositional 
logic. 
Michael LeFebvre has questioned Fishbane’s conclusions from another angle, one 
that does seem to bring us into a more fruitful line of thought. He points out that there is 
an “insurmountable problem for the prescriptive theory of Hebrew law,” both in Jer 17 
and Neh 10.55 I do agree with LeFebvre in that there are problems with Fishbane’s focus 
upon the reuse of exact wording. On the other hand, I also find LeFebvre’s own use of 
the term ‘prescriptive’ problematic. As I explained in my first chapter, as far as we know, 
                                               
54 Christl Maier writes, commenting on Fishbane’s claim that Jer 17 represents a “pseudo-
citation”: “Dieser Schluß ist nicht zwingend, da das erweiterte Sabbatgebot durch die Botenformel in Jer 
17,21aα als Gottesrede ausgewiesen ist. Es handelt sich um eine innerbiblische Auslegung des 
Sabbatsgebots, die dieses zitierend aufgreift und aktualisierend interpretiert. Seine Legitimation bezieht das 
erweiterte Gebot aus der Autorität des gottgesandten Propheten Jeremia” (Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer der 
Tora, 215). 
55 LeFebvre, Collections, Codes, and Torah, 117. While admitting that the cuneiform collections 
(e.g. LH) were ‘literary and non-legislative,’ Michael Fishbane argues that, ‘the internal traditions of the 
Hebrew Bible present and regard the covenantal laws as legislative texts” (Fishbane, Biblical 




Torah was seen as normative and therefore prescriptive. The literary reuse of Deut 5:12–
15 and threatened punishment if the instruction is rejected in Jer 17:19–27 do seem to 
support a normative concept of Torah. But I agree with LeFebvre in that Torah was not 
legislative, in the sense that exact wording constitutes the final boundaries of legitimate 
and illegitimate actions—and literary reuse for that matter. Torah is normative, but 
expansions of it can be seen as conforming to a view of Torah as covenantal instruction, 
opening for the concept of Living and Embodied Torah where expansions and 
elaborations based on a close reading seem not only permissible, but exactly what one is 
supposed to do, as will be seen in the two following cases. 
In Neh 10:30 the people are said to have taken an oath to follow “the Torah of 
God which was given by the hand of Moses” (תֹוַרת ָהֱאֹלִהים ֲאֶׁשר ִנְּתָנה ְּבַיד ֹמֶׁשה). In 10:32 
they promise a similar—if slightly different—restriction on the Sabbath as in Jer 17, not 
to buy goods from peoples of the land on the Sabbath.56 It should be noted that neither the 
prohibition against carrying loads in Jer 17 or the prohibition against buying goods in 
Neh 13 can be said to be in Torah itself. They are both legal nova, even if it may be 
argued that they only explicate what was already implicit in Torah, and are presented as 
given in Torah.57 Does not a passage like Jer 17:19–27 show that an appropriation that 
                                               
 Neh) ְוַעֵּמי ָהָאֶרץ ַהְמִביִאים ֶאת־ַהַּמָּקחֹות ְוָכל־ֶׁשֶבר ְּביֹום ַהַּׁשָּבת ִלְמּכֹור לֹא־ִנַּקח ֵמֶהם ַּבַּׁשָּבת ּוְביֹום ֹקֶדׁש 56
10:32). 
57 Why is it that Jer 17 chooses such a vague word as ַמָּׂשא (“load”)? Is it because it sought to be 
all-inclusive? Later Second Temple Judaism clearly saw this term as something that needed clarification, as 
shown by Jassen (Jassen, Scripture and Law, 179, 184–86, 191–94, 199–200, 202–5, 214–15). Jassen 
summarizes as follows: “Jer 17:21–22 is lacking in many of the necessary details and thus the Second 
Temple and rabbinic texts reflect a careful exegetical modification of much of the content of Jer 17:21–22” 
(Jassen, Scripture and Law, 213). In some ways ַמָּׂשא in Jer 17 and ֵחֶפץ in Isa 58 (see my discussion on Isa 
58) have a similar reception in Second Temple Judaism. Both terms were seen as too ambiguous for precise 




also contains a certain elaboration of a Torah passage was seen as legitimate, and can be 
presented as ֲאבֹוֵתיֶכםַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצִּויִתי ֶאת־ , even if the authority of the novum stands and falls 
with the authority of Jer 17:19–27? Since YHWH is presented as the speaker, he 
presumably has the full right to expand his own Torah-instructions. As with all of the 
other cases studied here, Jer 17:19–27 cannot be said to read the Torah-passage against 
the grain of Torah itself, but rather it reads Torah in an expansionist manner to 
encompass new settings and address new circumstances that did not exist when the initial 
instruction was given. As covenantal instruction, Torah was not meant to be exhaustive in 
the sense that it could not be adapted in order to authoritatively deal with new situations; 
in this sense, its words were not final. But it constitutes the basic parameters of God’s 
will for humanity which the reader, through close reading, needs to appropriate and 
embody via its words, so as to make them come alive by applying them to new situations 
not specifically addressed in the literal formulations of Torah. 
This also raises the question whether we as readers, ancient or modern, are 
entitled as well to perform certain elaborations of Torah. In a close reading of the text 
seeking to faithfully appropriate Torah for our present context, are we not also required to 
embody and live Torah in concrete forms of life not foreseen by the horizon of the 
biblical authors themselves? And can we claim a ַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצְּוָך ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֶהיָך (Deut 5:12) for 
such appropriations? If ַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצִּויִתי ֶאת־ֲאבֹוֵתיֶכם in Jer 17:22 is understood as referring to 
all of the five preceding injunctions, it can be understood as implying that the people 
themselves should have understood that Jer 17’s novum was implied by the previous 
instructions given, even if it was not formulated explicitly as such. Thus readers of Torah 




implications of the Torah we should have seen. 
On the other hand, it also seems that the personal disposition of the reader plays a 
significant role in what is read in a given text. Where some interpreters see continuity 
between Deut 5 and Jer 17, others see an intentional manipulation; might this not tell us 
as much about the reader as the text? It brings us back to the discussion of the heart 
earlier in Jer 17:9 which also raises the idea of reading as a disclosure of the thoughts of 
the heart. The question of Jer 17:9—who understands the heart?—finds an answer in 
17:10, where God is declared as the searcher of hearts and kidneys.58 In light of the 
profound deceptiveness of the heart (17:9 ,ָעֹקב ַהֵּלב ִמֹּכל ְוָאנֻׁש הּוא ִמי ֵיָדֶעּנּו) and the divine 
searcher of hearts and kidneys (ֲאִני ְיהָוה ֹחֵקר ֵלב ֹּבֵחן ְּכָליֹות ְוָלֵתת ְלִאיׁש ִּכְדָרָכו ִּכְפִרי ַמֲעָלָליו, 
17:10), the question arises as to what implications this has for the idea of reading as a 
disclosure of the thoughts of the heart? Fischer sees ֵלב (“heart”) as a Leitwort in Jer 17, 
with its attestation in Jer 17:1, 5, 9–10.59 And according to Deuteronomy (Deut 6:6; 
11:18), it was precisely the heart that was meant to contain Torah. With YHWH as 
searcher of the human deceptive heart, the only hope seen in the book of Jeremiah is the 
one found in Jer 31. YHWH himself needs to inscribe his Torah upon the human heart to 
change the ways of man; to change his manner of reading. Fischer writes on Jer 31: “The 
inscription of his תורה on the heart ‘overwrites’ the sin engravings of Jer 17:1, and it also 
signifies that God goes beyond the writing of his  
                                               
58 Cf. Fischer, Jeremia 1–25, 554–55. 




commandments on scrolls or stones on Mount Sinai (Exod 24:4; 31:18).”60 
                                               
60 Fischer, “The Relationship of the Book of Jeremiah to the Torah,” 898. Cf. Greenberg, “Three 
Conceptions of the Torah,” 19–20; Carasik, Theologies of the Mind, 72; Schellenberg, “A "Lying Pen of 






MANUMISSION INSTRUCTIONS IN EXOD 21:2–11; LEV 
 25:10, 39–46; DEUT 15:12–18; AND JER 34:8–22 
 
Introduction 
The discussion of the case of manumission instructions in Exod 21:2–11; Lev 
25:10, 39–46; Deut 15:12–18 and Jer 34:8–22 follows thematically well after the 
previous chapter on the Sabbath instructions. The manumission instructions in the 
Pentateuch are related to the Sabbatical and Jubilee years. The idea of fair treatment of 
the socially vulnerable in the manumission instructions are thus linked to the cultic 
calendar, indicating the relationship between cult and morality once more. A similar link 
is seen in parallels between Lev 16; 23; 25 and Isa 58 to be discussed in the next chapter. 
Since the days of Wellhausen, Jer 34 has occupied center stage in the question of 
the relation between the Pentateuch and Prophets, and more specifically the formation of 
the Pentateuch. For Wellhausen, “Jeremiah (xxxiv. 14) has not the faintest idea that the 
emancipation of the slaves must according to ‘law’ take place in the fiftieth year.”1 In 
other words, the author of Jer 34 does not have “the faintest idea” about Lev 25. 
Wellhausen saw the order of composition as Exod 21, Deut 15, Jer 34, and finally Lev 
                                               




25. Since Jer 34 is used to date the so-called P source, this chapter according to Levinson 
has assumed the position of “an ‘Archimedean point’ in the relative dating of the 
Pentateuchal sources.”2 Jer 34 warrants more treatment as compared to the other cases in 
this study, given the role Jer 34 has assumed in the discussion also of the relation 
between Torah and the Prophets. There are clear parallels between Jer 34 and Neh 5. But 
since Neh 5 only indirectly deals with the question of the relation between Torah and the 
Prophets and the direction of dependence rather seems to go from Jer 34 to Neh 5, I will 
not devote any extensive discussion to Neh 5 except where relevant for the present 
discussion.3 
A key question that will be raised in the following is therefore whether Jer 34 
shows traces of influence from Lev 25 or not, and if so, whether Lev 25 should be seen as 
a later redaction or part of the original composition of Jer 34. Generally, those admitting 
                                               
2 Levinson, “Zedekiah's Release,” 319. Levinson made the same remark in his earlier article, 
Levinson, “The Manumission of Hermeneutics,” 283. For brief histories of scholarship on Jer 34 see 
Levinson, “The Manumission of Hermeneutics,” 283–84; Levinson, “Zedekiah's Release,” 313–18. 
3 Weinfeld argued that the manumission instructions in Torah are closer to the Mesopotamian 
mīšarum, while Neh 5 shows closer affinity with Solon’s reform (Moshe Weinfeld, “Sabbatical Year and 
the Jubilee in the Pentateuchal Laws and their Ancient Near Eastern Background,” in The Law in the Bible 
and in its Environment, ed. T. Veijola (Helsinki: The Finnish Exegetical Society, 1990), 39–62). For a 
discussion of Weinfeld’s arguments, see N. P. Lemche, “The Manumission of Slaves—The Fallow Year—
The Sabbatical Year—The Jobel Year,” VT 26, no. 1 (1976): 38–59. Myers writes that Nehemiah “may 
have recalled the reprehensible action of the slaveholders in the time of Jeremiah (34:8 ff.)” (Myers, Ezra. 
Nehemiah, 131). Commenting on the relation between Neh 5 and the manumission instructions in Torah, 
Williamson writes: “Nehemiah acted immediately and absolutely, apparently, therefore, on his own 
authority and without invoking any of the specific legal stipulations. If the parallels noted with Lev 25 are 
conscious allusions, then we must conclude that Nehemiah acted within the spirit, not the letter of the law” 
(Williamson, Ezra, Nehemiah, 239). LeFebvre sums up his study of the relation between Neh 5 and its 
possible literary sources as follows: “Instead of citing texts as binding, he obliged the creditors by 
invoking: their fear of Yahweh and a divine curse (vv. 9, 12–13); their obligation as brother Jews (vv. 7–8); 
their national pride (v. 9); their own moral sensibilities (v. 9); and the pressure of public sensibilities (vv. 7, 
13). Furthermore, the creditors never appeal to any text to defend their legal rights (“they could find not a 
word to answer,” v. 8). . . . the only prescriptive order emerging from the narrative is the verdict stipulated 




reuse of Lev 25 in Jer 34 see it as a later redactional layer. Present discussion on Jer 34 
therefore centers around identifying the ipsissimma verba of the prophet and later 
Deuteronomistic, possibly also priestly, redaction of the chapter. Levinson sums up 
present scholarship on Jer 34 as follows: 
Thus, the various positions on Jer 34 seem to move within a single universe. The 
redactional issues are defined in terms of a single question: which verses are 
Jeremianic, and which are Deuteronomistic. The assumption is that Deuteronomy and 
its literary history are the only relevant considerations. All of the important 
challenges or modifications still move within this model and confirm its assumptions. 
The problem with these approaches is that they do not work. They explain away the 
evidence that most challenges their own explanatory model, and relegate the material 
that does not fit the model into problems of syntax, text-criticism or secondary 
expansion.4 
As in the rest of this study, I will not concern myself with the question of the 
absolute dating of the passages under study. Thus, I am here not concerned with the 
question whether Jer 34 should be seen as a pre-exilic, exilic, or post-exilic text, even if I 
have not found anything in this chapter to preclude a compositional date close to the 
mentioned events.5 Rather, my focus is upon clarifying the manner in which a biblical 
                                               
4 Levinson, “Zedekiah's Release,” 318. 
5 Levinson has recently argued that Jer 34 reused Lev 25 and Deut 15 in its original composition, 
but questions whether Jer 34 should be seen as “a reliable historical witness to the circumstances leading to 
the destruction of Jerusalem at the hands of the Babylonian army,” and prefers to date that chapter to 
“scribal exegetical activity in the Persian period” (Levinson, “Zedekiah's Release,” 325). For a similar 
view, seeing Jer 34:8–22 as a later midrash on Lev 25 and Deut 15 that should not be taken as historically 
reliable, see Robert P. Carroll, Jeremiah: A Commentary, The Old Testament Library [OTL] (Philadelphia, 
PA: Westminister, 1986), 647–49. To me, diachronic linguistics seems to provide significant aid in 
periodization of biblical texts. Relevant for the present discussion is Hurvitz’ argument for Leviticus 
belonging to Classical Biblical Hebrew (CBH) (Hurvitz, A Linguistic Study) and Hornkohl’s argument that 
Jer MT belongs to Transitional Biblical Hebrew (TBH) (Hornkohl, Language of the Book of Jeremiah). For 
a general discussion on the significance of diachronic linguistics for the formation of the Pentateuch, see 
Joosten, The Verbal System of Biblical Hebrew, esp. pp. 377–410; Joosten, “Diachronic Linguistics,” 327–
44. Joosten writes: “A first inference to be drawn from the diachronic framework is that the Pentateuch is to 
be regarded substantially as preexilic. Ascribing large parts of the Pentateuch to the Persian period, as is 
done routinely by many OT scholars, is impossible to reconcile with the linguistic data” (Joosten, 
“Diachronic Linguistics,” 336). And again: “The linguistic approach leads one to date the bulk of the 




author appropriates a normative text through proto-halakhic reuse. But in order to do this 
we need to establish the relative chronology of the passages in view, which also has 
indirect implications for the question of the formation of the Pentateuch and Hebrew 
Bible. 
First, given the need for sensitivity to nuances when reading the Pentateuchal 
manumission instructions, and the dense discussions pertaining to these passages, I will 
begin with a survey of scholarly opinions on the question of reuse between Exod 21:2–
11, Lev 25:10, 39–46, Deut 15:12–18, and Jer 34:8–22. Second, follows an analysis of 
Exod 21:2–11, Lev 25:10, 39–46, Deut 15:12–18, and Jer 34:8–22 separately, 
highlighting features of each passage in their respective contexts that are significant for 
the present discussion. I will especially focus on challenges to reading the manumission 
instructions in Torah as complementary from a synchronic perspective, since this 
highlights the dialectical reading of these instructions witnessed in Jer 34. Further, the 
ethnic ambivalence in the manumission instructions of Torah might be set in contrast to 
the exclusive focus upon Judahites in Jer 34. In both cases this might invite an 
expansionistic reading of the manumission laws, something I will argue is witnessed in 
Jer 34, even if Jer 34 itself has a more homogeneous ethnic focus. Third, given both the 
general agreement that Jer 34 reuses Deut 15, and the parallels between Exod 21:2–11, 
Deut 15:12–18, and Jer 34:8–22, I will discuss these passages together. I will argue that 
Jer 34 reuses Deut 15, while it is more doubtful whether there is reuse between Jer 34 and 
                                               
added after the Babylonian exile” (Joosten, “Diachronic Linguistics,” 340). And regarding the three 
prophetic texts considered in this study: “Notably, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Isaiah 40–66, Job, and Lamentations 
appear to represent a type of transitional Hebrew standing between the two main corpora [CBH and LBH]” 




Exod 21. Fourth, I will also argue that Jer 34:8–22 reuses Lev 25:10, 39–46, and that this 
reuse cannot be separated from the original layer of composition of Jer 34 without 
collapsing the passage itself. Fifth, and finally, I will discuss the question of how Jer 34 
appropriates Lev 25 and Deut 15. I will argue that Jer 34 presents a sophisticated blend of 
Lev 25 and Deut 15, challenging several assumptions within the discussion on the 
relation between the Pentateuch and the Prophets, as well as the formation of the 
Pentateuch itself. 
 
Survey of Scholarly Opinions on Reuse between  
Exod 21:2–11; Lev 25:10, 39–46;  
Deut 15:12–18 and Jer 34:8–22 
We can begin with the debate around the relative chronology among the 
manumission instructions in the Pentateuch.6 The scholarly consensus holds that Exod 
21:2–11 is the oldest law.7 The majority also see a reuse of at least Exod 21:2–6, if not 
also 21:7–11, in Deut 15:12–18.8 The most debated question concerns the reuse and 
                                               
6 That we find manumission instructions in all three legal corpora in Torah, in BC, HI, and D has 
contributed to giving these passages a prominent position in the debate on the relative chronology between 
the legal corpora in Torah (cf. John S. Bergsma, “The Biblical Manumission Laws: Has the Literary 
Dependence of H on D Been Demonstrated?,” in A Teacher for All Generations: Essays in Honor of James 
C. VanderKam, ed. Eric F. Mason, SJSJ. 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 65). Berman writes: “With the 
exception of the law prohibiting lending at interest, no other civil law is repeated as often throughout the 
Pentateuch as the law of manumission” (Berman, Created Equal, 104). Watts points out that repetition 
should not only be understood “for their mnemonic value . . . but also as a means of characterizing the 
speaker of law” (Watts, Reading Law, 97). The manumission laws thus not only serve to remind of 
compassionate treatment of financial dependents, but also contribute to characterizing YHWH himself. 
7 Van Seters argues that Deut 15 was the original, reused by Lev 25 and Jer 34, with Exod 21 as 
the youngest of the laws (Van Seters, A Law Book for the Diaspora, 82–95. See esp. pp. 83–84). See also 
his John Van Seters, “The Law of the Hebrew Slave,” ZAW 108 (1996): 534–46. For arguments against 
Van Seters see Levinson, “The Manumission of Hermeneutics,” 293–301; Bergsma, The Jubilee from 
Leviticus to Qumran, 38–39. Bergsma reminds us that the larger question of the relationship between BC, 
H, and D cannot be used to establish the direction of dependence between specific passages like Lev 25 and 
Deut 15 (Bergsma, The Jubilee from Leviticus to Qumran, 39–40). 




direction of dependence between Lev 25:39–46 and Deut 15:12–18. The scholarly default 
position has been Wellhausen’s, viewing a chronological influence between the different 
passages, where Exod 21:2–11 as the oldest law is adapted in Deut 15:12–18 to the 
Deuteronomic paradigm, Jer 34:8–22 reusing Deut 15 and simultaneously showing that 
the law was not enforced in Zedekiah’s day, and finally Lev 25:39–46 adapting the law 
by introducing a longer period in order to make it more applicable.9 Kaufmann 
challenged such a chronological influence, proposing instead that the similarities should 
be understood as a shared common tradition with the various compositions relating 
independently to this tradition, with P being chronologically prior to D.10 Others again 
                                               
upon the BC, see Lemche, “The Manumission of Slaves,” 45; Lohfink, “Zur deuteronomischen 
Zentralisationsformel,” 297–328; Lohfink, “Fortschreibung?,” 133–81; Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in 
Ancient Israel, 211n, 340; Otto, “Aspects of Legal Reforms,” 182–96; Levinson, Deuteronomy; Jeffrey H. 
Tigay, Deuteronomy, The JPS Torah Commentary (Jerusalem: Jewish Publication Society, 2003), 466; 
Levinson, “The Manumission of Hermeneutics,” 281–324; Kilchör, Mosetora und Jahwetora, 137–56. 
Interestingly, the manumission laws in Torah and Jer 34 do not receive a thorough discussion in Fishbane’s 
monumental Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, and are at best mentioned only in passing. 
9 Cf. Japhet, “The Relationship between the Legal Corpora,” 67; Levinson, “Zedekiah's Release,” 
315–18. Since Baentsch many have seen the direction of dependence as going from Deuteronomy to the HI 
(Bruno Baentsch, Das Heligkeits-Gesetz Lev XVII–XXVI (Erfurt: Hugo Günther, 1893), 76–80). The 
following authors see the directions of dependence going from Deut 15 to Lev 25: Lemche, “The 
Manumission of Slaves,” 50–51; Hans G. Kippenberg, “Die Entlassung aus Schuldknechtschaft im antiken 
Judäa: Eine Legitimitätsvorstellung von Verwandschaftsgruppen,” in Vor Gott Sind Alle Gleich 
(Dusseldorf: Patmos, 1983), 74–104; Stephen A. Kaufman, “A Reconstruction of the Social Welfare 
Systems of Ancient Israel,” in In the Shelter of Elyon, ed. W. B. Barrick and J. R. Spencer, JSOTSup 31 
(Sheffield: JSOT Press 1984), 277–86; Kaufman, “Deuteronomy 15 and Recent Research on the Dating of 
P,” 273–76; Robert Gnuse, “Jubilee Legislation in Leviticus: Israel’s Vision of Social Reform,” Biblical 
Theology Bulletin (BTB) 15 (1985): 43–48; Arndt Meinhold, “Zur Beziehung Gott, Volk, Land im Jobel-
Zusammenhang,” Biblische Zeitschrift (BZ) 29, no. 2 (1985): 245–61; Norbert Lohfink, “Gottes Reich und 
die Wirtschaft in der Bibel,” IKaZ 15, no. 2 (1986): 110–23; Yairah Amit, “The Jubilee Law—An Attempt 
at Instituting Social Justice,” in Justice and Righteousness, ed. H. G. Reventlow and Yair Hoffman 
(Sheffield: JSOT, 1992), 47–59; Rainer Albertz, “Die Tora Gottes gegen die wirtschaflichen Sachzwänge,” 
Ökumenische Rundschau 44 (1993): 290–310; Heinz-Josef Fabry, “Deuteronomium 15,” ZABR 3 (1997): 
92–111; Eckart Otto, “Programme der sozialen Gerechtigkeit,” ZABR 3 (1997): 26–63; Levinson, “The 
Birth of the Lemma,” 617–39; Levinson, “The Manumission of Hermeneutics,” 281–324; Nihan, From 
Priestly Torah to Pentateuch, 523–35, 554n; Stackert, Rewriting the Torah, 144–63, 209–10; Mark 
Leuchter, “The Manumission Laws in Leviticus and Deuteronomy: The Jeremiah Connection,” JBL 127 
(2008): 635–40. 




have accepted the priority of P over D, but against Kaufmann argue for a reuse between 
the two, specifically, for our case, a reuse of Lev 25:39–46 in Deut 15:12–18.11 
Moving to the relation between the manumission instructions in the Pentateuch 
and Jer 34, the majority of scholars see a dependence of Jer 34 upon Deut 15, even if this 
dependence is frequently regarded as a later deuteronomistic redaction of the chapter.12 A 
                                               
the three codes of the Torah is to be regarded as an independent crystallization of Israel’s ancient juristic-
moral literature. The evolutionary sequence and literary dependence assumed by Wellhausen has no 
foundation” (Kaufmann, The Religion of Israel, 170). And again, “not a single peculiarity of one legal 
corpus has insinuated itself into either of the others” (Kaufmann, The Religion of Israel, 171). For him the 
similarities between the legal corpora of the Torah should not be understood as influence between them, but 
each should be understood as an “independent development . . . immediately linked to the ancient Near 
Eastern tradition; each is a primary Israelite formulation of elements of that common tradition” (Kaufmann, 
The Religion of Israel, 171). On the question of the chronological priority of P over D see Kaufmann, The 
Religion of Israel, 153–211. For his comments on the manumission laws see pp. 168–69. Weinfeld 
expressed a related view, arguing in relation to P and D “that the divergencies between the two schools 
stem from a difference in their sociological background rather than from a difference in their chronological 
setting. The problem at hand concerns two different ideologies arising from two different circles but not 
necessarily from two distinct historical periods” (Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School, 
180). He tries to show that “the law of P, and the theological conception underlying it, are much older than 
those of D. D changes and reworks the traditional institutions and attitudes of P” (Weinfeld, Deuteronomy 
and the Deuteronomic School, 180n). Again, the similarities are explained as rooted in a common tradition, 
rather than literary influence between the two compositions. Other authors who see no dependence between 
D and HI, and may also dispute a dependence between BC and HI as well, are Elliott-Binns, “Some 
Problems of the Holiness Code,” 29–30; Merendino, Das deuteronomische Gesetz: Eine literarkritische, 
gattungs- und überlieferungsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zu Dt 12–26, 401–2; Joosten, People and Land 
in the Holiness Code, 159; Schwartz, “‘Profane’ Slaughter and the Integrity of the Priestly Code,” 38–42; 
Bergsma, The Jubilee from Leviticus to Qumran, 41, 51, 137–47, 163n–64n; Bergsma, “The Biblical 
Manumission Laws,” 65–91. For the legacy of Kaufmann in Jewish scholarship see Schwartz, “The 
Pentateuch as Scripture,” 223–27. Rofé argues for at least three stages in the development of D, with a later 
stage trying “to reconcile the contradictions between D’s laws and those of the Pentateuch’s other legal 
compilations” (Rofé, “The Book of Deuteronomy. A Summary,” 8). Bettenzoli argues for seeing the 
development of HI and D as a complex process of mutual influence over time (Bettenzoli, 
“Deuteronomium und Heiligkeitsgesetz,” 397–98). Seeing mutual influence between Torah and the 
prophets is a tendency that has gained some momentum in more recent scholarship. Jeffrey Tigay sees Deut 
15 reusing Exod 21, but Lev 25 as representing a more independent system of relief for the poor (Tigay, 
Deuteronomy, 466–67). 
11 Weingreen, From Bible to Mishna: The Continuity of Tradition, 132–42; Schenker, “Biblical 
Legislation,” 23–41; Japhet, “The Relationship between the Legal Corpora,” 63–89; Milgrom, Leviticus 
23–27, 2251–57; Bergsma, The Jubilee from Leviticus to Qumran, 139–40; Kilchör, Mosetora und 
Jahwetora, 137–56; Edwin Firmage, “Jeremiah, Deuteronomy, and the Metamorphosis of Israel 
(Unpublished work),” 1–64 (used by permission). On how Deuteronomy appears to be a dependent text, 
see Samuel Rolles Driver, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Deuteronomy, ICC 5 (Edinburgh: T. 
& T. Clark, 1902), xi–xiii. 




minority of scholars will also argue for a reuse of Lev 25 in Jer 34.13 Commonly a reuse 
                                               
Sabbatical Year,” in Orient and Occident: Essays Presented to Cyrus H. Gordon on the Occasion of his 
Sixty-fifth Birthday, ed. Jr. Harry A. Hoffner (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1973), 145; Weippert, Die 
Prosareden des Jeremiabuches, 92–93; Lemche, “The Manumission of Slaves,” 52; McKane, Jeremiah, 
882–84; Adrian A. Schenker, “Die Freilassung der hebräischen Sklaven nach Dtn 15,12 und Jer 34,8–22,” 
in Recht und Kult im Alten Testamen: Achtzehn Studien (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2000), 
150; Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer der Tora, 269–70; Van Seters, A Law Book for the Diaspora, 83; Jack R. 
Lundbom, Jeremiah 21-36: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB 21B (New York: 
Doubleday, 2004), 261; Bergsma, The Jubilee from Leviticus to Qumran, 163; Leuchter, “The 
Manumission Laws,” 635–53; Berman, “The History of Legal Theory,” 35; Dalit Rom-Shiloni, “"On the 
Day I Took Them out of the Land of Egypt": A Non-Deuteronomic Phrase within Jeremiah's Conception of 
Covenant,” VT 65 (2015): 642; Mastnjak, Textual Authority in Jeremiah, 146–52, 177–78; Klaas A. D. 
Smelik, “The Inner Cohesion of Jeremiah 34:8–22, on the Liberation of Slaves During the Siege of 
Jerusalem, and Its Relation to Deuteronomy 15,” in Torah and Tradition: Papers Read at the Sixteenth 
Joint Meeting of the Society for Old Testament Study and the Oudtestamentisch Werkgezelschap, 
Edinburgh 2015, eds. Klaas Spronk and Hans Barstad (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 239–50. Cf. Innocenzo 
Cardellini, Die biblischen 'Sklaven'-Gesetze im Lichte des keilschriftlichen Sklavenrechts: Ein Beitrag zur 
Tradition, Überlieferung und Redaktion der alttestamentlichen Rechtstexte (Bonn: Peter Hanstein, 1981), 
313, 317–19; Fischer, Jeremia 1–25, 68, 71. Holladay sees a “citation of the law of the release of Hebrew 
slaves in v 14 paraphrases Deut 15:1 and 12,” but at the same time he does not find Jer 34 to “reflect 
directly any single extant formulation of the law” found in Exod 21, Lev 25, nor Deut 15 (William L. 
Holladay, Jeremiah 2: A Commentary on the Book of the Prophet Jeremiah, Chapters 26-52, Hermeneia 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 238). Chavel only sees a reuse between Jer 34:14 and Deut 15:12, or at least 
“Jer 34.14 reflects a previous version of Deut. 15.12,” even if this parallel belongs to a later author (Simeon 
Chavel, “'Let My People Go!' Emancipation, Revelation, and Scribal Activity in Jeremiah 34.8–14,” JSOT 
76 (1997): 78. Cf. p. 83, 87). Georg Fischer writes concerning the reuse of Torah in Jeremiah: “diese 
anthologisch, mosaikhaft, in kombinierender Weise zu einer etgenen Synthese gestaltet. Diese Technik 
lasst sich nahezu das ganze Buch hindurch beobachten” (Fischer, “Der Einfluss des Deuteronomiums auf 
das Jeremiabuch,” 247). And again, he is arguing “that the whole Torah (Genesis–Deuteronomy, in a form 
very close to the Masoretic Text) predates Jer and serves as a source for it” (Fischer, “The Relationship of 
the Book of Jeremiah to the Torah,” 900). Cf. p. 903–4. Fischer sees all the books of Torah as available to 
the author of Jeremiah, with strong ties to Exodus and particularly Deuteronomy (Fischer, Jeremia 1–25, 
68). And again: “Daß Jer auf andere biblische Bücher zugreift, bedeutet eine Wertschätzung dieser 
Traditionen und eine Orientierung an ihnen als tragende Basis des gemeinsamen Glaubens” (Fischer, 
Jeremia 1–25, 71). According to him the book of Jeremiah values and orients itself in light of this tradition. 
Cf. how he sees Jeremiah as familiar with all the books of Torah (Fischer, Jeremia 1–25, 68). He mentions 
the Sabbat restrictions in Jer 17:19–27 and the manumission of slaves in Jer 34:8–22 as examples of this 
(Fischer, Jeremia 1–25, 71). For a more recent survey of scholarly opinions on the relative dependence 
between Deuteronomy and Jeremiah see Mastnjak, Textual Authority in Jeremiah, 2–12. Cf. Weinfeld, 
Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School, 359–61; Holladay, Jeremiah 26–52, 53–63. In his study of 
reuse of Torah in Jeremiah, and accepting the view of a secondary Deuteronomistic editing of the book of 
Jeremiah, Mastnjak has also found that “allusions to prophecy and curses of Deut 28 were a primary, 
though not exclusive, preoccupation of DtrJ,” while “the pre-DtrJ poetic traditions show a more sustained 
interest in the legal corpora [Deut 12–26]” (Mastnjak, Textual Authority in Jeremiah, 135). 
13 Fischer, Jeremia 1–25, 68, 71; Fischer, Jeremia 26–52, 242–61; Bergsma, The Jubilee from 
Leviticus to Qumran, 160–70; Bergsma, “The Biblical Manumission Laws,” 88–89; Leuchter, “The 
Manumission Laws,” 650; Rom-Shiloni, “"On the Day I Took Them out of the Land of Egypt": A Non-
Deuteronomic Phrase within Jeremiah's Conception of Covenant,” 642; Levinson, “Zedekiah's Release,” 
313–27. Weinfeld also argued for a reuse of Lev 25 and Deut 15 in Jer 34, but he was not concerned 




of Lev 25 is seen as a later redactional layer in Jer 34.14 Lemche expressed the claim that 
Jer 34, and Neh 5, “were put into effect without any reference or allusion to a Sabbatical 
Year or a Jobel Year. Zidkiah’s and Nehemiah’s laws should be judged as unique 
phenomena.”15 
Finally, the question occurs as to whether the borrowing text should be 
understood as intended to replace or complement its source. This question is particularly 
relevant in a study of Jer 34. As relevant for the present study we note the 
supersessionists, who argue that a later instruction reused a previous legislation in order 
to usurp its authority in a program, nevertheless, intended to modify the previous 
legislation and introduce legal revisions.16 Complementarians, however, stress a more 
synchronic reading, finding legal dissimilitude to be best explained as differences in the 
intention and context of the various laws.17 Berman voices what seems like an 
                                               
and the Jubilee,” 41). As Levinson, “Zedekiah's Release,” 319n puts it, “he fails to consider the 
consequence of his analysis.” In his 2006-article, Levinson pointed out the lack of studies on the 
implication of Jer 34 for the debate on the relation between the manumission laws in the Torah (Levinson, 
“The Manumission of Hermeneutics,” 292). Mastnjak has recently denied a reuse of Lev 25 in Jer 34 
(Mastnjak, Textual Authority in Jeremiah, 147–48). 
14 For representative scholars arguing that the parallels between Jer 34 and Lev 25 represent a later 
priestly redaction of Jer 34 see Chavel, “'Let My People Go!',” 71–95; Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer der Tora, 
249–81, esp. 280; Leuchter, “The Manumission Laws,” 649–51. For a critique of Chavel’s and Maier’s 
views see Levinson, “Zedekiah's Release,” 317–18, 323–24. Cf. Bergsma, The Jubilee from Leviticus to 
Qumran, 163. 
15 Lemche, “The Manumission of Slaves,” 56. 
16 Levinson and Stackert are examples of those arguing for a usurping supersessionism (e.g. 
Levinson, Deuteronomy; Levinson, “The Manumission of Hermeneutics,” 281–324; Levinson, Legal 
Revision; Levinson, “Zedekiah's Release,” 313–27; Stackert, Rewriting the Torah, 138––41). I here borrow 
the terms ‘supercessionist’ and ‘complementarians’ from Berman, “Supersessionist or Complementary?,” 
201–22. Cf. Berman, Inconsitency in the Torah, 171–91. 
17 Chirichigno, Schenker, Bergsma, and Kilchör can be taken as examples of complementarians 
stressing a more synchronic reading of the legal discrepancies in the manumission instructions. Chirichigno 
has argued that Lev 25 addressed the pater familias in contrast to Exod 21 and Deut 15, and they should 




intermediate position between the two which stresses the diachronic aspect and concedes 
that later laws were meant to replace former ones, while, nevertheless, seeing the later 
revision as complementary to and acknowledging the authority of the former:  
The prescriptions in the various corpora are data from which to reason. Indeed, as 
authors revised the collections, they certainly intended to invalidate former normative 
practices. But that did not entail a rejection of the authority of that text. Rather the 
earlier prescription was seen to be fulfilled through its reapplication to meet a new 
challenge. This, for complementarians, is the reason that lemmatic citation and 
expansion are so ubiquitous throughout this legal literature. A revised legal text is a 
new formulation and new application of an old, revered norm.18 
As argued below, the evidence seems to point to Jer 34:8–22 reusing both Lev 
25:10, 39–46 and Deut 15:12–18. As a biblical author reading the manumission 
instructions, Jer 34 might therefore inform us as to how early readers of the manumission 
instructions viewed the question of replacement or complementation between the various 
instructions in the Pentateuch. I will argue that the proto-halakhic reuse in Jer 34 created 
a dialectic between Lev 25 and Deut 15, without resolving tensions between them, but 
                                               
proposes that the manumission laws can be seen as complementary on the basis that they deal with distinct 
situations in regard to the familial status of the respective person subject to servitude (Schenker, “Biblical 
Legislation,” 23–24, 32–38). Bergsma argues that HI was written during the tribal period and D during the 
monarchy, holding open the possibility of a synchronic complementary role as they address two different 
groups, the Hebrews and Israelites (Bergsma, The Jubilee from Leviticus to Qumran, 43–48, 139–47). 
Kilchör has argued that Lev 25 and Deut 15 both were composed out of a concern for providing for the 
released slave so he (or she) would not immediately end in slavery again (Kilchör, Mosetora und 
Jahwetora, 137–56). Jonathan Kline writes: “the authors of the alluding texts appear to have sought not 
(primarily) to undermine the tradition they inherited but rather to mine it for incipient meanings that they 
believed could only be understood in the light of new circumstances” (Kline, Allusive Soundplay, 6. Italics 
original). 
18 Berman, “Supersessionist or Complementary?,” 211. Cf. Berman, Inconsitency in the Torah, 
179. See also his Berman, “The History of Legal Theory,” 35–36. Fishbane writes that “legal exegesis” in 
the HB reflect “a concern with scrutinizing the content of laws for real or anticipated deficiencies; a 
concern with contradictions among the inherited cases; a concern with making the law comprehensive and 
integrated; and a concern with making the law workable and practicable” (Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation 
in Ancient Israel, 164). Cf. pp. 220–21. Others see the manumission instructions of the Pentateuch as 
representing the polyphonic voice of God creating dialectics. Cf. Carmy, “Concepts of Scripture in 





drew on both in an attempt to show tua res agitur (“this concerns you”).19 
Exod 21:2–1120 
Table 7 gives Exod 21:2–11 MT with a translation. 
At first glance Exod 21:2–11, Lev 25:39–46, and Deut 15:12–18 seem to 
represent quite distinct traditions. In Exod 21:2–11 we find an instruction on the release 
of Hebrew slaves. No reason is mentioned for entrance into slavery, even if it is 
reasonable to assume it relates to some kind of economic crisis.21 The focus concerning 
both the male (21:2–6) and female (21:7–11) slave is upon conditions of release from 
slavery. Here the male slave is released every seventh year,22 while the female slave is  
                                               
19 The basic sense in which I use the word ‘dialectic’ here should not be confused with the 
dialectical method of Johann Fichte and Georg W. F. Hegel. Explicitly, Jer 34 does not appear to create a 
synthesis between Lev 25 and Deut 15. It simply places them in a dialogue, drawing elements from each in 
the process. Eckart Otto’s discussion of how to view the sources of the Pentateuch, would here be an 
analogy: “What methodological alternatives do we have today? One option is the aforementioned literary-
critical analysis, with its attendant consequence of a dismembered given text becoming a literary 
patchwork. The other option, an unhistorical synchronic analysis, is not more convincing. Adherents of this 
approach try to argue away these tensions, presupposing that there are no real inconsistencies in the given 
text. I prefer a third way of integrating diachrony and synchrony in the interpretation of a given text, and 
understand tensions and inconsistencies as consciously and deliberately left in the text to enable the reader 
to realize that a given text functions on two levels—namely, at the time of narration, that is, at the time 
when the text was written down, and the narrated time, that is, in the Pentateuch, the time of Moses” (Otto, 
“A Hidden Truth Behind the Text,” 5–6). He argues that the author left these marks to tell the reader tua 
res agitur (Otto, “A Hidden Truth Behind the Text,” 6, 8). While this to a certain extent might be correct, I 
nevertheless see a stronger ethical element in the legal inconsistency, enabling the type of ethical dialectics 
to be observed in Jer 34.  
20 Exod 21:2 is attested in 1QExod, frgs. 5–6, Exod 21:4–5 in 1 QExod, frg. 7, and Exod 21:5–6 in 
4QpaleoExodm, col. XXII, but neither show significant variations for the present study. Cf. Teeter, Scribal 
Laws, 128, 131. 
21 Cf. how Exod 22:2 prescribes slavery in case a thief is not able to pay the compensation. See 
also 2 Kgs 4:1; Amos 2:6; 8:6; Isa 50:1; Neh 5:5; Prov 22:7. 
22 I agree with those who claim that the Sabbatical year in Exod 21:2–6 seems to be based on an 
individual cycle (e.g. Wellhausen, Prolegomena, 116–17; Schenker, “Die Freilassung der hebräischen 
Sklaven,” 152). As I point out below, the case of Deut 15:12–18 could be taken as both an individual cycle  





Table 7. Exod 21:2–11 
ובׁשבעת  כי תקנה עבד עברי ׁשׁש ׁשנים יעבד 2
גפו יצא אם־אם־בגפו יבא ב 3יצא לחפׁשי חנם׃ 
אם־אדניו  4בעל אׁשה הוא ויצאה אׁשתו עמו׃ 
יתן־לו אׁשה וילדה־לו בנים או בנות האׁשה 
ואם־ 5וילדיה תהיה לאדניה והוא יצא בגפו׃ 
אמר יאמר העבד אהבתי את־אדני את־אׁשתי 
והגיׁשו אדניו אל־ 6ואת־בני לא אצא חפׁשי׃ 
האלהים והגיׁשו אל־הדלת או אל־המזוזה ורצע 
וכי־ 7ת־אזנו במרצע ועבדו לעלם׃ ס אדניו א
ימכר איׁש את־בתו לאמה לא תצא כצאת 
אם־רעה בעיני אדניה אׁשר־לא יעדה  8העבדים׃ 
 9והפדה לעם נכרי לא־ימׁשל למכרה בבגדו־ב׃ 
 10ואם־לבנו ייעדנה כמׁשפט הבנות יעׂשה־לה׃ 
אם־אחרת יקח־לו ׁשארה כסותה וענתה לא 
יעׂשה לה ויצאה ואם־ׁשלׁש־אלה לא  11יגרע׃ 
 ׃ ס23חנם אין כסף
2 If you buy a Hebrew slave, he shall serve six 
years and exit free in the seventh, without 
payment. 3 If he entered alone he shall exit alone. 
If he was the husband of a wife his wife shall exit 
with him. 4 If his master gives him a wife and she 
has borne him sons or daughters, the wife and her 
children belongs to her master, but he can exit 
alone. 5 But if the slave verily says, “I love my 
master, my wife and my children, I will not exit 
free,” 6 his master shall draw him to God, and he 
shall draw him near to the door or the doorpost, 
and his master shall pierce his ear with an awl, and 
he shall serve him forever. 7 And if a man sells his 
daughter as a female slave she shall not go out as 
the male slaves go out. 8 If she is displeasing in her 
master’s eyes, who do not designate her then he 
shall allow her to be ransomed. He is not 
authorized with regard to foreign people to sell 
her, in his treacherous dealing with her. 9 And if he 
designates her for his son he shall do to her 
according to the ordinances of daughters. 10 If he 
takes for himself another (woman) he shall not 
reduce her food, her clothing or her oil. 11 And if 
he does not do these three to her, then she shall 
exit free without money. 
 
either released on the grounds that she is ransomed because her master does not designate 
her for marriage with himself or she is not given the three provisions of food, clothing, 
and oil and can exit without compensation (21:8, 10–11). According to my analysis the 
arguments for claiming that the female slave in 21:7–11 de facto became a wife are 
errouneous, and that she became a concubine inconclusive.24  
                                               
In Exod 23:10–11 a seventh-year rest is commanded for the land, providing food for the poor 
among the people and wild animals. It has been seen as the background to Lev 25, especially 25:2–7. This 
literary relation is however not of direct relevance to Jer 34, and will not be discussed in the following. 
23 LXX ἄνευ ἀργυρίου. Here both MT and LXX might be somewhat ambiguous. Does it mean that 
she will go free without having to pay any silver, or that she is sent free without being provided with any 
silver? If the latter, it is directly countered in Deut 15:12–18 commanding abundant provisions. 
24 Cf. Kenneth Bergland, “Does the Case-Law of the Female Slave (Exod 21:7–11) Give a Right 




                                               
represents those readings of Exod 21:7–11 seeing the passage to imply some kind of marital relation 
between the female slave and her master. LXX clearly takes the MT ֲאֶׁשר־לֹא ְיָעָדּה in 21:8 as implying a 
bethrothal, rendering it as ἣν αὑτῷ καθωμολογήσατο (translated by Brenton as “she has betrothed herself to 
him”). And in the same verse, LXX ἠθέτησεν ἐν αὐτῇ may be understood as a less serious offense (Brenton 
renders it as “he has trifled with her”) than the treachery implied by MT ְּבִבְגדֹו־ָבּה (“in his dealing 
treacherously with her”). LXX τὰ δέοντα appears to be less specific than the MT ְׁשֵאָרּה (“food”) in 21:10, 
and can be rendered more as “necessaries” (Brenton). And in the same verse, LXX τὴν ὁμιλίαν αὐτῆς can 
be rendered as “her companionship” (Brenton), indicating some kind of intimate relationship. There are 
several reasons why I do not believe Exod 21:7–11 MT should be read as implying a marital relation 
between the master and female slave. First, a text-syntactic analysis of the passage shows that the weqatals 
 in 21:11 highlight the essential points in the instruction, namely the two ְוָיְצָאה ִחָּנם in 21:8 and ְוֶהְפָּדּה
permissions granted the female slave for freedom if she is not married either to her master or his son. The 
law therefore seems intended to regulate the conditions of the release of the female slave, analogous to 
21:2–6, not marital issues. Second, the Masora, LXX, Targum and Vulgate emend the לֹא in 21:8) לֹא ְיָעָדּה) 
with the 3ms suffix לֹו. The presupposition behind this emendation appears to be that the master already had 
designated the female slave for himself. But if this presupposition is not accepted, there is no reason for the 
emendation. The phrase ֹלו + לקח  appears to be the technical phrase for taking a wife or concubine, and not 
the יעד of vs. 8-9. Cf. Lev 18:18; 20:14.21; 21:7.13-14; Num 12:1; Deu 21:11; 22:13-14; 23:1; 24:1.3.5; 
25:5. Westbrook explains that we should expect the further specification in the phrases “to take a wife” or 
“to take for marriage” if it was a question of becoming the wife (Westbrook, “The Female Slave,” 168). 
This would be an additional argument for not seeing the master as having married the female slave. Third, 
 in 21:8 the text clearly state that the female slave had become the victim of some kind of ְּבִבְגדֹו־ָבּה
treachery. The lexeme יעד in 21:8 seems to refer to designating a female slave for concubinage. The 
treachery must thus consist in not giving her this legal status. Mal 2:14 is a relevant parallel: “But you say: 
‘Because of what?’ Because YHWH testify between you and the wife of your youth, who you acted 
treacherously toward ( ָּבּה ָּבַגְדָּתה ), and she is your companion and your covenanted wife.” Here the context 
is clearly divorcing a married wife. To me we do not seem entitled to project the meaning in Mal 2:14 upon 
Ex 21:8. The contexts are different. In the latter, it is an issue of a female slave becoming her master’s 
concubine, while in the former it rather seems to be a marriage between two free individuals. The time-span 
between the two passages could also allow for a semantic change of the ָּבּה + בגד phrase. Jer 3:20 and Lam 
1:2 provide two interesting instances of בגד. In Jer 3:20 the woman treats her  ֵַרע with treachery. Here he 
could be both a fiancé and husband, possibly simply a lover. In Lam 1:2 the plural  ֵָרֶעיה appears to be non-
marital sexual partners. Based on this we could understand Exod 21:8 as implying that the master might 
have had sexual relations with her, without designating her to become his wife or concubine. A master was 
expected to take a female slave as concubine if he used her sexually. As Westbrook explains this was due 
to the need to regulate the status of possible offsprings (Westbrook, “The Female Slave,” 155). But here I 
rather prefer to see the reason behind the accusation of treachery as an implicit reference to contract 
stipulations put in place when she was sold to her master, where it would possibly have been stated that she 
was intended to become his concubine. The treachery does therefore not imply an actual engagement or 
marriage but refers to contractual stipulations. Fourth, ֹעָנה in the phrase ְוֹעָנָתּה in 21:10 is a hapax 
legomenon. It has traditionally been taken to mean ‘sexual intercourse,’ ‘intimacy,’ and ‘cohabitation.’ For 
various interpretations of ֹעָנה and an argument that it means ‘sexual intercourse’ see Etan Levine, “On 
Exodus 21,10; 'Onah and Biblical Marriage,” Zeitschrift für Altorientalische und Biblische 
Rechtsgeschichte 5 (1999): 138-50; Koehler et al., HALOT, 855; Brown et al., BDB, 773; Tikva Frymer-
Kenski, “Anatolia and the Levant: Israel,” in A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law, ed. Raymond 
Westbrook (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 1004–5; Van Seters, A Law Book for the Diaspora, 91–92. The use of the 
verb ענה as suppression in the context of rape (Gen 34:2; 2 Sam 13:12, 14, 22, 32; Jud 19:24; 20:5; Lam 
5:11) does not seem applicable in the context of Exod 21. The provision of the threefold food, oil and 
garment appears in various contexts in ANE sources, and seems to have developed into a stereotype. It 
seems more likely that ֹעָנה should be understood as ‘oil’ on the analogy with ANE lists in similar context 




Bergsma argues that the ethnic label ִעְבִרי is used for a larger group than 
exclusively ‘Israelites’ in the HB.25 According to Gen 10:21, Shem was “the father of all 
the children of Eber (ֵעֶבר),” and his decendant Abraham later receives the gentilic 
designation ִעְבִרי (Gen 14:13). Thus, Arabians, Edomites, Moabites, and Ammonites may 
all have been included in the term ִעְבִרי, either as Abraham belonging to a larger group of 
 ,or as he gave birth also to other nations than the Israelites. Bergsma summarizes ִעְבִרי
stating that “when the whole range of uses of ‘Hebrew’ in the Bible are viewed together, 
it appears to be a term having both socio-economic and ethnic connotations, indicating an 
underclass which foreigners associated with slavery, but Israelites understood to be the 
branch of the Semitic peoples to which they belonged.”26 While Bergsma appears to be 
                                               
M. Paul, “Exod 21:10 a Threefold Maintenance Clause,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies [JNES] 28 
(1969): 50-51; Paul, Studies in the Book of the Covenant, 57-61; Benno Jacob, The Second Book of the 
Bible: Exodus, trans. Walter Jacob (New Jersey: Ktav, 1992), 627. Ecc 9:7-8 speak of four commodities 
(bread, wine, clothing and oil), while Hos 2:7 expand the list to six (bread, water, wool, linen, oil and 
drink). Even if these lists are longer than the tripartite list we find in Exod 21:10, the items are analogous. 
As “rations are the stuff of servants and dependants, not wives” (Westbrook, “The Female Slave,” 173), it 
seems best to take ֹעָנה as a reference to oil. The three provisions therefore support reading the case-law in a 
non-marital context. Fifth, the word ִחָּנם, appearing in 21:11, is used in 32 cases in the HB. It is either used 
in the meaning “without economic compensation” (Gen 29:15; Exod 21:2, 11; Num 11:5; Isa 52:3, 5; Jer 
22:13; 2 Sam 24:24; 1 Chron 21:24), “without cause, undeservedly” (Ezek 14:23; Job 1:9; 1 Sam 19:5; 
25:31; Ps 35:7, 19; 69:5; 109:3; 119:161; Prov 1:11; 3:30; 23:29; 24:28; 26:2; Job 2:3; 9:17; 22:6; Lam 
3:52), or “vainly” (Ezek 6:10; 14:23; Mal 1:10; Prov 1:17). The decisive point here is that in no case do we 
find ִחָּנם in a context of ‘divorce,’ or even a marital context. There is no way this term can legitimately be 
understood as ‘divorce.’ In Exod 21:2 ִחָּנם is also used, and here in the sense of freedom from slavery. It is 
only reasonable to see the same meaning of the term in 21:11. And sixth, given that there are good reasons 
to see Deut 15:12–18 as dependent on Exod 21:2–11, and the female slave in Deut 15 “was not a wife or 
concubine” (Bergsma, The Jubilee from Leviticus to Qumran, 136), weakens seeing her as such also in 
Exod 21:7–11. Cf. Gane, Old Testament Law for Christians, 110, 114, 140, 152, 312–15 who has recently 
argued that Exod 21:7–11 “involved a kind of marriage,” as a “servant concubinage.” However, I believe 
the observations made above also make this suggestion problematic. Further, while it is possible to read 
Exod 21:7–11 in the direction that the female slave became a concubine, I do not find the arguments for 
this conclusive. 
25 Bergsma, The Jubilee from Leviticus to Qumran, 43–48. 




correct in pointing out that ִעְבִרי likely refers to a larger ethnic group than Israelites alone, 
I am not able to follow the logic going from that ִעְבִרי included a broader group of 
Semitic peoples than the Israelites alone to a claim that it excludes the Israelites from the 
classification of ִעְבִרי in Exod 21 and Deut 15. Having pointed out that the term is used 
“predominantly in foreign contexts,”27 he goes on to comment on the use of ִעְבִרי 
predominantly in the context of slavery, and exclusively so in the Pentateuchal 
instructions (i.e. in Exod 21:2 and Deut 15:12). He writes: “To intentionally ‘mark’ the 
ethnicity of an individual with a definition that exceeds the boundaries of the group (i.e. 
‘Hebrew’) implies that the individual ‘marked’ is a member of the outer group 
(‘Hebrews’) but not the inner group (‘Israelite’).”28 Bergsma uses this to remove the 
possible discrepancy between the manumission laws in Exod 21 and Deut 15 on one side 
and the Jubilee release in Lev 25 on the other side.29 According to him, the ִעְבִרי in Exod 
21 and Deut 15 are non-Israelites while Lev 25:39––43, 46 deals with indentured labor of 
native Israelites. 
To me it seems more reasonable, on the basis of the use of ִעְבִרי in the HB, to 
conclude that Exod 21 and Deut 15 uses it to refer to Israelites,30 but possibly also 
                                               
27 Bergsma writes that ִעְבִרי is used “predominantly in foreign contexts, when (a) a foreigner 
(Philistine or Egyptian) is referring to the Israelites [Gen 39:14, 17; 41:12; Ex 1:16; 2:6, 13; 1 Sam 4:6, 9; 
13:19; 14:11; 29:3], or (b) when Israelites are describing themselves to foreigners [Gen 40:15; Exod 1:19; 
2:7; 3:18; 5:3; 7:16; 9:1, 13; 10:3; Jonah 1:9], or (c) when events are being viewed from a foreign 
(Egyptian or Philistine) perspective [Gen 43:32; Exod 1:15; 2:11, 13]” (Bergsma, The Jubilee from 
Leviticus to Qumran, 43). 
28 Bergsma, The Jubilee from Leviticus to Qumran, 45. 
29 Bergsma, The Jubilee from Leviticus to Qumran, 46, 100, 102, 134, 140. Cf. Christopher J. H. 
Wright, Old Testament Ethics for the People of God (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2004), 158n. 




individuals from kindred nations belonging to the same ancestral tree.31 Thus, the Hebrew 
male slave in Exod 21:2 and Hebrew male and female in Deut 15:12 may refer to both 
Israelites and individuals from kindred nations. In Exod 21 the people have just been 
released from slavery, and it therefore seems appropriate that the BC begins with 
addressing the question of a possible future re-enslavement. Sprinkle has commented that 
contrary to the BC, we never find slave laws at the beginning of ANE legal collections: 
The topic of ‘servitude’ does not introduce the other ancient Near Eastern ‘legal’ 
collections. The Laws of Hammurapi end rather than begin with slavery, though 
various laws deal with slaves (§§7, 15–20, 117–19, 146–47, 170–71, 175–76, 199, 
205, 223, 226–27, 231, 252, 278–82). Likewise, the Laws of Eshunna, though they 
mention slaves throughout (§§15–16, 22–23, 31, 33–35, 40, 49–52, 55, 57), place the 
laws dealing most substantially with servitude at the end (§§49–52). The Middle 
Assyrian Laws rarely mention slaves (MAL A §§4, 40, 54, MAL C §§1, 3). Why, 
then, do Exodus’s civil regulations feature servitude at the beginning? An answer lies 
in the narrative context: Exodus 21 begins with servitude, just as does the prologue to 
the Decalogue in 20.2, in order to develop the central theme of the book of Exodus, 
deliverance from bondage.32 
                                               
that should be understood as a reference to an “Israelite.” 
31 While Hamilton’s discussion of ִעְבִרי in Exod 21 and Deut 15 resonates with Bergsma’s 
argument that it represents an underclass “in their status as slaves” or “their status as aliens who have 
migrated to a foreign country,” he nevertheless sees the term as including “any member of the Israelite 
community” (Jeffries M. Hamilton, Social Justice and Deuteronomy: The Case of Deuteronomy 15, 
SBLDS (Atlanta: SBL, 1992), 84). The term ִעְבִרי for him does not therefore apply only to the non-
Israelites in Exod 21 and Deut 15. He does not specify that it might include non-Israelite persons from 
kindred nations, but his observation of an inclusive tendency in the BC toward the foreigner/sojourner can 
be taken as supportive evidence for such a contention. Referring to  ְֵּגרהַ  ׁשֶאת־ֶנפֶ  ֶּתםְיַדעְ  ַאֶּתםו  (“and you know 
the person of the foreigner”) in Exod 23:9, he writes: “To say that the sojourner within the community has 
the same identity as members of the community themselves had at one point of their own history . . . is to 
bring the sojourner within that community in an emotional sense even if the sojourner is still outside of it in 
a political sense” (Hamilton, Social Justice and Deuteronomy, 89–90). But in contrast to this “tendency 
toward inclusion” in BC, he sees the HI as focusing more on the definition of “the relationships which the 
actors have to one another” (Hamilton, Social Justice and Deuteronomy, 94). As will be argued below, it 
nevertheless seems possible to read HI as also opening a window to the inclusion of the foreigner. 
McConville also takes ִעְבִרי in Deut 15:12 as referring to an Israelite: “The term ‘Hebrew/Hebress’ is here 
in apposition to ‘brother’, and should in this case be equated with ‘Israelite’” (McConville, Deuteronomy, 
262). Cf. Averbeck, “Framing and Shaping of the Mosaic Law,” 154–55. 
32 Sprinkle, 'The Book of the Covenant', 62. Cf. Wright, Inventing God's Law, 149–51 arguing that 
the slave-law and its position at the beginning of BC draws from LH. As mentioned in chapter 1, Averbeck 




Further, even if the text claims there were other ethnic groups following the 
Israelites at the Exodus (Exod 12:38; Lev 24:10; Num 11:4), the BC is presented to the 
 the sons of Israel” (Exod 20:19; 21:1). Nevertheless, Exod 21:2 uses the“ ,ְּבֵני ִיְׂשָרֵאל
possible broader term ִעְבִרי, including both Israelites and kindred nations. Thus, it is also 
possible that the father selling his daughter in 21:7 might have been from kindred nations, 
even if it would predominantly have been native Israelites. Since her master according to 
21:7 is prohibited from selling the female slave to a foreign people ( ְלַעם ָנְכִרי לֹא־ִיְמֹׁשל
 it seems safe to assume that she was not to be sold outside the Israelite ,(ְלָמְכָרּה
community. And given that the contrast in 21:7 (לֹא ֵתֵצא ְּכֵצאת ָהֲעָבִדים) primarily seems to 
be between the regulations for the male slave (21:2–6) and the female slave (21:7–11), 
and not seeing 21:2–6 as a general category for Hebrew slaves with 21:7–11 as an 
exception for Israelite female slaves, it seems natural to see the primary concern in 21:2–
11 as with the “sons (and daughters) of Israel.”  
Also, Deut 15 can be said to contain a degree of ambivalence. Besides the broader 
scope of the term ִעְבִרי used in 15:12, the passage designates the male and female slave as 
“your brother” (ָאִחיָך). As pointed out by Bergsma, ָאִחיָך is also used in Deut 23:8 for the 
Edomite as a brother.33 The phrase ָאחִ יָך is therefore not necessarily limited to Israelites, 
but is also used of kindred nations in Deuteronomy. 
Exod 21:2–11 is not concerned with the question of property. However, this does 
not entitle us to argue that property was not involved in Exod 21:2–11. The question of  
                                               
“Framing and Shaping of the Mosaic Law,” 158–59, 161, 163). 




property is simply not addressed. It is also unclear whether “it expects debts to be 
remitted in the seventh year.”34 
Lev 25:10, 39–4635 
The chapter can be outlined as follows:36 
25:1–2b Introduction of divine discourse 
25:2c–7 The Sabbath year of rest for the land, during which the household will 
eat of the produce of the land from the six years prior to the Sabbath 
year. 
25:8–17 The year of Jubilee with slave release, repossession of inheritance 
property, and a rest for the land. 
25:18–22 The divine promise—on the condition that the people keep God’s 
decrees (25:18)—to provide sufficient abundance to bring them 
through the Sabbath and Jubilee years. 
25:23–55 Implications of the Jubilee for the redemption of property 
 25:23–24 Statement of general principle 
 25:25–55 Stages of destitution 
  25:25–28 The loss of lands 
  25:29–34 The loss of home 
  25:35–38 The loss of independence 
  25:39–46 The loss of freedom to a native Israelite 
   25:39–43 Slavery forbidden for Israelites 
   25:44–46 Slavery permitted for non-Israelites 
  25:47–55 The loss of freedom to a foreigner 
Table 8 gives the Lev 25:10, 39–46 MT with a translation. In Lev 25:1–55 we 
find regulations regarding the economically vulnerable members of the population, rest of 
the land, and transfer of property in the setting of the Sabbath and Jubilee years. For the 
present study, it is Lev 25:39–46 that will be of special interest. The main concern in Lev   
                                               
34 Tigay, Deuteronomy, 466. He continues: “it raises the possibility that debt-remission is an 
innovation in Deuteronomy” (Tigay, Deuteronomy, 466). And again: “It is also very unlikely that the 
remission of debts is operative in Leviticus [25]” (Tigay, Deuteronomy, 467). 
35 Lev 25:45–46 is attested in 4QLevb, frags. 27–28. In 25:46 MT hithpael ְוִהְתַנֲחְלֶּתם is replaced 
with the hiphil ונחלתם. Otherwise there are no significant variants. 
36 Cf. Chirichigno, Debt-Slavery, 322; Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2148–49; Bergsma, The Jubilee 




Table 8. Lev 25:10, 39–46 
                                               
37 LXX ἐνιαυτὸς ἀφέσεως σημασία (“a year of release, a proclamation”). Note how both MT ְּדרֹור 
and יֹוֵבל are both rendered in LXX with ἄφεσις in 25:10. 
38 LXX καὶ ἀπελεύσεται εἷς ἕκαστος εἰς τὴν κτῆσιν αὐτοῦ can be rendered “and each one shall 
depart to his possession” (Brenton), while MT has ְוַׁשְבֶּתם ִאיׁש ֶאל־ֲאֻחָּזתֹו (“and each shall return to his 
possession”). This difference is also seen in LXX ἀπελεύσεσθε (“you shall go away”) for MT ָּתֻׁשבּו (“you 
shall return”) in this verse. This emphasis is also seen in LXX ἀπελεύσεται (“he shall go”) in 25:41. LXX 
ἀποδραμεῖται (“he shall hasten back”) is closer to MT ָיׁשּוב in 25:21. 
39 LXX τὴν πατρίδα αὐτοῦ (“of his fatherland”) focus more upon the family land than the family 
as such as in MT ִמְׁשַּפְחּתֹו (“his family”). 
40 LXX ταπεινωθῇ (“be lowered”) for MT ָימּוְך (“become poor”). 
41 LXX does not have ֵמִעָּמְך הּוא (“he [shall exit] from you”), but adds τῇ ἀφέσει (“in the release”). 
42 For seeing ְלֹעָלם as belonging to this clause and not the previous, indicating a reuse of ְלֹעָלם in 
Exod 21:6, see Levinson, “The Birth of the Lemma,” 623–25; Levinson, “The Manumission of 
Hermeneutics,” 308–16. On how this can nevertheless not be used as argument that Lev 25:46 is trying to 
subvert Exod 21:6 see Averbeck, “Framing and Shaping of the Mosaic Law,” 172–73. For other text 
critical notes see Teeter, Scribal Laws, 133, 139. 
ׁשנה וקראתם  וקדׁשתם את ׁשנת החמׁשים 10
הוא תהיה  37דרור בארץ לכל־יׁשביה יובל
איׁש אל־אחזתו ואיׁש אל־ 38לכם וׁשבתם
 תׁשבו׃ . . . 39מׁשפחתו
אחיך עמך ונמכר־לך לא־ 40וכי־ימוך 39
כׂשכיר כתוׁשב יהיה  40תעבד בו עבדת עבד׃ 
ויצא  41עמך עד־ׁשנת היבל יעבד עמך׃ 
ובניו עמו וׁשב אל־מׁשפחתו  41מעמך הוא
כי־עבדי הם  42תיו יׁשוב׃ ואל־אחזת אב
אׁשר־הוצאתי אתם מארץ מצרים לא ימכרו 
לא־תרדה בו בפרך ויראת  43ממכרת עבד׃ 
ועבדך ואמתך אׁשר יהיו־לך  44מאלהיך׃ 
מאת הגוים אׁשר סביבתיכם מהם תקנו עבד 
וגם מבני התוׁשבים הגרים עמכם  45ואמה׃ 
מהם תקנו וממׁשפחתם אׁשר עמכם אׁשר 
 הולידו בארצכם והיו לכם לאחזה׃ 
והתנחלתם אתם לבניכם אחריכם לרׁשת  46
אחזה לעלם בהם תעבדו ובאחיכם בני־
 לא־תרדה בו בפרך׃ ס יׂשראל איׁש באחיו
10 and you shall sanctify the year of the fiftieth year. And 
you shall proclaim a release in the land to all who dwell 
in it. It shall be a jubilee for you, and each one of you 
shall return to his possession, and each one shall return 
to his family. . . . 39 And if your brother with you 
becomes poor, and is sold to you, you shall not make 
him serve the service of a slave. 40 He shall be with you 
like a hired worker, like a sojourner, he shall serve with 
you until the year of Jubilee. 41 And he shall exit from 
with you, he and his children with him. And he shall 
return to his family and he shall return to his ancestral 
property. 42 For they are my servants, whom I brought 
out from the land of Egypt. They shall not be sold 
according to the sale of a slave. 43 You shall not rule him 
ruthlessly, but fear your God. 44 However, your male 
slave and your female slave that you may have are from 
the peoples which are around you. From them you may 
buy a male slave and a female slave. 45 And even from 
the sojourning people with you, from them you may buy, 
and from their families which are with you, whom they 
give birth in your land. And they shall be to you a 
possession. 46 And you may inherit them to your children 
after you, to possess them as a property. Them you may 
make slaves forever.42 But among your brothers, the sons 





25:39–46 seems to be upon the non-enslavement of Israelites (ְּבֵני־ִיְׂשָרֵאל, v. 46) and the 
return of land to the member of the clan who had to sell himself due to economic failure. 
This seems to be more of a concern in this passage than the return of ancestral property as 
such, as will be discussed further below. 
Exod 20:1–Lev 26:46 constitute in its literary setting the Sinai Instructions which 
were repeated and reformulated 40 years later in Deut 12–16 with the Moab 
Instructions.43 As mentioned above, the placement of the manumission instructions at the 
beginning of the BC appears to be rooted in the deliverance narrative.44 Averbeck points 
out how manumission instructions also conclude the Sinai Instructions in Lev 25:39–55: 
Furthermore, not only does the Book of the Covenant begin with debt-slave law, but 
the whole of the laws given at Sinai also end with the debt-slave law in Lev 25:39-55, 
just before the blessings and curses of the covenant in Lev 26. This latter point is not 
often taken into account in discussions of the Sinaitic Law. Perhaps this is because 
the Laws of Hammurapi, for example, do indeed conclude with slave laws, so an 
ANE law collection ending this way is in fact not unique to the biblical Law, in 
contrast to the fact that no such collection begins with slave laws. Or perhaps it is 
because the overall canonical shape and frame of the Law is often not given full 
consideration; the emphasis tends toward the literary shape of the units of law within 
it. Or perhaps it is due to a combination of these and other factors. In any case, from 
the point of view of the text as it stands, Hebrew debt slave and release is ‘the 
beginning and end’ of the Law at Sinai, literally.45 
According to Averbeck the question of slavery and treatment of the resident alien become 
key questions in the instructions.46 
                                               
43 Lev 26:46 summarizes the preceding with the words  אֵ ּלֶ ה ַהחֻ ּקִ ים ְוהַ ִּמְׁשּפָ ִטים ְוהַ ּתֹוֹרת אֲ ׁשֶ ר ָנַתן ְיהָוה
הׁשֶ ַיד־מֹ ּבְ ִסיַני  ַהרּבְ  ָרֵאלׂשְ יִ  ֵניּבְ  ֵביןּו ינֹוּבֵ   (“These are the ordinances and judgments and instructions which 
YHWH gave on Mount Sinai by the hand of Moses, between himself and the sons of Israel”). Cf. 
Averbeck, “Framing and Shaping of the Mosaic Law,” 150. 
44 Cf. Sprinkle, 'The Book of the Covenant', 62. 
45 Averbeck, “Framing and Shaping of the Mosaic Law,” 158–59. 
46 Averbeck writes: “In reality, therefore, there are a good number of instances seeded through the 




If the manumission instructions thus form an inclusio of the Sinai instructions, 
being placed at the beginning in Exod 21 and at the end in Lev 25, the question of how 
we deal with their respective legal dissimilitude intensifies. First I will reject the common 
harmonistic reading of seeing Lev 25 as dealing with the pater familias who has sold 
himself in contrast to Exod 21 and Deut 15 where a family-member was sold by the pater 
familias.47 Second, I will describe how Jer 34 deals with such legal variation. 
Regarding the claim that Lev 25 prescribes a case where the pater familias has 
sold himself in contrast to Exod 21 and Deut 15 where a family-member is sold by the 
pater familias, I will list several reasons why I do not believe this explanation finds 
adequate textual support. First, even if the daughter is sold by her father in Exod 21:7, 
this does not legitimate the claim that the same applied to the rest of the slave-laws of 
Exod 21:2–6 and Deut 15.48 Second, regarding Chirichigno’s presupposition that an 
Israelite could not be sold by force but only by the pater familias, Schenker and Nihan 
have shown that forced slavery did occur in the HB (cf. Exod 22:2; 1 Sam 25:2; 2 Kgs 
4:1; Neh 5:2–5).49  
                                               
Egypt. One could say that it is essential to the ethos of the whole Law, Exodus through Deuteronomy, from 
beginning to end, and in between. Whether laying foundations or coming to conclusions, the lawgiver 
gravitated toward the founding event and its implications for the good life in ancient Israel” (Averbeck, 
“Framing and Shaping of the Mosaic Law,” 161). Cf. p. 163. Given my rejection of the pater familias 
interpretation of Lev 25, as I will argue below, saying both Exod 21 and Lev 25 belong to the same legal 
unit intensifies the legal tension between the two. Jer 34 might show us a biblical way of dealing with such 
legal variation. 
47 Chirichigno, Debt-Slavery, 275–82, 328–36, 352–57; Bergsma, The Jubilee from Leviticus to 
Qumran, 47, 66, 100–102, 105, 128, 144–45; Bergsma, “The Biblical Manumission Laws,” 79–80. 
48 Nihan, From Priestly Torah to Pentateuch, 529–30n. Cf. Kilchör, Mosetora und Jahwetora, 
142. 
49 Schenker, “Biblical Legislation,” 28–29; Nihan, From Priestly Torah to Pentateuch, 529n. 




Third, Schenker’s own proposal that the manumission laws can be seen as 
complementary on the basis that they deal with distinct situations in regard to the familial 
status of the respective person subject to servitude,50 also seem difficult to sustain. While 
denying Chirichigno’s claim that Exod 21 deals with a case where a family-member is 
sold by the pater familias, he nevertheless maintains that Lev 25 deals with the case of 
the pater familias.51 He is followed by Kilchör arguing that Lev 25 and Deut 15 
respectively deal with a question not addressed by Exod 21, namely how the slave will 
provide for himself so as not to immediately end up in slavery again. According to 
Kilchör the solution in Lev 25 is the return to the ancestral land, while Deut 15 prescribes 
sending the slave off with abundant provisions.52 While Kilchör seems correct in 
maintaining that Lev 25 and Deut 15 present different solutions to the same problem, 
does Lev 25 really give a basis for claiming it is dealing with the pater familias? While 
Exod 21:3–5 raises the question whether the slave had a family or not when entering 
slavery and instructs a similar status upon exit, Lev 25:41—as well as 25:54—only 
                                               
while the niphal  ִָּמֵכרי  in Deut 15:12 should be taken as a passive (‘to be sold’) (Chirichigno, Debt-Slavery, 
276, 330–32). For critiques of this position see Schenker, “Biblical Legislation,” 31–32; Eckart Otto, 
review of Debt-Slavery in Israel and the Ancient Near East, by G. C. Chirichigno, Bib 76 (1995): 254–61. 
50 Schenker writes: “Exodus does not consider the case where a debt-slave is bought and sold 
together with his children, while Leviticus 25 precisely deals with this case. . . . Leviticus 25.39–41 thus 
fills the gap left open by Exod 21,2–3! This rule for the jubilee does not therefore apply to all categories of 
slaves, but only to that of married Israelites who have (male) children. Hence this law is a supplement to 
Exod. 21.2-4” (Schenker, “Biblical Legislation,” 33). 
51 Schenker, “Biblical Legislation,” 27, 32–33. 
52 Kilchör, Mosetora und Jahwetora, 141–53. Berman adds that “the capacity of the creditor to 
hold the servant for an extended period of time would provide incentive for him to invest in the worker and 
train him in a skill that would then translate into human capital he would take with him on his release” 
(Berman, Created Equal, 107). If the fallow year of Exod 23:11 was practiced, presumably as a national 
seven-year cycle in contrast to the individual cycle of the slave release in Exod 21:2–6, this would also 
mean that the released slaves—being among the poor—would be entitled to eat of the crop of the fallow 




instructs the exit from servitude with one’s children. In other words, this in itself is not 
sufficient basis for claiming that Lev 25:41 regulates the situation of a pater familias. 
Exod 21:3 could easily be read to support the contention that not only the wife, but also 
the children would follow the slave upon the release. The verse does not focus on the 
wife to the exclusion of the children, but basically regulates that one should leave in the 
same familial status one arrived. Conversely, even if Lev 25:41 only mentions the 
children, it seems reasonable to assume that also the wife would follow him upon release. 
Schenker might, therefore, put too much into the variation when writing: “Exodus does 
not consider the case where a debt-slave is bought and sold together with his children, 
while Leviticus 25 precisely deals with this case.”53 Lev 25 does not deal with the 
familial status of the slave when “bought and sold.” There is nothing to exclude the 
possibility that he might have been without children and unmarried upon entry into 
servitude, and thus not a pater familias.54 It only mentions that the subservient Israelite 
should leave with his children upon exit after 49 years. Given that 49 years significantly 
exceeds the average age of a generation, it is only reasonable to consider the possibility 
that he had no children when entering and that these were acquired during the 49 years. If 
he was a pater familias upon entry into servitude, he would presumably be the eldest 
male of the household. In that case, it is doubtful that many would survive the 49 years of 
servitude, if they entered servitude at the beginning of the jubilee cycle or near to it. If 
Lev 25:39–46 therefore presupposes that the subservient person is a pater familias upon 
                                               
53 Schenker, “Biblical Legislation,” 33. 




entry into servitude, the duration of 49 years before release would tend to make the 
applicability of the law in practical terms void in that case. Again, it is problematic to 
read Lev 25:39–46 as addressing the situation of the pater familias exclusively or 
predominantly.  
Fourth, I have mentioned that the focus in Lev 25:39–46 does not seem to be upon 
the preservation of property within the clan as such, as much as the freedom of the 
released subservient person to return to his ancestral property, whether the property was 
sold or not.55 Fifth, as I will argue below, Zedekiah’s covenant with the people as 
                                               
55 Bergsma finds a parallel between Lev 25 and the ANE kiddunti and adurarum, where “the 
Levitical legislator regarded the Israelites as sacred slaves (hierodoules) and their land as a sacred precinct. 
As such, they enjoyed certain rights on analogy to the ancient Near Eastern institution of kiddinutu. Not 
having a king to proclaim edicts of andurarum, the legislator ensured the Israelites would enjoy such 
decrees periodically, by including them in the cycle of the cultic calendar” (Bergsma, The Jubilee from 
Leviticus to Qumran, 51). And again: “In the biblical narratives of the Exodus, the people of Israel are 
liberated from their obligations to Pharaoh in order to be entirely devoted to the service of YHWH. It is 
forbidden to enslave them, since they are already ‘slaves’ of God (Lev 25:42). Likewise, the land— 
distributed equitably among them (Num. 32, 34–36, Josh 13–21)—is holy and cannot be alienated (Lev 
25:23). An institution is put in place to ensure that displaced citizens are eventually returned to their family 
and the possession of their inheritance (Lev 25:10). They are sacred slaves, hierodoules (Exod 19:6)” 
(Bergsma, The Jubilee from Leviticus to Qumran, 30). Cf. Tigay, Deuteronomy, 467. For Egyptian 
permission “to transfer property for the term of one’s life” see VerSteeg, Law in Ancient Egypt, 110. 
Bergsma sees Lev 25 as reflecting a tribal setting, and one’s neighbor might therefore also have been once 
literal brother (Bergsma, The Jubilee from Leviticus to Qumran, 141), in contrast to the more urban setting 
of Deut 15:1–18 which “presuppose a society that is more urban, nationalized, and economically developed 
than that of the Holiness Code. Accordingly, Deut 15 may belong to a later period in Israel’s history” 
(Bergsma, The Jubilee from Leviticus to Qumran, 138). This reading of Lev 25 is also reflected in his claim 
that its main focus is to preserve the tribal inheritance within the clan: “This implies that the system in 
Leviticus is designed to benefit families more than individuals. Even though an individual might not regain 
his freedom, his family eventually would. This system seems to approach the problem from the perspective 
of tribal society . . . . The aim of the law is to prevent the clan or tribe from losing part of its land, just as 
daughters who inherited their father’s land were required to marry within their tribe for this very reason. 
Leviticus’s law of manumission, likewise, aims to prevent any of the family units of the tribe from being 
reduced to permanent servitude. Exodus and Deuteronomy, by contrast, serve to protect individuals” 
(Bergsma, The Jubilee from Leviticus to Qumran, 64. Cf. 65, 69–70, 84–85). Cf. Berman, Created Equal, 
90, 92, 99–100, 107 on the focus in Lev 25 to preserve land within the family, and Westbrook and Wells, 
Everyday Law in Biblical Israel, 119 on debt as “a chronic social problem throughout the ancient world.” 
However, while it seems correct to claim that the effect of Lev 25:39–46 would be to preserve the 
tribal inheritance within the clan, it is nevertheless formulated so as to primarily focus upon the return of 
the individual that was forced to sell himself into service. Vice versa, the text does not strictly address the 
question of the return of the land. On the contrary, the passage might even be read as if the land was never 




described in Jer 34:8–10, 15 seems to reuse the manumission instruction in Lev 25:39–
46. That it nevertheless modifies its reading of Lev 25 with the gender inclusive  ָהִעְבִרי
 in Deut 15:12, shows that Lev ָהִעְבִרי אֹו ָהִעְבִרָּיה Jer 34:9), likely borrowed from) ְוָהִעְבִרָּיה
25 was read in the days of Zedekiah, or at least at the composition of Jer 34, as implying 
both Hebrew male and female slaves. While it is not certain that the author of Jer 34 
believed that this was actually what Lev 25:39–46 meant, and that he possibly arrived at 
this reading rather by reading Lev 25:39–46 in light of Deut 15:12, at least he saw no 
problems in reading Lev 25:39–46 in gender inclusive terms. Therefore, Jer 34 does not 
perceive Lev 25:39–46 as restricted to the pater familias alone. On the contrary, Lev 
25:39–46 is taken in Zedekiah’s covenant as a general manumission of all Judahite 
slaves. 
Leviticus 25:39–46 differentiates between not enslaving “a brother who is with 
you” (25:39 ,ָאִחיָך ִעָּמְך), who has become economically vulnerable and forced to sell 
himself (25:39–43),56 and the sojourner and his family who may be enslaved (25:44–
                                               
property,  ְּתֹו ְוֶאל־ֲאֻחַּזת ֲאֹבָתיו ָיׁשּובְוָׁשב ֶאל־ִמְׁשַּפח , not his own property (ֲאֻחָּזתֹו). This does not mean that Lev 
25 in general is not concerned with the return of property as such. On the contrary, this is exactly what we 
see in Lev 25:10, 13, 23–34. Note the similarity, but also slight modification, between ְוַׁשְבֶּתם ִאיׁש ֶאל־
 in 25:41. While 25:10 ְוָׁשב ֶאל־ִמְׁשַּפְחּתֹו ְוֶאל־ֲאֻחַּזת ֲאֹבָתיו ָיׁשּוב in Lev 25:10 and ֲאֻחָּזתֹו ְוִאיׁש ֶאל־ִמְׁשַּפְחּתֹו ָּתֻׁשבּו
speaks of 25:41 ,ֶאל־ֲאֻחָּזתֹו reads ְוֶאל־ֲאֻחַּזת ֲאֹבָתיו. This slight difference seems to be highlighted when 
comparing 25:41 to the rest of the chapter. The emphasis upon a return to the ancestral property in the 
unique phrase in the HB ֲאֻחַּזת ֲאֹבָתיו of 25:41 strikes us when we compare with the idea of return to one’s 
own property in the rest of Lev 25 (ֲאֻחָּזתֹו in 25:10,13,25, 27–28, 32,  ַֻּזְתֶכםֲאח  in 25:24, and ֲאֻחָּזָתם in 25:32–
33, and ָלֶכם ַלֲאֻחָּזה in 25:45). My point is that the return of property does not seem to be the primary focus 
of 25:39–46, even if it may be an implied effect in cases where this applied. Cf. Nihan, From Priestly 
Torah to Pentateuch, 66 for a reference to scholars arguing that ֲאֻחָּזה should be understood as the ‘right to 
usufruct’ in contrast to ַנֲחָלה as ‘personal possession.’ The primary focus of 25:39–43 seems to be a 
response to the loss of the individual Israelite’s freedom to a native. 
56 Westbrook has argued that this should be called “famine slavery,” rather than “debt slavery” 
(Raymond Westbrook, Law from the Tigris to the Tiber: The Writings of Raymond Westbrook (Winona 




46).57 A sold kinsman should acquire the legal status of a hired worker, not the legal 
status of a slave.58 As argued above, there seems to be an ambivalence in the use of ִעְבִרי 
in Exod 21:2 and Deut 15:12, where individuals of kindred nations might be included in 
the reference to ִעְבִרי besides the Israelites. It is also possible to see ambivalence as to the 
ethnic demarcations in Lev 25:39–46, even if this passage is often understood to make a 
clear distinction between the Israelite and non-Israelite. The ָאִחיָך ִעָּמְך (“your brother with 
you”) of Lev 25:39 is defined as ַאֵחיֶכם ְּבֵני־ִיְׂשָרֵאל (“your brothers, sons of Israel”) in 
25:46. While this seems to define the ‘brother’ as an ‘Israelite,’ the context of Lev 25 also 
seems to invite another reading. While ִעְבִרי in Exod 21 and Deut 15 might be taken to 
refer to a broader group than Israelites exclusively, possibly including kindred nations 
belonging to the same ancestral tree, it may also be possible to read Lev 25 as containing 
a similar ethnic ambivalence, despite its clear distinction between the ethnic Israelite 
(25:39–43) and non-Israelite (25:44–46). 
Whether we read ֵּגר ְותֹוָׁשב in 25:35 ( ִעָּמְך ְוֶהֱחַזְקָּת ּבֹו ֵּגר ְוִכי־ָימּוְך ָאִחיָך ּוָמָטה ָידֹו 
 might de facto be a (ָאִחיָך) ”as open to the possibility that “your brother (ְותֹוָׁשב ָוַחי ִעָּמְך
                                               
57 For a general discussion on the status of the alien in Israelite society see James K. Hoffmeier, 
The Immigration Crisis: Immigrants, Aliens, and the Bible (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2009), especially pp. 
71–96. 
58 For the difference between the legal status of a slave and hireling see Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 
2223. For the differentiation between the Israelite and non-Israelite, and a break with a tribal framework for 
a national in Lev 25, see Japhet, “The Relationship between the Legal Corpora,” 76–78, 80. In his 
comparative study of international law in the ANE, Ziskind found that “it is only in the Old Testament that 
a considerable body of law governing the status of the alien exists,” finding three significant divergences in 
Torah with other ANE material: (1) in the use of descriptive terminology of the various types of aliens (ֵּגר/ 
 identifying them as a socially and legally recognizable class, and (3) a patronal system where an (2) ,(ָנְכִרי
Israelite would be the patron of an alien (Jonathan Rosner Ziskind, “Aspects of International Law in the 




“foreigner and sojourner” (i.e. “even if he is a foreigner and sojourner”)59 or as treating 
the native Israelite de jure “as though he were a resident foreigner,”60 this verse 
introduces a certain otherness, a foreignness, in the brother. As we come to 25:39 and 
again read the reference to “your brother” (ָאִחיָך), we might easily understand it in the 
broader sense of including some kind of otherness, be that as a foreigner treated as a 
native or a native treated as a foreigner. The link between 25:35 and 25:39 is further 
strengthened as both passages open with the identical clause, ְוִכי־ָימּוְך ָאִחיָך (“and if your 
brother becomes poor”). 
                                               
59 An argument in support of this reading would be the lack of the comparative כ in the phrase ֵּגר
 in 25:40. An observation by Nihan regarding 25:23b can be ְּכָׂשִכיר ְּכתֹוָׁשב in 25:35, in contrast to ְותֹוָׁשב
taken as supporting both alternative readings. Commenting on the complementarity of Lev 25:2–7 to Exod 
23:10–11 he writes: “This is entirely consistent with the overall conception underlying ch. 25, according to 
which Israelite landowners are themselves resident aliens and dependent workers ( ׁשביםגרים ותו ) on 
Yahweh’s land (v. 23b). As legal exegesis of Exod 23:10–11, the legislation on the Sabbatical Year in Lev 
25 thus act as a concrete reminder, every seven years, of this reality” (Nihan, From Priestly Torah to 
Pentateuch, 526). Accordingly, in Lev 25:23 the people of Israel are themselves considered to be strangers 
and resident workers, ָּמִדיעִ  ַאֶּתם ָׁשִביםְותֹו ִּכי־ֵגִרים . The same order on ֵּגר and תֹוָׁשב in Lev 25:23, 35 
strengthen the contention that the author may have intended them to be co-read. The stranger and resident 
worker in Lev 25:35 could thus de facto be an Israelite, even if they de jure have the status of strangers and 
resident workers, as well as being a brother (ָאח) who de facto and de jure are strangers and resident 
workers. Nihan continues: “The occurrence of the expression ׁשביםגרים ותו  in v. 35b has often been 
regarded as a later and somewhat awkward interpolation, but it actually does make sense in this context. 
Since the former landowner now exploits his own estate for his creditor, the latter is required to support 
 Hiphil) him by treating him as if he were a dependent worker” (Nihan, From Priestly Torah to חזק)
Pentateuch, 532. Italics original). And again: “The legislation on slavery in Lev 25:39–55 and, more 
generally, the entire law of 25:8–55 now concretely illustrate the ultimate purpose of this process for the 
Israelites: to become dependent workers (v. 24[v. 23?]) on Yahweh’s estate, cultivating the land for him” 
(Nihan, From Priestly Torah to Pentateuch, 535. Italics original). Whatever way we take it, it strengthens 
the contention here made that there is an ambivalence between the foreigner and native in Lev 25. Further, 
Levinson has pointed out that Lev 25, since it does not allow Israelites to be slaves, reapplies the provisions 
of Exod 21 to foreign nations (Levinson, “The Birth of the Lemma,” 620–23). This supports the claim that 
Lev 25 represents a studied negotiation of the relation between natives and foreigners. The way in which it 
is formulated might contain more sophistication than a superficial reading would detect. 
60 Milgrom argues that it should be rendered “(as though he were) a resident alien” (Milgrom, 
Leviticus 23–27, 2206–8). Milgrom sees the phrase as a hendiadys, “resident alien.” In a similar way, 





When we come to 25:46, however, we find the formulation ּוְבַאֵחיֶכם ְּבֵני־ִיְׂשָרֵאל 
(“but as for your brothers, the sons of Israel”), ָאח is clearly used exclusively for the 
Israelite. While 25:46 would thus mark a closure of a possibility envisaged by a 
synchronic reading of 25:35 and 25:39, legitimating a distinction between the Israelite 
and resident alien based on 25:46, the verses 25:35 and 25:39 read together seem to invite 
those ready for it into a more radical reading. Leviticus 25:39–46 may thus be read on 
two levels. On the first level the differentiation between the native (25:39–43) and 
foreigner (25:44–46) is explicit. But on the second level there are also indicators in the 
text that appear to deconstruct this disctinction, and invite the reader to treat the stranger 
and resident alien according to the release of 25:39–43. This would accord with Lev 
19:34 admonishing the Israelite to treat the stranger as a native ( ְּכֶאְזָרח ִמֶּכם ִיְהֶיה ָלֶכם ַהֵּגר
 in 25:40 is to be understood as a hendiadys, as ְּכָׂשִכיר ְּכתֹוָׁשב If 61.(ַהָּגר ִאְּתֶכם ְוָאַהְבּתָ  לֹו ָּכמֹוָך
argued by Milgrom,62 where תֹוָׁשב is never used alone in the HB but always qualified by 
either ָׂשִכיר or גור/ֵּגר as in Lev 25:6, 23, 35, 40, 45, 47, the תֹוָׁשב is always either a 
“resident foreigner” or “resident hireling.” Milgrom writes:  
The resident hireling is not a śākîr, a day laborer who returns to his home and family 
each evening (19:13; Deut 24:14–15; Job 14:6), but a long-term employee who lives 
with his family on the landowner’s property (haggārîm ʿimmāk, v. 6). . . . The 
resident hireling may be either Israelite . . . or non-Israelite. The exception is the 
verse under discussion: it would apply to only Israelites; non-Israelites may be treated 
as slaves (vv. 44–46), and the jubilee law does not pertain to them.63  
                                               
61 Cf. Kaufmann who writes that for P the foreigner has assimilated to Israelite culture and religion 
(Kaufmann, The Religion of Israel, 206), and Milgrom writes that he is a permanent resident (Milgrom, 
Leviticus 23–27, 2221). 
62 Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2221. 




But instead of seeing 25:40 as an exception to the rule,64 reading the verse as expressing 
ambivalence as to the distinction between the Israelite and non-Israelite, by seeing the 
Israelite servant as a hired worker and sojourner, (ְּכָׂשִכיר ְּכתֹוָׁשב) suggests the possibility 
for a more radical reading.65 Read in this manner, the enslavement of individuals from the 
surrounding nations in 25:44–46 might be read as a concession, rather than a prescription. 
At the same time it might be an invitation to rethink the relation to the foreigner in light 
of what is said about the native. Thus, the tension between 19:34 and 25:39–46 might not 
be as large as it appears at first glance. 
Further, Ezek 47:22–23 could be read as picking up the tension between Lev 
19:34 and 25:39–46 in regard to the stranger, thus including the stranger in the allotment 
                                               
64 Deut 24:14, לֹא־ַתעֲ ֹׁשק ָׂשִכיר ָעִני ְוֶאְביֹון מֵ ַאֶחיָך אֹו מִ ֵּגְרָך אֲ ֶׁשר ְּבַאְרְצָך ִּבְׁשָעֶריָך (“you shall not oppress 
a needy and poor hireling, whether your brother or your stranger, who is in the land, within your gates”), is 
another example of the idea of similar treatment of the native and foreign worker in Pentateuchal 
legislation. 
65 A question is whether we should view the manumission laws in Torah as idealistic or realistic? 
Patrick wrote: “The biblical lawbooks contain a healthy sampling of idealistic or utopian provisions. Even 
within the remedial law of the BC, one finds idealistic provisions, for example, granting a slave freedom 
for loss of a tooth (21:27). Most of Deuteronomy’s slave provisions are idealistic and would have brought 
the institution to an end if enforced. The Jubilee Year in the Holiness Code is thoroughly utopian. Such 
idealistic and utopian rulings would not have made their way into the lawbooks if the lawbooks were 
designed for practical application in judicial cases” (Patrick, Old Testament Law, 199). And Weinfeld: “In 
Israel, as in Mesopotamia, the collections of laws were edited by scribes whose object was to present the 
desirable rather than the actual and hence the gap between the laws and the legal documents, which 
reflected the actual reality. However, one cannot repudiate the real historical basis reflected in the 
pentateuchal laws of the Sabbatical year and the year of Jubilee, just as one cannot deny the actual reality 
standing behind the Mesopotamian laws” (Weinfeld, “Sabbatical Year and the Jubilee,” 42–43). Milgrom 
writes: “One should not confuse H’s Utopian ideals, which are far ahead of their time, with the 
socioeconomic problems that H is attempting to solve. The fact that H is more constructive than D is an 
indication of only H’s loftier vision, not its alleged lateness” (Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2207). Maybe we 
could say that Lev 25:39–46 could be read in both a radical and idealistic fashion on one side, and a 
socioeconomically realistic manner on the other—and that the text was intentionally composed to hold both 
possible readings open? Compare the tension between what Hamilton describes as “the ideal portrait and 
the importance of observance” in Deut 15:4–6, claiming that “there shall be no needy among you,” with the 
“importance of observance” being carried over into 15:7–11, claiming that “there will never cease to be 




of the land.66 Besides Lev 19:34, the author of Ezek 47:22–23 could also have found 
support in the above suggested reading of 25:35, 39–40. In Jer 34:9, on the contrary, the 
ethnic ambivalence from the Pentateuchal manumission instructions is not perceived. 
Here the ִעְבִרי is specifically defined as ִּביהּוִדי ָאִחיהּו ִאיׁש (“among Judahites, he is your 
brother”), and I find no hint that Jer 34 has the foreigner in view.67 In Jer 34, Hebrew 
/ִעְבִרי) ָּיהִעְבִר  , vv. 9, 14) and Judahites ( ּוִדיְיה , v. 9) simply appear to be synonomous ethnic 
designations. 
Deut 15:12–18 
The following Table 9 gives Deut 15:12–18 MT with a translation.68 
Deuteronomy 15:1–11 speaks of the seventh-year debt remission for Israelites 
 (15:1–3), promising abundance (15:4–6), while encouraging loaning to the needy 
(15:7–11). Deut 15:12–18 speaks of a seventh-year release for both male and female 
slaves, providing them with abundant supplies as they go out (15:13–15).69 In contrast to 
Exod 21:2–6 which seems to be an individual cycle, the links to the national cycle of 
Deut 15:1 and 31:9–11 for the ְׁשִמָּטה make it possible to read Deut 15:12 as either 
                                               
66 Cf. Lyons, From Law to Prophecy, 133–34. 
67 Cf. Hornkohl, Language of the Book of Jeremiah, 306. On inconsistency of gentilic reference in 
LXX see Hornkohl, Language of the Book of Jeremiah, 314. 
68 Deut 15:14–15 is attested in 1QDeutb, frg. 5 and Deut 15:15–18 in 4QDeutc, frgs. 28–30. In 
15:14 the MT ְיהָוה is replaced with א[֯דני in 1QDeutb, frg. 5, and in 15:15 instead of the MT ָאֹנִכי ְמַצְּוָך we 
find the more elaborate א[ֿנכי מצוך לֿע֯ש ]תו in 1QDeutb, frg. 5. Cf. Teeter, Scribal Laws, 134, 136. 
69 For a discussion of the relation between the agricultural fallow and debt remission in Exod 
23:10–11, Lev 25:2–7, and in Deut 15:1–18 see Bergsma, The Jubilee from Leviticus to Qumran, 131–32; 
Stackert, Rewriting the Torah, 118–22. For an argument that Deut 15:1–18 “formed the centre of the 




Table 9. Deut 15:12–18 
כי־ימכר לך אחיך העברי או העבריה ועבדך  12
ׁשׁש ׁשנים ובׁשנה הׁשביעת תׁשלחנו חפׁשי 
וכי־תׁשלחנו חפׁשי מעמך לא תׁשלחנו  13מעמך׃ 
העניק תעניק לו מצאנך ומגרנך  14ריקם׃ 
 15ומיקבך אׁשר ברכך יהוה אלהיך תתן־לו׃ 
וזכרת כי עבד היית בארץ מצרים ויפדך יהוה 
 16אלהיך על־כן אנכי מצוך את־הדבר הזה היום׃ 
והיה כי־יאמר אלי לא אצא מעמך כי אהבך 
ולקחת את־ 17ואת־ביתך כי־טוב לו עמך׃ 
לך עבד עולם  המרצע ונתתה באזנו ובדלת והיה
לא־יקׁשה בעינך  18ואף לאמתך תעׂשה־כן׃ 
בׁשלחך אתו חפׁשי מעמך כי מׁשנה ׂשכר ׂשכיר 
עבדך ׁשׁש ׁשנים וברכך יהוה אלהיך בכל אׁשר 
 תעׂשה׃ פ
12 If your brother is sold to you, a Hebrew man or 
woman, he shall serve you six years but in the 
seventh year you shall send70 him free from 
yourself. 13 And when you send him free from 
yourself you shall not send him empty-handed. 14 
Furnish him liberally from your flock and from 
your threshing floor and from your winepress, of 
that which YHWH your God blessed you you shall 
give him. 15 And remember that you were a slave 
in the land of Egypt, and YHWH your God 
redeemed you. Therefore, I command you this 
thing today. 16 And it shall be, if he says to you, “I 
do not want to exit from you, for I love you and 
your house,” because it is good for him with you, 
17 then you shall take the awl and put it through his 
ear and into the door, and he shall be your male 
slave forever, and you shall do thus also to your 
female salve. 18 Do not be hard in your eyes when 
you are sending him away, free from you. For he 
has served you for six years the double wages of a 
hired worker. And YHWH your God will bless 
you in all that you do. 
 
 
following an individual or national cycle.71 Whether Jer 34:14 understood Deut 15:12 as 
                                               
70 Since ׁשלח is used in Deut 15:12–13 three times, and since it has the meaning of ‘send’ in 
15:13b instead of ‘set (free)’ as in the two previous cases, I prefer to render all three cases in a similar way, 
as ‘send.’ 
71 A question here is whether or not we should see a basic contradiction between the ִמֵּקץ ֶׁשַבע־
,in 15:12. Besides Deut 15:1 and Jer 34:14 ֵׁשׁש ָׁשִנים ּוַבָּׁשָנה ַהְּׁשִביִעת of Deut 15:1 and ָׁשִנים  is  ִמֵּקץ ֶׁשַבע ָׁשִנים
also used in Deut 31:10 for the septennial reading of Torah at the Festival of Booths. It is here linked to the 
time of remission (ְּבֹמֵעד ְׁשַנת ַהְּׁשִמָּטה, cf. Deut 15:2, 9). Sarna has argued that the septennial cycle of 
manumission of slaves and reading of Torah coincided, implying a national cycle of the Deuteronomic 
manumission as well (cf. Sarna, “Zedekiah's Emancipation,” 147). Fischer explains that the two 
designations are used in Deut 15 and 31 in the sense of “in the seventh year,” an expression used in 15:12 
ֵׁשׁש + עבד According to him there may therefore not have to be a contradiction between .(ַבָּׁשָנה ַהְּׁשִביִעת)
 (Die Fügung ‘am Ende von sieben Jahren’ ist auch in Dtn 15,1 (für das Erlaßjahr“ :ִמֵּקץ ֶׁשַבע ָׁשִנים and ָׁשִנים
und 31,10 (für die Verlesung des Gesetzes im Sabbatjahr) belegt. Beide Male laßt es sich als Beendigung 
einer Zeitspanne verstehen, gleichbedeutend mit ‘im siebten Jahr’ oder ‘nach Ablauf von (vollen) sechs 
Jahren’, sodaß es mit der bald folgenden Zeitangabe (‘sechs Jahre’) nicht im Widerspruch stehen muß” 
(Fischer, Jeremia 26–52, 255). Cf. Bright, Jeremiah, 222; Holladay, Jeremiah 26–52, 238; Lundbom, 
Jeremiah 21-36, 563 taking a similar view. Cf. Levinson, Deuteronomy, 92 where he speaks of Deut 15:1, 
12 as having a “common septennial cycle.” Others maintain that the debt remission of Deut 15:1 was a 
national cycle while the slave manumission an individual cycle (cf. Lemche, “The Manumission of Slaves,” 
45; Weinfeld, “Sabbatical Year and the Jubilee,” 39–40; Chirichigno, Debt-Slavery, 282–86; McConville, 




representing a national cycle, and just wanted to make the point explicit by conflating the 
passage with Deut 15:1, or whether it understood the two to represent a national and 
individual cycle respectively while reworking Deut 15:12 into a national cycle by reusing 
15:1, it seems clear that Jer 34:14 presents Deut 15:12 as a national cycle.72 Providing 
abundantly for the released slave seems to be the main emphasis in the Deuteronomic 
manumission instruction.73 There is, therefore, a strong thrust towards compassion for the 
needy in this passage.74 While Exod 21:2–11 focuses on the conditions for the release of 
                                               
Leuchter, “The Manumission Laws,” 647). For the literary interconnectedness of Deut 15:1–11 and 15:12–
18 see Hamilton, Social Justice and Deuteronomy, 25–31. For a discussion on the dating and understanding 
of the seven-year cycle see Otto Loretz, Habiru-Hebräer: Eine soziolinguistiche Studie über die Herkunft 
des Gentiliciums 'ibri vom Appelativum ḫabiru, BZAW (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1984); N. P. Lemche, “The 
Hebrew and the Seven Year Cycle,” BN 25 (1984); Van Seters, A Law Book for the Diaspora, 94–95. 
72 It seems clear at least that Jer 34:14 sees them, or takes them, as referring to the same timeframe 
(contra Chavel, “'Let My People Go!',” 81–83 who sees a conflict between Deut 15 and Jer 34). Tigay 
writes that while Deut 15:1 seems to be a national cycle, while 15:12 an individual, in Jer 34 the two were 
“taken to be identical and that all servants were to be freed simultaneously, in the year of remission” 
(Tigay, Deuteronomy, 468). He explains that this ‘conflation’ might have been inspired by the two seven 
year cycles being juxtaposed in Deuteronomy based on an associative principle of organizing the laws. For 
a discussion of Jer 41:14 LXX see Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer der Tora. 
73 Cf. McConville, Deuteronomy, 263. According to Deut 15:1–11, in the Sabbath-year the people 
are to remit a loan to a neighbor, but in 15:3 they are allowed to exact a loan from foreigners. This reminds 
of the differentiation between the native and foreigner in Exod 21:8 and Lev 25:39–55. As they loan 
generously towards Hebrews and let go of the claim toward the loan in the Sabbath-year, God’s blessing 
will ensure that they have plenty to loan to other nations and get back their interest and loans manifold. 
Further, it will ensure that there will be no needy in the land (15:4), so there will really be no loss. But is 
there not an irony here? The blessing presupposes that they cancel loans in the Sabbath-year, while the 
blessing itself will eradicate the need of anyone to have to loan. So, if the people were loyal to the 
instruction, how could they then fulfill the condition for the blessing? May this paradoxically also be the 
key to the apparent contradiction between the presence and absence of the needy in the land mentioned in 
15:4, 11? This again may be an example of where a socioeconomic realistic reading of the instruction is 
challenged by a more radical reading. Compare how Deut 15:6 here may be playing on the word מׁשל in 
) he is not entitled“) ְלַעם ָנְכִרי לֹא־ִיְמֹׁשל ְלָמְכָרּה ְּבִבְגדֹו־ָבּה ׁשלמ ) to sell her to a foreign people in his 
treacherous dealing with her”) from Exod 21:8 in the formulation ּוָמַׁשְלָּת ְּבגֹוִים ַרִּבים ּוְבָך לֹא ִיְמֹׁשלּו (“and you 
will dominate ( ׁשלמ ) many nations, but they shall not dominate ( ׁשלמ ) you”). Deut 15:3 also mention the 
 .(”the foreigner“) ֶאת־ַהָּנְכִרי
74 Hamilton points out that in contrast to Exod 21:2–6, in Deut 15:16–17 “no attempt is made to 
spell out the circumstances which lie behind or create the desire for renouncing manumission. Only the 
attitude of the slave is spoken of, not the circumstances of that slave (married or not, childless or having 




slaves, Deut 15:12–18 focuses on the duty of the master to treat the slaves generously 
upon release.75 
Jer 34:8–22  
The following Table 10 gives the Jer 34:8–22 MT with a translation. 
                                               
familial circumstances of the subservient in Exod 21 and Lev 25 in contrast to Deut 15. The latter is simply 
not focusing on this question. Stackert explains the absence of the fallow year in Deut 15 as due to the 
absence of the fallow year in Exod 23:10–11 as well. He also points out that the ethical concerns of Deut 15 
results in the passage not focusing upon agricultural issues (Stackert, Rewriting the Torah, 129–41). 
75 Cf. Lohfink, “Fortschreibung?,” 159–60. Some commentators see no order in the legal material 
of Deut 12–26. Others have argued that Deut 12–26 is structured according to the Decalogue. In this later 
view, Deut 15:1–18 can be seen as corresponding to the Fourth Word of the Decalogue concerning the 
Sabbath. Cf. Stephen A. Kaufman, “The Structure of the Deuteronomic Law,” MAARAV 1/2 (1978-79): 
258–61; Bergsma, The Jubilee from Leviticus to Qumran, 130; Kilchör, Mosetora und Jahwetora, 41–70, 
108–15, 126–56; Hamilton, Social Justice and Deuteronomy, 103–7; Chirichigno, Debt-Slavery, 258–61. 
Braulik places Deut 15:1–18 rather together with the Third Word (Georg Braulik, Die deuteronomischen 
Gesetze und der Dekalog: Studien zum Aufbau von Deuteronomium 12–26 (Stuttgart: Katolisches 
Bibelwerk GMbH, 1991), 35–38. For other discussion on the Decalogic order of the instructions in 
Deuteronomy see Rüterswörden, “Die Dekalogstruktur des Deuteronomiums - Fragen an eine Annahme,” ; 
Georg Braulik, “Der unterbrochene Dekalog: Zu Deuteronomium 5,12 und 16 und ihrer Bedeutung für den 
deuteronomischen Gesetzeskodex,” ZAW 120 (2008); Otto, Deuteronomium 4,44–11,32, 689–704; Rofé, 
“The Arrangement of the Laws in Deuteronomy,” 55–77. Cf. Westbrook, “Origins of Legislation,” 95. For 
another approach to the order of instructions in Deuteronomy, mirroring the narrative material in Genesis to 
Numbers see E. Blum, Studien zur Komposition des Pentateuch, BZAW (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1990), 197–
201. Westbrook dated the composition of Deuteronomy to the 7th century. While the ANE law according to 
him was retrospective, in Deut 15 and its debt-release he finds a “fundamental innovation” in biblical legal 
thinking toward a prospective concept of law. He sees a simultaneous rise of a legislative concept of law in 
both Athens and ancient Israel (Westbrook, “Origins of Legislation,” 92–93). For a criticism of 
Westbrook’s analysis of Deut 15 see LeFebvre, Collections, Codes, and Torah, 76–83. Contra Westbrook 
on Deut 15, LeFebvre claims that prospective and cyclical cultic calendars were not unique to the HB, but 
“what was unique about Israel was its tendency to incorporate such cultic cycles into its law collections” 
(LeFebvre, Collections, Codes, and Torah, 79). He also claims that the prospective element in the ‘release’ 
 of Deut 15 does not signal Westbrook’s “transformation to true prospective legislation,” “a (ְׁשִמָּטה)
different intellectual climate,” or a “fundamental innovation” (Westbrook, “Origins of Legislation,” 92–
93), but is already found in the command to ‘release’ (ִּתְׁשְמֶטָּנה) the land every seventh year in Exod 23:10–
11. LeFebvre writes: “Supporting this view is the fact that the septennial release is not ‘new prospective 
legislation’ but actually goes back in principles to BC, where a cyclical ‘release’ (שמטה) was declared for 
the land: ‘Six years you shall sow your land and gather its produce, but the seventh year you shall leave it 
fallow (תשמטנה), that the poor of your people may eat. . .’ (Exod 23:10–11). The stated purpose of that BC 
release was a concern for the poor. The Deuteronomic provision calls itself by the same title (שמטה) and 
incorporates the same concern for the poor (vv. 4–11). In other words, Deut is not creating a new statutory 
cycle; it is merely updating an existing release-law cycle. The Deuteronomic version of the release is recast 




Table 10. Jer 34:8–22 
הדבר אׁשר־היה אל־ירמיהו מאת יהוה אחרי  8
כרת המלך צדקיהו ברית את־כל־העם אׁשר 
לׁשלח איׁש את־ 9בירוׁשלם לקרא להם דרור׃ 
עבדו ואיׁש את־ׁשפחתו העברי והעבריה חפׁשים 
ויׁשמעו  10׃ 76לבלתי עבד־בם ביהודי אחיהו איׁש
בברית לׁשלח כל־הׂשרים וכל־העם אׁשר־באו 
איׁש את־עבדו ואיׁש את־ׁשפחתו חפׁשים לבלתי 
ויׁשובו אחרי־ 11׃ 77עבד־בם עוד ויׁשמעו ויׁשלחו
כן ויׁשבו את־העבדים ואת־הׁשפחות אׁשר ׁשלחו 
ויהי  12חפׁשים ויכבׁשום לעבדים ולׁשפחות׃ ס 
כה־ 13דבר־יהוה אל־ירמיהו מאת יהוה לאמר׃ 
אמר יהוה אלהי יׂשראל אנכי כרתי ברית את־
ותיכם ביום הוצאי אותם מארץ מצרים מבית אב
מקץ ׁשבע ׁשנים תׁשלחו איׁש  14עבדים לאמר׃ 
את־אחיו העברי אׁשר־ימכר לך ועבדך ׁשׁש ׁשנים 
וׁשלחתו חפׁשי מעמך ולא־ׁשמעו אבותיכם אלי 
ותׁשבו אתם היום ותעׂשו  15ולא הטו את־אזנם׃ 
את־היׁשר בעיני לקרא דרור איׁש לרעהו ותכרתו 
ותׁשבו  16ׁשר־נקרא ׁשמי עליו׃ ברית לפני בבית א
ותחללו את־ׁשמי ותׁשבו איׁש את־עבדו ואיׁש את־
ותכבׁשו  78ׁשפחתו אׁשר־ׁשלחתם חפׁשים לנפׁשם
לכן  17לכם לעבדים ולׁשפחות׃ ס  79אתם להיות
כה־אמר יהוה אתם לא־ׁשמעתם אלי לקרא דרור 
 ואיׁש לרעהו הנני קרא לכם דרור  80איׁש לאחיו
 
8 The word that came to Jeremiah from YHWH, 
after king Zedekiah cut a covenant with all the 
people that were in Jerusalem to proclaim release 
among them, 9 each one to send his slave free, 
and each one his maidservant, a Hebrew man or 
woman, that none enslave his brother among 
Judeans. 10 And all the officials and all the people 
that came into the covenant to send free each one 
his slave and maidservant, not to enslave again 
among them. And they heard and they sent away. 
11 But afterward they turned around and returned 
the slaves and maidservant whom they sent free. 
And they subjected them to slaves and 
maidservants. 12 And the word of YHWH came to 
Jeremiah from YHWH, saying: 13 Thus says 
YHWH, the God of Israel: I, I made a covenant 
with your fathers when I brought them from the 
land of Egypt, from the house of slavery, saying: 
14 At the end of seven years each one shall send 
his Hebrew brother, who was sold to you and 
served you for six years, you shall send him free 
from you. But your fathers did not listen to me 
and did not incline their ear. 15 But you, you 
turned one day, and you did what was right in my 
eyes to proclaim a release, each one to his 
neighbor. And you made a covenant before my 
face, in the house which is called by my name.  16 
But you turned around and profaned my name by 
returning each man his slave and his maidservant 
whom you sent free for their life. 17 Therefore, 
thus says YHWH: You did not listen to me to 
proclaim a release, each one to his brother, and 
each one to his neighbor. Behold, I  
                                               
76 MT ָאִחיהּו ִאיׁש is not rendered in LXX. 
77 Jeremiah 41:10 LXX does not render Jer 34:10 MT ָחפְ ִׁשים ְלִבלְ ִּתי ֲעָבד־ּבָ ם עֹוד וַ ִּיְׁשְמעּו ַויְ ַׁשֵּלחּו, 
possibly because it saw it as redundant. 
78 Others render ְלַנְפָׁשם in 34:16 as “according to their desire” (NRSV/ESV/NASB), “to go where 
they wished” (NIV), “at their pleasure” (KJV/YLT/OJPS), or omit the phrase (NJPS). Given the meaning 
“their life” (ַנְפָׁשם) in 34:20–21 and the play on words in the chapter, linking sin and punishment, I prefer to 
render ְלַנְפָׁשם in 34:16 as well as “for their life.” The phrase  ְָׁשםְלַנפ  could be read as implying they were 
released for lifetime. LXX does not render 34:20 MT ְמַבְקֵׁשי ַנְפָׁשם (“those seeking their life”) or 34:21 
MT ד ְמַבְקֵׁשי ַנְפָׁשםּו ּוְביַדּוְביַ   (“and in the hands of those seeking their life, and in the hands of . . .”). 
79 MT ַוִּתְכְּבׁשּו ֹאָתם ִלְהיֹות (“and they subjected them to be”) is not rendered in LXX. 




Table 10 — Continued. 
 
ואל־הרעב  82אל־החרב אל־הדבר 81נאם־יהוה 
 לכל ממלכות הארץ׃  83ונתתי אתכם לזועה
ונתתי את־האנׁשים העברים את־ברתי אׁשר  18
לא־הקימו את־דברי הברית אׁשר כרתו לפני 
 אׁשר כרתו לׁשנים ויעברו בין בתריו׃ 84העגל
ׂשרי יהודה וׂשרי ירוׁשלם הסרסים והכהנים  19
 ונתתי  20וכל עם הארץ העברים בין בתרי העגל׃ 
proclaim a release for you, says YHWH, to the 
sword, to the pestilence and to the famine. And I 
will make you a horror for all the kingdoms of 
the earth. 18 I will make the men who 
transgressed my covenant, who did not fulfill the 
words of the covenant which they made before 
my face, the calf which they cut in two and 
passed between its parts: 19 The officials of Judah 
and the officials of Jerusalem, the eunuchs and 
the priests, and all the people of the land, who 
                                               
81 MT נְ ֻאם־ְיהָוה (“saying of YHWH”) is not rendered in LXX. 
82 MT ֶאל־ַהֶּדֶבר is present in LXX as εἰς τὸν θάνατον (“into death”). 
83 MT ִלַזוֲָעה is rendered in LXX as εἰς διασπορὰν (“to dispersion”). 
84 There is a discussion on whether the text should read ְוָנַתִּתי ֶאת־ָהֲאָנִׁשים  . . . ָהֵעגֶ ל (“I will make 
the men . . . a calf”) or  ֵָעֶגלּכ  I will make the men . . . like the calf”). The latter“) ְוָנַתִּתי ֶאת־ָהֲאָנִׁשים . . . 
reading, which has also been the common, lends itself to the idea that the rite of dividing the calf implied 
some kind of self-imprecation or self-curse. Cf. Carroll, Jeremiah, 645–46. John Bright has suggested that 
a simpler reading is to transpose “the young bull” after “they cut” and render it as “I will hand over the men 
who have transgressed my covenant, who did not keep the terms of the covenant which they made in my 
presence, when they cut the young bull in two and passed between its parts” (Bright, Jeremiah, 220). 
Gerhard Hasel sees the “acted-out curse rite” in the vassal treaty between Ashurniari V and Mati’lu of 
Arpad to “fit more or less the passage of Jer 34:18–19 but hardly the one of Gen 15:9–10, 17” (Gerhard F. 
Hasel, “The Meaning of the Animal Rite in Genesis 15,” JSOT 19 (1981): 69). On p. 64 Hasel rejects using 
Jer 34 as a key to understand the animal rite in Gen 15. Cf. also Arvid S. Kapelrud, “The Interpretation of 
Jeremiah 34, 18ff.,” JSOT, no. 22 (1982) responding to Hasel. Åke Viberg goes one step further than Hasel, 
denying even Jer 34:18–19 should be understood as a self-imprecation or self-curse, but rather simply as a 
covenant ratification. He writes: “The only thing that can be said for sure is that it is presupposed that 
breaking the covenant brings severe punishment. The legal function of dividing a calf and walking through 
the parts is, according to Jer 34:18, to ratify a covenant that has been made. There is no evidence from the 
text to imply a self-imprecatory sense of the act. There is also nothing that would indicate a sacrificial 
nature of the preparatory act of cutting up of the calf, Jer 34:18” (Åke Viberg, Symbols of Law: A 
Contextual Analysis of Legal Symbolic Acts in the Old Testament (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell 
International, 1992), 62–63). For a similar view see Lundbom, Jeremiah 21-36, 564–66; Holladay, 
Jeremiah 26–52, 242–43. Cf. Weeks, Adminition and Curse, 150. LXX has Ἐγὼ ἐθέμην διαθήκην (“I made 
a covenant”), and does not render the idea of ‘cutting’ a covenant (ָּכַרִּתי ְבִרית) in 34:13. Jeremiah 41:18 
LXX has τὸν μόσχον ὃν ἐποίησαν ἐργάζεσθαι αὐτῷ (“the calf which they prepared to sacrifice with it” 
(Brenton)). LXX therefore does not contain the idea of cutting the calf in two. Further, 41:19 LXX has καὶ 
τὸν λαόν (“and the people”) instead of MT ְוֹכל ַעם ָהָאֶרץ ָהֹעְבִרים ֵּבין ִּבְתֵרי ָהֵעֶגל (“and all the people of the 
land who passed between the parts of the calf”). Discussing this case Maier sees a possible allusion 
(“Anspielung”) in Jer 34:18 to Gen 15 (Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer der Tora, 274. See also pp. 253, 259–60, 
273–75). She also discusses a possible link in Jer 41:18 LXX to the image of the calf at Sinai in Exod 32 
(pp. 273, 275–76). 
Which ְּבִרִתי (“my covenant”) is precisely referred to in 34:18? Because of the description of 
passing through the halves of the calf, it is often read as referring to the ְּבִרית in 34:8–10. But would 
YHWH speak of this as “my covenant”? Might 34:18 be referring to the covenant YHWH made ( ָּכַרִּתי ָאֹנִכי 
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אותם ביד איביהם וביד מבקׁשי נפׁשם והיתה 
 נבלתם למאכל לעוף הׁשמים ולבהמת הארץ׃ 
ואת־צדקיהו מלך־יהודה ואת־ׂשריו אתן ביד  21
איביהם וביד מבקׁשי נפׁשםוביד חיל מלך בבל 
נאם־יהוה הנני מצוה  22העלים מעליכם׃ 
והׁשבתים אל־העיר הזאת ונלחמו עליה ולכדוה 
מאין  וׂשרפה באׁש ואת־ערי יהודה אתן ׁשממה
 יׁשב׃ פ
passed between the parts of the calf, 20 and I will 
give them in the hand of their enemies and in the 
hand of those seeking their life. And their corpses 
will be food for the birds of the heavens and the 
animals of the earth. 21 And Zedekiah, king of 
Judah, and his officials I will give in the hand of 
their enemies and in the hand of those seeking 
their life and in the hand of the army of the king 
of Babylon, having come up against them. 22 
Behold, I command, says YHWH, and I bring 
them to this city, and they will fight against her 
and take her and burn her with fire. And I will 
make the cities of Judah a desolation, without 
inhabitants. 
 
Some have claimed that Jer 34:8–22 does not belong to the original Jeremianic 
composition while others have found the passage to be appropriate to Jeremianic 
tradition.85 Some see the initial prologue and longer sermon in Jer 34:8–22 as a 
Deuteronomistic supplement to a historical source, possibly a royal annal. Some have 
seen it as “an amalgam of various strands and motifs.”86 My proposal will be similar to 
                                               
85 There are no fragments among the DSS for Jer 34:8–22. Jer 34:8–22 MT corresponds to Jer 
41:8–22 LXX. For how “the LXX has to be considered a defective and inferior text” see Lundbom, 
Jeremiah 21-36, 558. For a discussion on the relation between Jer MT and Jer LXX see Tov, The 
Septuagint Translation of Jeremiah and Baruch: A Discussion of an Early Revision of the LXX of Jeremiah 
29-52 and Baruch 1:1-3:8; Tov, “The Literary History of the Book of Jeremiah in the Light of Its Textual 
History,” 211–41; Rofé, “The Arrangement of the Book of Jeremiah,” 390–98; Rofé, “The Arrangement of 
the Book of Jeremiah (MT and LXX) (in Hebrew),” 126–37; Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer der Tora, 26–30, 
252–54, 257–60. Relevant for our discussion and the reuse of Deut 15 in Jer 34 is Rofé’s comment: “When 
did the dominant arrangement of the Book of Jeremiah (disregarding chs. 30; 31; 33) come into existence? 
The clue to the answer lies in the second collection (chs. 25–36). Here Deuteronomistic sermons, such as 
chs. 25; 27; 29; 32; 34; 35, alternate with reports of events that were only partly affected by 
Deuteronomistic phraseology—chs. 26; 28; 36” (Rofé, “The Arrangement of the Book of Jeremiah,” 395). 
86 Carroll, Jeremiah, 648. It has been claimed that Jer 34:14 is a Deuteronomic gloss (Thiel, 
Jeremia 26-45, 38–43; Lemche, “The Manumission of Slaves,” 51–53; Raymond Westbrook, Property and 
the Family in Biblical Law, JSOTSup 113 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1991), 16n; LeFebvre, 
Collections, Codes, and Torah, 83–84. Contra Weippert, Die Prosareden des Jeremiabuches, 86–106; 
Lundbom, Jeremiah 21-36, 561). For a discussion on the compositional history of Jer 34:8–22 see 
Cardellini, Die biblischen 'Sklaven'-Gesetze, 313–15, 318–19; Holladay, Jeremiah 26–52, 238; Lundbom, 
Jeremiah 21-36, 557–58; Levinson, “Zedekiah's Release,” 315–18. Lundbom writes: “The main difference 
between vv 8–11 and 12–22 is that the former is narrative and the latter a cluster of divine oracles, and 




Smelik’s recent article, where he suggests “that Jer 34:8–22 has an inner cohesion and 
that the phenomena which led other scholars to conclude that we are dealing here with a 
compilation of texts or a piece of poor writing, are, in fact, literary devices meant to grab 
the reader’s attention.”87 
Jeremiah 34:8–22 is situated in the context of YHWH speaking to his prophet 
Jeremiah, in the middle of Nebuchadnezzar’s attack upon Judah and Jerusalem (34:1–7). 
As pointed out by Levinson, the narrative “begins midway through the story,” after 
Zedekiah and the people made the covenant, and after the people revoked it and re-
enslaved their former slaves, and without recounting the reasons for either.88 The siege on 
Jerusalem started in the 10th of Teveth in the ninth year of King Zedekiah (2 Kings 25:1; 
Jer 39:1; 52:4; Ezek 24:1–2). This date can be determined as January 15, 588 B.C.89 
Jeremiah 34:1–7 speaks of Jerusalem already under attack. It is likely during the siege of 
                                               
on the four messenger formulas found in Jer 34:13–22, Lundbom divides the passages into four oracles (I 
34:13–16; II 34:17a; III 34:17b–21; IV 34:22) (Lundbom, Jeremiah 21-36, 556–57). In this division, 
oracles I and II are indictment and oracles III and IV judgment. More generally on the book of Jeremiah, 
Fischer has argued that Jeremiah should be seen as a complex unified composition (Fischer, Jeremia 1–25, 
73). 
87 Smelik, “The Inner Cohesion of Jeremiah 34:8–22,” 239. See also p. 240. In his article Smelik 
demonstrates “the author’s deliberate choice not to provide all necessary information to the reader at once   
. . . . Instead, he distributes the data over the whole text, so that the reader gradually understands what has 
happened by combining the author’s different clues, in this way, the reader has a role to play in 
understanding the meaning of the text” (Smelik, “The Inner Cohesion of Jeremiah 34:8–22,” 239). 
88 Levinson, “Zedekiah's Release,” 313–14. 
89 Sarna, “Zedekiah's Emancipation,” 144; Thiele, The Mysterious Numbers of the Hebrew Kings, 
190; Lisbeth S. Fried and David N. Freedman, “Was the Jubilee Observed in Preexilic Judah?,” in Leviticus 
23–27: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB 3B (New York: Doubleday, 2001), 
2259, 2269. Keown comments regarding Jer 34:21–22: “The final two verses provide the only information 
regarding the time during Zedekiah’s reign when the covenant was made and then broken. Judgment is 
pronounced when the Babylonian army is withdrawing from Jerusalem (v 21b). The most logical 
implication is that the covenant was made while the city was being besieged and that the people reneged 
and took back their slaves when the siege was lifted” (Gerald Lynwood Keown et al., Jeremiah 26-52, 




Jerusalem that King Zedekiah took the initiative to release all the Hebrew slaves.90 But a 
brief withdrawal of the Babylonian forces to meet an Egyptian relief force from Pharaoh 
Hophra might have given the people occasion to brazenly enslave their released slaves 
once more.91 
According to Ezek 29:1, on the 12th of Teveth in the tenth year of Jehoiachin’s 
exile, i.e. in January 587 B.C., the Egyptian relief campaign seems to have been 
imminent. Jeremiah 34:21–22 mentions the withdrawal (ֵחיל ֶמֶלְך ָּבֶבל ָהֹעִלים ֵמֲעֵליֶכם, 
34:21) and return ( ל־ָהִעיר ַהּזֹאתַוֲהִׁשֹבִתים אֶ  , 34:22) of the Babylonians. In other words, the 
emancipation of the slaves seems to have occurred in 588 B.C. and the re-enslavement in 
587 B.C. after the arrival of the Egyptians.92 
It is possible that Zedekiah’s release took place in a sabbatical or Jubilee year, 
                                               
90 Here we do not need to concern ourselves with the relation between economic, military, and 
religious motivations Zedekiah might have had for making the covenant. For a discussion of Zedekiah’s 
possible motives see Bright, Jeremiah, 223; Chavel, “'Let My People Go!',” 71–73; Fischer, Jeremia 26–
52, 252–53; Lundbom, Jeremiah 21-36, 558–60; Smelik, “The Inner Cohesion of Jeremiah 34:8–22,” 246. 
For other historical cases where a king or masters chose to release slaves under a siege, see Moshé Anbar, 
“La libération des esclaves en temps de guerre: Jer 34 et ARM XXVI.363,” ZAW 111 (1999): 245; Smelik, 
“The Inner Cohesion of Jeremiah 34:8–22,” 239–50. Adrian Schenker proposes that Zedekiah’s 
emancipation of the slaves took place in his accession year, in 598 B.C., and that the return of the 
Babylonians mentioned in Jer 34:17 would then refer to the siege in 588/87 B.C. (Schenker, “Die 
Freilassung der hebräischen Sklaven,” 155–57). Together with the reuse of ‘Stichworte,’ Fischer concludes: 
“daß Dtn 15 Zidkija zu seinem Schritt inspirierte” (Fischer, Jeremia 26–52, 255. Italics original). 
91 The text does not tell us Zedekiah’s role in the taking back of the slaves. It seems to be a 
broader group of leaders in the people being responsible for this turn. Cf. Fischer, Jeremia 26–52, 259. 
What could have triggered the general return and subjection of the released slaves in 34:11? After such a 
public release, how could they turn around? Was this a gradual, one by one act, or a sudden coordinated 
act? The narrative does not tell. Suggestions are therefore conjectural. Sarna proposes that the re-
enslavement might have been due to a “need for manpower to work the neglected fields” (Sarna, 
“Zedekiah's Emancipation,” 144). For the false hopes in Egyptian help and the predicted return of the 
Babylonians, see Jer 34:21–22; 37:5–11; Ezek 17:11–18; 29:1–12; 30:20–21. For the criticism of the social 
elite in Jer 34, see Fischer, Jeremia 26–52, 258. 
92 Sarna, “Zedekiah's Emancipation,” 144–45. Sarna proposes the Autumn New Year festival as 




even if more solid evidence and consensus as how to reckon sabbatical and Jubilee years 
seems wanting.93 And it may even be that for Zedekiah immediate action was justified 
because of the neglect of a long overdue release, in which case neither establishing this 
nor the exact year of the manumission and re-enslavement are needed for the following 
discussion. It is noteworthy that Jer 34 itself does not claim that it was a sabbatical or 
                                               
93 Cf. Cardellini, Die biblischen 'Sklaven'-Gesetze, 319–22 who argues 590/89 was a Sabbath year. 
Sarna argues on the basis of the biblical texts that 588/87 was a Sabbath year (Sarna, “Zedekiah's 
Emancipation,” 149). Holladay sees the reading of Deuteronomy to have taken place during the Feast of 
Booths in the sabbatical year in September/October 587 and based on the Egyptian army approaching “in 
the spring or summer of 588,” he speculates whether Zedekiah’s release occurred during “the feast of 
weeks in late spring of 588.” Anyways, he concludes “that Zedekiah’s proclamation of emancipation was 
not connected (in either season or year) with the feast of booths in a sabbatical year” (Holladay, Jeremiah 
26–52, 239). Fried and Freedman are more bold, arguing that it is possible to determine that the 
manumission of the slaves in Jer 34 took place on Tishri 10, or October 8, in 588 B.C., and that the re-
enslavement would have occurred between December 29, 588 and February 24, 587 B.C. (Fried and 
Freedman, “Was the Jubilee Observed in Preexilic Judah?,” 2260). They also see that “the goal of both 
Jeremiah’s aborted trip to Anathoth [Jer 37:11–38:28] and Hanamel’s visit to the court of the guard [Jer 
32:1–15] may be the same: to return the land to its original owner, as required by the jubilee laws (Lev 
25:10)” (Fried and Freedman, “Was the Jubilee Observed in Preexilic Judah?,” 2261–64). Compare this 
with Rofé’s claim that Jer 30; 31; and 33 all were grouped around Jer 32 with Hanamel’s visit (Rofé, “The 
Arrangement of the Book of Jeremiah,” 395). If so, the clustering of Jer 30–33 around ch. 32 would 
strengthen the claim that the composer linked Jer 32 and 34 together, ch. 34 following immediately after 
this section. See also Fischer, Jeremia 26–52, 253 for a discussion of the time of Zedekiah’s release. 
Bergsma comments: “Additionally, the word דרור by itself occurs in Ezek 46:17. Lev 25:10 is, of course, 
the seminal verse of the jubilee legislation, and, it will be argued, Ezek 46:17 and Isa 61:10 are both 
allusions to the jubilee. Thus, outside of Jer 34, דרור occurs in the Bible only as a reference to the jubilee. 
This does not prove that Jer 34 also means to allude to the jubilee, but it makes it reasonable to suppose that 
it does. This is all the more the case since the only universal, simultaneous release of persons in bondage in 
the biblical legal corpora is Lev 25; Exod 21 and Deut 15 provide only for individual manumissions. In this 
respect, Zedekiah’s emancipation resembles the jubilee more closely than the regulations of Exod 21 or 
Deut 15, leading Fried and Friedmann to argue that 588–587 B.C.E. was a jubilee year. While Fried and 
Friedmann probably go beyond the evidence in making such an assertion, they are correct in noting that the 
phrase לקרא דרור in Jer 34 is a jubilee allusion” (Bergsma, The Jubilee from Leviticus to Qumran, 164). If 
Wacholder is correct in that 513/12 B.C. was a Sabbatical year, this would make 591/90 B.C. also a 
Sabbatical year according to the same calendar (Ben Zion Wacholder, “The Calendar of Sabbatical Cycles 
During the Second Temple and the Early Rabbinic Period,” HUCA 44 (1973)). In a later article he 
suggested that 603/2 B.C.–555/54 B.C. constituted a Jubilee cycle (Ben Zion Wacholder, 
“Chronomessianism: The Timing of the Messianic Movements and Calendar of Sabbatical Cycles,” HUCA 
46 (1975)). In both cases, Zedekiah’s manumission would be out of synchrony with either a Sabbatical or 
Jubilee year. The same applies to Douglas Waterhouse’s attempt to reconstruct the Sabbatical and Jubilee 
years. He concludes that 605/4 B.C. was both a Sabbatical and Jubilee year, with the closest Sabbatical 
years to Zedekiah’s release falling in either 591/90 B.C. or 584/83 B.C. (Douglas Waterhouse, “Is It 




Jubilee year.94 To me it seems safest simply to say that the emancipation took place “at 
some period during Nebuchadnezzar’s siege of Jerusalem.”95 
Jeremiah 34:8–11 presents YHWH’s address through Jeremiah as occasioned by 
the re-enslavement of Zedekiah’s covenant-released Hebrew slaves. The previous neglect 
of manumission in the sabbatical year implied in Jer 34:8–22, and the re-enslavement of 
the slaves, show that neither the sabbatical nor Jubilee manumission was necessarily 
                                               
94 In fact, as pointed out by Fischer, the cultic offerings and calendar is absent from the Book of 
Jeremiah: “The entire legislation for cultic offerings is completely absent in Jer. . . . The major feasts – 
Pesach, Sukkot, and the Feast of Booths – are not mentioned, nor are the pilgrimages prescribed on these 
occasions. Similarly, Yom Kippur does not occur in Jer” (Fischer, “The Relationship of the Book of 
Jeremiah to the Torah,” 905). The silence as to a possible link between Zedekiah’s release and a Sabbatical 
or Jubilee year in Jer 34 therefore belongs to a more general pattern in the Book of Jeremiah not to mention 
the cultic calendar. We do not need to speculate as to whether Jeremiah intentionally omitted mentioning 
that Zedekiah’s release occurred in a Sabbath or Jubilee year, or whether the text simply reflects the fact 
that there was no such year coinciding with or occasioning Zedekiah’s release. What is to be observed here 
is simply that the text does not mention such a link. 
95 Sarna, “Zedekiah's Emancipation,” 144. We could ask why Jer 34 mentions a solemn covenantal 
ritual if it was only the implementation of the neglected Sabbath year? Would it not have been sufficient 
simply to refer to the Sabbath year? It is noteworthy that the text itself does not claim that Zedekiah’s 
manumission took place in relation to a Sabbath year, even if the rationale for a Sabbath year is referred to. 
Otto suggests that Jer 34:8ff follows the ANE mīšarum-edict, where the manumission depended on a royal 
decree (Otto, Theologische Ethik des Alten Testaments, 255). Contra Westbrook (Westbrook, Property and 
the Family, 16), LeFebvre has pointed out that Jer 34 does not testify to a “political coup” where “the 
Deuteronomic editor intended ‘to replace the untrustworthy royal prerogative’ with a written statute.” 
Instead, “the king is still upheld as the one who holds authority to pronounce release proclamations (vv. 8–
10). He is, in fact, commended by Yahweh for having independently determined the circumstances 
warranting a release (v. 15). The only thing for which Zedekiah is rebuked is his going back on his דרור 
proclamation (v. 16)” (LeFebvre, Collections, Codes, and Torah, 86). Cassuto wrote commenting on Jer 
34: “It is obvious, that they would not have been permitted to bring them back to a state of servitude, had 
not the existing law given them the right to do this. It would seem that the state law of the time made no 
provision for the Hebrew slave to be freed after a given number of years, and whoever acquired a Hebrew 
slave acquired him forever. The Torah law, whose existence at the time is not in doubt, since the covenant 
was based upon it, was regarded as an ethical precept that was left to a person’s conscience in the name of 
religion. The covenant that was made on the initiative of king Zedekiah did not mean the enactment of a 
new civil law, but only a moral obligation, which the princes and the people accepted voluntarily, in order 
to fulfill the Torah precept. Had the king desired to promulgate a statute in this regard, there would have 
been no need for a covenant to have been made between the parts of the calf. His intention was doubtless to 
arrange a solemn religious ceremony to mark the acceptance of the obligation of the commandment that 
was ordained in the name of the Lord” (Cassuto, A Commentary on the Book of Exodus, 261). Cassuto 
therefore takes Zedekiah’s covenant as evidence of the moral thrust of the manumission, rather than seeing 




practiced in pre-exilic times (cf. Lev 26:34–35; 2 Chr 36:21).96 YHWH’s first speech in 
34:12–16 is a historical description in light of his former manumission instruction 
(34:13–14). YHWH’s second speech in 34:17–22 begins with the basic indictment of the 
people and then declares their punishment.97 The prophetic words are presented as 
YHWH’s words (cf. 34:8, 12–13, 17). The majority view that Jer 34 reused Deut 15—a 
view I share—implies that YHWH in Jer 34 is presented as reusing his own instructions 
in Deuteronomy. Even if the book of Deuteronomy is couched in the words of Moses, the 
book presents the instructions as having originally been given by YHWH himself (Deut 
1:3; 4:5, 14; 6:1, 17; 10:13). In Jer 34:14, YHWH therefore claims to have been the 
speaker of the words of Moses in Deut 15:12.98 Jer 34 therefore presents itself as a case 
where YHWH reuses his own words. 
                                               
96 Milgrom comments on the observance of sabbatical years in pre-exilic times: “On whether it 
was actually observed, however, there is ample room for doubt. There is no textual evidence that it was 
observed in prexilic times. To the contrary, the admonitions of Lev 26:34–35 (cf. 2 Chr 36:21) testify that 
the law was observed only in the breach. (The claim that Zedekiah’s release occurred in an actual 
sabbatical year [Sarna 1973] has been disputed [Lemche 1976: 51–53, 59] . . . ). In any event, this text—
whether it stems from preexilic or exilic times is inconsequential—proves that the law itself is older (Alt 
[1968: 165, n. 118] dates it to Israel’s settlement in Canaan)” (Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2246). Cf. Otto, 
Theologische Ethik des Alten Testaments, 83, 105. Since “your fathers” (ֲאבֹוֵתיֶכם) are described as the 
Exodus-generation in 34:13, the reference to the fathers not listening in 34:14 seems to refer to the same 
generation, and not generally the ancestors. Nevertheless, since the contrast is to the people in Zedekiah’s 
days in 34:15, who recently made a temporary release ( ּיֹוםהַ  ַאֶּתם ָּתֻׁשבּווַ  ), the impression left by the passage 
is that the Sabbatical or Jubilee manumissions were not practiced in Israel between the Exodus-generation 
and Zedekiah’s time either. For the structure of Jer 34:8–22, especially the prophetic introduction formular 
in 34:8 compared to the Wiederaufnahme in 34:12 cf. Smelik, “The Inner Cohesion of Jeremiah 34:8–22,” 
240–41. 
97 Jer 34 also bears similarities to Neh 5; 13. Cf. Chavel, “'Let My People Go!',” 93–94; Fischer, 
Jeremia 1–25, 70. As the present discussion focus on reuse between the manumission instructions in Torah 
and Jer 34, and not the view of slave release in the HB per se, and because it does not seem to be a 
dependence of either passage here under study on Neh 5, I choose here not to go more into a discussion of 
these similarities. The likely explanation for the parallels seems to be a reuse in Neh 5 of the manumission 
instructions and Jer 34. 





Jeremiah 34 shows evidence of the oral-written continuum discussed by 
Niditsch.99 God speaks orally to Jeremiah and the words are presented as recorded in the 
written text we have.100 When Zedekiah made a covenant with the people to release the 
Hebrew slaves, the words of the covenant may have been written down or transmitted 
orally, but are presented as initially proclaimed orally (34:8, 15, 17). The people heard 
the covenant (cf. the double ַוִּיְׁשְמעּו in 34:10). YHWH’s instructions are presented as 
having been spoken orally, with ֵלאֹמר (“saying”) in 34:13 introducing the quotation from 
Torah, even if 34:14 seems to be a reuse of the written formulations found in Deut 15:12. 
Further, the audible reception of YHWH’s words through “listening” and the “ear”—or 
more precisely the lack thereof—in ְולֹא־ָׁשְמעּו ֲאבֹוֵתיֶכם ֵאַלי ְולֹא ִהּטּו ֶאת־ָאְזָנם (“but your 
fathers did not listen to me nor turn their ear”) in 34:14 also indicate that the Torah 
instructions are perceived as being presented orally. Given the discussion of a text-
supported oral culture of the present work, we should therefore bear in mind the ANE 




                                               
99 Cf. my discussion in the third chapter. 
100 Cf. ַהָּדָבר ֲאֶׁשר־ָהָיה ֶאל־ִיְרְמָיהּו ֵמֵאת ְיהָוה in 34:8, ַוְיִהי ְדַבר־ְיהָוה ֶאל־ִיְרְמָיהּו ֵמֵאת ְיהָוה ֵלאֹמר in  
 
ְנֻאם־ְיהָוה ִהְנִני ְמַצֶּוה ,in 34:17 ָלֵכן ֹּכה־ָאַמר ְיהָוה ַאֶּתם לֹא־ְׁשַמְעֶּתם ֵאַלי ,in 34:13 ֹּכה־ָאַמר ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֵהי ִיְׂשָרֵאל ,34:12  
in 34:22. 
There seems to be a redundancy here in Jer 34:12, ֹמרַוְיִהי ְדַבר־ְיהָוה ֶאל־ִיְרְמָיהּו ֵמֵאת ְיהָוה ֵלא . It is 
specified that it was the word of YHWH and that YHWH spoke it. Why this double determination? Further, 
as if this was not enough, 34:13 begins with ֹּכה־ָאַמר ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֵהי ִיְׂשָרֵאל. LXX does not render  ָהֵמֵאת ְיהו  in 




Exod 21:2–11; Deut 15:12–18; and Jer 34:8–22 
A Case for Reuse 
Table 11 gives an overview over parallels between Exod 21:2–11 and Jer 34:8–
22, and Table 12 gives an overview over parallels between Deut 15:12–18 and Jer 34:8–
22. 
Uniqueness: First, the combination of the root ֵׁשׁש ָׁשִנים + עבד is only attested in 
Exod 21:2; Deut 15:12, 18; and Jer 34:14.101 A question here is the precise time of the 
release. Exodus 21:2–11 and Deut 15:12–18 both advocate a six-year service (ֵׁשׁש  + עבד
 and release in the seventh year. Jeremiah 34:14, however, speaks of the beginning (ָׁשִנים
of the manumission at the end of the seven years (ִמֵּקץ ֶׁשַבע ָׁשִנים). As many have since the 
phrase ִמֵּקץ ֶׁשַבע־ָׁשִנים is also found in Deut 15:1, Jer 34:14 seems to insert this temporal 
phrase from Deut 15:1 into the quotation from Deut 15:12. The question is therefore 
whether these verses prescribe two different times for the release, either at the  
 
                                               
101 It is something to be said for claiming that Deut 15:12–18 conflates Exod 21:2–6 and 21:7–11, 
and not only reuse 21:2–6. I will here limit the argumentation to only some few observations making this 
reading credible. First, and most obvious, is that Deut 15:12–18 dissolves the differentiation between the 
male and female slaves in Exod 21. The explicit inclusion of both the Hebrew male and female ( ָהִעְבִרי אֹו
 in Deut 15:12 can be read as a conflation of the instruction regarding the Hebrew male (Exod (ָהִעְבִרָּיה
21:2–6) and female (21:7–11) slave. Second, while Exod 21:2 opens with ִּכי ִתְקֶנה ֶעֶבד ִעְבִרי, Exod 21:7 
opens with ְוִכי־ִיְמֹּכר ִאיׁש ֶאת־ִּבּתֹו, including the same verb used in the opening ִּכי־ִיָּמֵכר ְלָך ָאִחיָך in Deut 
15:12. Third, it might also be a relationship between ִמּצֹאְנָך ּוִמָּגְרְנָך ּוִמִּיְקֶבָך (“from the sheep, and from the 
threshing floor, and the wine (or oil?) press”) in Deut 15:14 and ְׁשֵאָרּה ְּכסּוָתּה ְוֹעָנָתּה (“her food, her clothing, 
and her oil,” see above) in Exod 21:10. LXX renders ֶיֶקב in Deut 15:14 as τῆς ληνοῦ, i.e. as “winepress.” 
From sheep you get clothing, and from the threshing floor food. Given this parallel between the first two 
elements in the triads of Exod 21:10 and Deut 15:14, may it be that there is a parallel also between ֹעָנה in 
Exod 21:10 and ֶיֶקב in Deut 15:14? Either the author of Deut 15:14 may have intended to refer to the 
oilpress through the word ֶיֶקב, or he took ֹעָנה in Exod 21:10 to be somehow related to wine, thus referring 
to a winepress through the word ֶיֶקב. HALOT writes that ֶיֶקב is usually rendered as ‘winepress’, but that it 
can also mean ‘oil press’ (Koehler et al., HALOT, 429–30). Speaking of Deut 15:12–18 on the one hand 
and Exod 21:2–6 and 21:7–11 on the other, I therefore agree with Levinson stating that “Deuteronomy 




Table 11. Exod 21:2–11 and Jer 34:8–22 
Exod 21:2–11 Jer 34:8–22 
ׁשׁש  עבריכי תקנה עבד  2
ובׁשבעת יצא  ׁשנים יעבד
ואם־ 5 . . .חנם׃  חפׁשיל
אמר יאמר העבד אהבתי 
את־אדני את־אׁשתי ואת־בני 
וכי־ 7. . . ׃ חפׁשילא אצא 
 איׁש את־בתו  ימכר
והעבריה  עברילׁשלח איׁש את־עבדו ואיׁש את־ׁשפחתו ה 9. . . 
ויׁשמעו כל־הׂשרים  10לבלתי עבד־בם ביהודי אחיהו איׁש׃  חפׁשים
וכל־העם אׁשר־באו בברית לׁשלח איׁש את־עבדו ואיׁש את־ׁשפחתו 
ויׁשובו אחרי־כן  11לבלתי עבד־בם עוד ויׁשמעו ויׁשלחו׃  חפׁשים
ויכבׁשום  חפׁשיםויׁשבו את־העבדים ואת־הׁשפחות אׁשר ׁשלחו 
מקץ ׁשבע ׁשנים תׁשלחו איׁש את־אחיו  14. . . לעבדים ולׁשפחות׃ ס 
  ׁשׁש ׁשניםך עבדולך  ימכרהעברי אׁשר־
לאמה לא תצא כצאת 
אם־רעה בעיני  8העבדים׃ 
אדניה אׁשר־לא יעדה והפדה 
ה מכרלעם נכרי לא־ימׁשל ל
 בבגדו־בה׃
. מעמך ולא־ׁשמעו אבותיכם אלי ולא הטו את־אזנם׃  חפׁשיוׁשלחתו 
ותׁשבו ותחללו את־ׁשמי ותׁשבו איׁש את־עבדו ואיׁש את־ 16. .
ׁשפחתו אׁשר־ׁשלחתם חפׁשים לנפׁשם ותכבׁשו אתם להיות לכם 
 . . .לעבדים ולׁשפחות׃ ס 
 
  
2 If you buy a Hebrew slave, he 
shall serve six years and exit free in 
the seventh, without payment. . . . 5 
But if the slave verily says, “I love 
my master, my wife and my 
children, I will not exit free,” . . . 7 
And when a man sells his daughter 
as a female slave she shall not go 
out as the male slaves go out. 8 If 
she is displeasing in her master’s 
eyes, who do not designate her, 
then he shall allow her to be 
ransomed. He is not authorized 
with regard to foreign people to sell 
her, in his treacherous dealing with 
her. 
. . . 9 each one to send his slave free, and each one his maidservant, a 
Hebrew male or female, that none enslave his brother among Judeans. 10 
And all the officials and all the people that came into the covenant to 
send free each one his slave and maidservant, not to enslave again 
among them. And they heard and they sent away. 11 But afterward they 
turned around and returned the slaves and maidservant whom they sent 
free. And they subjected them to slaves and maidservants. . . . 14 At the 
end of seven years each one shall send his Hebrew brother, who was 
sold to you and served you for six years, you shall send him free from 
you. But your father did not listen to me and did not incline their ear. . . 
.16 But you turned around and profaned my name by returning each man 
his slave and his maidservant whom you sent free for their life. And you 
subjected them to make them your slaves and maidservants. 
 
observed,102 end of the sixth or at the end of the seventh year? I will return to this 
                                               
102 E.g. Levinson, “Zedekiah's Release,” 320. Jer 34:14 LXX reads Ὅταν πληρωθῇ ἓξ ἔτη (“When 
six years are accomplished” (Brenton)). The LXX avoids the confusion created by the MT ִמֵּקץ ֶׁשַבע ָׁשִנים in 
Jer 34:14 as to how this relates to the six-year service of the slave. In Deut 15:1 LXX we read Διʼ ἑπτὰ 
ἐτῶν ποιήσεις ἄφεσιν (“Every seven years thou shalt make a release” (Brenton)), so the reuse between Deut 
15:1 and Jer 34:14 is not as clear as it is in MT. 
I am not convinced by Leuchter’s arguments that ִמֵּקץ ֶׁשַבע ָׁשִנים in Jer 34:14 is a reuse of Deut 
31:9–11 rather than Deut 15:1 (Leuchter, “The Manumission Laws,” 642–43). We have already seen that 
his first argument that Zedekiah’s release coincided with a Sabbatical year, and thus the septennial reading 




Table 12. Deut 15:12–18 and Jer 34:8–22 
Deut 15:12–18 Jer 34:8–22 
או  העברי ךאחי לך ימכרכי־ 12
 ׁשנהוב ׁשׁש ׁשנים ועבדך העבריה
 13׃ מעמך חפׁשי תׁשלחנו ׁשביעתה
לא  מעמך תׁשלחנו חפׁשיוכי־
 עבדוזכרת כי  15. . . ריקם׃  תׁשלחנו
ויפדך יהוה  ארץ מצריםהיית ב
ך את־הדבר מצואלהיך על־כן אנכי 
כי־יאמר אליך לא  והיה 16הזה היום׃ 
אהבך ואת־ביתך כי־ כי מעמךאצא 
                 טוב לו עמך׃ 
 העבריהו העבריו ואיׁש את־ׁשפחתו עבדאיׁש את־ ׁשלחל 9  . . .
ויׁשמעו כל־הׂשרים  10הו איׁש׃ אחי־בם ביהודי עבדם לבלתי חפׁשי
ו ואיׁש את־עבדאיׁש את־ ׁשלחוכל־העם אׁשר־באו בברית ל
ויׁשובו  11ו׃ ׁשלח־בם עוד ויׁשמעו ויעבדם לבלתי חפׁשיׁשפחתו 
ם חפׁשי ׁשלחוים ואת־הׁשפחות אׁשר עבדאחרי־כן ויׁשבו את־ה
כה־אמר יהוה אלהי יׂשראל  13  . . .ים ולׁשפחות׃ ס עבדויכבׁשום ל
 ארץ מצריםאנכי כרתי ברית את־אבותיכם ביום הוצאי אותם מ
 איׁש  תׁשלחו 103מקץ ׁשבע ׁשנים 14מבית עבדים לאמר׃ 
                                               
year, it is not clear why a reuse of Deut 31:9–11 should be preferred over that of 15:1 in Jer 34:14. Second, 
that both the reading in Deut 31 and release ritual in Jer 34 were public events, is a very weak argument for 
literary reuse. It is possible that Jer 34:14 reused Deut 15:1 exactly to clarify that it took the manumission 
release in Deut 15:12–18 as part of a national cycle, and therefore it would likely also be a public event. 
Further, the publicity in Jer 34 might just as well be connected to the declaration of Jubilee in Lev 25, as 
argued below. Third, Jer 34:14 reuses Deut 15:12 in the context of the release prescriptions, and 
incorporating Deut 15:1 would thus fit well in this context. When Jer 34:15–22 toward the end of the divine 
diatribe comes to the question of “life in the land” and its disruption, it rather seems to prefer a reuse of Lev 
25:39–46; 26:25–26; Deut 28:25–26 as argued below. The link between “life in the land” in Deut 31:9–13 
and disruption of this life in Jer 34:18–22 is vague. Fourth, Jer 34:8–22 does not seem to emphasize the 
importance of Levitical responsibilities, and even if Leuchter may be right about his reading of Jer 26–45, 
this again constitutes a very weak argument for reuse of the Levitical septennial reading of Torah in Deut 
31. I therefore see no reason to accept Leuchter’s claim that Jer 34:14 reuses ִמֵּקץ ֶׁשַבע ָׁשִנים from Deut 
31:9–11 rather than 15:1. On the contrary, as pointed out above, a reuse of Deut 15:1 fits better the setting 
of Jer 34:14. Jeremiah 34:14a can therefore not be seen as “a scribe advancing Levitical interests and 
authority” (Leuchter, “The Manumission Laws,” 645). The reason why “Jer 34:14a might very well read as 
a reference to the מטהש  of Deut 15:1 rather than as an appeal to the Levitical charge of Deut 31:9–11” 
(Leuchter, “The Manumission Laws,” 646), is therefore simply because this seems to be the most likely 
candidate. There seems to be no reason to construct an interest-conflict between Lev 25:39–46; Deut 15:1, 
12; 31:9–11; and Jer 34:14 on this basis. For a critique of Leuchter’s proposal on grammatical grounds see 
Mastnjak, Textual Authority in Jeremiah, 148–50. 
Deut 31:10 might intend to say that the remission and reading of Torah would occur in the same 
Fall, and not necessarily during the same festival. But it seems to imply that the Festival of Booths also 
would be the occasion of the remission. According to Lev 25:9 the declaration of the Jubilee took place at 
the end of the Day of Atonement. Sarna claims Zedekiah’s emancipation would most likely have occurred 
during the New Year festival (Sarna, “Zedekiah's Emancipation,” 148). Sarna writes: “It is apparent, 
therefore, that in Zedekiah’s day the provisions of Deut. 15:12 were interpreted in the context of the 
sabbatical year. The prescribed six year limit on debt-bondage was regarded as a maximum that would be 
reduced by the incidence of the sabbatical year” (Sarna, “Zedekiah's Emancipation,” 148). This may differ 
from Exod 21:2–6 where the seventh-year release might have been reckoned based on the time of entry into 
slavery, and therefore an individual cycle. Cf. Teeter, Scribal Laws, 136. 




Table 12 — Continued. 
 
18–Deut 15:12 Jer 34:8–22  
ו אזנולקחת את־המרצע ונתתה ב 17
ובדלת והיה לך עבד עולם ואף 
לא־יקׁשה  18לאמתך תעׂשה־כן׃ 
כי  מעמך חפׁשיך אתו ׁשלחך בעינב
 ׁשׁש ׁשניםך עבדמׁשנה ׂשכר ׂשכיר 
וברכך יהוה אלהיך בכל אׁשר 
 תעׂשה׃ פ 
חפׁשי תו ׁשלחוׁשׁש ׁשנים  ועבדך לך ימכראׁשר־ העבריו אחיאת־
ותׁשבו  15 ם׃אזנולא־ׁשמעו אבותיכם אלי ולא הטו את־ מעמך
י לקרא דרור איׁש לרעהו בעינאתם היום ותעׂשו את־היׁשר 
ותׁשבו ותחללו  16ותכרתו ברית לפני בבית אׁשר־נקרא ׁשמי עליו׃
תם ׁשלחו ואיׁש את־ׁשפחתו אׁשר־עבדאת־ׁשמי ותׁשבו איׁש את־
 17ים ולׁשפחות׃ ס עבדם לנפׁשם ותכבׁשו אתם להיות לכם לחפׁשי
ו אחידרור איׁש ללכן כה־אמר יהוה אתם לא־ׁשמעתם אלי לקרא 
ואיׁש לרעהו הנני קרא לכם דרור נאם־יהוה אל־החרב אל־הדבר 
הנני  22. . . ואל־הרעב ונתתי אתכם לזועה לכל ממלכות הארץ׃ 
נאם־יהוה והׁשבתים אל־העיר הזאת ונלחמו עליה ולכדוה  מצוה
   וׂשרפה באׁש ואת־ערי יהודה אתן ׁשממה מאין יׁשב׃ פ 
 
12 If your brother is sold to you, a 
Hebrew man or woman, he shall 
serve you six years but in the 
seventh year you shall send him 
free from you. 13 And when you 
send him free from you you shall 
not send him empty-handed. . . . 15 
And remember that you were a 
slave in the land of Egypt, and 
YHWH your God redeemed you. 
Therefore, I command you this 
thing today. 16 And it shall be, if he 
says to you, “I do not want to exit 
from you, for I love you and your 
house,” because it is good for him 
with you, 17 then you shall take the 
awl and put it through his ear and 
into the door, and he shall be your 
male slave forever, and you shall do 
thus also to your female salve. 18 Do 
not be hard in your eyes when you 
are sending him away, free from 
you. For he has served you for six 
years the double wages of a hired 
worker. And YHWH your God will 
bless you in all that you do. 
. . . 9 each one to send his slave free, and each one his 
maidservant, a Hebrew man or woman, that none enslave his 
brother among Judeans. 10 And all the officials and all the 
people that came into the covenant to send free each one his 
slave and maidservant, not to enslave again among them. And 
they heard and they sent away. 11 But afterward they turned 
around and returned the slaves and maidservant whom they sent 
free. And they subjected them to slaves and maidservants. . . . 13 
Thus says YHWH, the God of Israel: I, I made a covenant with 
your fathers when I brought them from the land of Egypt, from 
the house of slavery, saying: 14 At the end of seven years each 
one shall send his Hebrew brother, who was sold to you and has 
served you for six years, you shall send him free from you. But 
your fathers did not listen to me and did not incline their ear. 15 
But you, you turned one day, and you did what was right in my 
eyes to proclaim a release, each one to his neighbor. And you 
made a covenant before my face, in the house which is called 
by my name. 16 But you turned around and profaned my name 
by returning each man his slave and his maidservant whom you 
sent free for their life. And you subjected them to make them 
your slaves and maidservants. 17 Therefore, thus says YHWH: 
You did not listen to me to proclaim a release, each one to his 
brother, and each one to his neighbor. Behold, I proclaim a 
release for you, says YHWH, to the sword, to the pestilence and 
to the famine. And I will make you a horror for all the 
kingdoms of the earth. . . . 22 Behold, I command, says YHWH, 
and I bring them to this city, and they will fight against her and 
take her and burn her with fire. And I make the cities of Judah a 





question below.104 Here we note that the combination of the root ֵׁשׁש ָׁשִנים + עבד is unique 
to Exod 21:2; Deut 15:12, 18; and Jer 34:14. 
Second, it is only in Exod 21:2, 7–8; Deut 15:12; and Jer 34:9, 14 that we find the 
combination of the lexemes ִעְבִרי + מכר. While ִעְבִרי + מכר are used at different points in 
Exod 21:2, 7-8, only in Deut 15:12 and Jer 34:14 are they used within the same verse (ִּכי־
ַׁשְּלחּו ִאיׁש ֶאת־ָאִחיו ָהִעְבִרי ִמֵּקץ ֶׁשַבע ָׁשִנים ּתְ  in Deut 15:12 and ִיָּמֵכר ְלָך ָאִחיָך ָהִעְבִרי אֹו ָהִעְבִרָּיה
 is found in relative ִעְבִרי + ָאח + מכר in Jer 34:14). Further, the lexical set ֲאֶׁשר־ִיָּמֵכר ְלָך
proximity only in Deut 15:12 and Jer 34:14. The combination is unique to these two 
cases. The lexical set ִעְבִרי + ָאח + מכר therefore indicates reuse between Deut 15 and Jer 
34, rather than between Exod 21 and Jer 34. Even if Lev 25:39 also speaks of the 
dependent Hebrew as an ָאח, nonetheless the unique combination of lexemes indicates 
reuse of Deut 15:12 at this point and not Lev 25:39. 
Third, the phrase ָהִעְבִרי ְוָהִעְבִרָּיה in Jer 34:9 reminds of ָהִעְבִרי אֹו ָהִעְבִרָּיה in Deut 
15:12.105 It is only within these two verses in the HB that we find the coupled-gender use 
                                               
104 As expected the combinations of ָׁשָנה + ֶׁשַבע or ָׁשָנה + ְׁשִביִעי are so common in the HB that they 
do not seem to provide a basis for claiming reuse, but nevertheless do show a further parallel between Deut 
15:12 and Jer 34:14. 
105 Levinson has pointed out that we also find the gender inclusive formula in Lev 25:44, with 
ַוֲאָמְתָך ְּדָךְוַעבְ  . He uses this as an argument that Lev 25 was dependent on Deut 15, and not vice versa 
(Levinson, “The Birth of the Lemma,” 630, 636). But I find his argument weak, as it easily can be turned 
around as an argument for the reverse direction of dependence, with Deut 15 using the gender-inclusive 
language of Lev 25:44 in its reformulation of Exod 21:2–11. Both  ְַוֲאָמְתָך ְּדָךְוַעב  in Lev 25:44 and the 
mention of ֶעֶבד and ָאָמה in Deut 15:17 share a similarity to the gender-terminological division between the 
instruction for the male slave (ֶעֶבד) in Exod 21:2–6 and female slave (ָאָמה) in respectively 21:7–11, with 
the more reworked formulation  ּיָהָהִעְבִרי אֹו ָהִעְבִר  in Deut 15:12. Levinson might be correct in pointing out 
that Lev 25:43–46 seems to relocate the slavery of Hebrews (as in Exod 21:2–11) to non-Israelites (Lev 
25:43–46). Deut 15:12–18 on its side is closer to Exod 21:2–11 in the acceptance of slavery of both 
Hebrew males and females. I would, however, not use any of these observations as argument for direction 




of ִעְבִרי. This construction is therefore unique to these two verses. Once again Deut 
15:12–16 is seen as a more likely source for Jer 34:8–22 than Exod 21:2–11. 
Fourth, the lexical set ֵמִעָּמְך + ָחְפִׁשי + ׁשלח is again unique to Deut 15:12–13, 18 
and Jer 34:14.106 The lexeme ָחְפִׁשי has a significant accumulation in the three passages 
Exod 21:2–11; Deut 15:12–18; and Jer 34:8–22.107 Exodus 21:26–27 and Isa 58:6 are the 
closest parallels besides these, as they also describe the release of a slave. The rest of the 
cases seem thematically too far removed from our present cases to indicate reuse. 
Distinctiveness: First, the term ִעְבִרי is found 34 times in the HB.108 It is of interest 
that only in Jer 34:9; 14 and Jon 1:9 is the term found in the Latter Prophets. Jon 1:9 is in 
a narrative setting, where the prophet Jonah identifies himself as a Hebrew. It could be 
                                               
106 The lexical set ָחְפִׁשי + ׁשלח is used in Exod 21:26-27; Deut 15:12-13, 18; Isa 58:6; Jer 34:9-11, 
14, 16; Job 39:3, 5. For how Deut 15:13–15 might draw upon Gen 29–31; Exod 3:21–22; 11:1–3 on the 
idea of not sending off slaves without provisions see Chirichigno, Debt-Slavery, 286–94; Stackert, 
Rewriting the Torah, 160; Carr, Formation of the Hebrew Bible, 269–70. Deut 15:12 reads  ְּתַׁשְּלֶחּנּו ָחְפִׁשי
 ,is also found in Lev 25:41; Deut 15:12–13 ֵמִעָּמְך Note how .ְוִׁשַּלְחּתֹו ָחְפִׁשי ֵמִעָּמְך while Jer 34:14 has ֵמִעָּמְך
16, 18. This construction in itself does not help us say much with clarity, much less simply ִעָּמְך in Lev 25:6 
which Stackert uses as evidence in his argument. Further, Stackert’s claim that the order of ָאָמה ,ֶעֶבד, and 
 given in Lev 25:6 and Deut 15:17–18 would indicate reuse is not convincing (Stackert, Rewriting the ָׂשִכיר
Torah, 124). While Lev 25:6 also include ּתֹוָׁשב in its list, Deut 15:17–18 does not give such a list. It is not 
clear why there would be a reuse between these two passages, and Stackert fails to explain why. The 
similarity in order therefore seems accidental. In my opinion it is not the order of the terms here that makes 
the strongest argument, but rather that the lexical set ָאָמה ,ֶעֶבד and ָׂשִכיר in close proximity only occur in 
Lev 25:6 and Deut 15:17-18 (cf. Sarna, “Zedekiah's Emancipation,” 146). The similarity should likely be 
understood as shared theme, rather than direct literary reuse. 
107 The lexeme ָחְפִׁשי is found in Exod 21:2, 5, 26-27; Deut 15:12-13, 18; 1 Sam 17:25; Isa 58:6; 
Jer 34:9-11, 14, 16; Ps 88:6; Job 3:19; 39:5. It is only Exod 21:2 and Deut 15:12–13 that combine ָחְפִׁשי and 
יְׁשִביעִ  , making the combination unique to Exod 21:2–11 and Deut 15:12–18. Neither Exod 21:2–11 nor Lev 
25 uses ׁשלח. The lexical set ָחְפִׁשי + ׁשלח is used in Exod 21:26-27; Deut 15:12-13, 18; Isa 58:6; Jer 34:9-
11, 14, 16; Job 39:3, 5. Cf. Hornkohl, Language of the Book of Jeremiah, 305n on the translation of ָחְפִׁשי in 
LXX. 
108 Gen 14:13; 39:14, 17; 40:15; 41:12; 43:32; Exod 1:15-16, 19; 2:6-7, 11, 13; 3:18; 5:3; 7:16; 
9:1, 13; 10:3; 21:2; Deut 15:12; 1 Sam 4:6, 9; 13:3, 7, 19; 14:11, 21; 29:3; Jer 34:9, 14; Jonah 1:9. Bergsma 
writes: “The sole usage of the term in the prophets is found in Jer 34 (bis: vv. 9, 14) in which Jeremiah 
quotes the slave laws of Deuteronomy” (Bergsma, The Jubilee from Leviticus to Qumran, 44). This 





argued that ִעְבִרי is used in Gen 41:12 and Exod 2:6 is associated with slavery, as the 
contexts are the transfers of Joseph and the child Moses from the realm of servitude to 
freedom comparable to the release of the Hebrew slaves in Exod 3:18; 5:3; 7:16; 9:1, 13; 
10:3. However, the use of the lexeme in a legal context in relation to the manumission of 
slaves is distinct to Exod 21:2; Deut 15:12; Jer 34:9, 14. 
Second, we find ִחיוְלָא in 34:14, and ֶאת־ָאִחיו ָהִעְבִרי ,in Jer 34:9  ִּביהּוִדי ָאִחיהּו  in 
34:17, recalling the characterization of the ‘brother’ in Lev 25:39 (ְוִכי־ָימּוְך ָאִחיָך ִעָּמְך). But 
Deut 15:12 also speaks of ָאִחיָך ָהִעְבִרי אֹו ָהִעְבִרָּיה, very close to  ְִריֶאת־ָאִחיו ָהִעב  in Jer 34:14. 
The combination ָאח + ִעְבִרי is only found in Exod 2:11; Deut 15:11–12; and Jer 34:9, 14. 
Exodus 2:11 is found in the context of Moses seeing a “Hebrew man from his brothers” 
 being beaten by an Egyptian, and therefore in a different context than (ִאיׁש־ִעְבִרי ֵמֶאָחיו)
the ones found in Deut 15 and Jer 34. The combination ָאח + ִעְבִרי describing one’s 
relationship to one’s Hebrew slave is therefore distinct to Deut 15:11–12 and Jer 34:9, 14. 
Therefore Jer 34’s use of ָאח, and specifically ָאח + ִעְבִרי in 34:14, supports the case for 
reuse between Deut 15:12 and Jer 34:14. 
Availability of options: The combination ָחְפִׁשי + ׁשלח is relatively rare in the 
HB.109 In the passages here studied it is found in Deut 15:12–13, 18 and Jer 34:9–11, 14, 
16. The manumission instructions in Exod 21 and Lev 25 prefer other formulations, even 
if ָחְפִׁשי + ׁשלח is used in the BC in Exod 21:26–27 as compensation for inflicted bodily 
injury. The technical term for release in Exod 21:2–11; Lev 25:41–42; and Deut 15:16 is 
                                               
109 Exod 21:26–27; Deut 15:12–13, 18; Isa 58:6; Jer 34:9–11, 14, 16; Job 39:3, 5. For the stress 




 Given these possible ways of 110.ִחָּנם and/or ָחְפִׁשי variously combined with ,יצא
formulating manumission, Deut 15:12-13, 18 and Jer 34:9-11, 14, 16 chose to formulate 
themselves through the combination ָחְפִׁשי + ׁשלח. 
Thematic correspondence: First, the differentiated treatment of the Hebrew male 
and female slave, as found in Exod 21:2–11, is not reflected in Jer 34:8–22. Like Deut 
15:12–18, Jer 34:8–22 advocates a similar treatment of the Hebrew male and female 
slave. Further, Jer 34:8–22 advocates the abolition of slavery for both Hebrew male and 
female, contrary to the instruction both in Exod 21:2–11 and Deut 15:12–18. Whereas 
Exod 21:2, 5, 7—like Deut 15:17—speak of Hebrew ֶעֶבד and 111,ָאָמה Jer 34:9, 16 speak 
of ֶעֶבד and ִׁשְפָחה. So, Jer 34:8–22 shows thematic correspondence with Deut 15:12–18, 
even it also deviates from it at certain points. 
Second, there is a thematic parallel between Lev 25:42; Deut 15:15; and Jer 34:13 
regarding the exodus from Egypt as rationale for the manumission, something not found 
in Exod 21.112 The reference to the exit from slavery and the house of slavery in Jer 34:13 
 parallels the (ָאֹנִכי ָּכַרִּתי ְבִרית ֶאת־ֲאבֹוֵתיֶכם ְּביֹום הֹוִצִאי אֹוָתם ֵמֶאֶרץ ִמְצַרִים ִמֵּבית ֲעָבִדים ֵלאֹמר)
motivation clauses in Lev 25:42 and Deut 15:15. Here הֹוִצִאי אֹוָתם ֵמֶאֶרץ ִמְצַרִים in Jer 
                                               
110 Exod 21:8 also uses the verb פדה for a second possibility of release for the female slave, 
namely redemption. 
111 Lev 25:42 speak of YHWH’s ֶעֶבד and 25:44 of foreigners as ֶעֶבד and ָאָמה. 
112 Cf. Bergsma, The Jubilee from Leviticus to Qumran, 163. Joosten has pointed out how Lev 
25:42, 55 grounds the legislation in the Exodus-account, linking instruction and narrative together (Joosten, 
People and Land in the Holiness Code, 96–97). David Daube has argued that the Exodus-release was not 
simply a one-time historical event, but constituted a permanent institution where the people were legally 
transferred from being slaves under the rule of Pharaoh and the Egyptians to slaves under the rule of 





34:13 seems closer to  ָם ֵמֶאֶרץ ִמְצָרִיםֲאֶׁשר־הֹוֵצאִתי ֹאת  in Lev 25:42, than  ֶעֶבד ָהִייָת ְּבֶאֶרץ
 in Deut 15:15.113 But is seems difficult to determine with a satisfactory degree of ִמְצַרִים
confidence from what passage Jer 34:13 might be reusing the formulation from, or if it 
might even be combining from various sources, since there are also strong parallels to 
Deut 29:24.114 It may be an indication of a frozen formulation having its roots in the 
Torah-tradition. Or it may be a case of memorized or living Torah where the phrase has 
become so much part of the language-game of the author that it is reused and adapted to 
new formulations and contexts. In any case, it is an appropriate locution in the context of 
Jer 34 speaking of the release of slaves.115 
                                               
113 Lohfink points out that we find the reference to the Egyptian slavery or status as former 
foreigner used seven times in Deuteronomy, in 5:15; 10:19; 15:15;16:12; 24:18, 22 (Lohfink, 
“Fortschreibung?,” 153). 
114 Sarna claims that there is an “almost word for word” correspondence between Jer 34:13 ( ָאֹנִכי
ֶאת־ְּבִרית ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֵהי ֲאֹבָתם ) and Deut 29:24 (ָּכַרִּתי ְבִרית ֶאת־ֲאבֹוֵתיֶכם ְּביֹום הֹוִצִאי אֹוָתם ֵמֶאֶרץ ִמְצַרִים ִמֵּבית ֲעָבִדים
ֹוִציאֹו ֹאָתם ֵמֶאֶרץ ִמְצָרִיםֲאֶׁשר ָּכַרת ִעָּמם ְּבה ) (Sarna, “Zedekiah's Emancipation,” 145). In Deut 29:24; 1 Kgs 
8:21; Jer 31:32; 34:13 we find similar locutions. We do not need to establish the relation between these 
passages for the present purpose, but it suffices to say that there is a strong Deuteronomic flavor to the 
formulation in Jer 34:13. The phrases ֵמֶאֶרץ ִמְצַרִים ִמֵּבית ֲעָבִדים with the verb יצא is found in Exod 20:2; 
Deut 5:6; 6:12; 8:14; 13:6, 11; Jer 34:13. The lexical set ֵאת + יצא with suffix +  ִמְצָרִיםֵמֶאֶרץ  is found 
frequently in Leviticus, even if it is not unique to it (Exod 16:6, 32; 29:46; Lev 19:36; 22:33; 23:43; 25:38, 
42, 55; 26:13, 45; Num 15:41; Deut 13:6; 29:24; Judg 2:12; 1 Kgs 8:21; Jer 7:22; 11:4; 34:13). The 
construction ֶאֶרץ ִמְצָרִיםֹאָתם מֵ  + יצא  is found in Exod 29:46; Lev 23:43; 25:42, 55; 26:45; Deut 29:24; Judg 
2:12; 1 Kgs 8:21; Jer 7:22; 11:4; 34:13. The phrase ִמֵּבית עֲָבִדים is relatively frequent in Deuteronomy, even 
if it is not unique to it either (Exod 13:3, 14; 20:2; Deut 5:6; 6:12; 7:8; 8:14; 13:6, 11; Josh 24:17; Judg 6:8; 
Jer 34:13; Mic 6:4). In the majority of cases it is found in the more elaborate formulation  ֵמֶאֶרץ ִמְצַרִים ִמֵּבית
 Exod 20:2; Deut 5:6; 6:12; 8:14; 13:6, 11; Josh 24:17; Jer 34:13; Mic 6:4). Deut 13:6 and Mic 6:4) ֲעָבִדים
have minor variations. 
115 Cf. Fischer, Jeremia 26–52, 255. Fischer writes: “V 15 ist einer der seltenen Fälle, in denen 
Gott die Umkehr des Volkes V15 bestätigt. Wozu er in Jer 3 mehrfach eingeladen hatte, ist nun einmal 
wirklich erfolgt” (Fischer, Jeremia 26–52, 256. Italics original). Further, it is not only that the people 
repent, but also how they repent—implying Zedekiah’s novum—YHWH approves of. Fischer also claims 
that the formulation ַהָּיָׁשר ְּבֵעיַני+ עׂשה is borrowed from Exod 15:26 (Fischer, Jeremia 26–52, 256). Sarna 
sees the locution as “characteristically Deuteronomic (6:18; 12:25, 28; 13:19; 21:9)” (Sarna, “Zedekiah's 
Emancipation,” 145). The consistent formulation in the Deuteronomic passages is, however, יֵני ְּבעֵ  + ַהָּיָׁשר
 being replaced with the 1cs suffix in Jer 34:15, fully possible given ְיהָוה The modification would be .ְיהָוה
the divine discourse in which it occurs.  Even if this is possible, the distribution of the locution raises the 




Multiplicity: As the above evidence has indicated, the case for reuse between Deut 
15:12–15 and Jer 34:8–22 appears to be much stronger than that between Exod 21:2–11 
and Jer 34:8–22. Further, all the parallels between Exod 21:2–11 and Jer 34:8–22 seem to 
be best explained as parallels between Deut 15:12–18 and Jer 34:8–22, at points where 
Exod 21:2–11 and Deut 15:12–18 are parallel as well. Given the stronger evidence for 
reuse between Deut 15 and Jer 34, there is no reason to claim an exclusive reuse between 
Exod 21:2–11 and Jer 34:8–22.116 Sarna finds the parallels between Jer 34 and Deut 15 to 
                                               
Kgs 11:33, 38; 14:8; 2 Kgs 10:30; Jer 34:15. We find the combination ַהָּיָׁשר +  in 34 cases in the HB ַעִין +  ּבְ 
(Exod 15:26; Deut 12:8, 25, 28; 13:19; 21:9; Judg 17:6; 21:25; 1 Kgs 11:33, 38; 14:8; 15:5, 11; 22:43; 2 
Kgs 10:30; 12:3; 14:3; 15:3, 34; 16:2; 18:3; 22:2; Jer 34:15; 40:4-5; 2 Chr 14:1; 20:32; 24:2; 25:2; 26:4; 
27:2; 28:1; 29:2; 34:2), with a predominance of ְּבֵעיֵני ְיהָוה + ַהָּיָׁשר. The phrase ַהָּיָׁשר ְּבֵעיַני is found in 1 Kgs 
11:33, 38; 14:8; 2 Kgs 10:30; Jer 34:15. Given this distribution I am not able to see that we can say with 
confidence that it is borrowed from a specific passage. It might be a frozen formula that Jer 34:15 uses.  
The construction ְּבִרית + עבר in the meaning “to transgress a covenant” is found in Deut 17:2, Josh 
7:11, 15; 23:16; Jdg 2:20; 2 Kgs 18:12; Jer 34:18; Hos 6:7, 8:1, cf. Isa 24:5. The same construction in the 
meaning “to enter into a covenant” is found in Deut 29:11. Even if it is only in Deut 17:2 where it occurs in 
Torah in this sense, as Sarna points out (Sarna, “Zedekiah's Emancipation,” 145), this does not entitle us to 
claim Jer 34:18 borrowed the locution from Deut 17:2. Given the reuse between Jeremiah and Hosea in 
other parts of the books, it might be possible that there is a relation here between Jer 34:18 and Hos 6:7, 8:1 
as well. The evidence for a link between Jer 34 and Deut 17:2 is not conclusive at this point. 
It is true that there are some unique syntactic and lexical features between ֲאֶׁשר לֹא־ָיִקים ֶאת־ִּדְבֵרי
 in Jer 34:18 so as to warrant a possible ֲאֶׁשר לֹא־ֵהִקימּו ֶאת־ִּדְבֵרי ַהְּבִרית in Deut 27:26 and ַהּתֹוָרה־ַהּזֹאת 
influence (Sarna, “Zedekiah's Emancipation,” 145), even if the formulation might also be seen as an 
idiomatic expression for confirming a promise. In Neh 5:13 we find a similar formulation ( ֲאֶׁשר לֹא־ָיִקים
 .(ֶאת־ַהָּדָבר ַהֶּזה
116 Contra Lundbom who sees Jer 34:14 as drawing from both Exod 21:2 and Deut 15:12 
(Lundbom, Jeremiah 21-36, 563). Also, contra Levinson who argues for a possible reuse of Exod 21 in Jer 
34: “While the available evidence is insufficient to definitely establish literary dependence, it may be that 
the legal harmonization in Jer 34 extends even further than D and H. The chapter may also be drawing 
upon the Covenant Code. More specifically, the presence of the noun עבד, ‘slave’, in Jer 34:9, which here 
applies to fellow Judean citizens, may reflect the nominal formulation of the protasis of the manumission 
law of the Covenant Code: כי תקנה עבד עברי ׁשׁש ׁשנים יעבד ובׁשבעת יצא לחפׁשי חנם (Exod 21:2). D avoids 
referring to the Israelite slave as an עבד except when discussing the possibility of permanent indenture 
(Deut 15:16–17a), in which the slave becomes technically an עבד עולם (“perpetual slave”). H, on the other 
hand, applies the nominal form only to a non-Israelite and forbids the noun’s application to in-group 
members of the community (Lev 25:39, 42, 46b). Accordingly, that Jer 34 employs the nominal form of 
‘slave’ with fellow citizens, in a way that differs from the term’s use in the manumission laws of both D 
and H, may point to its having had access to the manumission law of the Covenant Code” (Levinson, 
“Zedekiah's Release,” 323n). But the use of ֶעֶבד in Jer 34 might also reflect the contemporary practice in 




lead to “inescapable conclusions,” and sums up: “In the aggregate they exclude any 
possibility of the direct dependence of the events of Jer. 34 upon Ex. 21:1-11.”117 We can 
therefore also leave the question of direction of dependence and appropriation between 
Exod 21:2–11 and Jer 34:8–22 aside. The importance of Exod 21:2–11 for the present 
study is therefore primarily as a possible source for Lev 25:39–46 and Deut 15:12–18, 
which do seem to stand in a relation to Jer 34:8–22. At the very least, the above analysis 
shows that there is nothing to indicate an exclusive relation between Exod 21:2–11 and 
Jer 34:8–22. On the other hand, the multiplicity of close parallels between Deut 15:12–18 
and Jer 34:8–22 makes it relatively safe to claim there is a literary reuse between the two 
passages. We find a particular concentration of parallels between Deut 15:12 and Jer 
34:9, 14. 
Direction of Dependence 
Reference to a source: Significantly, Jer 34:13 speaks of a past covenant with the 
fathers, presenting 34:14 as a quotation of that covenant formulation.118 Further, 34:14e–f 
                                               
form of ֶעֶבד not being used in the quote in 34:14, therefore showing no sign of amalgamation with Exod 21. 
However, Lohfink like Levinson, also makes the correct observation that in Deut 15:12–18 the nominal 
term ֶעֶבד is restricted to the case of ֶעֶבד עֹוָלם, when the slave voluntarily has chosen to remain with the 
master (Lohfink, “Fortschreibung?,” 162). 
117 Sarna, “Zedekiah's Emancipation,” 145. Commenting on Deut 15 and Jer 34, Fischer writes: 
“Die Berührungen zwischen beiden Texten sind sehr eng: Es verbinden u.a. die Fügung ‘frei entlassen’ 
(gleich fünfmal in Jer 34,9–16), die Wörter ‘Diener/Sklave’, ‘Bruder’ sowie die Ausdrücke ‘Hebräer oder 
Hebräerin’ (alle bereits in v9) und ‘das siebte Jahr’ (Jer 34,14). Trotz aller Differenzen gibt es erstens 
keinen anderen Text außer Dtn 15, auf den es sich beziehen könnte. Und zweitens sind die Berührungen in 
ihrer Gesamtheit massiv und darin exklusiv” (Fischer, “Der Einfluss des Deuteronomiums auf das 
Jeremiabuch,” 262). And again: “Die Beziehungen zwischen der Vorschrift in Dtn 15, Sklaven frei zu 
lassen, und Jer 34, als ‘Realisierung’, sind einzig innerhalb des AT” (Fischer, “Der Einfluss des 
Deuteronomiums auf das Jeremiabuch,” 265). 
118 Jer 34:13 reads  ֹּכה־ָאַמר ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֵהי ִיְׂשָרֵאל ָאֹנִכי ָּכַרִּתי ְבִרית ֶאת־ֲאבֹוֵתיֶכם ְּביֹום הֹוִצִאי אֹוָתם ֵמֶאֶרץ




tells us that this covenant of manumission was rejected by the fathers.119 Therefore, it 
seems reasonable to take Jer 34:14 as the borrowing text and Deut 15:12 as the source 
text. 
Modification: If the author of Jer 34:14 was reusing Deut 15:12, what reason may 
he have had for eliminating the reference to the female slave found in Deut 15:12? Since 
Deut 15:12 reads  ָּיהָהִעְבִרי אֹו ָהִעְבִר  and Jer 34:9  ְִרי ְוָהִעְבִרָּיהָהִעב , it is clear that both 
passages knew of the gender inclusive instruction.120 Rather than any of them adding a 
reference to the female slave, a more appropriate question is what reason Jer 34:14 may 
have had for eliminating 121?אֹו ָהִעְבִרָּיה One possibility could be that the elimination in 
34:14 might simply be explained as a short-hand reference to Hebrew male and female 
slaves, elliptically referring back to either 34:9 or Deut 15:12.122 
                                               
day I exited them from the land of Egypt, from the house of slavery, saying:”). 
119 Jer 34:14e–f reads ְולֹא־ָׁשְמעּו ֲאבֹוֵתיֶכם ֵאַלי ְולֹא הִ ּטּו ֶאת־ָאְזָנם (“but your fathers did not listen to 
me nor turn their ear”). Cf. Carroll, Jeremiah, 645 who makes a similar point, and also observes the 
difference between ְּביֹום (“on that day”) in 34:13 referring to the past in contrast to  ַּיֹוםה  (“today”) in 34:15 
referring to the present right action of the people. 
120 While Deut 15:12 prefers ָהִעְבִרי אֹו ָהִעְבִר ָּיה (“the Hebrew male or female”) in its consideration 
of the various possible legal cases, Jer 34:9 seems to prefer ָהִעְבִרי ְוָהִעְבִרָּיה (“the Hebrew male and female”) 
as a gender-inclusive language for the release of both. 
121 Chavel argues that in Deut 15:12 “או העבריה entered the text secondarily,” disrupting syntax 
and indicates a later interpolation (Chavel, “'Let My People Go!',” 86). 
122 For a similar reading see Levinson, “Zedekiah's Release,” 320–21n, contra Chavel, “'Let My 
People Go!',” 86–87. Interestingly, as pointed out by Levinson (Levinson, “The Manumission of 
Hermeneutics,” 303), while Deut 15:12 refers to the female slave, the next reference to the female slave is 
found just after Deut 15:17c has come to the end of the reuse of the instruction regarding the male slave in 
Exod 21:6 on permanent indenture, and where Exod 21:7 then continues into the instruction regarding the 
female slave. Levinson sees Deut 15 as revising Exod 21: “This gender inclusiveness represents a 
conscious revision of a textual tradition that was originally oriented to the male slave alone, as is clear from 
the Hebrew: כי־ימכר לך אחיך העברי או העבריה (Deut. 15:12a)” (Levinson, “The Manumission of 
Hermeneutics,” 301). As I have argued above, Deut 15:12–18 is best understood as a conflation of both the 
regulation of Hebrew male and female slaves in Exod 21:2–11. Levinson’s observation on Deut 15:17c can 
therefore be taken to support this view. Instead of explaining the disrupted syntax of Deut 15:12, with the 




Integration: First, there is a difference between the 2ms suffix of ָאִחיָך ָהִעְבִרי in 
Deut 15:12 and the 3ms suffix of ָאִחיו ָהִעְבִרי in Jer 34:14, while Jer 34:14 and Deut 15:12 
otherwise are consistent in using the 2ms to refer to the recipient of the instruction. While 
Deut 15:12 refers to the addressee as 2ms, in keeping with its surrounding syntax; Jer 
34:14 for its part, however, is more mixed. It has the 2mpl (ְּתַׁשְּלחּו) altered to the 3ms 
 ,ְלָך) but in parallel passages it uses 2ms like Deut 15:12 to refer to the addressee ,(ָאִחיו)
ּתֹוְוִׁשַּלחְ  ,ַוֲעָבְדָך  When the parallels with Deut 15:12 cease, Jer 34:14 reverts to .(ֵמִעָּמְך ,
2mpl again (ֲאבֹוֵתיֶכם), which is more appropriate for its general syntax. At the point 
where Jer 34:14 claims to quote the previous instruction, it therefore seems to presuppose 
a Vorlage referring to the addressee in the 2ms as we find in Deut 15:12, except for the 
phrase 123.ִאיׁש ֶאת־ָאִחיו ָהִעְבִרי This is, therefore, a case where PNG-shifts indicate reuse by 
Jeremiah. Jeremiah 34:14 adapts the person and number to accommodate the syntactic 
                                               
editing, it is better to understand it as a sign of reuse of different elements from Exod 21:2–11. 
A complicating factor is the use of the dyad ֶעֶבד and ִׁשְפָחה in Jer 34:9–11, 16. Cardellini explains 
this as different sources (Cardellini, Die biblischen 'Sklaven'-Gesetze, 318). Fischer, however, sees the 
change as due either to a certain appropriateness in the context together with ֶעֶבד or to indicate more the 
personal proximity of the female slave (Fischer, Jeremia 26–52, 253). Cf. Holladay also seeing context as 
determining the meaning of the terms (Holladay, Jeremiah 26–52, 240). The two lexemes Jer 34:9–16 used 
to refer to the female slave is ָהִעְבִרּיָה and ִׁשְפָחה. The use of ָאִחיו in 34:14 does not seem to explain the 
elimination of terminology for the female slave, since ָאח seems to be used both in 34:9, 17 as reference to 
both the male and female Hebrew slaves, as in Deut 15:12. The dyad found in 34:17 is ָאח and  ֵַרע rather 
than ָהִעְבִרי ְוָהִעְבִרָּיה or ֶעֶבד and ִׁשְפָחה. In general, the focus is primarily upon the slave belonging to one’s 
own class of people, expressed through terms like ָאח ,ָהִעְבִרָּיה ,ָהִעְבִרי, and  ֵַרע. Cf. Fischer, Jeremia 26–52, 
254. Jeremiah 34:9 contains and thus introduces all the slave-terminology used in the passage except  ֵַרע. As 
already mentioned, the reason why Jer 34:14 only speaks of ָאִחיו ָהִעְבִרי, and does not use the lexemes 
otherwise found in the passage for referring to the female slave, seems to be that is is a short-hand 
reference or memorized reuse elliptically referring back to either 34:9 or Deut 15:12. 
123 It therefore seems unnecessary to postulate, as Chavel does, that “Jer 34.14 reflects a previous 





form given in Deut 15:12.124 As to possible reasons for the shift to 3ms suffix in the 
phrase ָהִעְבִרי ָאִחיוֶאת־ ׁשִאי  in Jer 34:14, Cardellini points out that the main difference 
between these two passages is that Deut 15:12 has the casuistic form while Jer 34:14 the 
apodictic.125 So it may be that the author of Jer 34 found the phrase ִאיׁש ֶאת־ָאִחיו ָהִעְבִרי 
more appropriate for his apodictic form. Further, it may also be that we should 
understand the alteration to the 3ms suffix of  ְִבִריָאִחיו ָהע  in Jer 34:14 as occasioned by the 
author recognizing that he is reusing a passage originally written to a past generation, and 
therefore originally referring to an audience different from his own, making the 3ms form 
feel more appropriate.126 And Chavel might be correct in claiming that Jer 34:14’s  ִאיׁש
 is reusing and reworking the—ָאִחיָך as a modification of Deut 15:12’s simpler—ֶאת־ָאִחיו
                                               
124 Contra Glanz who claims that in the book of Jeremiah “the insertion of foreign text material is 
not responsible for causing PNG shifts” (Glanz, Participant-Reference Shifts in the Book of Jeremiah, 217). 
In his analysis of the “less than 2%” he finds to be an exception to this rule, the shifts in Jer 34:12 and its 
parallels to Deut 15:12 are not included. Commenting on the reuse of Deut 15:12 in Jer 34:14 Fischer on 
his side writes: “Die Beibehaltung der Redeweise in 2. Sg. im Kontext der Anrede mit 2. Pl. bei V 13.15 
hebt den Charakter als Zitat noch mehr heraus” (Fischer, Jeremia 26–52, 255. Italics original). Holladay 
writes: “The forms of address in vv 13–17 are in general second-person plural; thus the shift to singular in 
(at least most of) v 14a is curious . . . . The shift is doubtless intentional; there are similar shifts within 
Deuteronomy, though not within Deut 15:1 or 12. It has been suggested that one function of the shifts of 
number in Deuteronomy was to mark citations of earlier material, and the shift here may have the same 
function” (Holladay, Jeremiah 26–52, 241). For the same point see Sarna, “Zedekiah's Emancipation,” 147. 
For PNG shifts in 41:8–22 LXX see Hornkohl, Language of the Book of Jeremiah, 119. Cf. Cardellini, Die 
biblischen 'Sklaven'-Gesetze, 317–18; Lohfink, “Fortschreibung?,” 133–36. 
125 Cardellini writes: “Der Unterschied Jer v.14aα zu Dtn v. 12aα rührt tatsächlich von dem 
Wechsel her, den die Gottesrede dem Text Jer v. 14aαβ aufgedrängt hat, denn während in Dtn v. 12aα die 
kasuistische Formulierung gebraucht ist, wird in Jer v. 14aα nur das von der apodiktische erforderlich. 
Wenn wir die Element der beiden Texte genau gegenüberstellen, dann erscheint als neues Element in Jer v. 
14aα nur das von der apodiktischen Form verlangte” (Cardellini, Die biblischen 'Sklaven'-Gesetze, 317). 
This also explains why the casuistic formula ִּכי־ִיָּמֵכר ְלָך in Deut 15:12 is expressed as the relative clause 
 .in Jer 34:14 ֲאֶׁשר־ִיָּמֵכר ְלָך
126 Cf. Fischer on how Jeremiah might alter his source in minor details and/or abbreviate it 




formulation ִאיׁש ֶאת־ַעְבּדֹו ְוִאיׁש ֶאת־ִׁשְפָחתֹו in 34:10.127 If so, Jer 34:14 could also be 
understood as a correction of the formulation of Zedekiah’s covenant, denying the 
concept of ownership implied in 34:10. Finally, it may simply be that the introduction of 
ׁשִאי  in ָהִעְבִרי ָאִחיוֶאת־ ׁשִאי  of Jer 34:14 constrained the author to use the 3ms suffix of 
 To me the evidence does not seem to be conclusive enough to choose between these .ָאִחיו
alternatives. 
Second, we notice a difference between the singular ָחְפִׁשי in Deut 15 and the 
plural ָחְפִׁשים in Jer 34. Of all the uses of ָחְפִׁשי in the HB (Exod 21:2, 5, 26-27; Deut 
15:12-13, 18; 1 Sam 17:25; Isa 58:6; Jer 34:9-11, 14, 16; Ps 88:6; Job 3:19; 39:5) it is 
found only as a plural in Isa 58:6; Jer 34:9-11, 16. The plural form is used consistently in 
Jer 34:9-11, 16 for the gender inclusive focus of the passage.128 Once, in Jer 34:14, 
exactly where we find the closest parallels to Deut 15:12, we find the only occurrence of 
the singular ָחְפִׁשי in Jer 34. Again a PNG-shift seems to indicate reuse, where the use of 
the singular of ָחְפִׁשי in 34:14 appears to support the claim that this verse is quoting from 
Deut 15:12. 
Lexical dependence: Both Deut 15 and Jer 34 speak of the Hebrew (ָהִעְבִרי and 
 and/or ָהִעְבִרי slave. In the entire book of Jeremiah only Jer 34:9, 14 uses (ָהִעְבִרָּיה
 is preferred in the book and attested in 34:9 as יהּודִ י Otherwise the lexeme 129.ָהִעְבִרָּיה
                                               
127 Chavel, “'Let My People Go!',” 80. 
128 Contrast Deut 15:12 which also has the gender inclusive focus, but nevertheless formulates 
itself so as to take the singular ָחְפִׁשי. 




well.130 The same is the case with Deut 15:12: only here do we find ָהִעְבִרי and/or ָהִעְבִרָּיה 
in the book. But if we go with those scholars who view Deut 15:12–18 as reusing Exod 
21:2–11, we may have a straightforward solution. In Exodus ִעְבִרי is attested 14 times.131 
So given (1) that Deut 15:12–18 reuses Exod 21:2–11, and this explains the occurrence of 
 in Deut 15:12, (2) that there are no convincing reasons that Jer 34 is ָהִעְבִרָּיה and ָהִעְבִרי
reusing Exod 21:2–11 directly, and (3) that the book of Jeremiah otherwise prefers the 
term יהּוִדי over ִעְבִרי, a reasonable reading seems to be that Deut 15 borrowed ִעְבִרי from 
Exod 21, and Jer 34 in turn borrowed it from Deut 15. 
Conflation: Above I mentioned how Jer 34:14 seems to conflate Deut 15:1, 12, 
and how ּוַבָּׁשָנה ַהְּׁשִביִעת and ִמֵּקץ ֶׁשַבע ָׁשִנים can possibly be understood in the sense of 
ּוַבָּׁשָנה Here I am interested in the conflation itself. While Deut 15:12 has .ַבָּׁשָנה ַהְּׁשִביִעת
 in Jer 34:14. Interestingly, Deut 15:1 opens the ִמֵּקץ ֶׁשַבע ָׁשִנים we find ,ַהְּׁשִביִעת 
instruction on the Sabbath year with the formula ִמֵּקץ ֶׁשַבע ָׁשִנים. In whatever way we 
construe the direction of dependence, the combination of elements common to Jer 34:14 
and Deut 15:1, 12 at least points to a reuse between the two passages.132  
There might be good reasons why Jer 34:14 conflates Deut 15:1, 12 in this 
                                               
130 Cf. Jer 32:12; 34:9; 38:19; 40:11-12; 41:3; 43:9; 44:1; 52:28, 30. Cf. Smelik, “The Inner 
Cohesion of Jeremiah 34:8–22,” 240 making similar observations. 
131 Exod 1:15-16, 19; 2:6-7, 11, 13; 3:18; 5:3; 7:16; 9:1, 13; 10:3; 21:2. 
132 From this we have two options, either seeing Jer 34:14 as combining the elements from Deut 
15:1, 12, or Deut 15 splitting up the elements found in Jer 34:14. As will be seen, I will argue for the 
former. Chavel seems to get confused about the ִמֵּקץ ֶׁשַבע ָׁשִנים in Jer 34:14 because he only focuses on the 
parallels with Deut 15:12 (Chavel, “'Let My People Go!',” 81). As pointed out by LeFebvre, the author of 
Jer 34:14 “freely changes the provision in the way he cites it. He actually ‘mixes’ two laws into one: the 
timing of the Deut 15:1–11 debt release, and the subjects of the Deut 15:12–18 slave release” (LeFebvre, 




manner. When we read Deut 15:1–11 we see parallels to Lev 25:39–46. In both cases 
there is a release of—or return to—property (Deut 15:2; Lev 25:41), and in both cases the 
unfortunate person is called one’s ָאח (“brother”)133 having become poor (Deut 15:7 using 
the adjective ֶאְביֹון; Lev 25:39 using the verb מוך), and so both imply a link between debt 
and servitude on one side, and remission of debt and manumission on the other.134 It may 
be that the author of Jer 34:14 conflated Deut 15:1, 12 on the basis that Lev 25:39–46 
offers a key to how themes in Deut 15:1–11 can be combined with those of  
15:12–18.135 Further, LeFebvre would appear to be correct when he states that the author, 
whom he sees as a redactor, “is not really concerned about the accurate timings of the 
release laws cited. He does not expect the law writing to define precisely when release 
proclamations are made. It is the principle that slaves (specifically, ‘your brother 
Hebrews’) be released at appropriate intervals that is in view.”136 
Linguistic dating: The attestation of ִעְבִרי in CBH texts, but absence in LBH 
texts,137 in contrast to the absence of יהּוִדי in Torah, and attestation in texts dating to the 
                                               
133 In the passages here under study, ָאח is found in Lev 25:14, 25, 35-36, 39, 46-48; Deut 15:2-3, 
7, 9, 11-12; Jer 34:9, 14, 17. 
134 Cf. Sarna, “Zedekiah's Emancipation,” 147. This link between debt and slavery is substantiated, 
as Sarna shows, by other biblical passages as Exod 22:2; 2 Kgs 4:1–7; Amos 2:6; 8:6; Isa 50:1; Neh 5:5; 
Prov 22:7. 
135 Cf. Mastnjak, Textual Authority in Jeremiah, 147; Rom-Shiloni, “Compositional 
Harmonization,” 919. 
136 LeFebvre, Collections, Codes, and Torah, 85. 
 ;is attested in Gen 14:13; 39:14, 17; 40:15; 41:12; 43:32; Exod 1:15-16, 19; 2:6-7, 11, 13 ִעְבִרי 137





late CBH period, TBH and LBH, including Jeremiah and Jer 34:9 specifically,138 also 
indicate that Deut 15 is the early text and Jer 34 the late. 
Lev 25:10, 39–46 and Jer 34:8–22 
Given the general consensus that there is reuse of Deut 15:12 in Jer 34:14, while 
we at the same time observe a clear reworking of the order and meaning of the former in 
the latter, we should be sensitive to the possibility that Jer 34 might also choose to reuse 
Lev 25 creatively. As argued below, there is sufficient evidence to claim that Lev 25 was 
reused in the original composition of Jer 34. But again, we witness a sophisticated form 
of reuse that cannot be restricted to a direct quotation as such. 
A Case for Reuse 
The following Table 13 gives an overview over parallels between Lev 25:10, 39–
46 and Jer 34:8–22. 
Uniqueness: The lexical set ׁשוב + ְּדרֹור + קרא is unique to Lev 25:10, 13 and Jer 
34:8, 11, 15-17, 22. Jeremiah 34:8, 15, 17 uses ְּדרֹור + קרא four times, while it is used 
only twice elsewhere in the HB, in Lev 25:10 and Isa 61:1.139 This also gives a basis for 
comparing the key term ׁשוב in Lev 25:10, 13, 27-28, 41, 51-52 with  
                                               
138 The lexeme יהּוִדי is attested in 2 Kgs 16:6; 18:26, 28; 25:25; Isa 36:11, 13; Jer 32:12; 34:9; 
38:19; 40:11-12; 41:3; 43:9; 44:1; 52:28, 30; Zech 8:23; Esth 2:5; 3:4, 6, 10, 13; 4:3, 7, 13-14, 16; 5:13; 
6:10, 13; 8:1, 3, 5, 7-9, 11, 13, 16-9:3; 9:5-6, 10, 12-13, 15-16, 18-20, 22-25, 27-31; 10:3; Neh 1:2; 2:16; 
3:33-34; 4:6; 5:1, 8, 17; 6:6; 13:23-24; 1 Chr 4:18; 2 Chr 32:18. Cf. Chavel, “'Let My People Go!',” 89; 
Hornkohl, Language of the Book of Jeremiah, 305–14. 
139 Since Isa 61:1 speaks of a ְּדרֹור for the captives (לִ ְׁשבּוִים), while Jer 34 for the Hebrew male and 
female slaves (ֶעֶבד ,ְוָהִעְבִרָּיה ,ָהִעְבִרי, and ִׁשְפָחה), their respective context differ. I am not able to see a basis 




Table 13. Lev 25:10, 39–46 and Jer 34:8–22 
 
Lev 25:10, 39–46 Jer 34:8–22 
וקדׁשתם את ׁשנת  10
החמׁשים ׁשנה 
בארץ  דרור קראתםו
לכל־יׁשביה יובל הוא 
תם ׁשבלכם ותהיה 
איׁש אל־אחזתו ואיׁש 
 ו׃ׁשבאל־מׁשפחתו ת
. . . 
ך עמך אחיוכי־ימוך  39
ונמכר־לך לא־תעבד בו 
כׂשכיר  40עבדת עבד׃ 
כתוׁשב יהיה עמך עד־
ׁשנת היבל יעבד עמך׃ 
ויצא מעמך הוא  41
אל־ ׁשבובניו עמו ו
מׁשפחתו ואל־אחזת 
 . . .׃ ׁשובאבתיו י
 
הדבר אׁשר־היה אל־ירמיהו מאת יהוה אחרי כרת המלך צדקיהו ברית  8
לׁשלח איׁש את־עבדו  9׃ 140דרורלהם  קראאת־כל־העם אׁשר בירוׁשלם ל
הו אחיואיׁש את־ׁשפחתו העברי והעבריה חפׁשים לבלתי עבד־בם ביהודי 
ויׁשמעו כל־הׂשרים וכל־העם אׁשר־באו בברית לׁשלח איׁש את־ 10איׁש׃ 
 11עבדו ואיׁש את־ׁשפחתו חפׁשים לבלתי עבד־בם עוד ויׁשמעו ויׁשלחו׃ 
ם ואת־הׁשפחות אׁשר ׁשלחו חפׁשיו אחרי־כן ויׁשבו את־העבדים ׁשובוי
מקץ ׁשבע ׁשנים תׁשלחו איׁש את־ 14   . . .ויכבׁשום לעבדים ולׁשפחות׃ ס
ו העברי אׁשר־ימכר לך ועבדך ׁשׁש ׁשנים וׁשלחתו חפׁשי מעמך ולא־אחי
ו אתם היום ותעׂשו את־ׁשבות 15ׁשמעו אבותיכם אלי ולא הטו את־אזנם׃ 
איׁש לרעהו ותכרתו ברית לפני בבית אׁשר־נקרא  קרא דרורהיׁשר בעיני ל
ו איׁש את־עבדו ואיׁש את־ׁשבו ותחללו את־ׁשמי ותׁשבות 16ׁשמי עליו׃ 
ׁשפחתו אׁשר־ׁשלחתם חפׁשים לנפׁשם ותכבׁשו אתם להיות לכם לעבדים 
איׁש  קרא דרורלכן כה־אמר יהוה אתם לא־ׁשמעתם אלי ל 17ולׁשפחות׃ ס 
נאם־יהוה ־החרב אל־הדבר  דרורלכם  קראו ואיׁש לרעהו הנני אחיל
הנני מצוה  22. . .  ואל־הרעב ונתתי אתכם לזועה לכל ממלכות הארץ׃
תים אל־העיר הזאת ונלחמו עליה ולכדוה וׂשרפה באׁש ׁשבנאם־יהוה וה
 ואת־ערי יהודה אתן ׁשממה מאין יׁשב׃ פ
10 and you shall sanctify 
the fiftieth year. And 
you shall proclaim a 
release in the land to all 
who dwell in it. It shall 
be a jubilee for you, and 
each one of you shall 
return to his possession, 
and each one shall 
return to his family. . . . 
39 And if your brother 
with you becomes poor, 
and is sold to you, you 
shall not make him 
serve the service of a 
slave. 40 He shall be with 
you like a hired worker, 
like a sojourner, he shall  
8 The word that came to Jeremiah from YHWH, after king Zedekiah cut a 
covenant with all the people that were in Jerusalem to proclaim release 
among them, 9 each one to send his slave free, and each one his 
maidservant, a Hebrew male or female, that none enslave his brother 
among Judeans. 10 And all the officials and all the people that came into the 
covenant to send free each one his slave and maidservant, not to enslave 
again among them. And they heard and they sent away. 11 But afterward 
they turned around and returned the slaves and maidservant whom they 
sent free. And they subjected them to slaves and maidservants. . . . 14 At the 
end of seven years each one shall send his Hebrew brother, who was sold 
to you and served you for six years, you shall send him free from you. But 
your fathers did not listen to me and did not incline their ear. 15 But you, 
you turned one day, and you did what was right in my eyes to proclaim a 
release, each one to his neighbor. And you made a covenant before my 
face, in the house which is called by my name. 16 But you turned around 
and profaned my name by returning each man his slave and his 
maidservant whom you sent free at their life. And you subjected them to 
make them your slaves and maidservants. 17 Therefore, thus says YHWH:  
                                               
140 While Jer 34:8 LXX reads καλέσαι ἄφεσιν (“to proclaim a release”), Lev 25:10 LXX reads 
διαβοήσετε ἄφεσιν (“to proclaim a release”). The reuse is therefore not as clear in the LXX as we shall see 
it is in the MT. Jeremiah 34:8–22 LXX seems to use more similar terminology to Deut 15:12–18 LXX, 




Table 13 — Continued. 
 
Lev 25:10, 39–46 Jer 34:8–22 
serve with you until the 
year of Jubilee. 41 And he 
shall exit from with you, 
he and his children with 
him. And he shall return 
to his family and he shall 
return to his ancestral 
property. 
You did not listen to me to proclaim a release, each one to his brother, and 
each one to his neighbor. Behold, I proclaim a release for you, says YHWH, 
to the sword, to the pestilence and to the famine. And I will make you a 
horror for all the kingdoms of the earth. . . . 22 Behold, I command, says 
YHWH, and I bring them to this city, and they will fight against her and take 
her and burn her with fire. And I make the cities of Judah a desolation, 
without inhabitants.  
 
the occurrences of the same term in Jer 34:11, 15-16, 22.141 
Thematic Correspondence: First, the most striking instance of thematic 
correspondence between Lev 25 and Jer 34 may be seen in the absolute abolition of 
slavery for Hebrews. In Lev 25 it is expressed negatively as לֹא־ַתֲעֹבד ּבֹו עֲֹבַדת ָעֶבד in v. 
ֶבדלֹא ִיָּמְכרּו ִמְמֶּכֶרת עָ  ,39  in v. 42,  ֹ א־ִתְרֶּדה בֹו ְּבָפֶרְךּוְבַאֵחיֶכם ְּבֵני־ִיְׂשָרֵאל ִאיׁש ְּבָאִחיו ל  in v. 46, 
and positively as ְּכָׂשִכיר ְּכתֹוָׁשב ִיְהֶיה ִעָּמְך in v. 40. A similar norm is expressed twice in Jer 
34, with ְלִבְלִּתי ֲעָבד־ָּבם ִּביהּוִדי ָאִחיהּו ִאיׁש in Jer 34:9 and  ֹודעְלִבְלִּתי ֲעָבד־ָּבם  in 34:10. 
As discussed above, Lev 25:39–46 legitimizes a differentiated treatment of 
Israelites and non-Israelites, denying slavery of the former but permission to enslave the 
latter. Even if a more radical reading of Lev 25:39–49 in its literary context might be 
                                               
141 LXX renders the opening verb in Jer 34:10 MT, ַוָּיׁשּובּו, with ἐπεστράφησαν (“they turned 
around”). Cf. Shirley Lal Wijesinghe, Jeremiah 34,8–22: Structure and Redactional History of the 
Masoretic Text and of the Septuagint Hebrew Vorlage (Colombo, Sri Lanka: Centre for Society and 
Religion, 1999), 17. LXX does not render the MT ָחְפִׁשים ְלִבְלִּתי ֲעָבד־ָּבם עֹוד ַוִּיְׁשְמעּו ַוְיַׁשֵּלחּו in 34:10. It is 
probably because the translator felt it was redundant, since the same idea was already expressed in 34:9, τὸ 
μὴ δουλεύειν ἄνδρα ἐξ Ιουδα. MT ַוָּיׁשּובּו ַאֲחֵרי־ֵכן ַוָּיִׁשבּו ֶאת־ָהֲעָבִדים ְוֶאת־ַהְּׁשָפחֹות ֲאֶׁשר ִׁשְּלחּו ָחְפִׁשים in 34:11 
is neither rendered in LXX. LXX appears to conflate 34:9–11, or if it should be seen as more original, 





possible, as argued above, seeing in it an invitation to treat the foreigner as a native, both 
Lev 25 and Jer 34, nevertheless, share the absolute ban on enslavement of 
Israelites/Judahites. This is not found in Deut 15. As Levinson has correctly pointed out, 
Deut 15 avoids using ֶעֶבד for the Hebrew subservient except for permanent indenture in 
the phrase 142.ֶעֶבד עֹוָלם But this restriction is nevertheless different from the absolute 
abolishment of Israelites/Judahites that we find in Lev 25 and Jer 34. While Jer 34:14 
seems to be reusing Deut 15:12 advocating a release of all dependent Hebrews in the 
seventh year, Jer 34, nevertheless, appears to be conceptually framed around the abolition 
of slavery of Hebrews altogether found in Lev 25.143 
                                               
142 Levinson, “Zedekiah's Release,” 323. 
143 The parallels between the reference to the exit from slavery and the house of slavery in Jer 
34:13 and its parallels to the motivation clauses in Lev 25:42 and Deut 15:15 have been discussed above. 
Bergsma writes that “Chavel’s denial that דרור in Jer 34 alludes to the jubilee (“Let My People 
Go!” 75 n. 12) seems unnecessary, especially since he recognizes that the redactor of the passage (1) refers 
to the jubilee legislation elsewhere (i.e. Jeremiah 34:9b; “Let My People Go!” 88–93) and (2) that the word 
was taken as a reference to the jubilee by later biblical writers (i.e. in Neh 5:1–13; “Let My People Go!” 
93–94). Chavel’s claim that ‘the term דרור in Jer 34:8 coincidentally recalls the legislation of Lev 25’ (“Let 
My People Go!” 93) seems strained. The fact that Zedekiah’s emancipation was not actually a jubilee year 
(‘[the word derôr’s] meaning [in Lev 25:10] differs greatly from Jer 34:8,’ idem) does not mean that the 
author of Jer 34:8–12 or even Zedekiah himself would have missed the resonances the event had with the 
ancient jubilee and taken advantage of the opportunity to cloak the event with jubilee language (so Fried 
and Freedman, “Jubilee Year,” 2257)” (Bergsma, The Jubilee from Leviticus to Qumran, 164n.). And 
further that “outside of Jer 34, דרור occurs in the Bible only as a reference to the jubilee. This does not 
prove that Jer 34 also means to allude to the jubilee, but it makes it reasonable to suppose that it does. This 
is all the more the case since the only universal, simultaneous release of persons in bondage in the biblical 
legal corpora is Lev 25; Exod 21 and Deut 15 provide only for individual manumissions” (Bergsma, The 
Jubilee from Leviticus to Qumran, 164). Cf. Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer der Tora, 277 seeing some kind of a 
link between ְּדרֹור + קרא in Jer 34:8, 15, 17 and the Jubilee in Lev 25:10. An objection to the claim that Jer 
34 reuses Lev 25 might be that Jer 34 does not reuse the key term יֹוֵבל from Lev 25. On the possibility that 
“the term יובל had fallen out of general use” by the time we come to Ezekiel (and Jeremiah), see Bergsma, 
The Jubilee from Leviticus to Qumran, 61. Weinfeld comments on the semantics of the words for liberty in 
Akkadian and Hebrew: “The names for ‘liberty’ in both Akkadian and Hebrew are connected with the idea 
of free movement. The Akkadian name mīšarum is derived from ešēru, a verb which includes the meaning 
‘to go straight ahead’, whereas durārum has the meaning ‘to roll without restraint’” (Weinfeld, “Sabbatical 
Year and the Jubilee,” 45). For parallels between Lev 25:41 and Num 35:28 cf. Stackert, Rewriting the 
Torah, 89. Basing himself upon Hartley, Bergsma writes: “As Hartley points out, Lev 25 makes use of 
several apparently ancient terms. Primary among these is the word יובל itself. The meaning and etymology 




Excursus: The Reuse of the Curse Formulas  
in Lev 26:25–26 and Deut 28:25–26 in  
Jer 34:17, 20 
The clearest case of intertwining Leviticus and Deuteronomy in Jer 34:12–22 is 
probably where it draws on the covenant curses from Lev 26:25–26 and Deut 28:25–26 in 
both Jer 34:17 and 34:20.144 Levinson argues that the talionic element is a novum in Jer 
34: 
This major compositional idea of the chapter has no direct precedent in the 
Pentateuch. Granted, both Deuteronomy and the Holiness Code treat faithful 
observance of the whole Law as a general condition of the covenant (Deut 7:12; Lev 
26:14–15). Yet neither source’s manumission law specifies a punishment for its 
infraction. Nor does either D or H explicitly connect manumission with covenant, let 
alone define failure to implement manumission as a cause of exile. In other words, the 
larger theological, conceptual and judicial perspective of Jer 34 cannot be explained 
simply in terms of D or H. However extensively it draws upon its literary sources and 
appears to quote them, the text is a new synthesis and a creative transformation of its 
sources.145 
I agree with Levinson to the extent that we find creative composition in Jer 34. 
Nevertheless, the link to Jer 34’s sources might be closer in the talionic aspect than his 
statement admits. It is true that Deuteronomy and Leviticus formulate themselves in 
                                               
or post-exilic literature in the Hebrew Bible; in Ezekiel’s reference to the jubilee year (Ezek 47:17) it is 
simply called “the year of release” (שנת דרור) perhaps indicating that by the time Ezekiel was composed, 
the term יובל had fallen out of general use. Significantly, however, the statement of Lev 25:10, “It [the 
fiftieth year] will be a Jubilee for you,” assumes that the reader/listener knows what a jubilee is, i.e. the text 
presupposes some prior knowledge of the meaning of יובל” (Bergsma, The Jubilee from Leviticus to 
Qumran, 61). 
144 Fischer has pointed out that Lev 26 and Deut 28 take a prominent position, when compared to 
other passages in their respective books, among passages preferably reused within the Book of Jeremiah 
(Georg Fischer, “Fulfillment and Reversal: The Curses of Deuteronomy 28 as a Foil for the Book of 
Jeremiah,” Semitica et Classica 5 (2012): 43–49; Fischer, “The Relationship of the Book of Jeremiah to the 
Torah,” 902–3, 908). 
145 Levinson, “Zedekiah's Release,” 324. Cf. p. 314 as well. Levinson does, however, see the link 
between the exile and 49 years of Jubilee in the actual period of exile: “Moreover, this group will remain 
enslaved, as previously noticed, for the period of the jubilee (587–539/8 =49 years)” (Levinson, 
“Zedekiah's Release,” 324). Cf. Jer 25:11–12; 29:10; 2 Chr 36:21 speaking of 70 years of exile and slavery. 




terms of faithfulness to the entire covenant. Nevertheless, Jer 34, and vv. 17 in particular, 
seems to ground its talionic discourse on the implications formulated in Lev 26 in a 
situation where the manumission instructions in Lev 25 are rejected. Jeremiah 34:17, 20 
does not create the talionic element ex nihilo, but, rather, seems to explicate what is 
implied by reading Lev 25 and 26 together on the one hand, and Deut 15 and 28 together 
on the other. More specifically, both Jer 34:17 and 34:20 seem to draw one element each 
from both Lev 26:25–26 and Deut 28:25–26,146 as illustrated by the following Table 14. 
Even if only ֶחֶרב and ֶּדֶבר are parallel on the lexical level between Lev 26:25–26 and Jer 
34:17, the thematic link between the hunger of Lev 26:26 and ָרָעב in Jer 34:17 is clear. 
They are further found in the same order in both passages. The combination of ֶּדֶבר ,ֶחֶרב, 
and ָרָעב is found predominantly in Jeremiah and Ezekiel.147 The words are usually given  
                                               
146 Bergsma has already pointed out the parallels between Lev 26:25–26 and Jer 34:17. He writes: 
“It is interesting to note that the punishments of v. 17 follow the pattern of punishments in Lev 26:25–26. 
In both texts the order of punishments is sword (חרב, Lev 26:25a), pestilence (דבר, Lev 26:25b), and 
famine (רעב, Lev 26:26 [the word is not used in v. 26 but famine is described]), and the offense is 
covenant-breaking (cf. Lev 26:14–15, 25a; Jer 34:13–14, 18). If the author of Jer 34:17 is drawing on 
traditions from Lev 26—a chapter so closely related to the jubilee legislation, as noted above—it enhances 
the likelihood that the allusions to the jubilee elsewhere in the pericope are intentional” (Bergsma, The 
Jubilee from Leviticus to Qumran, 167–68). He also finds  ְַׁשִמיֶאת־ ְּתַחְּללּוו  in Jer 34:16 to reuse this locution 
from Leviticus: “the expression חלל ׁשמי (“profane my name,” v. 16) is an idiom from H (Lev 18:21; 19:12; 
20:3; 21:6; 22:2, 32) which Ezekiel also borrows (Ezek 20:39; 36:20, 21, 22, 23) . . . . This use of H 
language strengthens the plausibility that the wordplay on לקרא דרור and ׁשוב is also drawing on H (i.e. Lev 
25:10)” (Bergsma, The Jubilee from Leviticus to Qumran, 167). I will discuss further the wordplay on קרא 
 with 1. person suffix occurs especially in ֵׁשם + חלל below. Here we can note that the locution ׁשוב + ְּדרֹור +
Leviticus and Ezekiel, but also some other passages including Jer 34:16 (Lev 19:12; 20:3; 22:2, 32; Isa 
56:6; Jer 25:29; 34:16; Ezek 20:9, 14, 22, 39; 36:20-23; 39:7; Amos 2:7). Cf. Holladay, Jeremiah 26–52, 
241–42. Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer der Tora, 270–71, 277 notes the parallels, and sees this locution as 
“entstammt priestlicher Terminologie.” In addition, there are some occurrences of ֵׁשם + חלל that are 
relevant as well (Lev 18:21; 21:6; Ps 74:7). Except Lev 19:12, where it is used of swearing in YHWH’s 
name, all the other occurrences are in a cultic context. In Jer 34:16 the setting is rather that of breaking the 
covenant entered in the name of YHWH, by re-enslaving the released slaves. It is of course a link between 
the cult and covenant in Torah, but we should note that the phrase is used differently in Leviticus and Jer 
34:16. It might be a frozen phrase associated with Leviticus, that the author of Jer 34:16 used as part of his 
language-game interweaving locutions drawn from Leviticus. 




Table 14. Lev 26:25–26; Deut 28:25–26; and Jer 34:17, 20 
Lev 26:25–26 Jer 34:17, 20 
נקמת נקם־ברית ונאספתם אל־ חרבוהבאתי עליכם  25
 ׃ביד־אויבם נתתבתוככם ו דברעריכם וׁשלחתי 
בׁשברי לכם מטה־לחם ואפו עׂשר נׁשים לחמכם בתנור אחד  26
 ׃ סוהׁשיבו לחמכם במׁשקל ואכלתם ולא תׂשבעו
 
לכן כה־אמר יהוה אתם לא־ 17
ׁשמעתם אלי לקרא דרור איׁש לאחיו 
ואיׁש לרעהו הנני קרא לכם דרור 
ואל־ דבראל־ה חרבנאם־יהוה אל־ה
לזועה לכל ונתתי אתכם  רעבה
 . . . ׃ ממלכות הארץ
יהם וביד ביד איבי אותם נתתו 20
למאכל ם והיתה נבלתמבקׁשי נפׁשם 
 ׃לעוף הׁשמים ולבהמת הארץ
Deut 28:25–26 
 
יתנך יהוה נגף לפני איביך בדרך אחד תצא אליו ובׁשבעה  25
 ׃לזעוה לכל ממלכות הארץדרכים תנוס לפניו והיית 
־עוף הׁשמים ולבהמת הארץ כלוהיתה נבלתך למאכל ל 26
 ואין מחריד׃
 
Lev 26:25 And I will bring a sword upon you, avenging the 
vengeance of the covenant. And if you gather to your cities, I will 
send pestilence in your midst, and you will be delivered into the 
hand of your enemy. 26 When I break your supply of bread, ten 
women will bake your bread in one oven, and will ration your 
bread by weight, and you shall eat but not be satisfied. 
 
 
Jer 34: 17 Therefore, thus says YHWH: 
You did not listen to me to proclaim 
a release, each one to his brother, and 
each one to his neighbor. Behold, I 
proclaim a release for you, says 
YHWH, to the sword, to the 
pestilence and to the famine. And I 
will make you a horror for all the 
kingdoms of the earth. . . . 20 and I 
will give them in the hand of their 
enemies and in the hand of those 
seeking their life. And their corpses 
will be food for the birds of the 
heavens and the animals of the earth. 
Deut 28:25 YHWH will make you be defeated before your enemies; 
you will exit against him by a single road, but flee from him by 
many roads; you shall be a horror for all the kingdoms of the 
earth. 26 And your corpse shall be food for all the birds of the air 
and for the animals of the earth, with none to frighten them. 
 
                                               
Ezek 5:12, 17; 6:11-12; 7:15; 12:16; 14:21; 1 Chr 21:12; 2 Chr 20:9. For discussions on how Ezekiel reuses 
Lev 26:25–26 see Lyons, From Law to Prophecy, 69, 72, 78–79, 82, 91, 94, 100, 113, 117–18, 120–21, 
144, 150, 162–63, 183–84. For an extensive discussion of the triad, see Weippert, Die Prosareden des 
Jeremiabuches, 148–91. She seems correct in concluding that this should not be understood as a 
Deuteronomic reworking of Jer 34 (Weippert, Die Prosareden des Jeremiabuches, 191). Given that the 
triad is more likely a reuse of Lev 26:25–26, and that Jer 34 appears to reuse Deut 28:25–26, it is 
nevertheless tempting to see an awareness on the part of the author of Jer 34 of parallels between Lev 
26:25–26 and Deut 28:20–24. Here also the lexemes ֶּדֶבר (Deut 28:21) and ֶחֶרב (Deut 28:22) are used. The 
burning heat, drought, blight, and mildew (Deut 28:22–24) would all affect agricultural production, and so 
indirectly lead to hunger. Since the triad stands out clearer in Lev 26:25–26, in the same order as in Jer 
34:17, it seems more reasonable to see a link between these two passages, even if the resonances with Deut 
28:20–24 should also be heard, especially given the reuse of other elements from Deut 28:25–26 in Jer 




in the order ָרָעב ,ֶחֶרב, and ֶּדֶבר in the book of Jeremiah, except in 21:7 and 34:17. Only in 
34:17 does it parallel the order found in Lev 26:25–26. Jeremiah 34:17  
therefore seems dependent on Lev 26:5–26 here.148 
The parallels between  ְַוֵאין ַמֲחִריד ָאֶרץהָ  ּוְלֶבֱהַמת ָּׁשַמִיםְוָהְיָתה ִנְבָלְתָך ְלַמֲאָכל ְלָכל־עֹוף ה  
(“And your body will be food for the birds of the heavens and for the beast of the earth, 
with none to frighten them off”) in Deut 28:26 and  ֵַׁשיְמַבקְ  ּוְבַידֹאְיֵביֶהם  ְּבַידאֹוָתם  ִּתיְוָנת 
ָאֶרץהָ  ּוְלֶבֱהַמת ָּׁשַמִיםְוָהְיָתה ִנְבָלָתם ְלַמֲאָכל ְלעֹוף הַ  ָׁשםַנפְ   (“And I will give you into the hand of 
their enemies and into the hand of those seeking their life, and their body shall be food 
for the birds of the air and the beasts of the earth”) in Jer 34:20 should also be mentioned. 
This locution is found in Deut 28:26; Jer 7:33; 16:4; 19:7; 34:20, and seems to be a reuse 
of Deut 28:26 in the book of Jeremiah.149 Deut 28:26; Jer 16:4; and 34:20 all share the 
exact same clause,  ַָאֶרץהָ  ּוְלֶבֱהַמת ָּׁשַמִיםְוָהְיָתה ִנְבָלָתם ְלַמֲאָכל ְלעֹוף ה . The only minor 
difference is Deut 28:26 having ְלָכל־עֹוף, while the Jeremianic passages read ְלעֹוף. It 
might be a harmonization in the Jeremianic passages with ּוְלֶבֱהַמת in the next phrase of 
Deut 28:26, only having the preposition ל without the noun ָכל. The case for a reuse here 
is also strengthened by the parallels between ְלַזֲעָוה ְלֹכל ַמְמְלכֹות ָהָאֶרץ (“for a horror for all 
the kingdoms of the earth”) in Deut 28:25 andִלַזוֲָעה ְלֹכל ַמְמְלכֹות ָהָאֶרץ (“for a horror to all 
                                               
148 P. D. Miller has pointed out that in Jer 34:8–22 “the judgment speech becomes almost a mosaic 
of themes and devices of poetic justice” where we see a close “correspondence of sin and punishment” (P. 
D. Miller, “Sin and Judgment in Jeremiah 34:17–19,” JBL 103, no. 4 (1984): 611). Cf. Lundbom, Jeremiah 
21-36, 564. 
149 Cf. Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer der Tora, 277 commenting on the variations of this locution in 
the book of Jeremiah. Mastnjak also discusses the parallels between Deut 28:25–26 and Jer 15:3–4 and 
concludes: “It is important to emphasize that Jer 15:3–4 and Jer 34:17, 20 are the only texts in Jeremiah 
that allude to elements of both Deut 28:25 and 26, and that these texts are best explained as independent 




the kingdoms of the earth”) in Jer 34:17, even if there is a variation in the spelling of 
 between the two (cf. Isa 28:19; Jer 15:4; 24:9; 29:18; Ezek 23:46; 2 Chr ַזוֲָעה/ַזֲעָוה
29:8).150 
What we see here is that the author of Jer 34:17, 20 has drawn locutions from 
both Lev 26:25–26 and Deut 28:25–26 in both verses. In Jer 34:17, ֶּדֶבר ,ֶחֶרב, and ָרָעב 
parallels Lev 26:25–26, having ֶּדֶבר ,ֶחֶרב, followed by the theme of famine, in the same 
order in both verses. Further, Jer 34:17 also appears to borrow the locution of being made 
a horror for the kingdoms of the earth ( ָאֶרץִלַזוֲָעה ְלֹכל ַמְמְלכֹות הָ  ) from Deut 28:25. 
Likewise, Jer 34:20 seems to intertwine the curse formulas from Lev 26 and Deut 28. The 
phrase  ַָאֶרץהָ  ּוְלֶבֱהַמת ָּׁשַמִיםְוָהְיָתה ִנְבָלָתם ְלַמֲאָכל ְלעֹוף ה  in Jer 34:20 parallels  ְוָהְיָתה ִנְבָלְתָך
ְוֵאין ַמֲחִריד ָאֶרץהָ  ּוְלֶבֱהַמת ָּׁשַמִיםְלַמֲאָכל ְלָכל־עֹוף הַ   in Deut 28:26, and, given the likely reuse 
of Lev 26:25–26 in its entirety in Jer 34:17, it also appears reasonable to take the idea of 
being given into the hands of the enemy (ֹאֵיב + ְּבַיד + נתן) twice used in Jer 34:20–21 as 
borrowed from the same locution in Lev 26:25. Even if the locution ֹאֵיב + ְּבַיד + נתן is 
found several places in the HB,151 the sense of YHWH giving over the people into the 
hands of the enemy as punishment for covenantal breach seems close in Lev 26:25 and 
Jer 20:5; 34:21 (cf. 2 Kgs 21:14), if not distinct.152 
This leads me to conclude that Jer 34:17, 20 contain a sophisticated blend of the 
                                               
150 Cf. Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer der Tora, 253; Holladay, “Elusive Deuteronomists,” 76. 
151 E.g. Lev 26:25; Deut 21:10; Josh 10:19; 21:44; Judg 3:28; 16:23-24; 1 Sam 24:5; 2 Kgs 21:14; 
Jer 20:4-5; 21:7; 34:20-21; 44:30; Lam 2:7. 
152 The locution ַנפְ ָׁשם + ְמַבקְ ֵׁשי + ְּבַיד + נתן is found in Jer 19:7; 21:7; 22:25; 34:20-21; 44:30; 




curse-formulas found in Lev 26:25–26 and Deut 28:25–26. The direction of dependence 
thus goes from Lev 26:25–26 and Deut 28:25–26 to Jer 34:17, 20.153 It can be argued that 
since the reuse occurs in independent clauses in Jer 34:17, 20, the reuse of either Lev 
26:25–26 or Deut 28:25–26 could have been easily added by a later redactor. However, 
the close interweaving of Lev 25 and Deut 15 in Jer 34 in general makes it more likely 
that the reuse of Lev 26:25–26 and Deut 28:25–26 in Jer 34:17, 20 is one more example 
of the phenomenon of interweaving of Leviticus and Deuteronomy in Jer 34.  
The specific novum of Jer 34 can thus be formulated as explicating what seems 
implied when the manumission instructions and curses in Lev 25 and 26 and Deut 15 and 
28 are read together,154 with the talionic punishment being formulated in terms of the קרא 
 .found in Lev 25:10, 13 ׁשוב + ְּדרֹור +
Direction of Dependence 
Reference to a source: While the neglect by the ancestors to give heed to 
YHWH’s instructions ( ָאְזָנםֶאת־ ּטּוֲאבֹוֵתיֶכם ֵאַלי ְולֹא הִ  ָׁשְמעּוְולֹא־ ) in Jer 34:14 is presented as 
a neglect of the Deuteronomic instruction in Deut 15:12–18, Jeremiah’s contemporaries 
in Jer 34:17 are presented as neglecting to give heed to a release instruction strikingly 
similar to the one found in Lev 25:39–46 (155.(לֹא־ְׁשַמְעֶּתם ֵאַלי ִלְקרֹא ְדרֹור As seen above, it 
                                               
153 Weippert, Die Prosareden des Jeremiabuches, 179; Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer der Tora, 271–
72. Cf. Carr, “Method in Determination of Direction of Dependence,” 107–40 where he several times 
points out that conflation is a sign of a borrowing text. 
154 For the link between Lev 25 and 26 see Averbeck, “Framing and Shaping of the Mosaic Law,” 
159. 
155 There is a similarity between לֹא־ְׁשַמְעֶּתם ֵאַלי (“you did not listen to me”) in Jer 34:17 and Ezek 
18, a chapter we will look at in the following. Backtracking one’s action, like in Ezek 18, can entirely undo 




is reasonable to see ְּדרֹור + קרא as linked to Lev 25:10. In Jer 34:8c we find the phrase 
ֹורְּדרִלְקרֹא ָלֶהם   (“to proclaim a release to them”). The prepositional phrase ָלֶהם does not 
have a referent here. If we go to Lev 25:10, however, we find the clause  ְּדרֹור ּוְקָראֶתם
ְׁשֶביהָ ְלָכל־יֹ  ָּבָאֶרץ  (“and they shall proclaim a release in the land to all those dwelling in 
her”). It may thus be that the prepositional phrase ָלֶהם in Jer 34:8 reflects influence from 
 in Lev 25:10.156 Even if the evidence for claiming that Zedekiah’s release ְלָכל־יֹ ְׁשֶביהָ 
occurred during a Jubilee year is not as strong as Fried and Freedman might want us to 
believe, their comment on Jer 34:17 is worth noting: 
The statement that “you did not heed me” with reference to the release of slaves 
suggests that the release was in response to a long-standing law or tradition, and was 
not simply a hasty maneuver to gain YHWH’s good graces in a time of national 
emergency. It is not likely, furthermore, that YHWH was viewed as the sort of god 
who responded to hasty maneuvers. It seems more likely that he would be swayed the 
most by obedience to ancient tradition. It is not likely, therefore, that a release of 
slaves would effect a victory over the Chaldeans if Zedekiah was seen as introducing 
an innovation; rather, the universal release of slaves had to be viewed as being in 
conformity with ancient law. This suggests that there must have been a long-standing 
tradition of a jubilee year and that it was in conformity with the laws of this tradition 
that the release was made. This suggests that Zedekiah released the slaves at the start 
of a jubilee year in Judah.157 
Wordplay158: As mentioned, the lexical set ׁשוב + ְּדרֹור + קרא is unique to Lev 
25:10; Jer 34:15-17.159 Table 15 gives an overview of what appears to be relevant uses of  
                                               
fact that the king and the people reneged on the covenant makes it seem as if they did not listen to Yahweh 
at all, putting their disobedience on the same level as that of earlier generations (v 14b)” (Lundbom, 
Jeremiah 21-36, 564). 
156 I am indebted to Carsten Vang for pointing out this possible link to me. 
157 Fried and Freedman, “Was the Jubilee Observed in Preexilic Judah?,” 2258. 
158 I here choose to discuss wordplay and linguistic dating prior to modification, as the latter 
makes more sense when addressed last. 
159 Holladay points out that Jer 34 does not reuse ַּתֲעֶׂשה ׁשְ ִמָּטה from Deut 15: “One wonders, then, 




Table 15. Lev 25:10, 41 and Jer 34:8, 11, 15–17, 22 
 
Lev 25:10, 41 Jer 34:8, 11, 15–17, 22 








ויצא מעמך  41. . .  
 ׁשבהוא ובניו עמו ו
אל־מׁשפחתו ואל־
 ׃ׁשובאחזת אבתיו י
הדבר אׁשר־היה אל־ירמיהו מאת יהוה אחרי כרת המלך צדקיהו ברית  8
ו אחרי־כן ׁשובוי 11. . . ׃ דרורלהם  קראאת־כל־העם אׁשר בירוׁשלם ל
ו את־העבדים ואת־הׁשפחות אׁשר ׁשלחו חפׁשים ויכבׁשום לעבדים יׁשבו
לקרא ו אתם היום ותעׂשו את־היׁשר בעיני ׁשבות 15. . . ולׁשפחות׃ ס 
 16איׁש לרעהו ותכרתו ברית לפני בבית אׁשר־נקרא ׁשמי עליו׃ דרור 
ו איׁש את־עבדו ואיׁש את־ׁשפחתו אׁשר־ׁשבאת־ׁשמי ות ו ותחללוׁשבות
ׁשלחתם חפׁשים לנפׁשם ותכבׁשו אתם להיות לכם לעבדים ולׁשפחות׃ ס 
איׁש לאחיו  לקרא דרורלכן כה־אמר יהוה אתם לא־ׁשמעתם אלי  17
נאם־יהוה ־החרב אל־הדבר ואל־ דרורלכם  קראואיׁש לרעהו הנני 
הנני מצוה נאם־ 22. . . הרעב ונתתי אתכם לזועה לכל ממלכות הארץ׃ 
תים אל־העיר הזאת ונלחמו עליה ולכדוה וׂשרפה באׁש ואת־ׁשביהוה וה
 ערי יהודה אתן ׁשממה מאין יׁשב׃ פ
 
10 and you shall sanctify 
the fiftieth year. And 
you shall proclaim a 
release in the land to all 
who dwell in it. It shall 
be a jubilee for you, 
and each one of you 
shall return to his 
possession, and each 
one shall return to his 
family. . . . 41 And he 
shall exit from with 
you, he and his children 
with him. And he shall 
return to his family and 
he shall return to his 
ancestral property. 
8 The word that came to Jeremiah from YHWH, after king Zedekiah cut 
a covenant with all the people that were in Jerusalem to proclaim release 
among them . . . . 11 But afterward they turned around and returned the 
slaves and maidservant whom they sent free. And they subjected them to 
slaves and maidservants. . . . 15 But you, you turned one day, and you did 
what was right in my eyes to proclaim a release, each one to his 
neighbor. And you made a covenant before my face, in the house which 
is called by my name. 16 But you turned around and profaned my name 
by returning each man his slave and his maidservant whom you sent free 
at their life. And you subjected them to make them your slaves and 
maidservants. 17 Therefore, thus says YHWH: You did not listen to me 
to proclaim a release, each one to his brother, and each one to his 
neighbor. Behold, I proclaim a release for you, says YHWH, to the 
sword, to the pestilence and to the famine. And I will make you a horror 
for all the kingdoms of the earth. . . . 22 Behold, I command, says 
YHWH, and I bring them to this city, and they will fight against her and 
take her and burn her with fire. And I make the cities of Judah a 
desolation, without inhabitants. 
 
 
                                               
deliberate or whether the writer is simply using a synonymous phrase” (Holladay, Jeremiah 26–52, 238). 
Two observations. First of all, ַּתֲעֶׂשה ְׁשִמָּטה is found in Deut 15:1, and is therefore not the key passage Jer 
34 reuses, even if we have seen above that Jer 34:14 reuses  ִֶׁשַבע־ָׁשִנים ֵּקץמ  from Deut 15:1. Second, it is 
possible to see Jer 34 as preferring to use ְּדרֹור + קרא from Lev 25 and ָחְפִׁשי + ׁשלח from Deut 15:12–13, 18, 
instead of ַּתֲעֶׂשה ְׁשִמָּטה from Deut 15:1, or even ְׁשִמָּטה + קרא from Deut 15:2, 9. For a reflection on the use 




 .in Lev 25:10, 41 and Jer 34:11, 15-16, 22 for the present study ׁשוב and ְּדרֹור + קרא
In Lev 25:10, 41 ְּדרֹור + קרא is used for the proclamation of release and ׁשוב for the return 
to one’s own and ancestral property. In Jer 34:8 ְּדרֹור + קרא has the expected meaning of 
proclaiming a release. However, already in its first use in our passage, in 34:11, ׁשוב is 
given an unexpected meaning. We expect that the slaves will return (ׁשוב) home to their 
inheritance property. But instead ׁשוב is used twice in the two following clauses in 34:11 
with other meanings. We find both their masters changing their mind (ַוָּיׁשּובּו ַאֲחֵרי־ֵכן, 
using qal ׁשוב) and forcing the slaves to return to slavery again ( ַוָּיִׁשבּו 
 Taken in isolation, each usage does not seem .(ׁשוב using hifil ,ֶאת־ָהֲעָבִדים ְוֶאת־ַהְּׁשָפחֹות
significant, but as we continue reading it is difficult to avoid the impression that there is 
an intentional word play here.160 
Jeremiah 34:15 describes how the people had repented (qal ׁשוב) from their 
fathers’ sins and did what was right in proclaiming a release. But then 34:16 reverts to the 
theme of their turning back (qal ׁשוב) from their right actions and returning (hifil ׁשוב) the 
slaves.161 With this subversion of ׁשוב in regards to the release, YHWH then declares in 
                                               
160 For examples of others who have recognized this wordplay see Weippert, Die Prosareden des 
Jeremiabuches, 94n; Carroll, Jeremiah, 645, 650; McKane, Jeremiah, 882; Fried and Freedman, “Was the 
Jubilee Observed in Preexilic Judah?,” 2258; Lundbom, Jeremiah 21-36, 557; Bergsma, The Jubilee from 
Leviticus to Qumran, 165–68; Smelik, “The Inner Cohesion of Jeremiah 34:8–22,” 241, 243.  Cf. Maier, 
Jeremia als Lehrer der Tora, 255. For other possible wordplays in Jer 34, see Viberg, Symbols of Law, 61 
commenting on ְּבִרית + כרת in 34:18, Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer der Tora, 275 on עבר and ָהִעְבִרי in Jer 
34:14, 18–19, and Smelik, “The Inner Cohesion of Jeremiah 34:8–22,” 244 on עבר in Jer 34:18. 
161 Maier has found a symmetry between v. 11 and v. 16, commenting: “Die Abkehr der 
Sklavenbesitzer von der getroffenen Vereinbarung wird sowohl in V. 11 als auch in der Gottesrede V. 16 
mit der Verbfolge ׁשוב q. + ׁשוב hif. + ׁשכב  ausgedrückt, ist also symmetrisch angeordnet” (Maier, Jeremia 
als Lehrer der Tora, 255). This symmertry strengthens the claim that there is an intentional use of ׁשוב in 
Jer 34. McKane has claimed that there is a difference between ׁשוב in Jer 34:15–16 MT and ἐπιστρέφω in 
Jer 41:15–16 LXX: “The different senses of ׁשוב at vv. 15f. should be noticed. ׁשוב (v. 15) means ‘to turn in 




34:17 that he will subvert the meaning of ְּדרֹור + קרא. He will release them to the 
covenant curses of sword, pestilence, and famine in Lev 26:25–26. ְּדרֹור + קרא is then 
also formulated in terms of the covenantal curses of Lev 26:25–26, as pointed out above. 
Since the masters returned their slaves, YHWH declares that he will also subvert ׁשוב 
(hifil) by surprisingly returning the enemies of the people back upon the city (34:22). It is 
a divine creative reading of Torah that takes its meaning in the opposite direction.162 
Given that the lexical set ׁשוב + ְּדרֹור + קרא is unique to Lev 25 and Jer 34, that Lev 25 
uses them in a plain sense while Jer 34 subverts the meaning of ְּדרֹור + קרא, and that the 
multiple meanings of ׁשוב also functions as an intentional play on words, we can 
positively identify Jer 34 as the borrowing text.163 Given the word play, the use of ְּדרֹור in 
                                               
or go back on one’s word. Sept. has rendered these occurrences as if the sense were identical in both cases 
(ἐπέστρεψαν and ἐπεστρέψατε)” (McKane, Jeremiah, 872). But as far as I can see, ἐπέστρεψαν in v. 15 is 
used to describe a “turn in the right direction” in contrast to ἐπεστρέψατε in v. 16 in the sense “to turn in 
the wrong direction.” Further, ἐπεστράφησαν in v. 10 is used analogous to ׁשוב in MT v. 11 for the return of 
slaves. Despite some re-shuffling or shorter version in 41:10–11 LXX, the same meaning of the verb is 
preserved. Finally, in ἐπιστρέψω in 41:22 is used for God returning the enemies, just as with ׁשוב in 34:22 
MT. As far as I can see, the wordplay is found in Jer 41 LXX analogous to Jer 34 MT. 
162 For similar observations on reuse in the book of Ezekiel see Risa Levitt Kohn, New Heart and 
A New Soul: Ezekiel, the Exile and the Torah, eds. David J. A. Clines and Philip R. Davies. JSOTSup 358 
(London: Sheffield Academic Press, 2002). 
163 Contra Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer der Tora, 265 claiming “Jer 34,8.15.17 werden als die älteste 
Belege für דרור gewertet.” Leuchter argues based on ANE comparative studies, where we find that the ְּדרֹור 
in other nations often occurred as a royal edict, that since it is used in Jer 34 in the context of a royal edict 
while this aspect is not present in Lev 25:10, this indicates that Jer 34 is the more original text and Lev 
25:10 borrows the concept from Jer 34. To this can be said that this argument appears far weaker than the 
wordplay testified in Jer 34, indicating Jer 34 as the borrowing text. Further, regarding the assumption that 
we can simply assume the same legal practice across national and cultic borders in the ANE, this 
assumption has been effectively disproven by Weeks, Adminition and Curse. Leuchter sums up his reasons 
for claiming a reuse of Jer 34 in Lev 25 as follows: “Leviticus 25 takes its thematic inspiration from a 
variety of features in Jeremiah 34: the general amnesty associated with the דרור, the seven-year counting 
cycle of the  ”of Deut 15:1 שמתה formula, and that formula’s potential allusion to the calendar-based מקץ 
(Leuchter, “The Manumission Laws,” 650). As argued in the above, none of these three arguments 
constitute strong and convincing arguments. Further, he ignores the evidence for conflation of Lev 25; 26 
and Deut 15; 28 in Jer 34 as argued here. Rather, Leuchter often constructs his argument on rather 




Jer 34 should not be understood primarily as a loan from Akkadian andurārum, as 
sometimes suggested,164 but, instead, primarily as an intentional reuse of Lev 25 even if 
this does not exclude an etymological and cultural link to the Akkadian andurārum. 
Linguistic dating: even if the distribution of the lexeme כבׁש is found throughout 
the HB, the use of כבׁש (“subjugate”) for people seems to be more a LBH phenomena (cf. 
Est 7:8; Neh 5:5; 2 Chron 28:10). Hornkohl has shown how Jeremiah belongs to TBH, 
and we, therefore, find traits from both CBH and LBH. Jeremiah 34:11, 16 כבׁש used with 
people as object therefore fits this pattern.165 
Modification: although Chavel sees elements from Lev 25 redacted into Jer 34 at 
a later stage, his discussion of  ְׁשִאי ָאִחיהּו ִּביהּוִדי ָּבםֲעָבד־ ִּתיְלִבל  in Jer 34:9 claims a 
sophisticated reworking and conflation of the beginning and end of Lev 25:39–46: 
The phrase בםד לבלתי עב  draws on the opening command of the slave laws in Lev. 
תעבד בולא  ,25.39  but adjusts it to conform to the circumstances of Zedekiah’s 
emancipation, which extended to maidservants, and to the syntax of Zedekiah’s 
proclamation. Thus תעבד לא   (apodosis) becomes ד לבלתי עב  (infinitive construct) to 
act as a motivational or definitional clause, while  בו (singular) becomes בם (plural) to 
refer inclusively to maidservants as well as slaves. Then, taking from the end of the 
priestly legislation, the author of Jer. 34.9b collapsed the two units  ובאחיכם בני־יׂשראל 
and איׁש באחיו (Lev. 25.46) into one phrase that maintains a representative of each of 
the original elements אח ,איׁש, and a nationalistic designation. In a double example of 
Zeidel’s law, according to which citations appear in inverted form, this scribe 
reversed the regular order of איׁש באחיו and inverted the form of the construct 
                                               
between Lev 25; Deut 15; and Jer 34, with weak textual support. 
164 Cf. Lemche, “The Manumission of Slaves,” 52, 56–57. 
165 Hornkohl, Language of the Book of Jeremiah, 10, 51. The term כבׁש is not discussed in Avi 
Hurvitz, A Concise Lexicon of Late Biblical Hebrew: Linguistic Innovations in the Writings of the Second 
Temple Period (Leiden: Brill, 2014), but this is likely because the lexicon did not aim at being 
comprehensive. Cf. Hurvitz, A Linguistic Study for an argument for Leviticus being a pre-exilic 





common to אחיך העברי (Deut. 15.12), אחיו העברי (Jer. 34.14), and  אחיכם בני־יׂשראל 
(Lev. 25.46), while also updating the nationalistic designation to יהודי. When finally 
combined, the reworked elements produced the phrase, 166. ביהודי אחיהו איׁש  
He sums up: “In other words, Jer. 34.9b encapsulates the entire paragraph 
concerning slave laws in the Holiness Code by drawing on the language of its opening 
and closing verses.”167 Table 16 underlines the parallels seen by Chavel. 
 
Table 16. Lev 25:39, 46b and Jer 34:9b 
Lev 25:39, 46b Jer 34:9b 
 39 וכי־ימוך אחיך עמך ונמכר־לך 
 לא־תעבד בו עבדת עבד׃ . . .
 לא־תרדה בו בפרך׃ ס איׁש באחיו ובאחיכם בני־יׂשראל 46
  לבלתי עבד־בם . . . 9
 ׃ ביהודי אחיהו איׁש
 
It is possible that the author of Jer 34:9 reworked Lev 25:39, 46 in this detailed 
manner, drawing from both the beginning and end of the slave release in Lev 25:39–46. 
If this is the case, it would illustrate the sophisticated scribal techniques used to compose 
Jer 34. Although it requires some fortitude to follow the argument, the syntactic analogy 
between ּבֹולֹא־ַתֲעֹבד  in Jer 34:9 and  ָּבםֲעָבד־ ִּתיְלִבלְ   in Lev 25:39, and the double reversal 
of ׁשִאי ָאִחיהּו ִּביהּוִדי  in Jer 34:9, placing ָאח at center to produce the phrase, is difficult to 
                                               
166 Chavel, “'Let My People Go!',” 91. Cf. Leuchter, “The Manumission Laws,” 649–51. Levinson 
argues in a similar way, but strangely enough does not refer to Chavel’s article at this point (Levinson, 
“Zedekiah's Release,” 321–22). Tongue in the cheek it is tempting to ask whether this is a ‘rhetorics of 
concealment’ of this reason? He also points out the parallel usage of ב + עבד in both Lev 25:39–46 and Jer 
34:9 (Levinson, “Zedekiah's Release,” 321n). This construction is less helpful to establish a case of reuse 
between the two passages, as it is not unique to the two and it is neither clear that it is distinct to them. But 
given that reuse between the two passages is already established, it adds to the parallels between the 
passages. Neither passage seems to rework the construction so as to help us determine direction of 
dependence. 




ignore.168 At the same time, if the author of ְלִבלְ ִּתי ֲעָבד־ָּבם ִּביהּוִדי ָאִחיהּו ִאיׁש in 34:9 wanted 
to demonstrate proximity Lev 25:39–46, why did he not use a more explicit quotation as 
testified in the reuse by Jer 34:14 of Deut 15:12? Furthermore, both 34:9 in relation to 
Lev 25:39, 46 and 34:14 in relation to Deut 15:12 demonstrate a similar freedom to 
rework literary sources. With these precautions, I am, nevertheless, inclined to accept 
Chavel’s analysis as evidence of a possible sophisticated reworking of Lev 25:39, 46 in 
Jer 34:9. If accepted, this becomes a strong argument for the direction of dependence 
going from Lev 25:39–46 to Jer 34:9. Levinson writes: 
To anticipate an objection, given that only Jer 34 and Lev 25 envision a universal 
manumission, it is worth asking whether the direction of dependence could run in the 
opposite direction. That is, could H have taken the idea of a universal release from 
Jeremiah? This is unlikely. The syntactically difficult formulation of Jer 34:9b,  לבלתי
 represents an exegetical précis of the beginning and end of ,עבד־בם ביהודי אחיהו איׁש
the manumission law of the Holiness Code, summarizing and integrating its key 
components. This précis places Jer 34 in the reception history of the Holiness Code, 
not the other way around.169 
                                               
168 For a critique of Chavel’s proposal see Mastnjak, Textual Authority in Jeremiah, 147–48. 
169 Levinson, “Zedekiah's Release,” 323. Levinson also raises the question of “the two distinct 
justifications of manumission in Jer 34:9b and 14,” and resolves this by claiming that both Exod 21 and 
Deut 15 represent individual cycles of release, i.e. the seven-year release would be counted on the basis of 
the year of entrance into servitude of the individual slave. Thus, he finds Jer 34:14 to present a 
reformulation of Deut 15, based upon the idea of universal manumission in Lev 25: “The picture 
constructed in Jer 34:14 through exegetical reformulation of Deut 15 is very different: manumission occurs 
simultaneously every seventh year throughout the country. There is only one passage in biblical law that 
envisions a universal manumission: the Holiness Code jubilee legislation of Lev 25:39–46. Rather than 
postulating that the author of Jer 34 developed the idea of a universal release of slaves ex nihilo, it seems 
more reasonable that he was working with H as a literary precedent. In other words, the author who wrote 
the ‘Deuteronomic’ law of v. 14 must also have been drawing on H for his inspiration” (Levinson, 
“Zedekiah's Release,” 323). As mentioned above, while Exod 21 seems to be based on an individual seven-
year cycle of release, Deut 15:12–18 could be read as based either on an individual or national cycle. It is 
therefore possible that the author of Jer 34:14 simply clarifies how he read Deut 15:12–18 as representing a 
national cycle by reusing Deut 15:1. Possibly it may have been some discussion on this, and Jer 34:14 
simply takes sides. In this case Lev 25 would not be necessary for arriving at the conflation of Deut 15:1, 
12 in Jer 34:14. Alternatively, the author of Jer 34:14 recognized Deut 15:12–18 as based on an individual 
cycle, and intentionally reworked it into a national cycle based on Deut 15:1, as suggested by Levinson. 
The motivation for this might have been to stress the national responsibility of manumission, a 




Conflation: Jer 34 appears to be a conflation of Lev 25 and Deut 15.170 If we 
juxtapose the relevant three passages, with terminological parallels as discussed above 
between Jer 34 and Lev 25 underlined, parallels between Jer 34 and Deut 15 double 
underlined, and conceptual parallels between Jer 34 and Lev 25 in italics, we get the 
following in Table 17. 
Given that modern commentators have easily identified the tension between Lev 
25 and Deut 15, it would be folly to claim that the author of Jer 34 did not. Rather, the 
formulations in Jer 34 seem to be a studied negotiation between the two. The initial 
description of Zedekiah’s covenant with the people is introduced with a locution from 
Lev 25 ( ְּדרֹורִלְקרֹא ָלֶהם  , v. 8c), then it is elaborated in locutions from Deut 15 (  ׁשִאי ַׁשַּלחלְ 
ִׁשיםָחפְ  ָּיהָהִעְבִרי ְוָהִעְבִר  ִׁשְפָחתֹוֶאת־ ׁשְוִאי ּדֹוֶאת־ַעבְ  , v. 9a), and finally conceptually formulated 
in harmony with the ban on enslaving Israelites from Lev 25 (  ָאִחיהּו ִּביהּוִדי ָּבםֲעָבד־ ִּתיְלִבלְ 
ׁשִאי , v. 9b). The people’s response in 34:10 is similarly intertwining elements from both 
Lev 25 and Deut 15. The repeated phrase in 34:10c,  ְעֹוד ָּבםֲעָבד־ ִּתיְלִבל , is conceptually 
close to Lev 25. Otherwise the verse reads according to the diction of Deut 15 (  ִַּיְׁשְמעּוו 
 ִּיְׁשְמעּווַ  . . . ִׁשיםָחפְ  ִׁשְפָחתֹוֶאת־ ׁשְוִאי ּדֹוֶאת־ַעבְ  ׁשִאי ַׁשַּלחלְ  ְּבִריתבַ  ֶׁשר־ָּבאּוְוָכל־ָהָעם אֲ  ָּׂשִריםָכל־הַ 
  Finally, the people’s reversal in 34:11 seems to be a combination of a play on 171.(ַויְ ַׁשֵּלחּו׃
                                               
the author of Jer 34:14 used the national cycle of Lev 25 to conflate Deut 15:1, 12. But the evidence seems 
inconclusive and should not be given weight. 
170 Cf. Bergsma, The Jubilee from Leviticus to Qumran, 164–5. 
171 While Jer 34:10a and 10c both begin with וַ ִּיְׁשְמעּו, and this could be understood as a 
Wideraufnahme, in this case functioning as a repetition to indicate the resumption of the reuse of Deut 15, 
we also note that the final clause  ְַׁשֵּלחּוַוי  (34:10d) is left somewhat hanging in the air. It lacks the more 
elaborate Deuteronomic formulation of ָחְפִׁשי + ׁשלח and is instead to be understood elliptically referring 
back to the preceding clauses. This may indicate that the author of Jer 34:10 at this point was more 




Table 17. Lev 25:39, 39–46; Deut 15:12–18; and Jer 34:8–22 
Lev 25:10, 39–46 Jer 34:8–22 
 קראתםוקדׁשתם את ׁשנת החמׁשים ׁשנה ו 10
בארץ לכל־יׁשביה יובל הוא תהיה לכם  דרור
תם איׁש אל־אחזתו ואיׁש אל־מׁשפחתו ׁשבו
 ו׃ׁשבת
. . . 
בו  עבדלא־ת מכר־לךך עמך ונאחיוכי־ימוך  39
עד־ׁשנת  כׂשכיר כתוׁשב יהיה עמך 40׃ עבדת עבד
ויצא מעמך הוא ובניו עמו  41היבל יעבד עמך׃ 
כי־ 42׃ ׁשובאל־מׁשפחתו ואל־אחזת אבתיו י ׁשבו
לא עבדי הם אׁשר־הוצאתי אתם מארץ מצרים 
 . . .׃ ימכרו ממכרת עבד
והתנחלתם אתם לבניכם אחריכם לרׁשת  46
כם בני־יׂשראל אחיובו עבדאחזה לעלם בהם ת
 ׃ סו לא־תרדה בו בפרךאחיאיׁש ב
הדבר אׁשר־היה אל־ירמיהו מאת יהוה אחרי  8
כרת המלך צדקיהו ברית את־כל־העם אׁשר 
איׁש את־ לׁשלח 9׃ דרורלהם  קראבירוׁשלם ל
ם חפׁשי העבריהו העבריו ואיׁש את־ׁשפחתו עבד
ויׁשמעו  10הו איׁש׃ אחיביהודי ־בם עבדלבלתי 
 ׁשלחכל־הׂשרים וכל־העם אׁשר־באו בברית ל
לבלתי ם חפׁשיו ואיׁש את־ׁשפחתו עבדאיׁש את־ 
ו אחרי־כן ׁשובוי 11ו׃ ׁשלחעוד ויׁשמעו וי ־בםעבד
ו ׁשלחים ואת־הׁשפחות אׁשר עבדו את־הׁשבוי
 13 . . .ים ולׁשפחות׃ ס עבדם ויכבׁשום לחפׁשי
כה־אמר יהוה אלהי יׂשראל אנכי כרתי ברית 
 172את־אבותיכם ביום הוצאי אותם מארץ מצרים
 173מקץ ׁשבע ׁשנים 14מבית עבדים לאמר׃ 
 לך ימכראׁשר־ העבריו אחיאיׁש את־ תׁשלחו
ולא־ חפׁשי מעמךתו וׁשלח ׁשׁש ׁשנים ועבדך
 15אזנם׃ ׁשמעו אבותיכם אלי ולא הטו את־
קרא ו אתם היום ותעׂשו את־היׁשר בעיני לׁשבות
איׁש לרעהו ותכרתו ברית לפני בבית  דרור
ותחללו את־ו ׁשבות 16אׁשר־נקרא ׁשמי עליו׃ 
ו ואיׁש את־ׁשפחתו עבדו איׁש את־ׁשבות 174ׁשמי
ם לנפׁשם ותכבׁשו אתם חפׁשיתם ׁשלחאׁשר־
לכן כה־ 17ים ולׁשפחות׃ ס עבדלהיות לכם ל
 קרא דרוראמר יהוה אתם לא־ׁשמעתם אלי ל
 דרורלכם  קראו ואיׁש לרעהו הנני אחיאיׁש ל
  175רעבואל־ה דבראל־ה חרבאל־ה נאם־יהוה
18–15:12Deut  
 ועבדך העבריהאו  העבריך אחי לך ימכרכי־ 12
 חפׁשי תׁשלחנו ׁשביעתה ׁשנהוב ׁשׁש ׁשנים
 תׁשלחנולא  מעמך חפׁשי תׁשלחנווכי־ 13׃ מעמך
ארץ מצרים היית ב עבדוזכרת כי  15. . .  ריקם׃
ויפדך יהוה אלהיך על־כן אנכי מצוך את־הדבר 
 מעמךוהיה כי־יאמר אליך לא אצא  16הזה היום׃ 
ולקחת  17כי אהבך ואת־ביתך כי־טוב לו עמך׃ 
 את־המרצע ונתתה באזנו ובדלת והיה לך עבד 
                                               
does not render Jer 34:10 MT  ְַׁשֵּלחּוַויְ  ִּיְׁשְמעּועֹוד וַ  ָּבםֲעָבד־ ִּתיְלִבלְ  ִׁשיםָחפ , possibly because it saw it as 
redundant. Or did it also perceive  ַַׁשֵּלחּוַויְ  ִּיְׁשְמעּוו  as somewhat hanging in the air? 
172 Cf. the discussion above on ֵמֶאֶרץ ִמְצַרִים ִמֵּבית ֲעָבִדים. 
173 From Deut 15:1. 
174 For a discussion of וַ ְּתַחְּללּו ֶאת־ְׁשִמי in Jer 34:16 as a reuse of a locution from Leviticus see 
above. 





Table 17 — Continued. 
 
18–15:12Deut  22–Jer 34:8 
לא־יקׁשה  18עולם ואף לאמתך תעׂשה־כן׃ 
כי מׁשנה ׂשכר  מעמך חפׁשיך אתו ׁשלחבבעינך 
וברכך יהוה אלהיך בכל  ׁשׁש ׁשניםך עבדׂשכיר 
 אׁשר תעׂשה׃ פ
 . . .׃ 176לזועה לכל ממלכות הארץונתתי אתכם 
 ׁשיוביד מבק 177יהםביד איבי אותם נתתו 20
 ׁשמיםלעוף הוהיתה נבלתם למאכל  ׁשםנפ
נאם־יהוה  מצוההנני  22   . . .׃178ולבהמת הארץ
תים אל־העיר הזאת ונלחמו עליה ולכדוה ׁשבוה
וׂשרפה באׁש ואת־ערי יהודה אתן ׁשממה מאין 
 יׁשב׃ פ
 
the verb ׁשוב from Lev 25 and the locution ָחְפִׁשי + ׁשלח in Deut 15. 
A question is whether any or all of the clauses with parallels to Lev 25 or Deut 15 
could be removed from Jer 34:8–11, and still leave the passage meaningful? I suggest 
that this may be a useful test in order to determine whether the two passages were reused 
in the original composition of Jer 34 or not. To me it seems that there are no good reasons 
to prefer a reuse of Deut 15 over that of a reuse of Lev 25 in the original composition of 
Jer 34:8–11. Based on the analysis above, which has shown that each clause in 34:8c–11 
contains likely reuse of either Lev 25 or Deut 15, to eliminate both Lev 25 and Deut 15 
would leave us only with  ְּבִרית ָּיהּוִצְדקִ  ֶּמֶלְךהַ  ְּכֹרת ַאֲחֵריֵמֵאת ְיהָוה  ּוֶאל־ִיְרְמָיה ֶׁשר־ָהָיהאֲ  ָּדָברהַ 
ִּבירּוָׁשַלִם ֶׁשראֲ  ָּכל־ָהָעםֶאת־  (“The word that came to Jeremiah from YHWH after the king 
Zedekiah made a covenant with all the people that were in Jerusalem”). First, we could 
ask whether some of the elements in 34:8c–11 could have been in an original 
                                               
176 For how ְוָנתַ ִּתי ֶאְתֶכם ִלַזוֲָעה ְלֹכל ַמְמְלכֹות הָ ָאֶרץ is a likely reuse of Deut 28:25 see above. 
177 For how ְוָנתַ ִּתי אֹוָתם ְּבַיד ֹאְיֵביֶהם is a likely reuse of Lev 26:25 see above. 
178 For how ְוָהְיָתה ִנְבָלָתם ְלַמֲאָכל ְלעֹוף הַ ָּׁשַמִים ּוְלֶבֱהַמת הָ ָאֶרץ is an exact parallel and likely reuse of 




composition without reusing either Lev 25 or Deut 15? But then we would immediately 
be confronted with the need to explain how Jer 34:8–11 could be seen as original in 
regard to the use of such terminology or conception. Second, it would leave us entirely 
ignorant as to the occasion, purpose, content and implementation of Zedekiah’s covenant. 
Third, it is not clear that it would have contained the description of the people’s reversal 
in 34:11, and would therefore have been a deficient introduction to the divine indictment 
in 34:12–22. And if it was originally not an introduction to 34:12–22 it would be unclear 
why it was included at all in Jer 34. Fourth, since it would not be a meaningful literary 
unit in itself, but only function as a prologue to the divine indictment (34:12–22), which 
reuses elements from both Lev 25 and Deut 15, it would undermine the basis for 
removing such elements from 34:8–11 in the first place. It therefore seems reasonable to 
assume that there was at least a reuse of either Lev 25 or Deut 15 in the original 
composition of Jer 34:8–11. 
If the clauses with parallels to Lev 25 are removed,  ְּדרֹורִלְקרֹא ָלֶהם  (“to proclaim 
among them a release”) in 34:8c,  ְׁשִאי ָאִחיהּו ִּביהּוִדי ָּבםֲעָבד־ ִּתיְלִבל  (“that none enslave his 
brother among Judeans”) in 34:9b,  ְעֹוד ָּבםֲעָבד־ ִּתיְלִבל  (“that none enslave again among 
them”) in 34:10c, and the possible play on ׁשוב from Lev 25 in 34:11a–b we would be left 
with the Deuteronomic content of the covenant, reading  
. . ַהָּדָבר ֲאֶׁשר־ָהָיה ֶאל־ִיְרְמָיהּו ֵמֵאת ְיהָוה ַאֲחֵרי ְּכֹרת ַהֶּמֶלְך ִצְדִקָּיהּו ְּבִרית ֶאת־ָּכל־ָהָעם ֲאֶׁשר ִּבירּוָׁשַלִם 
ַוִּיְׁשְמעּו ָכל־ַהָּׂשִרים ְוָכל־ָהָעם   . . .ְלַׁשַּלח ִאיׁש ֶאת־ַעְבּדֹו ְוִאיׁש ֶאת־ִׁשְפָחתֹו ָהִעְבִרי ְוָהִעְבִרָּיה ָחְפִׁשים  .
ֲאֶׁשר ִׁשְּלחּו  . . . ַוִּיְׁשְמעּו ַוְיַׁשֵּלחּו. . . ָּבאּו ַבְּבִרית ְלַׁשַּלח ִאיׁש ֶאת־ַעְבּדֹו ְוִאיׁש ֶאת־ִׁשְפָחתֹו ָחְפִׁשים ֲאֶׁשר־
 ָחְפִׁשים ַוִּיְכְּבׁשּום ַלֲעָבִדים ְוִלְׁשָפחֹות׃




with all the people who were in Jerusalem . . . each one to send his slave and his 
maidservant, Hebrew male or female, free. . . . And all the officials and all the people, 
who had entered the covenant that each one send his slave and his maidservant free, 
heard . . . They heard and sent away. . . . who they sent away. And they subjected 
them to slaves and maidservants.  
Taken in this way the passage would read procedurally well. But in Deut 15:12–
 follows an occasion, namely the six-year service. In this light, if the ָחְפִׁשי + ׁשלח 18 ,13
release in Jer 34:8–9 was based on Deut 15, it would have removed the occasion given in 
Deut 15 and instead rooted it in the royal edict. The secondary or dependent character of 
 in Deut 15 would thus be uprooted from its textual roots and transplanted ָחְפִׁשי + ׁשלח
into political soil. This is of course possible, given that Jer 34:8–11, as it now stands, 
grounds the Deuteronomic locution ָחְפִׁשי + ׁשלח in the royal edict and proclamation of 
release ( ְּדרֹורִלְקרֹא ָלֶהם  ). The present form of the text, however, invites one to see Jer 
34:8–11 as an active reworking of both Lev 25 and Deut 15. Denying this, and removing 
the elements parallel to Lev 25, would highlight the tension between 34:9 and 34:14. 
While the occasion in 34:9 would be the royal edict, in 34:14 it would be the seven-year 
release from Deut 15. We would still have to reconcile this tension in some way. And if 
this is admitted, then the likelihood of Jer 34:8–11 also reworking and incorporating Lev 
25 increases. Furthermore, the proximity of ְּדרֹור ּוְקָראֶתם  in Lev 25:10 and  ְׁשִמָּטהָקָרא  in 
Deut 15:2 rather leads us to believe that the author of Jer 34 was actively reworking and 
conflating Lev 25 and Deut 15, through the phrase  ְּדרֹורִלְקרֹא ָלֶהם  (Jer 34:8c), echoing the 
locution from Lev 25:10, and immediately being defined by Jer 34:9a in terms of Deut 15 
( ִׁשיםָחפְ  ָּיהָהִעְבִרי ְוָהִעְבִר  ִׁשְפָחתֹוֶאת־ ׁשְוִאי ּדֹוֶאת־ַעבְ  ׁשִאי ַׁשַּלחלְ  ). The infinitive construct of 
ַׁשַּלחלְ  34:8c) and) ִלְקרֹא  (34:9a) also invite the two clauses to be co-read.  




from Lev 25 would be seen in 34:11. As argued above, it is likely that as the text now 
reads there is a play in 34:11a–b ( . . .ְּׁשָפחֹות ֶאת־ָהֲעָבִדים ְוֶאת־הַ  ָּיִׁשבּווַ  ַאֲחֵרי־ֵכן ּוָּיׁשּובוַ  ) on ׁשוב 
from Lev 25. Either one would have to deny such a word play, or remove it from 34:11, 
rendering the verse incomprehensible. The syntax of the verse would be disrupted, 
leaving  ֲִׁשיםָחפְ  ִׁשְּלחּו ֶׁשרא  hanging in the air. Re-enslavement is not prohibited according 
to Deut 15. Since Jer 34:8–11 MT formulates the problems with the re-enslavement in 
terms of Lev 25, without the clauses reusing Lev 25, we would remain ignorant about 
what the problem with the re-enslavement was.179 Removing the clauses containing reuse 
of Lev 25 in Jer 34:8–11, would thus leave 34:8–11 a conundrum. It would not function 
well as an introduction to the divine indictment in 34:12–22.180 Therefore, the reuse of 
Lev 25 in Jer 34:8–11 seems original to the composition of these verses. 
If the clauses with parallels to Deut 15 are removed, ֶאת־ ׁשְוִאי ּדֹוֶאת־ַעבְ  ׁשִאי ַׁשַּלחלְ 
ִׁשיםָחפְ  ָּיהָהִעְבִרי ְוָהִעְבִר  ִׁשְפָחתֹו  (“to send his slave and his maidservant, Hebrew male or 
female, free”) in 34:9a,  ְִׁשיםָחפְ  ִׁשְפָחתֹוֶאת־ ׁשְוִאי ּדֹוֶאת־ַעבְ  ׁשִאי ַׁשַּלחל  (“to send each his slave 
and his maidservant free”) in 34:10c,  ַַׁשֵּלחּוַויְ  ִּיְׁשְמעּוו  (“and they heard and they sent off”) 
                                               
179 Based on locutions from Deut 15 in Jer 34, and v. 14 in particular, one could claim that the 
people did not take back their previous slaves in Jer 34, but rather decided simply to continue the practice 
from Deut 15 of taking slaves and releasing them in the seventh year. If so, the Torah interpretation 
witnessed in Jer 34 would be even more poignant. Jeremiah 34 would then pitch Deut 15 against Lev 25. 
The people would have followed Deut 15, while the author of Jer 34 argued for a practice more aligned to 
Lev 25. But ִׁשיםָחפְ  ִׁשְּלחּו ֶׁשראֲ  ְּׁשָפחֹותֶאת־ָהֲעָבִדים ְוֶאת־הַ  ָּיִׁשבּו  (“they brought back the slaves and maidservants 
which they had sent free”) in 34:11 and  ַָׁשםְלַנפְ  ִׁשיםָחפְ  ֶׁשר־ִׁשַּלְחֶּתםאֲ  ִׁשְפָחתֹוֶאת־ ׁשְוִאי ּדֹוֶאת־ַעבְ  ׁשִאי ָּתִׁשבּוו  
(“and each one brought back his slave and his maidservant which they sent free for their lives”) in 34:16 
read against this interpretation, since they specify that the people returned the same slaves that they had 
sent off. 
180 Levinson criticizes traditional literary criticism of Jer 34: “Absent the judgment oracle, the 
whole rationale for the inclusion of the account of the manumission and its reversal in the book of Jeremiah 
collapses. In other words, the very fact that a preexilic Jeremianic condemnation of the events narrated in 
the account cannot be clearly identified within the passage should begin to raise questions altogether about 




in 34:10d–e, and  ֲִׁשיםָחפְ  ִׁשְּלחּו ֶׁשרא  (“who they sent free”) in 34:11c the passage would 
read 
ִרית ֶאת־ָּכל־ָהָעם ֲאֶׁשר ִּבירּוָׁשַלִם ַהָּדָבר ֲאֶׁשר־ָהָיה ֶאל־ִיְרְמָיהּו ֵמֵאת ְיהָוה ַאֲחֵרי ְּכֹרת ַהֶּמֶלְך ִצְדִקָּיהּו ּבְ 
־ַהָּׂשִרים ְוָכל־ָהָעם ֲאֶׁשר־ָּבאּו ַוִּיְׁשְמעּו ָכל ֲעָבד־ָּבם ִּביהּוִדי ָאִחיהּו ִאיׁש׃ְלִבְלִּתי . . . ִלְקרֹא ָלֶהם ְּדרֹור 
ַוִּיְכְּבׁשּום  . . .ָבִדים ְוֶאת־ַהְּׁשָפחֹות ַוָּיׁשּובּו ַאֲחֵרי־ֵכן ַוָּיִׁשבּו ֶאת־ָהעֲ  . . .ְלִבְלִּתי עֲָבד־ָּבם עֹוד  . . .ַבְּבִרית 
 ַלֲעָבִדים ְוִלְׁשָפחֹות׃
The word that came to Jeremiah from YHWH after the king Zedekiah made a 
covenant with all the people who were in Jerusalem to proclaim a release . . . that 
none enslave his brother among Judeans. . . . And all the officials and all the people, 
who had entered the covenant . . . , heard . . . that none enslave among them again. 
But afterward they turned around and returned the slaves and maidservant . . . . And 
they subjected them to slaves and maidservants. 
The problem with this formulation is that it presupposes that the reader knows that ְּדרֹור 
means a release of present slaves. This could be solved by claiming that this is a reuse of 
Lev 25, and that the reader would immediately recognize the release from there.181 Both 
 seem to function as absolute ְלִבְלִּתי ֲעָבד־ָּבם עֹוד and ְלִבְלִּתי ֲעָבד־ָּבם ִּביהּוִדי ָאִחיהּו ִאיׁש
prohibitions; namely, they prohibit taking or holding Judahite slaves per se. Again, this 
could be taken as an imperative to release present slaves. But since no actual release of 
slaves is described, the return of the slaves in 34:11 comes as somewhat of a surprise. It 
could be understood as a lacuna in the text; a well-known phenomenon in biblical 
narrative,182 but it would nevertheless leave us with a feeling that something essential is 
                                               
181 It could also be explained as a common ANE knowledge that ְּדרֹור means a release of present 
slaves, something that may be a reasonable assumption. Cf. Moshe Weinfeld, Social Justice in Ancient 
Israel and in the Ancient Near East (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1995). 
182 Cf. e.g. Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, trans. 




missing. It would manifestly not improve the clarity of the text to remove the 
Deuteronomic elements. Otherwise, we notice that reading Jer 34:8–11 as originally a 
reuse of Lev 25 without the elements of Deut 15 actually works better than the reverse.183 
On textual grounds, given the text as we have it, there is, therefore, no reason to prefer a 
reuse of Deut 15 over that of a reuse of Lev 25 in the original composition of Jer 34:8–
11. Lundbom writes: “The integration of Deut 15:12 into the oracle is too complete for it 
to be secondary.”184 While I agree that the reuse of Deut 15:12–18 is not secondary in Jer 
34, I would also observe that the reuse of Lev 25:39–46 is not secondary either. 
Proceeding to the divine indictment in 34:12–22, we find a similar challenge in 
removing either the elements parallel to Lev 25 or Deut 15. Here the reuse of Lev 15 and 
Deut 15 is attested more in separate sections. Even if a verse such as 34:14 contains a 
significant concentration of reuse from Deut 15, the intertwining of elements from Lev 25 
and Deut 15 is not as condensed as in 34:8–11. As in Jer 34:8–11, again we find that the 
prescription to release the slaves in Jer 34:13–14 is predominantly formulated in terms of 
Deut 15, with no clear elements from Lev 15. On the other hand, the description of—and 
indictment against—the return of the slaves in Jer 34:15–22 is largely formulated in 
                                               
183 While the people’s release of the slaves in 34:10 could be read nicely without the element 
parallel to Lev 25 (  . . . ִׁשיםָחפְ  ִׁשְפָחתֹוֶאת־ ׁשְוִאי ּדֹוֶאת־ַעבְ  ׁשִאי ַׁשַּלחלְ  ְּבִריתבַ  ֶׁשר־ָּבאּוְוָכל־ָהָעם אֲ  ָּׂשִריםָכל־הַ  ִּיְׁשְמעּווַ 
ַׁשֵּלחּוַויְ  ִּיְׁשְמעּווַ  ), likewise the people’s return of the slaves in 34:11 could be read nicely without the element 
parallel to Deut 15 ( ְׁשָפחֹות׃ַלֲעָבִדים ְולִ  ִּיְכְּבׁשּוםוַ . . .  ְּׁשָפחֹותֶאת־ָהֲעָבִדים ְוֶאת־הַ  ָּיִׁשבּווַ  ַאֲחֵרי־ֵכן ָּיׁשּובּווַ  ). But the 
narrative itself would be severely compromised by a removal of either the parallels to Deut 15 in 34:10 or 
the parallels to Lev 25 in 34:11. I therefore suggest that both the reuse of Lev 25 and Deut 15 should be 
seen as original to the composition of Jer 34:8–11. 
It is also possible to imagine that elements were omitted from earlier compositions, but as Pakkala 
has pointed out, this would place any project trying to reconstruct the original composition in jeopardy, 
making them “much less certain” (Pakkala, God's Word Omitted, 14). 




terms of Lev 25 (Jer 34:15–22), with elements from Deut 15 taking a secondary role. 
Jeremiah 34:8–11 and 34:12–22, therefore, utilize consistent and distinct approaches to 
reusing Lev 25 and Deut 15: Jer 34:8–11 intertwines the two while Jer 34:12–22 keeps 
them more or less in separate sections. Since 34:8–11 and 34:12–22 are interdependent, 
with 34:8–11 providing the narrative setting and 34:12–22 the divine indictment, it would 
seem most reasonable to conclude that the same author wrote 34:8–22 but reused Lev 25 
and Deut 15 differently in 34:8–11 as compared to 34:12–22.185 As in 34:8–11, it would 
create disruption to remove either the reuse of Lev 25 or Deut 15 in 34:12–22. 
Summary: The above evidence leads to the conclusion that the reuse of Lev 25 
and Deut 15 was part of the original composition of Jer 34:8–22. Therefore, it is not 
“remixing the language of Zedekiah’s proclamation with the Deuteronomic legislation” 
that brings the author of Jer 34 to the understanding that the “Judean slaves must be—or 
should have been—released unconditionally and irrevocably.”186 This thrust in Jer 34 is 
far better explained as an original reuse of Lev 25. It appears entirely unjustified for 
Chavel to ignore the possibility of a reuse of Lev 25 in the original composition of Jer 34 
and then to insist that “a higher standard not called for in the original Deuteronomic 
                                               
185 This observation counters Chavel’s claim, of seeing 34:9 and 34:14 as representing different 
redactional layers: “Given that the thrust of Jer. 34.14 purports to renounce the very premise of Zedekiah's 
emancipation and demand that a higher principle undergird the covenant, it is unlikely that its author had a 
text that contained the reuse of the abolitionist ideas of the Holiness Code in Jer. 34.9b” (Chavel, “'Let My 
People Go!',” 92). Also contra Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer der Tora, 260–61, 264. Since Lev 25 and Deut 15 
are reused in more separate sections in Jer 34:12–22, in contrast to the closer intertwining of the two in 
34:8–11, we simply would expect 34:14 to be a purer quote while 34:9 a more intermixed. This is exactly 
what we find. Levinson therefore seems closer when seeing “the two distinct justifications for manumission 
in Jer 34:9b and 14” as “an exegetical harmonization of the legal sources of the Pentateuch” (Levinson, 
“Zedekiah's Release,” 323. See also p. 322), even if I am not able to follow him in seeing a reuse of the 
universal manumission from Lev 25:39–46 in Jer 34:14, as explained above.  




legislation, demanding that the owner recognize his or her slave as a social equal” was 
the original creation of the author of Jer 34.187 As argued above, the differences between 
the justification of manumission in 34:9b and 34:14 are best understood as different 
strategies of reuse by the same author. Jeremiah 34:8–11 on the one hand shows an 
alternating and much tighter knit reuse of Lev 25 and Deut 15, where Deut 15 is reused to 
describe the release and Lev 25 both the release and return. Jer 34:12–22 on the other 
hand largely relocates Deut 15 to the prescription for release in Jer 34:13–14, while 
34:15–22 reuses Lev 25 more in the divine indictment against the people’s return of 
slaves. 
Given the above discussion, it seems reasonable to conclude that the reuse of both 
Lev 25 and Deut 15 was found in the original composition of Jer 34:8–22.188 As an 
amalgamation of both Lev 25 and Deut 15, Jer 34 would be the youngest of the three. I 
can therefore concur with Levinson as he writes: 
The chapter truly becomes intelligible only once it is recognized that its author knew 
the Pentateuchal legal sources and exploited them to craft a brilliant exegetical 
homily on the cause of the Babylonian exile. His halakic midrash justifies the exile as 
punishment for covenantal transgression, for breach of Torah, now meaning an 
exegetical blend of the manumission laws of Deuteronomy and the Holiness Code. 
The chapter is a theodicy, one that presupposes not only the formation of the 
                                               
187 Chavel, “'Let My People Go!',” 85. 
188 I therefore challenge the common conception that blending of passages from Lev–Num and 
Deut necessarily is a mark of later redaction (cf. Carr, Formation of the Hebrew Bible, 29–31, 34, 40–48, 
66–71, 91–98, 303, 347–49; Rom-Shiloni, “Compositional Harmonization,” 915). Berman writes: “If a 
later scribe indeed revised the text of Jeremiah 34 to favor a Holiness Code ideology of manumission, why 
would he allow the original references to manumission from Deuteronomy to remain elsewhere in the text? 
Some hypothesize that revered texts in the ancient world had a canonical status, so that deleting passages 
already present was not an option. But this hypothesis is self-contradictory. If a text is so revered that 





Pentateuch, but a sophisticated process of hermeneutics.189 
And again: “In other words, this text is a response to the legal sources of the Pentateuch, 
not a transition point between them.”190 
Appropriation 
Of course, it is possible to construct a complex theory of an original composition 
of Jer 34 as having been subsequently edited, thereby introducing elements from both 
Deut 15 and Lev 25 in later editorial stages.191 It is also possible to claim a post-exilic 
                                               
189 Levinson, “Zedekiah's Release,” 314–15. He also writes: “Equally present in the text, however, 
playing just as commanding a role as does the invading Babylonian army, is the Torah, made repeatedly 
evident through a tight weave of citations and allusions to biblical law” (Levinson, “Zedekiah's Release,” 
313). Levinson takes Jer 34 as written ex post facto, after the fall of Jerusalem, and not pre facto as the 
chapter presents itself. Cf. Levinson, “Zedekiah's Release,” 319, 324–25. As mentioned, the absolute dating 
of Jer 34 is not my concern here, but in the present study I have not seen anything that would demand a late 
dating of Jer 34. It is thought-provoking to note how many biblical passages scholars claim to be 
significantly postdated not only the narrative reference time but also the narrated reference time. What is 
beyond dispute, at least, is that Jer 34 itself presents itself as a prediction of the coming judgement, rather 
than an explanation of the exile. The punishment in Jer 34:17, 20–22 do not even mention exile, and it is 
therefore difficult to see it as an ex post facto “aetiology of exile,” as Levinson calls it (Levinson, 
“Zedekiah's Release,” 324). Interestingly, Jer 34 does not formulate the sanctions in terms of slavery and 
exile as might be expected. We could have expected that since they re-enslaved their former slaves and did 
not let them return do their inheritance property as in Lev 25, they would themselves go into slavery and 
exile from their inherited land. Rather, Jer 34:17, 20–22 predict destruction through the sword, pestilence, 
and hunger. Note the contrast between Zedekiah being told he will go into exile in 34:3 and how he simply 
will be given into the hands of those seeking his life in 34:21. Levinson again: “The idea that Jeremiah as 
prophet delivers the crucial explanation for the exile as just punishment for Judah’s transgression of the 
covenant is also fully present in the final chapter of the Book of Chronicles (2 Chr 36). Strikingly, in this 
passage Jeremiah has been transformed into an exegetical prophet whose oracles presuppose Torah” 
(Levinson, “Zedekiah's Release,” 315). Based on the above, given that we already in Jer 34 find Jeremiah 
presented as “an exegetical prophet whose oracles presuppose Torah,” we cannot claim that this 
transformation first occurred in 2 Chr 36. Keown comments on Jer 34:21–22: “The lesson to be learned 
from this passage, according to R. Carroll (650), is that to violate even one stipulation of the Sinai covenant 
is to break the whole and to risk total destruction” (Gerald L. Keown, Jeremiah 26–52 (vol. 27; WBC; 
Dallas: Word, Incorporated, 1998), 190). Cf. Carroll, Jeremiah, 650. 
190 Levinson, “Zedekiah's Release,” 319. 
191 Many see a conflict between the law cited in Jer 34:14 and the narrative of Jer 34:8–11, e.g. 
Lemche, “The Manumission of Slaves,” 51–52; Weinfeld, “Sabbatical Year and the Jubilee,” 40; Schenker, 
“Die Freilassung der hebräischen Sklaven,” 152. Cf. Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic 
School, 320–61 for Weinfeld’s discussion of parallels between Deuteronomy and Jeremiah. Chavel writes: 
“Weinfeld enumerates a number of the unbridgeable discrepancies between Zedekiah's declaration of 




composition of Jer 34, admitting the reuse of Deut 15 and Lev 25 already in the original 
composition. But, given the text as we have it, neither would represent the most plausible 
or economical reading. The only possible utility of such theorizing would be to rescue 
some metatheory on the development of the religion of Israel á la Wellhausen. It is also 
possible to claim—based on the lack of exact correspondence between Lev 25 and Deut 
15 on the one hand, and Zedekiah’s release in Jer 34 on the other—that Jer 34 simply 
“attempts to graft these laws onto existing conditions, but this incorporation was 
artificial.”192 The most straightforward explanation—and therefore according to Occam’s 
razor the most preferable explanation—is to see Jer 34 originally composed as a 
sophisticated and creative reuse of Lev 25 and Deut 15. While an absolute dating of Jer 
34 has not been my concern, there is nothing in the above discussion that requires us to 
question the narrative’s own historial claims. Jeremiah 34:8–22 can be read as one unit 
and as a response to real events during Zedekiah’s reign. The often claimed mismatch 
between Lev 25 and Deut 15 on the one hand and Zedekiah’s release in Jer 34 on the 
other is regularly pointed out, but this cavil appears to stem from the expectation, or 
should we say extra-textual assumption, that we should find an exact correspondence 
between source and borrowing text in proto-halakhic applications. But if we allow for a 
more creative reuse of normative texts, the reuse of Lev 25 and Deut 15 begins to make 
perfect sense within its own historial setting. 
                                               
Go!',” 74n). But as argued, these become unbridgeable only if one insists on a direct correspondence-
model. In my opinion, this seems to be because they do not see the dialectic set up between Lev 25 and 
Deut 15 both in Jer 34:8–11 and 34:12–22, which is precluded by not allowing Lev 25 a role in the original 
composition of Jer 34.  




Chavel is correct in pointing out that “the authority behind Zedekiah’s 
emancipation resides in Zedekiah himself, as the king of Judah, rather than in 
YHWH.”193 Sarna formulates the issues involved even more poignantly: 
Appropriately, the royal edict is repeatedly designated derôr (vv. 8, 15, 17), a 
technical term that, to judge from its other biblical usages and ancient Near Eastern 
analogies, is applicable only to an institution administered on a community-wide 
basis (Lev. 25:10; Is. 61:1-2; Ezek. 46:17). How is this to be reconciled with the 
indubitable fact that the legislation of Deut. 15 in its substance and literary 
formulation constituted the legal and theological foundation upon which rested the 
events that took place during the Babylonian siege of Jerusalem? This problem is 
exacerbated by another fact. Jeremiah himself acknowledges that Zedekiah’s 
enactment was in fulfillment of, and in accord with, the provisions of the Sinaitic 
covenant, which earlier generations had honored more in the breach than in the 
observance (vv. 13-14).194 
Since Torah is covenantal instruction, there is an individual responsibility in how 
the passages are concretely applied. This relates to the characterization of Torah as 
discussed in the first chapter. As mentioned there, Torah was not perceived according to a 
legislative concept of law. Therefore, it did not have to be quoted verbatim. As with other 
ANE law collections, we see that the authority nevertheless rested in the decree of the 
                                               
193 Chavel, “'Let My People Go!',” 74. Berman writes on the periodic release prescribed in Lev 25 
and Deut 15: “The Bible’s reformulation of these laws begins with a fundamental departure from the norms 
of the ancient Near East: the decoupling of these releases from the political order. What determined the 
occasion of a release proclamation elsewhere was a royal decision, timed to suit the needs of the king. The 
Bible, however, regulates these proclamations by mandating them on a periodic basis. The implications of 
this are far-reaching. For one thing, such periodic scheduling means that the release proclamations are 
taken out of the hands of the king, indeed, in biblical law the king has no hand in declaring or 
implementing the release of debt, the manumission of slaves, or the redemption of tribal lands” (Berman, 
Created Equal, 99). So is Zedekiah going beyond his rights, or is it justified in a situation where the upper 
class are not doing what they are supposed to? He continues: “Yet this goes precisely to the heart of a 
proper understanding of biblical ‘law’: the treaty stipulations are themselves presented as a body of 
teaching. The purpose of biblical law is to shape and form the polity, not merely address cases and provide 
remedy” (Berman, Created Equal, 100). Berman’s observations on the manumission instructions in Torah, 
however, only intensify our questions regarding the role of Zedekiah in Jer 34. 
194 Sarna, “Zedekiah's Emancipation,” 147. Given the discrepancies between Deut 15 and 
Zedekiah’s covenant in Jer 34, Sarna writes that “at first glance there would seem to be no way of 
reconciling the action of Zedekiah with the legal provisions of Deut. 15” (Sarna, “Zedekiah's 




king. LeFebvre has shown that the typical pattern in the HB is not to use a precise 
formulation from Torah as the basis for action, but rather a certain fluidity is regularly 
observed in the reuse of passages from Torah. Further, the authority of a political action 
was not primarily grounded in a legislative reference to Torah as the political law, but the 
authority was based on an edict by the king or governor, where the formulations might be 
strongly influenced by the instructions in Torah.195 Given this general pattern in the HB, 
Zedekiah’s role in Jer 34 loses its surprise factor and rather corroborates the pattern itself 
as yet another piece of evidence indicating a similar trend.  
It follows, that Zedekiah’s covenant in no way undermines the possibility of 
literary influence from Torah, nor does it deny the existence of Torah prior to the time of 
Zedekiah. Further, the interesting thing about Jer 34, in this regard, is that we, once more, 
encounter the pattern of repetition with variation in the reuse of Torah as observed 
earlier; namely, both a certain continuity and discontinuity and both an intentional reuse 
and creativity in how the Torah passages are appropriated by later authors.196 Fischer 
calls it “einen Doppelcharakter mit Bezug auf die genannten Texte” in Jer 34.197 
                                               
195 Cf. LeFebvre, Collections, Codes, and Torah, 55–145. LeFebvre writes “that the Zedekiah 
practice narrative employs Deut 15 as a religious/ethical exemplar, but not a legislative norm. This practice 
narrative shows that the Deuteronomy text’s influence on debt release is theological nor statutory, and that 
the authority to proclaim actual release edicts remains in the hands of the king (Jer 34:8, 15)” (LeFebvre, 
Collections, Codes, and Torah, 86–87). However, I find LeFebvre’s denial of a normative aspect of Torah 
at best as imprecise. Jeremiah 34 clearly takes Lev 25 and Deut 15 as normative texts, even the grounds 
upon which the entire nation will be handed over to extinction (Jer 34:20–22). That Zedekiah might have 
initiated the covenant does not detract from the normativity of Torah, even if this normativity is different in 
character than what is found in a legislative normativity. 
196 Cf. Fischer, “The Relationship of the Book of Jeremiah to the Torah,” 908. 
197 Fischer writes: “Jer 34 zeigt einen Doppelcharakter mit Bezug auf die genannten Texte. 
Einerseits bezieht es sich auf sie, mit teils wortlichen Berührungen (z. B. mit Dm 15, so Sarna, 
Emancipation 2000 [ursprünglich 1973], 298-300, als eine alte Interpretation dazu; oder mit Lev 25, auch 




 Chavel does not explain this dual phenomenon, but simply avoids it by removing 
all the parallels to Torah through dubious critical means in order to claim that they were 
not part of the original composition but only added by a later redactor at a much later 
stage; he claims they were added even after Neh 5.198 According to Chavel, “Only the 
legal citation in Jer. 34.14 bears any literary relationship to Deut. 15.12.”199 
As the above analysis has not uncovered any good reasons to see an exclusive 
reuse between Exod 21 and Jer 34, given that all the parallels and a multiplicity of others 
are better explained as a reuse between Deut 15 and Jer 34, the following questions arise: 
Was the author of Jer 34:8–22 unaware of Exod 21:2–11? Is this because he viewed the 
later instructions in Deut 15:12–18 as replacing Exod 21:2–11, or might it even be that 
                                               
sodaß Lemche keine Verbindung mit Sabbat- oder Jobeljahr sieht (Manumission 1976, 56); im Unterschied 
dazu verknüpft Sarna (Emancipation 2000, 301) mit einem Sabbatjahr 588/7, und Lundbom deutet es als 
Freilassung anläßlich eines Jobeljahres (561). Daß die Entlassung für alle Sklaven zugleich erfolgt, steht 
gegen Dtn 15, das je individuell nach sechs Jahren deren Freigabe fordert (Rudolph 223)” (Fischer, Jeremia 
26–52, 252. Cf. p. 261). 
198 Chavel, “'Let My People Go!',” 74–76. The text does not claim a conflict between Zedekiah’s 
and YHWH’s covenant, but rather their convergence. The hermeneutics of conflict is introduced by Chavel 
himself in his reading (Chavel, “'Let My People Go!',” 77). Chavel comes across as quite confident in being 
able to reconstruct how a possible initial composition of Jer 34 would have looked like (e.g. Chavel, “'Let 
My People Go!',” 80). Ironically Chavel comes around and acknowledges the reuse of both Deut 15 and 
Lev 25 in Jer 34 as we have it, and here I would agree with him. But he explains the parallels between Deut 
15 and Jer 34 as an effort by “later hands” “to bring these texts into a stronger measure of conformity and 
mutual reference” and the parallels between Lev 25 and Jer 34 as “one scribe” (if so, why only one?) 
“adding a reference to Leviticus . . . to represent Zedekiah’s proclamation as an attempt to implement the 
radical, total abolition of Judaean slavery” (Chavel, “'Let My People Go!',” 88). Well, if the reuse of Lev 
25 and Deut 15 in Jer 34 is acknowledged, Occam’s razor inclines us to simply pose the possibility that it 
was because Jer 34 originally used these passages. Chavel’s hypothetical and conjectural reasoning to make 
these parallels later interpolations distort Jer 34 more than the distortions he claims to find in the syntax of 
Jer 34 itself. Berman critiques Chavel asking: “If a later scribe indeed revised the text of Jeremiah 34 to 
favor a Holiness Code ideology of manumission, why would he allow the original references to 
manumission from Deuteronomy to remain elsewhere in the text? . . . . If a text is so revered that nothing 
may be erased, why may new materials be interjected into it?” (Berman, “The History of Legal Theory,” 
35–36). 




Exod 21:2–11 was not composed at the time of the composition of Jer 34:8–22 as Van 
Seters would claim?200 These questions would easily lead to speculation, and it seems 
prudential to not exceed the extant evidence. Jeremiah 34 does not offer a basis for 
claiming that its author took a supersessionist view of Exod 21 and Deut 15. What we 
observe is simply a reuse of Deut 15 in Jer 34 with no evidence as to whether or not Exod 
21 was consulted by the author. 
The one relevant question, however, is whether the author of Jer 34:8–22 saw the 
manumission instructions as replacing one another, as seen in the relative relation 
between Lev 25:39–46 and Deut 15:12–18? In other words, does the author of Jer 34 take 
a supersessionist view in regard to Lev 25:39–46 and Deut 15:12–18? As far as I can see, 
the author of Jer 34 does not view the relation between Lev 25 and Deut 15 in a 
supersessionist manner, but rather creates a dialectic between the two.201 The word 
                                               
200 Van Seters, A Law Book for the Diaspora, 82–95. 
201 Earlier I was inclined to see Deut 15:12–18 as being reused more in phraseology, while Lev 
25:39–46 more conceptually in Jer 34:8–22. It is especially the paraphrase of Deut 15:12 in Jer 34:14, 
together with the significant reuse of Deuteronomy in the book of Jeremiah as a whole, that may incline us 
to see Deuteronomy as predominant also in Jer 34. But the more I have looked at the evidence, the more I 
have become convinced that the author is treating the two in very similar fashion, intent upon placing them 
into a dialogue with each other, and that the differences we might observe in how the two are reused is 
more a question of syntax and rhetoric than a difference in how the author perceive the authority and 
centrality of the two. Still, I do see that Jer 34 could be read as giving a predominance to Deut 15 over Lev 
25, á la Rofé’s argument that in Josh 20 Num 35 take a predominance over—but is altered on the basis of—
Deut 4:41–43 (Alexander Rofé, “Joshua 20: Historico-Literary Criticism Illustrated,” in Empirical Models 
for Biblical Criticism, ed. Jeffrey H. Tigay (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), ). 
David T. Stewart’s summary of his discussion of Lev 19 seem to resonate with the finds here on 
Jer 34: “Indigenous literary features allow us to step away from the theological position that all biblical 
laws are of equal importance (according to Schwartz). . . . Different contexts are sufficient to allow 
different nuances of meaning. Thus I would suggest, contra Nihan, that allusion to or citation of other 
biblical laws in Lev 19’s compendium is not to harmonize them. It is also more, I think, than a simple 
memory aid. Literary allusion in Lev 19 is an aid to recollection that ‘simultaneously activates’ two or 
more texts and holds them in dialectical tension. 
To say that Lev 19 is a ‘mini-Torah’ is to assert more than the existence of fifty-plus laws here. It 
is to say that the structure of the chapter embodies its own pedagogy of reading. Here one must not just 




‘dialectic,’ borrowed from the Greek διαλεκτική, in this case would mean that Jer 34 sets 
up a discourse or conversation between Lev 25 and Deut 15 thereby counterposing their 
different viewpoints in order to establish a faithful proto-halakhic appropriation in the 
present situation. 
While Exod 21 differentiates between the conditions of release for the male and 
female slaves, in Jer 34 no such difference is observed. While Exod 21 and Deut 15 
regulate a septennial release, the former likely based on an individual cycle and the latter 
either an individual or a national cycle, Lev 25 prescribes a national cycle of release 
every 49 years, and Zedekiah’s covenant in Jer 34 prescribed an immediate national 
release of all Hebrew slaves. The immediacy of the release ignores both the sabbatical 
year cycle of Deut 15 and Jubilee cycle of Lev 25. While the royal covenant was the 
occasion of the immediate and absolute abolishment of slavery of Hebrews, both Deut 15 
and Lev 25 are appealed to, respectively Lev 25 in 34:9b and Deut 15 in 34:14, to give 
the manumission a basis in Torah.202 
Jeremiah 34:8–11 seems to alternate the reuse of Lev 25 and Deut 15 in a 
sophisticated manner.203 The narrative of the release of the slaves is largely formulated in 
                                               
forth to its associations. This perturbs the reader, who must recollect past reading in order repeatedly to 
grapple with meaning, just as citing texts wrestle with prior texts. Thus it is to say, the structure of Lev 19 
contains ‘directions’ for reading from its redactor/rabbi. Might not this spur one to meditate with delight on 
the Torah day and night?” (David T. Stewart, “Leviticus 19 as Mini-Torah,” in Current Issues in Priestly 
and Related Literature: The Legacy of Jacob Milgrom and Beyond, eds. Roy E. Gane and Ada Taggar-
Cohen, RBS 82 (Atlanta: SBL, 2015), 323). 
202 Speculations whether Zedekiah’s release of the slaves might have coincided with a Sabbath or 
Jubilee year seem conjectural, even if it cannot be excluded. 
203 Smelik might be right that Jer 34 should be read as reusing catchwords and catchphrases, even 
if this does not need to undermine the historicity of the account as I have commented elsewhere: “Attempts 
to harmonize Jer 34 with the laws in the Torah in relation to debt slavery, however, appear to miss the 




terms of Deut 15 and Lev 25, while the return of the slaves is formulated only in terms of 
Lev 25. The same applies in Jer 34:12–22, but here the two are held more apart and 
largely reused in successive order, Deut 15 again for the release in 34:13–14 and Lev 25 
for the talionic punishment for their neglect in 34:15–22.  
While the tension between Jer 34:9 and 34:14 is often noted, and commonly 
interpreted as an indication of different sources,204 we can now rather explain it in light of 
an original reuse of Lev 25 and Deut 15, where the author apparently did not see a need 
to harmonize or synthesize his sources. This dialectical approach in Jer 34 also explains 
why the author creates an interplay between Zedekiah’s covenant with the people in the 
Temple (34:8–11, 15–17) and YHWH’s covenant with their forefathers at Sinai (34:13–
14).205 Smelik argues that YHWH uses the pronoun ָאֹנִכי in Jer 34:13 to emphasize the 
contrast between his covenant at Sinai and Zedekiah’s covenant with the people.206 It is 
part of an intentional juxtaposition of authoritative texts and historical events. In this 
perspective, the combination of authoritative texts prescribing a seven-year (Deut 15:1, 
12–18) or 49-year (Lev 25:39–46) release cycle with the immediate release in Zedekiah’s 
covenant is less problematic as well. 
Jeremiah 34:8–22 can not be explained simply as a harmonization of Lev 25 and 
                                               
historical account of what actually happened in Jerusalem during the Babylonian siege” (Smelik, “The 
Inner Cohesion of Jeremiah 34:8–22,” 250). The catchwords and catchphrases, or repetition with variation 
as I have called it elsewhere, should be understood in light of the author of Jer 34 alternating and creating a 
dialectic between Lev 25 and Deut 15. 
204 Cf. e.g. Chavel, “'Let My People Go!',” 92; Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer der Tora, 260–61.  
205 Maier sees a link between the reference to the forefathers in Jer 34 and the “Vatertora 
orientierten Haltung der Rechabiten in Jer 35” (Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer der Tora, 280). 




Deut 15, but rather seems to create a dialectic between the two, apparently sensitive to 
their inconsistencies.207 It does not see Lev 25 and Deut 15 as addressing different cases 
in order to see them as complementary, but brings the two together in order to support the 
royal covenant to release the Hebrew slaves and judge the people for retracting this 
action.208 Instead of trying to synthesize or harmonize the two,209 Jer 34 attempts to look 
at both in order to draw out their most far-reaching implications for the present 
situation—be that gender-inclusivity, absolute abolishment of Hebrew slaves, or talionic 
retribution for their neglect. Neither does it treat Lev 25 and Deut 15 in a supersessionist 
manner where one replaces the other, but reuses both, in tandem, for its own 
sophisticated rhetorical purposes. 
Dalit Rom-Shiloni, in her study of reuse of “priestly and deuteronomic 
                                               
207 This resonates with the finds of Rofé in his study of Josh 20 and Seeligmann in his study of 
Chronicles (Rofé, “Joshua 20: Historico-Literary Criticism Illustrated,” 131–47; I. L. Seeligmann, 
“Anfänge der Midraschexegese in der Chronik,” in Gesammelte Studien zur Hebräischen Bibel, ed. E. 
Blum (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 31–54). Seeligmann writes regarding the Chronicler: 
“Selbstverständlich kennt er, wie sich auch im Verlauf unserer Untersuchung zeigte, keine Unterscheidung 
zwischen priesterlichen order deuteronomistichen quellen. Jedoch selbst da, wo er sich einer Spannung 
zwischen verschiedenen Tora-stellen bewusst ist, kommt für ihn ein Eingriff in die Textformulierungen der 
Tora nich in Frage; vielmehr versucht er sie lediglich durch Kombinaiton auszugleichen” (Seeligmann,  
“Anfänge der Midraschexegese in der Chronik,” 54). Cf. Rom-Shiloni, “Compositional Harmonization,” 
917. 
208 As mentioned earlier, Kilchör argues that Lev 25 and Deut 15 respectively deal with a question 
not addressed by Exod 21, namely how the slave will provide for him- or herself so as not to end in slavery 
immediately again. According to him, the solution in Lev 25 is the return to the ancestral land, while Deut 
15 prescribes sending the slave off with abundant provisions (Kilchör, Mosetora und Jahwetora, 141–53). 
Jeremiah 34 could be taken to support this view, claiming that Jer 34 sees a common concern in Lev 25 and 
Deut 15. It does not, however, identify this common concern as sufficient provisions upon release of the 
slave. Instead, Jer 34 seems to see the common concern in Lev 25 and Deut 15 as securing the release of 
the subservient as soon as possible. Thus, Jer 34:8–11 prescribes an immediate release, without mentioning 
provisions for all the released slaves suddenly having their freedom returned. 
209 Because Jer 34 does not resolve the tension between Lev 25 and Deut 15, as for example in the 
difference between the Sabbatical and Jubilee year cycle, we are not entitled to call it a synthesis. Rather, it 
leaves the tension untouched, leaning upon them while simultaneously formulating a third prescription 




references” in Jer 2:3; 3; and 49:1–2, four qualities of what she calls ‘harmonization’:  
In the wake of Rofé’s study of Josh 20, four distinctive qualities of harmonization as 
a literary technique may be recognized (although Rofé himself noted only the first 
two): (a) Harmonization is motivated by the need to reconcile contradictory (or at 
least different) statements and seems even more essential when legal traditions are 
involved. (b) There is no necessary ‘balance’ between the evoked traditions. One may 
be more explicitly or extensively referenced, the other(s) supplementary in nature. (c) 
The evoked texts may share common phrases that function as connecting ties. (d) The 
later author is free to combine his target texts in a way that enhances his own 
rhetorical aims, a procedure that may include coining his own phraseology. . . . From 
the standpoint of function, the collation of two or more independent literary or legal 
traditions into one combined text may serve different goals. Two of these functions 
have been thoroughly analyzed in previous scholarship. Within narrative passages, 
harmonizations function to resolve contradictions, discords, and/or gaps within the 
plot. Within a legal text, they are used to clarify or blend legal regulations in order to 
adapt these effectively to the author’s time and circumstances (e.g., Josh 20:1–9; Neh 
8:13–18).”210 
To me Rom-Shiloni’s definition of ‘harmonization’ seems too broad and vague to 
be a useful tool.211 For example, it would be negligent to call Jer 34 a harmonization of 
Lev 25 and Deut 15. Still, her four points are useful in terms of helping us to further 
valorize the dialectical features of Jer 34 already discussed. First, the author of Jer 34 
                                               
210 Rom-Shiloni, “Compositional Harmonization,” 919. The article by Rofé that she refers to is 
Rofé, “Joshua 20: Historico-Literary Criticism Illustrated,” 131–47. Cf. also her seven summary points, 
Rom-Shiloni, “Compositional Harmonization,” 937–38. And then in a footnote referring to Fishbane, she 
also writes regarding blending of legal traditions: “According to Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation (see n. 
13), 164–65, this is the major motivation behind the legal exegesis of Deuteronomy in reference to what he 
considered to be ‘earlier JE and P traditions.’ The blending of the earlier sources, according to Fishbane 
(220–221), reflects the Deuteronomic author’s attitude that they are equally authoritative, although they 
represent different traditions in relation to one and the same topic” (Rom-Shiloni, “Compositional 
Harmonization,” 919n). She formulates the author’s freedom with a good ‘Jeremianic’ pun: “What appears 
very plainly throughout is the prophet’s freedom in handling different legal traditions in their exact 
terminology and conceptions, which are for him as clay in the potter’s hand” (Rom-Shiloni, 
“Compositional Harmonization,” 933). Her following statement is also relevant for Jer 34: “if we consider 
these verses to be ‘authentic,’ we see Jeremiah, or his contemporary tradents, uniting Priestly terminology 
(and conceptions) with a Deuteronomic worldview and intertwining them in this prophecy to create entirely 
original meanings” (Rom-Shiloni, “Compositional Harmonization,” 927). 
211 Rom-Shiloni defines ‘harmonization’ as follows: “Harmonization (also called coordination, 
combination, collation, conflation, or blend) is usually treated as a scribal phenomenon in two different 
contexts – either as a technique of literary composition performed by authors and redactors or as part of the 





does not seem to feel a “need to reconcile contradictory” statements in Lev 25 and Deut 
15. For example, he leaves the obvious tension between the timeframe of the sabbatical 
and Jubilee years untouched. Rather, he goes beyond both passages by using one source 
to radicalize the other. Second, Jer 34:14 contains the clearest case of reuse, namely of 
Deut 15:1, 12. This could be taken as a basis for arguing that Deut 15 is given a more 
dominant role than Lev 25. However, as argued above, the situation rather seems to be 
one of alternating between the two sources so as to create a dialogue or dialectic between 
them. Third, even if ְּדרֹור + קרא from Lev 25:10 and ְׁשִמָּטה + קרא from Deut 15:2, 9, or 
the common lexeme ָאח could be said to constitute possible bridges for the author of Jer 
34 between Lev 25 and Deut 15, this is by no means evident. It makes more sense to see 
him as moving between his sources such that it is relatively clear, from clause to clause, 
whether it is Lev 25 or Deut 15 that is being reused. Fourth, and finally, we also can see a 
creative reuse in Jer 34 where the author is clearly not restricted to preserving an exact 
correspondence to his sources. While Rom-Shiloni’s points are perceptive and helpful, 
they would need modification and specification in light of Jer 34. Proto-halakhic reuse 
should not be seen as a homogenous approach with multiple qualities, but rather as 
allowing multiple and various literary strategies, depending on the intention of the author 
and message in a specific context. Rom-Shiloni basically appears to be saying much the 
same thing. She acknowledges the dual phenomenon of intentional and creative reuse, a 
phenomenon repeatedly witnessed in this study, as follows: 
Two features of this rhetorical/literary technique within the book of Jeremiah (and 
prophecy in general) deserve special attention: the thoughtful intentionality behind 
the harmonizations and the prophet’s freedom in creating harmonizations in what 
appear oftentimes to be virtuosic ways. The prophet clearly feels completely free to 




prophecy. Jeremiah utilizes these national narrative and legal traditions interpretively, 
in the most creative ways – making use of analogy, expansion, transformation, 
reversal, and many other techniques – to tap this treasury of traditions for his own 
message.212  
Again: “The prophet pursues the double (and not easily cooperative) aims of preserving 
authoritative earlier traditions while creating new prophetic messages.”213 Finally, having 
discussed reuse in narrative passages and legal texts, her comment on the prophetic 
literature seems right on the mark in light of Jer 34: 
The prophetic literature suggests that a third, more sophisticated function may stand 
behind the harmonization of Pentateuchal traditions. Prophetic combinations of 
diverse Pentateuchal traditions develop neither out of a need to correct or smooth out 
narrative irregularities nor out of a need to establish or fine-tune legal regulations. 
Rather, prophets intentionally harmonize Pentateuchal traditions for the sake of their 
historical or metaphorical value; for the additional moral or ethical lesson that the 
Pentateuchal materials may be seen to convey; and to authorize their own messages 
via the evocation of familiar and authoritative traditions.214 
The author of Jer 34:8–22 treats both Lev 25:39–46 and Deut 15:12–18 as 
authoritative sources with normative implications for the present. Nevertheless, he takes 
certain liberties in the reuse by never giving any extensive and exact quotation from 
either. Even the quote of Deut 15:12 in Jer 34:14 is freely modified. All the time we find 
alterations of the original passages; for example, minor changes in phrases, reordering the 
sequence of syntactic elements, and word play. Bergsma writes: 
The covenant of emancipation instigated by Zedekiah does not, in fact, aim to fulfill 
any specific law of the Torah to the letter, but rather is an ad hoc enactment meant to 
fulfill the spirit of all of them, and the language used to describe the event draws from 
                                               
212 Rom-Shiloni, “Compositional Harmonization,” 939. 
213 Rom-Shiloni, “Compositional Harmonization,” 939. For her references to Carr see Rom-
Shiloni, “Compositional Harmonization,” 915n, 939. And for her reference to Levitt Kohn’s study of 
similar compositional techniques found in Ezekiel, see Rom-Shiloni, “Compositional Harmonization,” 940. 
Carr and Levitt Kohn are discussed in other chapters of this study. 




both Deut 15 and Lev 25. The fact that the emancipation does not accord exactly with 
any one legal text has been used to argue that the association between Zedekiah’s 
covenant and the pentateuchal texts is only a product of later redactional activity: 
originally the event made no reference to older laws and was purely a political 
expedient. Such a conclusion is unwarranted. The slave release laws of the Covenant, 
Holiness, and Deuteronomic codes had been formulated for specific socio-cultural 
conditions that had long since ceased to obtain by the reign of Zedekiah,  and no 
wooden one-for-one application of the laws was possible even if it were desired.215 
Since it is uncertain whether the making of this covenant coincided with either a Jubilee 
or sabbatical year (Jer 34 makes no such claim) Zedekiah’s concern rather seems to aim 
at alleviating the slaves neglect, and the possible divine retribution following such 
neglect, with the Babylonian armies literally at the gate. It is the immediacy of the 
abolition that strikes us. There was no waiting for a sabbatical or Jubilee year. Jer 34 
signals an immediate abolition of Hebrew slaves for all time. 
Still, the people are indicted for not having followed Lev 25 and Deut 15, and, 
therefore, it seems that the people are held responsible for having neglected instructions 
they could have followed. The divine indictment of Jer 34 appears to presuppose that 
obedience to Lev 25 and Deut 15 was a possibility for the people given their situation. 
Only in this way is it possible to understand the severe punishments. 
                                               
215 Bergsma, The Jubilee from Leviticus to Qumran, 162. Holladay seems somewhat perplexed 
about the character of the reuse: “It is thus evident not only that the laws recorded variously in Exodus 21, 
Leviticus 25, and Deuteronomy 15 have undergone a complicated evolution but also that the specific 
application of the law referred to in the present passage of Jer uses phraseology that does not reflect 
directly any single extant formulation of the law” (Holladay, Jeremiah 26–52, 238). It seems most 
reasonable to pose a free reuse as the explanation, rather than “a complicated evolution” often caught up in 
conjectures. While I often admire Levinson’s attention to details, in this case he as well might seem to 
make too much out of the lack of exact wording (Levinson, “Zedekiah's Release,” 320–31). Understanding 
Jer 34 as reusing Lev 25 and Deut 15 according to what it saw as their intent and trajectory, manumits us as 
modern readers (to use Levinson’s formulation, cf. Levinson, “The Manumission of Hermeneutics,” 323–
24) from being hung up in the lack of exact reuse of words, phrases, and semantics. Sarna writes: “In actual 
fact, no real contradiction between the Deuteronomist and Jer. 34 need be assumed, if the latter be 





Nevertheless, even if a literal observance seemed to be expected as realistic, a 
certain novum in Zedekiah’s covenant seems unproblematic—even approved by YHWH 
(Jer 34:15). Even if they later retracted their abolition of the Hebrew slaves, Jeremiah 
34:15 actually confirms that the people temporarily did what was right—despite the 
variation between Zedekiah’s covenant and the instructions in Torah. In light of Deut 15, 
Zedekiah’s covenant goes ‘beyond the call of duty’ to release all Hebrew slaves. He 
neither waits for the time of a sabbatical year according to Deut 15 or a Jubilee year 
according to Lev 25.216 Given that both could very likely have been neglected from the 
exodus until the time of Jeremiah’s contemporaries (Jer 34:14–15), it seems Zedekiah felt 
that any time was appropriate for their application and the sooner the better.217 It is an 
immediate abolition of all Hebrew slavery in full accord with Lev 25. Given the absolute 
rejection of slavery of Hebrews in Lev 25, Zedekiah certainly did not need to wait for any 
cycle, whether a sabbatical or Jubilee year, but could implement the actions immediately. 
Although Lev 25 can be read as only prohibiting harsh treatment of Israeli slaves, thus 
endorsing a kind of ‘soft’ servanthood, Zedekiah clearly seems to read it in its most 
radical sense; namely, the entire and immediate abolition of all Hebrew slaves. He can, 
therefore, also be said to go “beyond the call of duty” in Lev 25, by applying the gender 
inclusive perspective of Deut 15 as well. Jeremiah 34 radicalizes Lev 25 and Deut 15 
respectively by incorporating elements from the other legal passage, seen most clearly in 
                                               
216 The use of קרא + ְּדרֹור + ׁשוב from Lev 25:10, מִ ֵּקץ ֶׁשַבע־ָׁשִנים from Deut 15:1, and the curse 
formulas from Lev 26:25–26 and Deut 28:25–26 also show that Jer 34 was not restricted to Lev 25:39–46 
and Deut 15:12–18 but also took their contexts into consideration. Instead of drawing upon the blessings of 
Deut 15:18, Jer 34:17, 20 therefore seems to draw upon the curse-formula in Deut 28:25–26. For the use of 
the blessing-formula as motivation for individual instruction see Lohfink, “Fortschreibung?,” 153. 




its seeming modification of Lev 25 through the gender inclusive language of Deut 15, 
and Deut 15 through the abolition of all Hebrew slavery per se from Lev 25. He does not 
interpret Lev 25 as only applicable to the pater familias or Hebrew males. In short, Jer 34 
picks up the more radical aspects of both Lev 25 and Deut 15, reading the two in light of 
each other to reach the most radical possible application given the situation they found 
themselves in. 
Further, the divine indictment in Jer 34 links Lev 25 and 26 in order to formulate 
a talionic principle for retracting Zedekiah’s covenant and returning the slaves. By 
identifying the breach of Zedekiah’s covenant and the covenant instructions in Lev 25 
and Deut 15, the people will be exposed to the covenant curses of Lev 26:25–26 and Deut 
28:25–26. The breach of the manumission instructions invokes the covenant curses (cf. 
Deut 7:12; Lev 26:14–15). Formulated differently, Lev 26 and Deut 28 are sanctions 
given for breach of the preceding instructions. The author of Jer 34 seems to see an 
association between Lev 25:39–46 and Deut 15:12–18 and link them with the covenant 
curses in Lev 26:25–26 and Deut 28:25–26. Since the people were not willing to let their 
slaves return to their families and their inheritance property, but, instead, returned them to 
inslavement, God will return the Babylonians to seek the people’s lives (Jer 34:20–22).  
What we see in Jer 34 seems to be an instance of a characteristic way of reading 
Torah instructions in the HB. Torah is neither manipulated, read idealistically, nor read as 
legislative law, but, rather, embraced as covenantal instruction and applied in it is most 




Torah-passages.218 This evinces a willingness to follow all the ways of YHWH to the 
end. Muffs sees in Deut 15:10 “the concatenation of the three ideas” of (a) giving 
willingly, (b) according to one’s means, and (c) the concomitant blessing.219 This relates 
to the legal concept of acting gladly in volition, an idea not present in our contemporary 
concepts of law. The willingness/unwillingness also become a key issue in Jer 34 with 
the initial release and then re-enslavement.220 
While Lev 25 forbids enslaving Israelites, Jer 34 does not explicitly criticize past 
enslavement of Hebrews. The author of Jer 34 does not mention the ‘concession’ of Lev 
25 to treat Israelites as hired laborers. Neither does he emphasize the right to enslave 
foreigners. There is no mention of foreign slaves at all. Further, no reference is given to 
the possibility of re-enslaving former slaves if they again fall into poverty as implied by 
Deut 15, something that would be an extentuating reading in light of the re-enslavement 
of slaves in Jer 34. Jeremiah 34 does not take advantage of the ‘loopholes’ in Lev 25 and 
                                               
218 Levinson writes: “It denies that it is any way derivative. Far from presenting itself as a 
recondite or jejune rewriting of tradition, it presents itself rather as more original than the tradition it both 
revises and expands. Similarly, the superscription to Leviticus 25 locates the chapter at Sinai. In effect, H’s 
ex post facto revision of Deuteronomy ironically precedes the covenant at Moab both in hermeneutical time 
discover ourselves as readers and learn to see the text as the work of writers who were themselves readers, 
thinkers, and theologians. In mandating that critical engagement with the ancient text, the slave laws of the 
Pentateuch manumit their modern readers, לחפׁשי חנם, into hermeneutics” (Levinson, “The Manumission of 
Hermeneutics,” 323–24). And on how Jer 34 is an innovation, see. p. 320. While I agree with Levinson in 
that Jer 34 represents an expansionistic reading, and as such a novum, we nevertheless see that the author 
stays within a trajectory envisioned through a dialectic between Lev 25 and Deut 15. I would therefore also 
deviate from Levinson’s oft repeated claim that legal dissimilitude necessarily implied a criticism and 
rejection of previous traditions, concealed or not. It is not clear that Jer 34 signals a “paradigm shift,” as 
Pakkala calls it (Pakkala, God's Word Omitted, 362), but rather remains within the framework and 
trajectory outlined and indicated by the Torah-passages. 
219 Muffs, Love and Joy, 179–81, 185. On the volitional aspect of Deut 15:18 see Japhet, “The 
Relationship between the Legal Corpora,” 82–83. 
220 The initiative for the covenant seems to have come from Zedekiah. Cf. Sarna suggesting that 





Deut 15, but reads the texts according to their most far-reaching ethical implications. It is 
precisely this tendency in prophetic reuse of Torah that we have found in the other cases 
here, as well. We see a persistent challenging of conventional positions on the question of 
reuse between Torah and prophets that urges us as modern readers to undertake a more 
radical reading of the biblical passages for the good of our own lives. 
Such an expansionistic reading could be explained as warranted when YHWH is 
the one who reuses his own texts, as claimed by Jer 34. In any case, it is the reading of 
Lev 25 and Deut 15 in Zedekiah’s covenant with the people that sets the stage for the 
entire passage. An appropriate question here is whether YHWH approves of the 
hermeneutics of Zedekiah and the people, or if he merely approves of their action to 
release the slaves? It can be argued that  ְַּבֵעיַני ָּיָׁשרֶאת־הַ  ַּתֲעׂשּוו  (“and you did what was 
right in my eyes”) in 34:15 is only an approval of the people’s actions (pl. of 221,(וַ ַּתֲעׂשּו 
not the hermeneutics that inspired them. Still, the analogical use of Lev 25 and Deut 15 in 
the narrative section of Jer 34:8–11, when compared to the divine indictment, seems to 
place a divine stamp of approval upon the hermeneutics, as well, albeit indirectly. 
However, the approval is given to a specific hermeneutic isolated from action. The 
passage focuses upon what Zedekiah and the people do with this reading; how they use it 
to change their lived life. A faithful proto-halakhic reading is thus not simply words, but 
also a life that lives out those words in deeds.  
Jeremiah 34 is therefore also significant in that it shows that an expansive reading 
                                               
221 Lundbom writes: “and you did what is right in my eyes. Even though the release may have been 
done with mixed motives, it is said here to have been a right action” (Lundbom, Jeremiah 21-36, 564). It 
could here also be pointed out that according to Jer 34:18, the words of the covenant was not sufficient in 




of Torah is not limited to either YHWH or his prophet; instead, persons without any 
special spiritual giftedness are entitled to read Torah in such a manner and act upon it. An 
objection to this point might be that Zedekiah, as king, was entitled to such a reading 
because of his exalted status. However, the formulation in 34:8, ָּיהּוִצְדקִ  ֶּמֶלְךהַ  ְּכֹרת ַאֲחֵרי 
ָּכל־ָהָעםֶאת־ ְּבִרית  (“after king Zedekiah made a covenant with all the people”) does not 
specify who actually devised the reading. It only says that Zedekiah made a covenant 
with the people. While the passage therefore remains silent about who originally 
proposed the reading, the context clearly emphasizes the people’s responsibility for the 
reading to be put into action. Jeremiah 34:21 does not single Zedekiah out as having more 
responsibility in this regard than the people to the extent that they were to remain 
passive.222 It could even be argued that Zedekiah and the princes are being punished less 
severely, only being given into the hands of those seeking their lives (34:21), while the 
people would be punished with death (34:20). The focus is upon the outcome of the 
covenant between Zedekiah and the people and not those who originally proposed the 
reading. Therefore, we cannot confidently speak of Zedekiah’s hermeneutic in this case. 
The author of Jer 34 presents both Zedekiah and the people as responsible for the actions 
they perform; actions he formulates in terms of a dialectic between Lev 25 and Deut 15. 
We will see that Isa 58 goes one step further and appears to hold all the people 
responsible to read Torah expansionistically. But this is not seen as clearly in Jer 34. 
In Jer 34:14 the fathers are held responsible for the manumission instruction in 
Deut 15, and in Jer 34:17 the people of Zedekiah’s day are possibly held responsible for 
                                               
222 Cp. this with the king as the model Israelite and arch Troah-reader in Deut 17:18–20  (Sonnet, 




Lev 25:39–46, as argued above. But Zedekiah and his people are held responsible for the 
expansionistic reading only because they endorsed and covenanted upon it in Jer 34:8–
10.223 It would therefore be a stretch to claim that Zedekiah and the people in Jer 34 were 
expected or obliged to read Torah expansionistically. Still, when they had read it so and 
made a commitment to put it into action, as presented by the author of Jer 34, they are 
obliged by their resolution. In other words, as a base line the people are held morally 
responsible for YHWH’s covenant instructions in the past (34:13, 17), but as Zedekiah 
and the people follow up the invitation in Torah to read the passages expansionistically, 
they are held responsible for the greater insight and higher commitment that result from 
such a reading. While Jer 34 can not be taken to support the claim that we, as readers, are 
expected to read Torah expansionistically, it can be taken as support that the ‘commoner’ 
is entitled to read Torah expansionistically and will be expected to act upon such a 
reading.224 An expansionistic reading of Torah thus seems to contain a volitional element. 
It is voluntary to read it in such a way; it is not a moral obligation. While Torah seems to 
invite such a reading in the attitude of love (Deut 6:5–9), it could also be done in fear, as 
seems to have been the case with Zedekiah and his contemporaries in Jer 34 with the 
threat of the Babylonian armies at the city gates. The inherent danger of a volition driven 
                                               
223 Since the obligation of the people is formulated in terms of Deut 15:12 in Jer 34:13–14, one 
could argue that they are held accountable to the less demanding requirement of the two, Lev 25 and Deut 
15, since Deut 15 does not abolish Hebrew slavery as such and allows holding Hebrews as slaves between 
the Sabbatical years. Still, when the people fail to obey this instruction, they are nevertheless judged on the 
basis of the more demanding requirements of Lev 25 in Jer 34:15–22. Nevertheless, the exact formulations 
of punishment are drawn both from Lev 26:25–26 and Deut 28:25–26 in both Jer 34:17, 20. 
224 Besides the gender inclusive abolition of Hebrew slavery advocated by Jer 34, as modern 
readers we may therefore be entitled to read the ethnic inclusive language of Lev 19:34; 25:35; and Ezek 





by fear is also highlighted by Jer 34, where we learn of the regret on the part of the 
people for having released their slaves and the subsequent return of the slaves to their 
masters. 
It must also be emphasized that this expansionistic reading is not a hermeneutic 
without any controls. It is rooted in a close reading of the text that encourages the reader 
to follow the text’s lead in a walk that goes as far as possible with YHWH, whether the 
text is explicitly clear on or only indicates such a covenantal form of life. Significantly, 
an expansionist reading is not an undisciplined reuse of Torah instructions. Rather, Jer 34 
stays within the framework and boundaries of the manumission instructions of Torah, but 
reads them expansively, i.e. reads them in their most far-reaching implications. 
Perhaps we as modern readers should not be as concerned about legal variation 
found between the legal corpora of Torah, seeing how the biblical authors, themselves, do 
not seem to be troubled by what to us as modern readers may look like contradictions. 
Instead, we should try to learn the art of seeing legal variation as a fertile soil for creative 
appropriation within the parameters of the texts before us? Tensions create intellectual 
dissonance, and few things motivate serious thought more. The ongoing production of 
scholarly reflections on the manumission instructions in Torah—this essay included—is a 
testimony to the productivity of such tensions. By reading the fractures and incoherence 
of the passages in the spirit of wholehearted love toward YHWH, who communicates 
through them, and with a will to walk in his ways as far as they lead, we can enter the 







FASTING IN LEV 16; 23; 25 AND ISA 58:1–14 
Introduction 
That Lev 25 constitutes the background to Isa 61:1–2 is generally accepted, but 
that it should be seen as the background to Isa 58, as well, is less studied.1 Some authors 
have seen a reuse of Lev 16; 23; 25 and Num 29 in Isa 58,2 while others do not see such a 
connection.3 What is the precise relation between the cultic passages relating to the Day 
                                               
1 Cf. Thomas D. Hanks, God So Loved the Third World: The Biblical Vocabulary of Oppression 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1983), 99.  
2 Cf. Hans Kosmala, “Form and Structure of Isaiah 58,” Annual of the Swedish Theological 
Institute 5 (1967): 80; Hanks, God So Loved the Third World, 97–104; Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in 
Ancient Israel, 304–7; Kyung-Chul Park, Die Gerechtigkeit Israels und das Heil der Völker: Kultus, 
Tempel, Eschatologie und Gerechtigkeit in der Endgestalt des Jesajabuches (Jes 56,1–8:58,1–14; 65,17–
66, 24), Beiträge zur Erforschung des Alten Testaments und des antiken Judentum (Frankfurt am Main: 
Lang, 2003), 237–39; Bergsma, The Jubilee from Leviticus to Qumran, 195–98; Bohdan Hrobon, Ethical 
Dimension of Cult in the Book of Isaiah, BZAW 418 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2010), 165, 202–5; Shalom M. 
Paul, Isaiah 40–66: Translation and Commentary, Eerdmans Critical Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2012), 480–81. Weinfeld is open to the possibility that the reference to the blowing of the 
shophar in Isa 58:1 may be “an allusion to the blowing of the shophar on the Day of Atonement of the 
Jubilee year” (Weinfeld, Social Justice in Ancient Israel, 18n). Fishbane only speaks of parallels between 
Isa 58 to Lev 16 and 23, not Lev 25 (Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 304–7). For how 
Isa 58 combines the Day of Atonement with descriptions of the Sabbatical Year and the Year of Jubilee see 
Park, Die Gerechtigkeit Israels, 237–38; Hrobon, Ethical Dimension, 202–205. Sloan gives three reasons 
for seeing the theme of Jubilee behind Isa 58:6: (1) The Jubilary sitz im Leben of Isa 58 itself, (2) the inner-
prophetic relationship to Isa 61:1–3, and (3) the use of the term ἄφεσις in the LXX of both passages, which 
according to P. Miller was the basis for Jesus merging the two passages together in Luke 4 (Robert Sloan, 
Jr., The Favorable Year of the Lord: A Study of Jubilary Theology in the Gospel of Luke (Austin, TX: 
Schola, 1977), 40). Cf. p. 116. Cf. Patrick D. Miller, “Luke 4:16–21,” Interpretation 29, no. 4 (1975): 417–
21; James A. Sanders, “From Isaiah 61 to Luke 4,” in Luke and Scripture: The Function of Sacred 
Tradition in Luke-Acts, eds. James A. Sanders and Craig A. Evans (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), 46–69. 
3 Leslie Hoppe thinks that “the fast which the prophet condemns in Isa 58 is probably the fast 
established to mourn the destruction of the Temple in 587 B.C. (cf., Zech 7:3, 5; 8:19)” (Leslie J. Hoppe, 
“Isaiah 58:1–12, Fasting and Idolatry,” BTB 13 (1983): 45). Kosmala sees the Day of Atonement as 




of Atonement and Year of Jubilee in Lev 16; 23; 25 and the issues of social justice in Isa 
58? As far as I can see there are no chronological data linking Isa 58 to the Day of 
Atonement as such. It is more lexemes, phrases and themes that establish this link. 
Lev 16; 23; 25 
In contemporary scholarship it is typical to see Lev 1–16(17) as largely Priestly 
material (P), while Lev 17(18)–26 as largely Holiness material (H).4 According to this 
                                               
of Isaiah 58,” 71, 78). Oswalt asks whether Isa 58 may be a polemic against Lev 16:31, but immediately 
refutes it (John N. Oswalt, The Book of Isaiah Chapters 40–66 (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998), 502), 
and points out a similar meaning of “affliction of soul” between Lev 16:29, 31 and Isa 58:10 (Oswalt, 
Isaiah 40–66, 497, 506). Otherwise he does not discuss the possibility of a reuse of Leviticus. Neither 
Claus Westermann, Isaiah 40–66: A Commentary, trans. David M. G. Stalker (Philadelphia, PA: 
Westminister, 1969), 333–42 argue for reuse of Leviticus in Isa 58. He does state that “vv. 13f. are a 
commentary on a single commandment, the fourth,” and take this to show that “vv. 13f. are an addition to 
vv. 1-12 dictated—just like 56.2—by zeal for this one commandment which has particular stress put upon 
it” (Westermann, Isaiah 40–66, 340). Cf. 341. Based on this he presumably sees the Decalogue as 
preceding Isa 58, even if he does not make a case for literary reuse other than thematic correspondence. He 
does see a link between Isa 58 and 61:1–2 (Westermann, Isaiah 40–66, 334, 338, 366–67). Cf. Edward J. 
Young, The Book of Isaiah: The English Text, with Introduction, Exposition, and Notes (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1972), 415–28 neither mentioning Lev 16; 23; or 25, or the Day of Atonement, as possible 
backgrounds of Isa 58. 
4 For a good overview over scholarship see Nihan, From Priestly Torah to Pentateuch, 1–19. He 
writes: “Actually, particularly in the Anglo-American exegesis, by far the most significant development in 
the analysis of Leviticus has been the gradual rise of more comprehensive approaches to this book which, 
in spite of their great diversity, have in common to be interested first and foremost in recovering the inner 
logic of the various priestly rituals. Seminal studies in this area have been the analysis of the animal 
classification of Lev 11 by M. Douglas in her epoch-making study of the notion of pollution, Purity and 
Danger (1966), which introduced more generally the analysis of the rituals of Leviticus in terms of 
‘symbolic systems’; and, on a distinct but related path, the work of several Jewish scholars concerned with 
interpreting the P legislation as a comprehensive cultic system, with a coherence and rationale of its own. 
Distinctive of this approach are the works by M. Haran on Ex 25–31 and 35–40 . . . . It is not excessive to 
state that these studies have revolutionized the understanding of P’s legislation in many ways, either by 
making a case for an integrative reading of these laws (whereas earlier scholarship usually postulated an 
erractic conflation of various pieces of distinct origin) or by evincing the complex theological assumptions 
underlying certain laws which otherwise made little sense or even appeared arbitrary, such as the grades of 
sanctity identified by Haran in the description of the wilderness sanctuary, or the taxonomy of pollution 
analyzed by Milgrom and Wright in Lev 11–15, with its division into three primary categories of pollution 
(minor, major, and ‘extreme’) requiring different forms of seclusion from the community (one-day 
seclusion, seven-day, or expulsion from the camp). In the last two decades, this approach to Leviticus has 
also gradually made its way in Europe, and can be found in the work of various authors such as A. Marx in 





model Lev 16; 23; and 25 would be located in two different textual corpora. There are 
however some arguments for seeing Leviticus as a more unified composition. Mary 
Douglas outlines Leviticus in a ring as follows,5 as can be illustrated in Table 18: 
 
Table 18. Ring Construction of the Book of Leviticus 
















Law of Offerings, sins, holy 







Beginning of the Ending  
Holy times, law of talion, 




Consecration of Aaron and 








Defiled and blemished priests, 

























(chap. 20)  
Molech, regulation of sex 
 
 
Jacob Milgrom called Douglas’ model of a ring construction “the most 
commendable attempt to account for the organization of Leviticus.”6 While this proposal 
                                               
5 Mary Douglas, “Poetic Structure in Leviticus,” in Pomegranates and Golden Bells: Studies in 
Biblical, Jewish, and Near Eastern Ritual, Law, and Literature in Honor of Jacob Milgrom, eds. David P. 
Wright, David Noel Freedman and Avi Hurvitz (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1995), 253. 




sees Lev 23–25 as matching Lev 1–7, Lev 16 is seen as part of the larger section Lev 8–
17 that matches Lev 21–22. It is therefore not clear how the three chapters would 
structurally belong together. Roy Gane, partly following William Shea, proposes a 
structure seeing Lev 16 as the center section of the book:7 
 I. Sacrificial Worship (chs. 1–7) 
 II. Description of Ceremonies That Founded the Ritual System (chs. 8–10) 
 III. Purity Versus Impurity (chs. 11–15) 
 IV. Purgation of Sanctuary and Camp on Day of Atonement (ch. 16) 
 V. Holy (Sacrificial) Slaughter (ch. 17) 
 VI. Community Holiness (chs. 18–20) 
 VII. Special Holy Entities (chs. 21–27) 
While this highlights the role of Lev 16, again there is no clear structural link to Lev 23 
and 25. The link between these chapters therefore rather seems to be on the level of 
content rather than on the structural level. 
Lev 25:1 begins with the phrase ַוְיַדֵּבר ְיהָוה ֶאל־ֹמֶׁשה ְּבַהר ִסיַני ֵלאֹמר (“And the Lord 
spoke to Moses at Mount Sinai, saying”), marking the following as one discursive unit 
ending in Lev 26:46. It is only a thematic shift that indicates a new aspect as we come to 
v. 8. For our purpose, we can note the link between the sabbatical years and Jubilee year. 
The text as it now stands appears as intended to be viewed as one literary and legal unit. 
However, there have been numerous attempts to also see various compositional strata in 
this text. Summing up the major views, ending with Wenham and Levine who have not 
                                               
7 Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 31, 35–36. Cf. William Shea, “Literary Form and Theological 
Function in Leviticus,” in The Seventy Weeks, Leviticus, and the Nature of Prophecy, ed. Frank Holbrook, 
Daniel and Revelation Committee Series 3 (Washington, DC: Biblical Research Institute, 1986), 149. For 
other arguments for seeing Lev 16 as the literary center of the book of Leviticus see Wilfried Warning, 




made an attempt at a compositional analysis, Milgrom concludes: “I shall follow the last 
position, not because the identification of the literary strata is too difficult, but because 
the search for them – if they exist at all – is meaningless. The chapter, as is, flows 
logically and coherently. Even if the redactor had different sources before him, he welded 
them together in such an artistic and cogent sequence that it suffices to determine what he 
had in mind.”8 
Isa 58 
There is no scholarly consensus as to the genre of Isa 58.9 While the majority of 
scholars see 58:13–14 as a later addendum,10 several scholars have argued that these two 
verses are an integral part of the chapter.11 I will deal with these arguments below where 
they relate to the present discussion. Westermann has pointed out that since Isa 59 begins 
a new section and both Isa 56:1–2 and 58:13–14 mention the Sabbath, these seem to 
constitute the frame of Isa 56–58 as one literary unit.12 Oswalt rather sees 58:1–59:21 as 
                                               
8 Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2150. 
9 Hrobon, Ethical Dimension, 167. 
10 E.g. John L. McKenzie, Second Isaiah, AB 20 (New York: Doubleday, 1968), 165; Fishbane, 
Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 304–7; Joseph Blenkinsopp, Isaiah 56-66: A New Translation with 
Introduction and Commentary, The Anchor Bible 19B (New York: Doubleday, 2003), 181. Cf. 
Blenkinsopp, Isaiah 56-66, 181. 
11 Kosmala, “Form and Structure of Isaiah 58,” 80; Gregory J. Polan, In the Ways of Justice 
toward Salvation: A Rhetorical Analysis of Isaiah 56–59 (New York: Peter Lang, 1986), 225, 241; Brevard 
S. Childs, Isaiah, OTL (Louisville, KY: Westminister John Knox, 2001), 480–81; Park, Die Gerechtigkeit 
Israels, 225–28, 238–40, 247–49, 275–77; Hrobon, Ethical Dimension, 197–205; Paul, Isaiah 40–66, 493; 
Kline, Allusive Soundplay, 86n. 
12 Westermann, Isaiah 40–66, 340. Westermann, however, sees Isa 58 as containing “many 
disparate elements” with vv. 13–14 as “an addition” in the post-exilic period (Westermann, Isaiah 40–66, 
333, 340–41). Cf. his various discussions on pp. 333–42. We could maybe also add the theme of 
righteousness and justice in 56:1–2 as reflected in Isa 58:6 (cf. Weinfeld, Social Justice in Ancient Israel, 




one unit, with 58:1–14 depicting true religion, 59:1–15a speaking of the people’s failure, 
and 59:15b–21 portraying God’s action on behalf of his people.13 The addressee seems to 
be the people as a community, or spokesmen of these (58:3).14 
Isa 58 seems to have the following structure: 
1. Isa 58:1: Prologue with divine imperatives to the prophet to call a solemn 
assembly, as the Day of Atonement (often rendered as the ‘Day of 
Atonement’), to make known to the people their sins.15 The reference to Jacob 
forms an inclusio in the chapter with the reference to the same patriarch in 
58:14.16 
                                               
original composition (Michael L. Barré, “Fasting in Isaiah 58:1–12: A Reexamination,” BTB 15 (1986): 
95–96). Andreasen sees vv. 13–14 as likely to be part of the chapter as a whole on the basis of thematic 
links, seeing it as probably dated to 538–20 B.C. (Andreasen, The Old Testament Sabbath, 38–39). Cf. 
253n, 269. Oswalt also comment that “the chapter is so unified that scholars find little agreement 
concerning its subdivisions” (Oswalt, Isaiah 40–66, 494). Cf. Polan, In the Ways of Justice, 275ff. For 
others seeing vv. 13–14 as separate and a later addition see Kosmala, “Form and Structure of Isaiah 58,” 
69, 79–80. Kosmala dates the composition and additions to the exilic and/or post-exilic period (Kosmala, 
“Form and Structure of Isaiah 58,” 78). Even if he claims several additions and editions of the poem he 
nevertheless says that it “is undoubtedly one of the most highly finished ancient Hebrew compositions, and 
we are very fortunate that it has come down to us practically intact” (Kosmala, “Form and Structure of 
Isaiah 58,” 79). 
Konrad Schmid explains how the conditionality in Isa 56–66 has commonly been used as 
argument to distinguish between Deutero-Isaiah (chs. 40–55) and Trito-Isaiah (chs. 56–66). In contrast to 
this he writes: “The traditional distinction between chapters 40–55 (‘Deutero-Isaiah’) and 56–66 (‘Trito-
Isaiah’), if understood in the sense of two originally independent literary core traditions, can no longer be 
sustained” (Schmid, The Old Testament, 167). As  “only chapters 56–59 are conceptually ‘Trito-Isaianic’ in 
the sense of new conditions placed on the proclamations of salvation” he concludes that only these chapters 
should be ascribed to a later ‘Trito-Isaiah,’ “as the prophecy of scribal tradents that never existed except as 
texts for a book” (Schmid, The Old Testament, 168). The distinctions are made on purely thematic or 
conceptual grounds, and it is legitimate to ask how sound such procedures are, as they unavoidable become 
subjective criteria for outlining a literary history. 
13 Oswalt, Isaiah 40–66, 493. 
14 I see no textual basis for claiming Isa 58 specifically criticises priests as Leslie Hoppe claims, 
and he does neither provide any evidence for this (Hoppe, “Isaiah 58:1–12, Fasting and Idolatry,” 45–46). 
15 The imperatives in clauses 1, 3, and 4 are all in the 2ms, thus being directed to the prophet 
rather than the people. 




2. Isa 58:2: God accuses the people for their pretentious and hypocritical 
religiosity. 
3. Isa 58:3a–d: The people interrupt God’s speech to accuse Him of neglect, as 
He has not responded to their religious practice.17 
4. Isa 58:3e–14d: God exposes the real intention behind the Day of Atonement 
by drawing the themes of social justice and compassion from the Jubilee year, 
and the purpose of the Day of Atonement and weekly Sabbath to give the 
other, as another needy human or as YHWH, the privilege otherwise reserved 
for one’s self. 
a. Isa 58:3e–4d: God again takes up the accusation in 58:2 about the 
people’s pretentious and hypocritical religiosity.18 
b. Isa 58:5: God exposes the false meaning of the Day of Atonement. 
c. Isa 58:6a–9e: First set of protases and apodoses.19 
i. Isa 58:6a–7e: Protasis 1 with the condition of living the true 
                                               
for having coveted and stolen his brother’s birthright and blessing” (Hanks, God So Loved the Third World, 
100) that he is referred to in Isa 58:1. If so, and this would need more reflection, 58:14 might again refer to 
Jacob based on the inherited and apportioned land (cf.  ֲֹקבַנֲחַלת יַע ).  
17 Paul writes: “The nation accuses God of being inattentive to their pleas, despite, according to 
them, their genuine attempt to seek Him. They claim that they fulfill all their cultic obligations, yet the 
Lord remains unresponsive. In reply to their bitter complaint, however, the Deity Himself accuses the 
nation of hypocrisy and asserts that a true fast, i.e., “a fast acceptable to Him,” is not solely a series of 
prescribed perfunctory rituals, but must be accompanied by a true moral reversal and by addressing social 
injustice” (Paul, Isaiah 40–66, 480). It reminds of Prov 21:13 which reads: “The one who shuts his ear at 
the cry of the wretched, he also will cry and not be answered.” 
18 Cf. Paul, Isaiah 40–66, 483. 





meaning of the Day of Atonement and Year of Jubilee.20 It is 
possible to read this section as containing two protases, the first 
being introduced with the negative interrogative ֲהֹלוא in 58:6a 
and the second with the conditional particle ִּכי in 58:7c.21  
ii. Isa 58:8a–9e: Apodosis 1 with the blessings of one’s light, 
healing and righteousness and encounter with God. As 58:6a–
7e contain two protases, likewise we find two apodoses in 
58:8a–9e, both being introduced with the consequential particle 
 in 58:8a and 58:9a.22 ָאז
d. Isa 58:9f–12f: Second set of protases and apodoses. 
i. Isa 58:9f–10b: Protasis 2 continuing with the condition of 
living the true meaning of the Day of Atonement and Year of 
Jubilee, introduced by ִאם. 
ii. Isa 58:10c–12f: Apodosis 2 with a repetition of the blessing of 
one’s light and intercourse with God, added with the blessings 
of being satisfied, watered like a garden and taking part in the  
 
 
                                               
20 We find a structural similarity underlining the contrast between the false meaning of the Day of 
Atonement in 58:5, introduced with  ְהיֶה ֹצום ֶאְבָחֵרהּוֲהָכזֶה ִיִֽ , and the true meaning of the Day of Atonement 
in 58:6–7, introduced with ֲהֹלוא ֶזה ֹצום ֶאְבָחֵרהּו. 
21 For ִּכי and ִאם introducing conditional clauses see Waltke and O'Connor, Biblical Hebrew 
Syntax, 510, 636–67. 




iii. restoration of the ruins. Here the apodosis is introduced with a 
weqatal verb.23 
e. Isa 58:13a–14c: Third set of protases and apodoses. 
i. Isa 58:13: Protasis 3 with the condition of setting self and one’s 
own business aside on the Sabbath and honoring and finding 
delight in the Sabbath. Again, the protasis is introduced by ִאם. 
ii. Isa 58:14a–c: Apodosis 3 with the blessing of finding one’s joy 
in YHWH and Him making one ride on the heights of the land 
and enjoying the inheritance of Jacob.24 As mentioned, the 
reference to Jacob forms an inclusio in the chapter with the 
reference to the same patriarch in 58:1.25 The apodosis is 
introduced by ָאז. 
5. Isa 58:14f: Concluding discursive remark that these are the words from the 
mouth of YHWH. 
It is the prologue in section 1, the people’s response in section 3, God’s 
accusation and exposition of the false Day of Atonement in sections 4a and 4b, and then 
afterwards in the protasis-sections that we find the material most clearly reusing elements  
from Lev 16, 23 and 25. One significant exception  
                                               
23 Waltke and O’Connor writes: “If the protasis of a conditional clause has a non-perfective form 
with a contingent-future sense (after ִּכי ,ִאם etc.), the apodosis is introduced by wəqataltí; the waw has the 
apparently archaic role of the ‘apodosis waw’” (Waltke and O'Connor, Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 526). A 
question is if we should understand the weqatal in 58:11a–b, d, 12a, c in a similar manner.  
24 Paul: “The reward of one who ‘calls the Sabbath ‘Delight’ (ענג)’ will be that he shall find his 
‘delight’ (תתענג) in the Lord” (Paul, Isaiah 40–66, 495). 




to this is ַויהָוה ַיֲעֶנה in 58:9b; I will return to this below. 
Orality and Writing in Isa 58 
Isaiah 58 shows some indicators of the orality in manner in which it is written. Isa 
58:1 opens with the exhortation to cry out loud (ְקָרא ְבָגרֹון) and the words are preserved 
for us in written form. As argued below, this shows signs of literary dependence, and at 
the same time the creative play made between Lev 16; 23; 25 might be understood more 
in terms of living Torah. Westermann comments on Isa 58:1 and 61:1–3, quoting Volz: 
“At all events, both point to an activity by word of mouth on the part of the speaker here, 
even if in principle ch. 58 is to be thought of as a compilation in writing. ‘Everything 
suggests that the leader was speaking in public; perhaps in the synagogue at an assembly 
for fasting.’”26 Further, the abrupt participant-reference shift in 58:3 is primarily 
indicated by the shift of person and number to 1cpl.27 In the middle of YHWH’s 
discourse the people interfere by articulating their surprised question. While YHWH is 
still the speaker in v. 6a, from v. 8d and onwards YHWH is only spoken of in the third 
person, now in the prophet’s voice, with the one exception of the 1cs suffix ָקְדִׁשי (“my 
holy (day)”) in v. 13b.28 The MT text simply assume a discourse setting where the 
participants are known and the reader will know who speaks when to whom. The LXX 
                                               
26 Quoted in Westermann, Isaiah 40–66, 334. Volz’ reference to the synagogue presupposes a 
post-exilic dating of Isa 58. 
27 Cf. my Kenneth Bergland, “Reading as a Disclosure of the Thoughts of the Heart,” in Scripture 
and Philosophy: Essays Honoring the Work and Vision of Fernando Luis Canale, eds. Tiago Arrais, 
Kenneth Bergland and Michael Younker (Berrien Springs, MI: ATS, 2016), 263–64. 
28 Cf. Westermann, Isaiah 40–66, 333. Westermann did not see v. 13 as part of the original 




translator clearly sensed the abruptness of the Hebrew and added λέγοντες (“saying”), 
making it clear that the people spoken about in vv. 1–2 are now quoted.29 But the MT 
does not give such cues. As 57:21 ends with the prophet speaking about God in the 3ms, 
it is not immediately clear who initially speaks to whom in 58:1–2. The participants are 
not introduced. Based on the content, we can identify the speaker as YHWH and the 
addressee as the prophet. To underline YHWH as speaker, 58:14 ends with  ִֵּברִּכי ִּפי ְיהָוה ּד  
(“For the mouth of YHWH has spoken”).30 All this indicates a discourse setting where 
the reader is almost assumed to be in the audience, visually identifying who is speaking 
to whom. 
A Case for Reuse 
The following Table 19 gives an overview over the parallels between Lev 16; 23; 
25; and Isa 58. 
Distinctiveness: First, a key concept for establishing a case for reuse between Isa 
58 and Lev 16; 23 is in II ענה in piel + 31.ֶנֶפׁש We only find these used together in Lev   
                                               
29 Oswalt also points out that the Targums do the same, cf. Oswalt, Isaiah 40–66, 493n. 
30 The ambiguity of ְוַדֵּבר ָּדָבר in Isa 58:13 attracted much attention in Second Temple Judaism, as 
it was taken as the key passage for a Sabbath prohibition on speech, ַׁשָּבת understood as the weekly Sabbath 
rather than Yom Kippur. Jassen discusses the reuse or non-reuse of Isa 58:13 in CD 10:17–19; 4Q264a I I 
5–8; Jub 2:29–30; 50:6–13; m. Shabb. 23:3; b. Shabb. 150a–b; t. Shabb. 17:9; y. Shabb. 15.3 15b–c; 
Leviticus Rabbah 34:16; Mishnat Rabbi Eli‘ezer 20; Mek. de-R. Shim‘on b. Yoḥai on Exod 35:2; Midr. ha-
Gadol on Exod 20:10 (Jassen, Scripture and Law, 68–130 (esp. 100). He also discusses CD 10:20–21, 
4Q264a I I 5–8, Mos. 2:211, Mekhilta Ba-Ḥodesh 7; Mekhilta Shabbata I; b. ‘Erub. 38b; Leviticus Rabbah 
34:16; Pesiqta Rabbati 23:8; b. Shabb. 150a–b on the prohibition against thoughts of labor on the Sabbath 
as they relate to Isa 58:13 (Jassen, Scripture and Law, 131–71). 
31 Milgrom writes: “The piʿel of the root ʿnh is used to express the humbling or mishandling of an 
individual (Gen 16:6), of a nation by war or bondage (Gen 15:13), of a woman by cohabitation (Gen 34:2), 
or it connotes affliction by God as a discipline (Deut 8:2–3). The verb does not specify by itself the mode, 





Table 19. Lev 16; 23; 25 and Isa 58 
Lev 16:21, 29–31; 23:24, 27–28, 
31–32; 25:9–10; Num 29:7 
 
Isa 58:1–14 
Lev 16:21  וסמך אהרן את־ׁשתי ידו על
ראׁש הׂשעיר החי והתודה עליו את־כל־
הם לכל־פׁשעיעונת בני יׂשראל ואת־כל־
ונתן אתם על־ראׁש הׂשעיר  חטאתם
  . . .וׁשלח ביד־איׁש עתי המדברה׃ 
והיתה לכם לחקת עולם בחדׁש  16:29
את־ תענוהׁשביעי בעׂשור לחדׁש 
האזרח  תעׂשווכל־מלאכה לא תיכם נפׁש
 והגר הגר בתוככם׃
כי־ביום הזה יכפר עליכם לטהר  16:30
 יכם לפני יהוה תטהרו׃חטאתאתכם מכל 
תם את־עניׁשבת ׁשבתון היא לכם ו 16:31
  . . .תיכם חקת עולם׃ נפׁש
Lev 23:24 אל לאמר דבר אל־בני יׂשר
בחדׁש הׁשביעי באחד לחדׁש יהיה לכם 
  . . .־קדׁש׃ קראׁשבתון זכרון תרועה מ
אך בעׂשור לחדׁש הׁשביעי הזה יום  23:27
הכפרים הוא מקרא־קדׁש יהיה לכם 
והקרבתם אׁשה  32תיכםנפׁשתם את־עניו
 ליהוה׃
בעצם היום  תעׂשווכל־מלאכה לא  23:28
 הזה כי יום כפרים הוא לכפר עליכם לפני
הרם קולך והגד  ׁשופרבגרון אל־תחׂשך   כ קרא 1
 ׃חטאתםם   ולבית יעקב פׁשעלעמי 
כגוי  יחפצוןואותי יום יום ידרׁשון   ודעת דרכי  2
 ומׁשפט אלהיו לא עזב    עׂשהאׁשר־צדקה 
 ׃יחפצוןיׁשאלוני מׁשפטי־צדק   קרבת אלהים 
ולא תדע הן  33נוענינו נפׁשלמה צמנו ולא ראית    3
 וכל־עצביכם תנגׂשו׃   תמצאו־חפץביום צמכם 
הן לריב ומצה תצומו   ולהכות באגרף רׁשע לא־ 4
 תצומו כיום   להׁשמיע במרום קולכם׃
 ו נפׁשאדם  ענותהכזה יהיה צום אבחרהו   יום  5
 הלכף כאגמן ראׁשו   וׂשק ואפר יציע 
 הלזה תקרא־צום   ויום רצון ליהוה׃
 הלוא זה צום אבחרהו  6
 אגדות מוטה פתח חרצבות רׁשע   התר 
 וׁשלח רצוצים חפׁשים   וכל־מוטה תנתקו׃
הלוא פרס לרעב לחמך   ועניים מרודים תביא  7
 בית 
 ומבׂשרך לא תתעלם׃   34כי־תראה ערם וכסיתו
אז יבקע כׁשחר אורך   וארכתך מהרה תצמח והלך  8
 לפניך צדקך   כבוד יהוה יאספך׃
 אז תקרא ויהוה יענה   תׁשוע ויאמר הנני  9
                                               
32 Lev 16:29, 31; 23:32 are unattested in the DSS. 11QpaleoLeva supports MT Lev 23:27 by 
reading ֿנפשתיכמ[..]א⸱ועניתמ . The LXX renders the Hebrew in Lev 16:29 as ταπεινώσατε τὰς ψυχὰς ὑμῶν 
(“ye shall humble your souls” (Brenton)) and as καὶ ταπεινώσετε τὰς ψυχὰς ὑμῶν (“ye shall humble your 
souls” (Brenton)) in Lev 16:31; 23:27, 32.  
33 Both 1QIsaa and 1QIsab have the feminine plural of ֶנֶפׁש by נפשתינו/ נפשותינו , also attested in 
LXX with τὰς ψυχὰς and Vulgate with animam. As far as I can see the form ַנפָשַתָנא in Targum Jonathan 
can be both singular and plural of נפׁש. See Paul, Isaiah 40–66, 484. Again, I here only include text critical 
notes that are somehow relevant for the present discussion, and not discussed elsewhere in this chapter. 
34 1QIsaa here adds בגד. This clarifies what the naked should be covered with, something implicit 
in MT and 1QIsab. Paul comments: “When you see the naked, to clothe him—1QIsaa adds the word בגד 
(“clothing”), ְוִכִּסיתֹו בגד, as in Ezek 18:7: “And clothed the naked (וֵעיֹרם ְיכסה בגד)” (cf. also Ezek 18:16). 
One may compare this to one of the reforms (mīšarum) initiated by Esarhaddon, king of Assyria, in which 
he declared: mīrânūte lubuštu ulabbīšma, “I provided the naked with clothing” (CAD M/2:22)” (Paul, 




Table 19 — Continued. 
 
 
Lev 16:21, 29–31; 23:24, 27–28, 
31–32; 25:9–10; Num 29:7 
 
Isa 58:1–14 
  . . .יהוה אלהיכם׃
חקת עולם  תעׂשוכל־מלאכה לא  23:31
 ׃מׁשבתיכםלדרתיכם בכל 
תם את־עניהוא לכם ו ׁשבת ׁשבתון 23:32
תיכם בתׁשעה לחדׁש בערב מערב נפׁש
      . . .פכם׃ׁשבתו ׁשבתעד־ערב ת
Lev 25:9  תרועה בחדׁש  ׁשופרוהעברת
הׁשבעי בעׂשור לחדׁש ביום הכפרים 
  תעבירו ׁשופר בכל־ארצכם׃
וקדׁשתם את ׁשנת החמׁשים ׁשנה  25:10
תם דרור בארץ לכל־יׁשביה יובל קראו
אחזתו  הוא תהיה לכם וׁשבתם איׁש אל־
 ואיׁש אל־מׁשפחתו תׁשבו׃
Num 29:7  ובעׂשור לחדׁש הׁשביעי הזה
תם את־ענייהיה לכם ו מקרא־קדׁש
 ו׃עׂשלא ת כל־מלאכהתיכם נפׁש
 אם־תסיר מתוכך מוטה   ׁשלח אצבע ודבר־און׃ 
 תׂשביע  נפׁש נענהותפק לרעב נפׁשך   ו 10
 וזרח בחׁשך אורך   ואפלתך כצהרים׃
ונחך יהוה תמיד   והׂשביע בצחצחות נפׁשך  11
 והיית כגן רוה    35ועצמתיך יחליץ
 ו מימיו׃וכמוצא מים   אׁשר לא־יכזב
ובנו ממך חרבות עולם   מוסדי דור־ודור  12
 תקומם 
 ׃לׁשבתנתיבות  מׁשבבלך גדר פרץ    36וקרא
 ביום קדׁשי 13
 ענג   לקדוׁש יהוה מכבד  ׁשבתוקראת ל
 ודבר דבר׃ממצוא חפצך וכבדתו מעׂשות דרכיך   
אז תתענג על־יהוה   והרכבתיך על־במותי  14
 ארץ 
כי פי יהוה דבר׃  והאכלתיך נחלת יעקב אביך  
  ס
 
Lev 16:21 And Aaron shall lay both his hands 
upon the head of the live goat, and confess 
over it all the iniquities of the sons of Israel 
and all their rebellions and all their sins. And 
he shall put them on the head of the goat, 
and send [it] away, by the hand of one ready,  
1 Cry with a throat, do not hold back,   Raise your voice 
like a shofar 
And make known to my people their rebellion   And to 
the house of Jacob their sins. 
2 Yet they seek me daily   And desire the knowledge of 
my ways 
                                               
35 While MT reads the singular ַיֲחִליץ, both 1QIsaa (יחליצו) and 1QIsab (יחלצו) have the plural form 
here. See Paul, Isaiah 40–66, 491. 
36 1QIsaa here has וקראו, again rendering the plural instead of the MT singular. 1QIsaa seems to 
want to avoid the collective sense implied in MT and rather bring out the plural explicitly. Kutscher 
comments here: “Most of the changes in number—sing. and pl.—are due to exegetical considerations, i.e. 
the desire to achieve internal agreement in number within a single verse, etc. The Scroll’s reading thus 
frequently seems to be more appropriate than that of the Masoretic Text; but in view of the obvious 
tendency to coordinate, we need not assume that the reading contained in the Scroll is necessarily that of 
the underlying text” (Eduard Yechezkel Kutscher, The Language and Linguistic Background of the Isaiah 
Scroll (IQIsaA) (Leiden: Brill, 1974), 43). And again: “Several instances may be explained as due to a 
tendency towards harmonization where the context would seem to require it—i.e. in instances where the 
subject and object of the verse differ in number in the MT, or where there is both a singular and plural 
subject in a single sentence, and the like” (Kutscher, The Language and Linguistic Background of the 
Isaiah Scroll (IQIsaA), 395). Paul writes: “The form ֹקָרא is an archaic qal passive (see also 48:8; 61:3; 




Table 19 — Continued. 
 
Lev 16:21, 29–31; 23:24, 27–28, 
31–32; 25:9–10; Num 29:7 
 
14–58:1Isa  
into the wilderness. . . . 
16:29 And it shall be to you an ordinance 
forever, in the seventh month, on the tenth 
[day] of the month, you shall afflict your 
persons, and you shall not do any work, the 
native or the stranger dwelling in your midst.  
16:30 For on this day he does purgation for 
you to cleanse you from all your sins. You 
shall be clean before YHWH. 
16:31 It is a Sabbath of Sabbaths for you, and 
you shall afflict your persons, an ordinance 
forever. . . . 
23:24 Speak to the sons of Israel saying: “In 
the seventh month, on the first [day] of the 
month it shall be a memorial Sabbath [with] 
trumpet blast, a holy convocation. . . . 
Lev 23:27 Now on the tenth [day] of this 
seventh month is the Day of Atonement, it 
shall be for you a holy convocation, and you 
shall afflict your persons, and draw near an 
offering by fire to YHWH.  
23:28 And you shall not do any work on that 
very day, for it is the Day of Atonement to 
atone on your behalf before YHWH your 
God. . . . 
23:31 You shall not do any work. It is an 
ordinance for ever to your generations in all 
your dwellings. 
23:32 It shall be a Sabbath of Sabbaths for 
you, and you shall afflict your persons. On 
the ninth [day] of the month, in the evening, 
from evening to evening you shall keep your 
Sabbath. . . . 
Lev 25:9 And your shall pass a blast of the 
shophar in the seventh month, on the tenth 
[day] of the month, on the Day of 
Atonement you shall pass the shophar 
throughout all your land. 
25:10 And you shall sanctify the fiftieth year, 
and proclaim liberty in the land to all who 
dwell in it. It shall be a jubilee for you, while 
each one shall return to his property and  
As a people that does righteousness   And do not 
despise the justice its god(s). 
They ask me for the justice of righteousness,   They 
desire the nearness of God. 
3 “Why have we fasted but you did not see,   We 
afflicted our persons but you did not notice?” 
“Behold, on the day of your fast you seek business   
And oppress all your labourers37! 
4 Behold, you fast for the purpose of strife and 
contention   And in order to strike with a wicked fist! 
You do not fast at this moment   To make your voice 
heard on high. 
5 Will this be the fast I choose:   A day to afflict a man 
his person? 
Is it to bow down his head as a rush,   Spreading out 
sackcloth and dust? 
Is this what you call a fast  And a desirable day of 
YHWH? 
6  Is not this the fast that I choose:  
To loose bonds of wickedness,   To untie ropes of the 
yoke, 
And to let oppressed go free    And you snap all yokes? 
7 Is not this to break your bread for the hungry,  And 
bringing afflicted poor and homeless to a house; 
If/when you see a naked even to clothe him   And not 
ignore your kin? 
8 Then your light will burst forth like the dawn   And 
your healing will spring up quickly, 
And Your Vindicator will walk before your face;   The 
glory of YHWH shall be your rear guard.38 
9 Then you shall call and YHWH will answer.   You 
will cry for help and he will say: “Here I am!” 
If you remove the yoke from your midst,  To point 
finger and speak evil; 
10 And you offer your person/sustenance to the hungry   
And satisfy the starved throat,  
Then your light shall shine in the darkness   And your 
gloom as the noon. 
11 And YHWH will lead you continually   And He will 
satisfy your person in drought 
And strengthen your bones.   And you will be like a 
watered garden, 
                                               
37 For specific translations I have consulted Paul, Isaiah 40–66, 485–94. Unless specifically 
relevant for the present discussion I do not include discussions here. 





Table 19 — Continued. 
 
 
Lev 16:21, 29–31; 23:24, 27–28, 31–
32; 25:9–10; Num 29:7 
 
Isa 58:1–14 
each one return to his family. 
Num 29:7 And on the tenth day of this seventh 
month there shall be a holy convocation for 
you, you shall afflict your persons; you shall 
not do any work. 
Like a spring of water,   Whose water never fail. 
12 And [men] from you will build ancient ruins,   Raise 
up foundations of generations and generations, 
And call you ‘repairer of a breach,   Restorer of paths, 
in order to dwell’. 
13 If you turn back your foot on the Sabbath   From 
doing your business on my holy day, 
And you name39  the Sabbath: “Delight!”,   To 
YHWH’s holy: “Honored!”, 
And you honor it more than to do your ways,   More 
than finding your business and not speak a word, 
14 Then you will take your pleasure in YHWH   And I 
will cause you to ride over the high places of the land 
And you will eat the inheritance of your father Jacob   
For the mouth of YHWH has spoken. 
 
16:29, 31; Lev 23:27, 32; Num 29:7; 30:14; Ps 35:13; Isa 58:3, 5, 10. All of these 
passages refer to the Day of Atonement, except in the cases of Num 30:14 and Ps 35:13. 
Outside the Torah only Ps 35:13 and Isa 58 use this expression. Num 29:7 contains three 
key locutions or concepts also found in Isa 58: (1) ׁשֶנפֶ  + ענה (2) ,ִמְקָרא־ֹקֶדׁש , and (3) 
 It therefore seems reasonable to take these locutions as linked to the 40.עׂשה + לֹא + ְמָלאָכה
Day of Atonement in Lev 16; 23; and Num 29:7. 
                                               
39 Note how it is really an issue of naming the Sabbath here: “If you call the Sabbath “Delight”—
The prophet now switches from prohibitions to positive commandments: If you shall treat the Sabbath as a 
day of joy and delight (cf. Saadyah Gaon: “If you shall celebrate the Sabbath with pleasures”). The 
substantive ֹעֶנג appears again only in Isa 13:22: “In the palaces of pleasure (ענג).” The expression קרא ל-  
denotes naming or designating; cf. Esth 9:26: “For that reason these days were named ( -קראו ל ) Purim”” 
(Paul, Isaiah 40–66, 494). 
40 For commentators that emphasize the closeness of Num 29:7 to Lev 16 and 23 see Baruch A. 
Levine, Numbers 21-36: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AYB 4A (New York: 
Doubleday, 2000), 388; Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 751; Philip J. Budd, Numbers, WBC 5 (Waco, TX: 
Word Books, 1984), 317; George Buchanan Gray, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Numbers, 
ICC (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1903), 411–12; Carl Friedrich Keil, Pentateuch, Commentary on the Old 




In Num 30:14 the legislation concerns self-imposed vows and sworn obligations 
of self-denial (ֶפׁשנֶ  + ענה ) of a woman dependent upon her husband. Here the phrase does 
not seem to be limited only to fasting, and might refer to other forms of self-denial such 
as sexual abstinence.41 Ps 35:13 appears to be more limited to mere fasting, as it also 
includes the word ִעֵּניִתי ַבֹּצום ַנְפִׁשי) צֹום). The psalmist prays, as for a friend or a brother 
 ,in v. 14), for those maligning him and repaying his goodness with evil (vv. 11 ְּכֵרַע־ְּכָאח)
12) by afflicting himself through fasting. 
Roy Gane takes the phrase נהע  in the more general sense of self-denial as ֶנֶפׁש + 
“an outward expression accompanying supplication to God at a time of inner distress.”42 
The LXX by rendering ענה with ταπεινόω also seems to support this more general 
understanding of ענה as self-denial or self-humiliation in Lev 16:29, 31; Lev 23:27, 32. 
We also find ענה in the hithpael (Gen 16:9; 1 Kings 2:26 (2x), Ps 107:17; Dan 10:12; 
                                               
41 See Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 761; Levine, Numbers 21-36: A New Translation with 
Introduction and Commentary, 433; Budd, Numbers, 323; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1054. 
42 Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 405. Milgrom provides five arguments for why the phrase ֶנֶפׁש + ענה 
in itself does not mean mere fast: “There are, however, several reasons why the limitation to fasting does 
not do justice to the range of the idiom. (1) The words themselves imply more than hunger. To be sure, 
nepeš, like its Akk. cognate napištu, can have the restricted notion of appetite (Ps 107:9) or throat (Isa 
5:14). In P, however, it only denotes the individual (2:1) or the body (21:1). Moreover, that nepeš here 
refers to the self, the entire person, is evident from the use of the root ʿnh in the hithpaʿel, where nepeš does 
not appear (Ezra 8:21; Dan 10:12; cf. Ps 107:17) and need not appear, because the hithpaʿel is reflexive. 
Surely, there are more ways to ‘afflict’ the body than just by starving it. (2) wĕkol-šĕbuʿat ʾissār lĕʿannōt 
nāpeš ‘every sworn obligation of self-denial’ of the wife can be annulled by her husband (Num 30:14). Of a 
certainty, her absentions are not limited to fasting. (3) ʿinnêtî baṣṣôm napšî ‘I afflicted myself with a fast’ 
(Ps 35:13) clearly implies that there are other means of self-affliction than fasting. (4) Daniel’s attempt 
lĕhitʿannôt (Dan 10:12) consisted of three weeks of mourning during which he ‘refrained from all choice 
food, no meat or wine passed my lips and I did not anoint myself’ (ibid., v 3). Thus his self-denial consisted 
of a partial fast and, in addition, he abstained from anointing his body. The latter deprivation is included 
among the items enumerated in the rabbinic definition: ‘Afflict yourselves, from food, drink, and from 
enjoying bathing, and from anointing, and from sexual intercourse’ (Tg. Ps.-J.; cf. m. Yoma 8:1). (5) King 
David not only fasts, but sleeps on the ground, does not change his clothes, and refrains from sex, 
anointing, and bathing (2 Sam 12:16–20), a striking confirmation of the rabbinic definition” (Milgrom, 
Leviticus 1–16, 1054). See also Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2023; John E. Hartley, Leviticus, WBC 4 




Ezra 8:21).43 The meaning in these cases seems to be to subject oneself to affliction.44 Ibn 
Ezra therefore seems to overstate the evidence when based on Ps 35:13 he stated the 
following rule: “The rule is that every time ‘abstinence’ (עינוי) is mentioned in Scripture 
together with ‘self’ (נפש), it denotes fasting.”45 It is only when צֹום is used together with 
 .that we can be certain that it has the more narrow meaning of fasting ,ֶנֶפׁש + ענה
Ps 35:13 seems too far removed from Isa 58 to give a basis for arguing that there 
is reuse between the two.46 Still, Ps 35:13 raises the following question: As Isa 58 uses 
both ֶפׁשנֶ  + ענה  and צֹום (Isa 58:3, 5, 6), while צֹום is absent from the Torah, including Lev 
16; 23 specifically,47 is Isa 58’s more narrow understanding of self-denial (ֶנֶפׁש + ענה) as 
fasting (צֹום) simply using a common understanding of self-denial from the time of its 
composition, or can it be argued that Isa 58 is reusing the concept of ֶנֶפׁש + ענה from the 
                                               
43 Based on the criteria of biblical distribution in Hurvitz’ methodology and given this attestation 
of the hitpael of ענה it would be difficult to argue for a diachronic replacement of the phrase ענה in piel + 
 in hitpael in LBH (Avi Hurvitz, “Continuity and Innovation in Biblical Hebrew: The ענה in CBL with ֶנֶפׁש
Case of "Semantic Change" in Post-Exilic Writings,” in Studies in Ancient Hebrew Semantics, ed. T. 
Muraoka, Abr-Nahrain Supplement 4 (Louvain: Peeters, 1995), 1–10). Ezra 8:21 shows that the phrase ענה 
in piel + ֶנֶפׁש was still in use in LBH. 
44 As seen above Milgrom takes the cases of ענה in hitpael as an affirmation that ענה in piel + ֶנֶפׁש 
has a broader meaning of self-denial than mere fasting (Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1054). 1 Kgs 2:26b (ֲאֶׁשר־
 could be discussed here, as the affliction might be understood (ּוֵמֲעֹוֹנֵתיֶהם ִיְתַעּנּו) and Ps 107:17 (ִהְתַעָּנה ָאִבי
as coming from the outside.  
45 Quoted in Paul, Isaiah 40–66, 484. 
46 Just as Ps 35:13, Joel 2:15 holds open the alternative reading that Isa 58 is concerned with a fast, 
rather than pointing to the Day of Atonement or Year of Jubilee. 
47 I therefore disagree with Hartley when he claims that “ענה is used in place of צום, ‘fast,’ in order 
to communicate that more than not eating is required” (Hartley, Leviticus, 242). As צֹום is not used at all in 
the Torah, it is not evident that the author of Leviticus saw this as an available term. Keil and Delitzsch 
points out that צֹום came into use first in the time of the Judges, referring to Judg 20:26 and 1 Sam 7:6 
(Keil, Pentateuch, 591). Their argument evidently rests on an understanding of the chronological 
composition of the Torah, but the absence of צֹום in the Torah needs to be accounted for if Hartley’s claim 




Day of Atonement in Lev 16; 23, even if it adds the word צֹום? The phrase ֶנֶפׁש + ענה 
could be said to be distinctly characteristic of to the Day of Atonement, but it is not 
unique to it. Based on the above evidence I would argue that the phrase ֶנֶפׁש + ענה, in 
itself, is not conclusive enough to warrant saying there is literary reuse between Lev 16; 
23 and Isa 58. We need corroborating evidence to make this claim secure. 
We find three additional parallels that strengthen the claim that there is reuse 
between Isa 58 and Lev 16 and 23.48 Second, the opening phrase in Isa 58:1 is:  ְקָרא ְבָגֹרון
 Cry with a throat, do not hold back, raise your voice like a“) ַאל־ַּתְחֹׂשְך ַּכֹּׁשוָפר ָהֵרם ֹקוֶלָך
shofar”).49 The lexeme קרא in 58:1a opens the entire chapter. The imperative directed 
toward the prophet might very well come as the divine response to the apostasy of the 
people described in Isa 57.50 In comparison we read in Lev 25:9:  ְּבֹיום ַהִּכֻּפִרים ַּתֲעִבירּו
 On the Day of Atonement you shall cause the shofar to pass“) ֹׁשוָפר ְּבָכל־ַאְרְצֶכם
                                               
48 I have here found Paul’s suggestion about parallels between Isa 58 and Lev 16; 23 helpful (Paul, 
Isaiah 40–66, 480-81). He does, however, not analyze these parallels in detail. The following is therefore 
an attempt to analyze the nature and strength of these parallels in detail to evaluate whether they really 
provide a clear picture of reuse or not. Cf. Hanks, God So Loved the Third World, 99–100; Bergsma, The 
Jubilee from Leviticus to Qumran, 195. 
49 Paul writes: “The opening verses of this prophecy may have been influenced by Hos 8:1–2: ‘Put 
a ram’s horn to your mouth!’ (Hos 8:1)—‘Cry with a full throat, without restraint, raise your voice like a 
ram’s horn!’ (v. 1); ‘Because they have transgressed My covenant and rebelled against My teaching’ (Hos 
8:1)—‘Declare to My people their transgression, to the house of Jacob their sins!’ (v. 1); ‘Israel cries out to 
Me, ‘O my God, we are devoted to You’’ (Hos 8:2)—‘To be sure, they seek Me daily, eager to learn My 
ways” (v. 2)’ (Paul, Isaiah 40–66, 482). See also Mic 3:8; Ezek 33:1–6. As my focus in this chapter is upon 
the reuse between the Torah and Isa 58, I do not study the parallels with Hos 8:1–2 further here. 
50 For other parallels between Isa 57 and 58 see Paul, Isaiah 40–66, 482. See also 58:5f where קרא 
is also used, but this time for the people calling a fast. In 58:9a it is used a third time, but now for the 
people’s call being heard. This time they do not proclaim a fast, but call upon God under conditions where 
He will hear them. In clause 64 it is used about the faithful who are given the name ‘restorer of a breach, 
restorer of paths, in order to dwell’. In 58:13c the inner joy of true spirituality makes the faithful call the 
Sabbath a delight. קרא is of course a common word, and care should be used not to exaggerate the point. 
Due to its central role in the opening clause, it nevertheless seems justified to notice how the word is used 





throughout the land”).51 Even if קרא is a very common word in BH, it is worth noting that 
it is used in Lev 23:2, 4, 21, 37 for proclaiming the festivals.52 Apparently, it was normal 
practice to publicly proclaim the command to assemble for the sacred festivals, which 
were called 53.ִמְקָרֵאי ֹקֶדׁש The shofar (ׁשֹוָפר) was thus sounded for the beginning of the 
Year of Jubilee, on the Day of Atonement at the end of the seventh cycle of sabbatical 
years, at the beginning of the fiftieth year.54 But the ׁשֹוָפר was also used at other 
occasions. Generally speaking, it was used to call attention at some kind of solemn 
occasion.55 It was even blown for religious festivals like the new moon (Ps 81:4) and a 
general fast (Joel 2:15).56 The use of ׁשֹוָפר in Isa 58:1 therefore seems to point us more 
                                               
51 Cf. ַוּיַ ֲעֶבר־ֹקול in Ezra 1:1, that Moshe Weinfeld takes as using technical terminology for the 
proclamation of liberation associated with the Year of Jubilee (Weinfeld, Social Justice in Ancient Israel, 
13). 
52 Having discussed various suggestions of how to render קרא, Milgrom concludes that the basic 
meaning in relation to the festivals is ‘proclaim’ (Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 1957). 
53 For how ִמְקָרֵאי ֹקֶדׁש and קרא are related to the festivals see Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 1957–58. 
The phrase ִמְקָרֵאי ֹקֶדׁש is used eleven times only in Lev 23, in vv. 23:2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 21, 24, 27, 35, 36, 37. 
54 Cf. Park, Die Gerechtigkeit Israels, 235–38; Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 432–34; Hrobon, 
Ethical Dimension, 202; Paul, Isaiah 40–66, 482. See Joel 2:15. In Lev 23:24, in relation to the Day of 
Atonement, it is not the word ׁשֹוָפר that is used, but ְּתרּוָעה. I would therefore not use this verse as a link 
between Isa 58 and Lev 23 as Michael Fishbane does (Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 
305). 
55 Cf. Oswalt, Isaiah 40–66, 495. 
56 Milgrom writes that ׁשֹוָפר was used “to muster an army (Judg 3:27; 6:34), to frighten the enemy 
(Judg 7:8, 16, 22), to proclaim victory (1 Sam 13:3), to terminate a battle (2 Sam 18:16; 20:22), to warn of 
an approaching enemy (Jer 4:21; Hos 5:8), to install the Ark in David’s tent (2 Sam 6:15), and to crown 
kings (2 Sam 15:10; 2 Kgs 9:13)” (Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2163–64). HALOT expands the list by 
writing that “the reasons, or alternatively the occasions, for using the 1—: ׁשֹוָפר . a) at a theophany of 
Yahweh Ex 19:16,19; 20:18; Zech 9:14, cf. Is 27:13; 58:1; b) on יֹום יהוה the day of Yahweh Jl 2:1; Zeph 
11:6. —2. ceremonial occasions: a) Year of jubilee Lv 25:9 (ׁשֹוַפר ְּתרּוָעה sounding the alarm); b) at the 
festival of the new moon Ps 81:4; c) at a general fast Jl 2:15; d) for the proclamation of a new king 2S 
15:10; 1K 13:4,39,41; 2K 9:13; e) at the exaltation of Yahweh, hauling up the Ark 2S 6:15; Ps 47:6; 98:6, 
cf. Ps 150:3; 1C 15:28; 2C 15:14. —3. in the course of battle: a) to announce the approach of an enemy Jr 
4:5 (textual emendation), 19, 21; 6:1; b) ׁשֹוָפר the means by which a watchman warns the populace Is 18:3; 




specifically to the announcement of the Year of Jubilee on the Day of Atonement.57 
However, the use of the lexeme ׁשֹוָפר is not by itself a conclusive argument for reuse 
between Isa 58 and Lev 25:9.58 
                                               
6, 8, 9, 13, 13, 16, 20; Ju 3:27; 6:34; 7:8, 16, 18, 18, 19, 20, 22; 1S 13:3, 2S 2:28, 18:16; 20:1, 22; Jr 42:14; 
51:27; Hos 5:8; Am 2:2; Jb 39:24f” (Koehler et al., HALOT, 1447–48). As the evidence reviewed here and 
below point in the direction of reuse between Isa 58 and Lev 16; 23, I do not agree with HALOT in simply 
understanding the ׁשֹוָפר in Isa 58:1 as “a theophany of Yahweh”. Divine theophany is not central as such in 
Isa 58, even if it is implied in v. 9 with the  ִֵניִהּנ  (“Here I am”), but rather the state of the people in their 
religious assemblies. 
57 Weinfeld points out that “it was customary in Israel to blow the shofar at the beginning of the 
year of ‘liberation’ (Lev. 25:10), so that over the course of time the blowing of the shofar became a symbol 
of freedom and liberation” (Weinfeld, Social Justice in Ancient Israel, 14). In other ANE countries a torch, 
pole or banner had a similar function as the shofar in Israel. 
58 Sommer points out a possible reuse between Mic 3:5–12 and Isa 58:1–12: 
Mic 3:5–12 Isa 58:1–12 
5 Thus says YHWH to the prophets who mislead 
my people. . . and proclaim (ְוָקְראּו) peace . . . 6 
Therefore, it shall be night to you rather than 
vision, and darkness (ְוָחְׁשָכה) to you rather than 
prophecy. And the sun shall set on the prophets so 
the day shall be darkened for them. . . . 7 . . . for 
there will be no answer (ַמֲעֵנה) from God. 8 But I 
am full of the power of the spirit of YHWH and 
justice and might to tell Jacob his sins and Israel 
his sins ( ֹאתוְלַהִּגיד ְלַיעֲֹקב ִּפְׁשעֹו ּוְלִיְׂשָרֵאל ַחּטָ  ). Hear 
now  
. . . 10 you who build (ֹּבֶנה) Zion with blood . . . 
Her leaders judge (ִיְׁשֹּפטּו) for bribes . . . and her 
prophets divine for silver. Yet they rely upon 
YHWH, saying, “Is not YHWH in our midst 
 No evil will come upon us!” 12 ?(ְּבִקְרֵּבנּו)
Therefore, because of you, Zion will be plowed as 
a field. 
1 Cry (ְקָרא) with a throat, do not hold back (ַּתְחֹׂשְך), 
. . . And make known to my people their rebellion 
And to the house of Jacob their sins ( ְוַהֵּגד ְלַעִּמי
 Yet they seek me daily 2 .(ִּפְׁשָעם ּוְלֵבית ַיעֲֹקב ַחּטֹאָתם
. . . As a people that . . . do not despise the justice 
 of its god(s). They ask me for the justice (ּוִמְׁשַּפט)
of righteousness,   They desire the nearness of 
God. . . . 4 Behold, you fast for the purpose of strife 
and contention . . . 6  Is not this the fast that I 
choose: To loose bonds of wickedness, . . . And to 
let oppressed go free  . . . 7 Is not this to break your 
bread for the hungry, . . . 8 Then your light will 
burst forth like the dawn . . . 9 Then you shall call 
 . . . 10 . . . .(ַיֲעֶנה) and YHWH will answer (ִּתְקָרא)
Then your light shall shine in the darkness . . . 12 
And [men] from you will build (ּוָבנּו) ancient ruins 
. . . 
It is possible there is a reuse between Isa 58 and Mic 3. If so, the tendency to conflate various 
passages in a new literary composition is even stronger in Isa 58. Sommer also points out a thematic 
reversal: “The motive behind the allusion becomes palpable here: as a prophet who reassures—that is, the 
sort of prophet whom Micah reviles—Deutero-Isaiah wants to stress his connection with his predecessors; 
he needs not only to reverse the older message but to repeat it within newly appropriate confines. Lest the 
audience mistake him for the sort of prophet whom Micah condemns, Deutero-Isaiah first follows Micah’s 
biddings by proclaiming the people’s sins. Having thus abrogated not Micah’s message but the situation 
that called it forth, Deutero-Isaiah can proceed to announce the cessation of the punishment Micah foresaw: 
light will replace the darkness, prophets will again receive answers, and what was destroyed will be rebuilt” 




Third, there is a parallel in regard to the acknowledgment of sin.59 In Lev 16:21 
we read:  ֵאל ְוֶאת־ָּכל־ִּפְׁשֵעיֶהם ְלָכל־ַחּטֹאָתםְוִהְתַוָּדה ָעָליו ֶאת־ָּכל־ֲעֹוֹנת ְּבֵני ִיְׂשָר  (“and he [Aaron] 
shall confess over it [the live goat] all the culpability of the sons of Israel, and all their 
rebellion and all their sins”). In comparison Isa 58:1 reads: ֲעֹקב ְוַהֵּגד ְלַעִּמי ִּפְׁשָעם ּוְלֵבית יַ 
 and make known to my people their rebellion and to the house of Jacob their“) ַחּטֹאָתם
sin”). The settings in Lev 16 and Isa 58 are different. In Lev 16 the people have 
confessed their sins throughout the year, but in Isa 58 they are called to a solemn 
assembly to be told their sin. In vv. 2–3 the people appear ignorant as to their true 
spiritual state.60 This ignorance has, apparently, also led to a consequent failure to confess 
                                               
59 For others seeing a link to the Day of Atonement on the basis of the words used for sin in Isa 58, 
see Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 305–6; Hrobon, Ethical Dimension, 203; Kline, 
Allusive Soundplay, 83–84. It is nothing in the words used for sin in the Hebrew that gives us an indication 
that there is a reuse between Isa 58 and Lev 16; 23. Isa 58 uses three words for sin: (1) ֶּפַׁשע (“inexpiable 
defiant sin”; Isa 58:1. 1QIsaa, LXX, Targum Jonathan and Vulgate all have plural here instead of the MT 
singular), (2) ַחָּטאת (“expiable nondefiant sin”; Isa 58:1), and (3) ֶרַׁשע (“wickedness”; Isa 58:4, 6). Lev 16 
and 23 uses four words for sin: (1) ֻטְמָאה (“physical ritual impurity”; Lev 16:16, 19), (2) ָעֹון (“culpability”; 
Lev 16:21, 22), (3) ֶּפַׁשע (“inexpiable defiant sin”; Lev 16:16, 21), (4) ַחָּטאת (“expiable nondefiant sin”; Lev 
16:3, 5, 6, 9, 11, 15, 16, 21, 25, 27, 30, 34; 23:19) (See Roy E. Gane, Cult and Character: Purification 
Offerings, Day of Atonement, and Theodicy (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2005), 298–300). We see that 
Isa 58 uses ֶרַׁשע, only once attested in the Torah, not in the legal material, but in a prayer (Deut 9:27). On 
the other hand Lev 16:21, 22 uses ָעֹון, not used in Isa 58, and  ְֻמָאהט , not used by Isaiah at all. It is not a 
substantial argument to say that since Isa 58 LXX repeats the three words for sin in Lev 16 LXX (ἀνομία, 
ἀδικία, and ἁμαρτία), while Isa 58 MT has only two of them (ֶּפַׁשע and ַחָּטאת, leaving out ָעֹון), that LXX 
draws Isa 58 and Lev 16 closer together. LXX does not seem to operate consistent with several of the 
words for sin, as the following analysis shows: LXX in Lev 16 and 23 renders (1) ֻטְמָאה with ἀκαθαρσία in 
Lev 16:16, 19, a word not attested at all in the LXX of Isaiah, (2) ָעֹון with ἀνομία in Lev 16:21, also found 
in Isa 58:1 to render ַחָּטאת, and with ἀδικία in Lev 16:22, not used at all by Isaiah, (3) ֶּפַׁשע with ἀδίκημα in 
Lev 16:16, not used in Isa 58, and with ἀδικία in Lev 16:21, rendering  ֶַׁשער  in Isa 58:6, and (4) ַחָּטאת with 
ἁμαρτία in Lev 16:3, 5, 6, 9, 11, 15, 16, 21, 25, 27, 30, 34; 23:19, a word not used in Isa 58. ἀδικία is 
therefore used in Isa 58:6 LXX to render ֶרַׁשע, something that is done only one other time according to 
Muraoka (Takamitsu Muraoka, A Greek ≈ Hebrew/Aramaic Two-Way Index to the Septuagint (Leuven: 
Peeters, 2010), 4). The lexeme ֶרַׁשע is also rendered as the adjective ταπεινός in Isa 58:4 LXX. Further, Isa 
58:1 is the only time ַחָּטאת is rendered with ἀνομία (Muraoka, A Greek ≈ Hebrew/Aramaic Two-Way Index 
to the Septuagint, 11). Could it be that Isa 58 chooses the words for inexpiable (ֶּפַׁשע) and expiable (ַחָּטאת) 
sins as it is concerned more with moral sins than ritual? 
60 A NT parallel could here be the Laodicean church who in Rev 3:15–17 also seems ignorant 




previous sins, so their sin needs to be made known and spelled out to them in order that 
they might confess. If Isa 58 reuses Lev 16; 23 with respect to the Day of Atonement, this 
would only heighten the intensity of the opening words of Isa 58. Coming unrepentant to 
the Day of Atonement with unconfessed sins would be fatal. This critical situation would 
most likely catch the attention of Isaiah’s audience. Despite the difference between Isa 58 
and Lev 16; 23 in regard to sin, the character of this difference only makes the connection 
stronger.61 
                                               
God’s perspective, the people are ignorant of their sins, and need to be made aware of them (58:1). This is 
marked by the only three imperatives in the chapter. In response, the people counter that God seems 
ignorant about their religious practice (58:3). The irony is that if the people really believed they were right 
about their conviction that the neglect was on God’s side, why then do they seem to have been content for 
such a long time, first questioning God’s silence as a response when they themselves are accused?  
61 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the lexical set ָחְפִׁשי + ׁשלח is used in Exod 21:26-27; Deut 
15:12-13, 18; Isa 58:6; Jer 34:9-11, 14, 16; Job 39:3, 5. We can add that like Exod 21 and Deut 15 Isa 58 
speaks of the release of slaves. However, as with Jer 34, Isa 58 draws upon the conceptual framework of 
Lev 25. While it is possible that Isa 58 is reusing ָחְפִׁשי + ׁשלח from Exod 21 and/or Deut 15, the lack of 
additional clear reuse makes it difficult to make a substantial argument for this. Cf. Thomas Podella, Ṣôm-
Fasten: Kollektive Trauer um den verborgenen Gott im Alten Testament (Neikirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 
1989), 218. Westermann claims there is a parallel between  ְוִהְרַּכְבִּתיָך ַעל־ָּבֳמוֵתי ָאֶרץ ְוַהֲאַכְלִּתיָך ַנֲחַלת ַיֲעֹקבin 
58:14 and ַיְרִּכֵבהּו ַעל־ָּבמֹוֵתי ָאֶרץ ַוּיֹאַכל ְּתנּוֹבת ָׂשָדי in Deut 32:13 (Westermann, Isaiah 40–66, 342). Sommer 
sees a similar parallel, adding that ִּכי ִּפי ְיהָוה ִּדֵּבר (“for the mouth of YHWH has spoken”) in 58:14 
“sometimes is a formula indicating reliance on an older oracle or text” (Sommer, A Prophet Reads 
Scripture, 134–35). Cf. Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 478–79. Delitzsch sees a 
parallel between Jer 34:8–22 which he sees as pre-exilic and Isa 58 as he sees as exilic, in a continuing 
oppressive spirit among the people towards the poor and afflicted (Carl Friedrich Keil and Franz Delitzsch, 
Isaiah, Commentary on the Old Testament (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2001), 555). Oswalt thinks it is a 
more general focus here, where the last part of the book of Isaiah emphasize the freedom God wants to give 
his people through the Servant. The question thus raised in Isa 58 is how they live as free persons in 
relations to others (Oswalt, Isaiah 40–66, 503). Paul also points out a similar parallelism between the verbs 
 in Job 39:5 and Isa 58:6 (Paul, Isaiah 40–66, 487), but again the evidence appears to be too פתח and שלח
meagre to make a case of reuse. Thomas Hanks has pointed out that Jesus in his inaugural sermon in 
Nazareth seems to conflate LXX Isa 58:6 ἀπόστελλε τεθραυσμένους ἐν ἀφέσει with Isa 61:1–2 by speaking 
ἀποστεῖλαι τεθραυσμένους ἐν ἀφέσει (“to release the oppressed into liberty”) “to underscore the liberating 
dimension of his own ministry and his understanding of the kingdom of God as involving the kind of socio-
economic revolution envisioned in the Jubilee provision” (Hanks, God So Loved the Third World, 98, 103–
4). He proposes “that the insertion of Isaiah 58:6 in Isaiah 61:1–2 is best explained by recognizing that both 
of them reflect the teaching of Leviticus 25 concerning the Year of Jubilee, and that the originality and 
boldness exemplified in relating the two texts is best accounted for as reflecting Jesus’ own exegetical 
insight and passion for liberation (not just ‘forgiveness,’ as Marshall suggests)” (Hanks, God So Loved the 




Finally, an additional inner-Isaianic parallel supports the contention that Isa 58 is 
referring to the Day of Atonement. Whereas Isa 58:5 refers to the Day of Atonement as 
 the day pleasing to YHWH”), the Jubilee year announced on this day is“) יֹום ָרצֹון ַליהָוה
called ָוהְׁשַנת־ָרצֹון ַליה  (“the year pleasing to YHWH”) in 61:2. As Hanks puts it: “the 
‘acceptable year’ (Jubilee, Isa. 61:[2]) is to be inaugurated by the ‘acceptable day’ (Isa. 
58:5), the fast day of Atonement.”62 If it is accepted that ְׁשַנת־ָרצֹון ַליהָוה in 61:2 is the 
Year of Jubilee, it would then strengthen the contention that יֹום ָרצֹון ַליהָוה in 58:3 is a 
reference to the Day of Atonement. 
Thematic correspondence: First, I have already noted how the use of ׁשֹוָפר in Isa 
58:1 might point to the Year of Jubilee. In Lev 25:10 we read: ּוְקָראֶתם ְּדֹרור ָּבָאֶרץ ְלָכל־
 and you shall proclaim a release in the land for all her inhabitants”).63 The phrase“) ֹיְׁשֶביהָ 
ֲאסּוִרים ְּפַקח־ִלְקרֹא ִלְׁשבּוִים ְּדֹרור ְולַ  :from Lev 25:10 might be reused in Is 61:1 ְּדרֹור + קרא
 to proclaim a release to the captives, liberation to the imprisoned”).64 Besides Isa“) קוחַ 
                                               
62 Hanks, God So Loved the Third World, 100. 
63 Milgrom writes: “Three interpretations are extant for the meaning of dĕrôr: (1) “release” (LXX; 
Jos. Ant. 12.3; Ibn Ezra); (2) “flow,” as in mōr/môr dĕrôr ‘free flowing myrrh’ (Exod 30:23; Song 5:5, 13), 
supported by Arabic “flowing streams” (Snaith 1967; see also Lewy 1958: 21–22); and (3) “freedom” (Tgs; 
Sipra Behar 2:2; Ibn Ezra, “free as the swallow,” dĕrôr, Ps 84:4; Prov 26:2; b. Beṣa 24a). One can easily 
see that the three meanings are related: whatever is released, flows and gains freedom. The first meaning, 
“release,” would be primary, with “flow” and “freedom” as its natural but secondary extension” (Milgrom, 
Leviticus 23–27, 2166–67). 
64 Moshe Weinfeld calls ְּדרֹור “the epitome of the establishment of ‘righteousness and justice’ in 
Israel” “whose aim is to establish social justice and equality and to assist the weaker members of society” 
(Weinfeld, Social Justice in Ancient Israel, 9). He continues: “The proclamation of freedom—in Scriptural 
language, the calling (קרא) of freedom ( רדרו )—was done by means of a proclamation of a royal figure” 
(Weinfeld, Social Justice in Ancient Israel, 12). Weinfeld sees as the background in Isa 61:1–2 (Weinfeld, 
Social Justice in Ancient Israel, 18). Paul also points out the relation between ֹיום ָרֹצון (“a favourable day”) 
in Is 58:5 with ֵעת ָרֹצון (“a favourable time”) in Isa 49:8 and יהָוה  (”a year of favour for YHWH“) ְׁשַנת־ָרֹצון ַלִֽ
in Isa 61:2. This would also link Isa 58 and the Year of Jubilee in Isa 61:2 together (Paul, Isaiah 40–66, 
486). Whereas Isa 58:5 refer to the Day of Atonement as יֹום ָרצֹון ַליהָוה, the Jubilee year announced on this 




58:1, the combination of ׁשֹוָפר + רום is only found in close proximity in Job 39:24–25, 27, 
but this case is too far removed to speak of a parallel. We find the combination of קרא + 
 in several cases of the HB, but as they are only thematically and not grammatically ׁשֹוָפר
connected this affords little help.65 As we shall see below, there might also be diachronic 
reasons why Isa 58:1 uses the word ָפרׁשֹו  instead of יֹוֵבל. 
Here it is significant to note that the context of Isa 58 also might evoke formulas 
related to the Year of Jubilee. In Isa 58:6 we find the theme of liberation, ֲהֹלוא ֶזה ֹצום
ֹמוָטה ְוַׁשַּלח ְרצּוִצים ָחְפִׁשים ְוָכל־ֹמוָטה ְּתַנֵּתקּו ֶאְבָחֵרהּו ַּפֵּתַח ַחְרֻצֹּבות ֶרַׁשע ַהֵּתר ֲאֻגֹּדות  (“Is not this 
the fast that I choose: to loose bonds of wickedness, to untie ropes of the yoke, and to let 
oppressed go free and you breaking all yokes?”). There is not a significant reuse of 
lexemes or phrases between Isa 58:6 and Lev 25:10, but we could say that there is a 
thematic correspondence. Hrobon has pointed out, however, that the lexeme מֹוָטה 
(“yoke”) only occurs in Lev 26:13, outside the prophets, in the analogical context of 
Israel having its yoke of bondage broken.66 
                                               
65 The combination of the lexemes ׁשֹוָפר + קרא in the same context is linked with the Sinai 
theophany (Exod 19:16-17, 19-20), as a war-signal (Josh 6:4-6; Judg 6:32, 34-35; 7:19-20, 22; 2 Sam 
15:10-11; 20:1; Jer 4:5, 19-21), for coronation (1 Kgs 1:39, 41), and for a public assembly, be that a fast 
(Joel 2:15), a festival (Ps 81:4, 8), or more specifically the Year of Jubilee (Lev 25:9-10). Isa 58:1 clearly 
belongs to the latter thematically, but the combination of רׁשֹופָ  + קרא  is only linked thematically, not 
grammatically, since ׁשֹוָפר is nowhere the object of קרא. This combination is therefore not helpful. 
66 The lexeme מֹוָטה is testified in Lev 26:13; Isa 58:6, 9; Jer 27:2; 28:10, 12–13; Ezek 30:18; 
34:27; 1 Chr 15:15. Might there be a link between the word used for poor in Lev 25:35 (ָמָטה) and the word 
for yoke (מֹוָטה) in Isa 58:6? May there be a double entendre with מֹוָטה in ַהֵּתר ֲאֻגּדֹות מֹוָטה, (“to release the 
ropes of the yoke/poor”) based on the reuse of Lev 25? The clause ְוָכל־מֹוָטה ְּתַנֵּתקּו (“you shall break 
off/lure away every yoke/poor”) would be more difficult to explain as such a double entendre. Hrobon 
writes: “It is noteworthy that the Hebrew word for yoke (מֹוָטה) that comes up three times in Isa 58 (v. 6 
twice and v. 9) is used outside the Prophets only once, namely Lev 26:13. This verse and its nearby parallel 
25:55 list the underlying principle for observing God’s statutes and commandments in general and the 
Sabbath year and the Year of Jubilee in particular: ‘I am the LORD your God who brought you out of the 
land of Egypt, to be their slaves no more; I have broken the bars of your מֹוָטה and made you walk erect’ 




Second, it is even possible that Isaiah built his integration of themes from the 
Year of Jubilee, Day of Atonement, and weekly Sabbath upon Lev 25:1–12, as all three 
are mentioned here, if we take the Sabbath-theme from the sabbatical year in vv. 2-4.67 
Hrobon writes that “if Isa 58:1–12 is read through the lens of the Sabbath, the Sabbatical 
year, the Year of Jubilee, and the Day of Atonement regulations in Leviticus, the sabbath 
concept turns out to be all-encompassing in Isa 58, and vv. 13–14 then come naturally as 
the chapter’s grand finale.”68 
Third, in Isa 58:3–6 there is a focus upon proper fasting. The only fast 
commanded in the Torah is on the Day of Atonement (Lev 16:29–31; 23:26–32). In post-
exilic times other fasts were added (Zech. 7:3–10; 8:18; 8:18).69 
Fourth, the thematic parallels between Lev 25 and Isa 58 can be summed up as 
outlined in Table 20. 
Multiplicity: As we will see below, it is the specific manner in which lexemes and 
themes from passages in Lev 16; 23; 25 are woven together in Isa 58 that indicate a 
dependence of the latter upon the former. It is the same indicators that also provide the 
stronger arguments for the case of reuse between these passages as well. As Fishbane,  
                                               
land of Egypt: I am the LORD your God’ (25:55)” (Hrobon, Ethical Dimension, 202). Cf. Park, Die 
Gerechtigkeit Israels, 239. 
The lexical set ָחְפִׁשי + ׁשלח is used in Exod 21:26-27; Deut 15:12-13, 18; Isa 58:6; Jer 34:9-11, 14, 
16; Job 39:3, 5. In order to establish a case of reuse between the manumission instrucitons of Exod 21 
and/or Deut 15 on the one hand and Isa 58 on the other it would be desireable with stronger evidence for 
reuse. 
67 Cf. Exod 23:10-12, where the weekly Sabbath is juxtaposed to the sabbatical years. 
68 Hrobon, Ethical Dimension, 205. 
69 Cf. Hanks, God So Loved the Third World, 99; Oswalt, Isaiah 40–66, 497; Bergsma, The 









25:14–17 Fair trade 58:3, 
13 
Seeking and not seeking one’s 
own business/desire 
25:36, 39, 
43, 46, 53 
Prohibition against 
enslavement and harsh 
treatment of Hebrews 
58:3 Oppression of workers70 
25:29, 31 Return to one’s home (58:7 71(ּבַ ִית Home ( ִיתּבַ  ) for the homeless 
25:35–38 Showing hospitality to the poor 
brother and not exploiting him 
58:7, 
1072 
Showing hospitality to the poor 




Taking care of and redeeming 
one’s brother  
58:7 Not to ignore one’s own kin73 
25:39–55 Manumission of economically 58:6, 9 Setting the afflicted free 
                                               
70 Bergsma writes: “The constellation of ethical injunctions in Isa 58 corresponds well with those 
of Lev 25. The freeing of debt-slaves (Isa 58:6, 9c; cf. Lev 25:39–55), the protest against the abuse of 
workers (Isa 58:3d; cf. Lev 25:36, 39, 43, 46, 53), and the sharing of food and shelter with the needy, 
especially the needy kinsman (Isa 58:7, 10a–b; cf. Lev 25:35–38) can all be found reflected in the jubilee 
legislation. In addition, some scholars have suggested translating Isa 58:4a[58:3a] as ‘Behold, on the day of 
your fast you pursue your own business and dun your debtors.’ This would reflect the prohibition on 
charging interest of Lev 25:35–38. In sum, nearly all the injunctions of Isa 58 find a parallel in Lev 25. No 
other biblical legislation (i.e. Deut 15, Exod 21:2–11) corresponds so completely. This may explain why 
the promised blessings for fidelity to the LORD in Isa 58 (vv. 8, 11, 14) are thematically similar to those of 
Lev 25:18–19 and Lev 26:3–13, including bountiful rain (Isa 58:11, Lev 26:4a), the divine presence (Isa 
58:8d, Lev 26:11–12), divine military defense (Isa 58:8c; Lev 26:6–8), and the consumption (אכל), cf. Isa 
58:14c, Lev 25:19, 26:5) of the produce of the ancestral land” (Bergsma, The Jubilee from Leviticus to 
Qumran, 196). To me Bergsma’s rendering of Isa 58:3a so as to deal with the relation between debtors and 
lenders seems a little pressed, and therefore the link to Lev 25:35–38 is not as clear as he suggests. 
Otherwise, though, there seems to be weight to his suggested parallels between Lev 25 and Isa 58. 
71 The parallel between Lev 25:29, 31 and Isa 58:7 may explain the ambiguity of the latter. For 
more discussion see below. 
72 A question here is how to understand ְוָתֵפק ָלָרֵעב ַנְפֶׁשָך in Isa 58:10. Should ֶנֶפׁש here be 
understood as ‘food’, ‘abundance’, or ‘person’? See discussion below. 
73 Paul writes: “And not to ignore your own kin—If your kith and kin are in need, you are obliged 
to lend them a helping hand as well. For ָּבָׂשר (“kindred blood relations”), see Gen 29:14: “You are truly my 
bone and flesh (בשרי)”; Lev 18:6. For the verbal expression להתעלם מ- , denoting disregard or evasion, see 
Deut 22:1: “If you see your fellow’s ox or sheep gone astray, do not ignore it ( מהם והתעלמת ). You must 
take it back to your fellow”” (Paul, Isaiah 40–66, 488). Hanks also reads ָּבָׂשר in terms of blood-relations 
(Hanks, God So Loved the Third World, 101). May it be that Isa 58:7 used ָּבָׂשר in the sense of “your own 
kin”/“according to your kind” as a word referring both to the native, stranger and sojourner, as both your 
kindred and those of the same flesh as yourself (cf. ְּבָׂשִרימִ  ּוָבָׂשר  in Gen 2:23), i.e. other humans? Oswalt 
acknowledges the kindred meaning of ָּבָׂשר, but sees the possibility of a more universal scope as well, 




    
Table 20 — Continued. 
 
 
 Lev 25 
 
 Isa 58 
 dependent Hebrews   
25:18–19; 
26:3–13 
Promised blessings, including 
divine military defense (26:7–
8), YHWH’s dwelling among 
the people (26:11–12), rain in 
its season (26:4), peaceful 
habitation in the land (26:6), 
the land giving fruit to eat (אכל) 





Promised blessings, including 
divine military defense (58:8), 
YHWH being available to the 
people (58:9), with abundant 
water (58:11), restored 
habitation in the land (58:12), 
God satisfying ( בעׂש ) one’s soul 
(58:11) and giving one to eat 
 of the inheritance of the (אכל)
Jacob (58:14). 
26:2 Keeping the Sabbath ( תַׁשּבָ  ) 58:13–
14 
Keeping the Sabbath (74(ַׁשּבָ ת 
 
Park, and Hrobon have argued, each individual parallel does not make a strong case. It is 
the combination of several parallels that combine into a convincing case for reuse in Isa 
58 of the Torah-passages related to the Day of Atonement.75 So far we have found the 
following parallels to warrant such a conclusion: (1) the use of the phrase ֶנֶפׁש + ענה 
which is distinct, even if it is not unique, to the Day of Atonement (Lev 16:29, 31; 23:27, 
32; Num 29:7; Isa 58:3, 5, 10), (2) the use of the verb קרא (Lev 23:2, 4, 21, 37; Isa 58:1) 
and the noun ׁשֹוָפר (Lev 25:9; Isa 58:1) to call a solemn assembly, (3) the issue of the 
people having confessed their sins on the Day of Atonement (Lev 16:21) but live in 
                                               
74 Hanks also claims there is a similarity between “the conclusion of the Jubilee teaching even 
includes an exhortation to Sabbath keeping (Lev. 26:2) that is remarkably similar to Isaiah 58:13–14” 
(Hanks, God So Loved the Third World, 99). 
75 Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 305–6; Park, Die Gerechtigkeit Israels, 237–
39; Hrobon, Ethical Dimension, 202–5. Fishbane and Hrobon mention the use of ַחָּטאת and ֶּפַׁשע, in Isa 58 
as supportive evidence of reuse. Above I have shown that this lexical combination does not add much to the 




unrepentant ignorance of it in Isa 58:1, 6, and (4) the thematic correspondence between 
Isa 58:6 and the Year of Jubilee in Lev 25:10. 
Direction of Dependence 
Reference to a source: Isaiah 58:2 refers twice to 76,ִמְׁשָּפט the most frequent word 
used in the instructive material of Torah to describe its own genre, as mentioned in 
chapter one.77 The verse speaks of the people’s hypocrisy in appearing as if they have 
notforsaken YHWH’s ּוִמְׁשַּפט ֱאֹלָהיו לֹא ָעָזב) ִמְׁשָּפט) and inquiring after YHWH’s ִמְׁשָּפט 
( ֵטי־ֶצֶדקִיְׁשָאלּוִני ִמְׁשּפְ  ). Some form of ִמְׁשָּפט is clearly presupposed in Isa 58. The lexeme 
 in Lev 25, both used in the land-promise ֻחָּקה is the only genre-lexeme used besides ִמְׁשָּפט
of Lev 25:18 (ַוֲעִׂשיֶתם ֶאת־ֻחֹּקַתי ְוֶאת־ִמְׁשָּפַטי ִּתְׁשְמרּו ַוֲעִׂשיֶתם ֹאָתם). Given the parallels 
between Isa 58 and Lev 25 the reference to ִמְׁשָּפט in 58:2 supports seeing Isa 58 as a 
secondary text, even if it does not entitle us to claim that it is secondary to Lev 25. Isaiah 
58:2 does not speak of ִמְׁשָּפט as a written composition nor as a source borrowed from. 
 the knowledge of my“) ַדַעת ְּדָרַכי is rather placed in parallel to general concepts like ִמְׁשָּפט
way”) and ְצָדָקה (“righteousness”).78 Still, all of these concepts refer to some kind of a 
                                               
76 Cf. Hanks, God So Loved the Third World, 100. 
 ,is used in total 85 times in Torah, 65 of these in its instructive material: Gen 14:7; 18:19 ִמְׁשָּפט 77
25; 40:13; Exod 15:25; 21:1, 9, 31; 23:6; 24:3; 26:30; 28:15, 29-30; Lev 5:10; 9:16; 18:4-5, 26; 19:15, 35, 
37; 20:22; 24:22; 25:18; 26:15, 43, 46; Num 9:3, 14; 15:16, 24; 27:5, 11, 21; 29:6, 18, 21, 24, 27, 30, 33, 
37; 35:12, 24, 29; 36:13; Deut 1:17; 4:1, 5, 8, 14, 45; 5:1, 31; 6:1, 20; 7:11-12; 8:11; 10:18; 11:1, 32-12:1; 
16:18-19; 17:8-9, 11; 18:3; 19:6; 21:17, 22; 24:17; 25:1; 26:16-17; 27:19; 30:16; 32:4, 41; 33:10, 21. 
As mentioned, Sommer comments on ִּכי ִּפי ְיהָוה ִּדֵּבר (“for the mouth of YHWH has spoken”) in 
58:14 “sometimes is a formula indicating reliance on an older oracle or text” (Sommer, A Prophet Reads 
Scripture, 134–35). I do, however, not see that it is possible to corroborate a claim 58:14 is actually a 
reference to a source. 
78 The phrase ִמְׁשְּפֵטי־ֶצֶדק in Isa 58:2f seems to combine ְצָדָקה in v. 2c and ִמְׁשַּפט ֱאֹלָהיו in v. 2d. 




divine instruction. The portrait of Torah as we have it would fit this characterization, as 
we have seen earlier, with ְצָדָקה as the standard for judges, ִמְׁשָּפט as the preferred self-
designation in Torah, and with YHWH as the ultimate reference for conduct. At least we 
can claim that Torah and Isa 58 participate in a similar conceptual world, with Isa 58 
signalling dependence on such a conceptual world. 
Modification and wordplay: First, in Isa 58:10a we read ְוָתֵפק ָלָרֵעב ַנְפֶׁשָך (“and 
you offer your person to the hungry”). One reason why this formulation is puzzling is that 
it is the only time ֶנֶפׁש + פוק is attested in the HB. 1QIsaa supports the MT by reading 
 This clause has posed a problem to ancient as well as modern 79.ותפק לרעב נפשכה
readers.80 Hurowitz shows how three interpretations have been suggested: (1) ְוָתֵפק ַנְפֶׁשָך 
as “the desired attitude towards the hungry,” (2) ַנְפֶׁשָך as “your bread,” and (3)ְוָתֵפק ַנְפֶׁשָך 
as “providing food generously or with a good attitude.”81 The primary difference between 
                                               
formula indicating reliance on an older oracle or text,” thinking of the parallels between Isa 58:11–14 and 
Deut 32:9–13 (Sommer, A Prophet Reads Scripture, 134–35). 
79 The ה final of נפשכה is simply a final vowel letter to represent ָ (Elisha Qimron, The Hebrew of 
the Dead Sea Scrolls, Harvard Semitic Studies (Atlanta: Scholar Press, 1986), 23; Eduard Yechezkel 
Kutscher and Elisha Qimron, The Language and Linguistic Background of the Isaiah Scroll (1QIsaA): 
Indices and Corrections (Leiden: Brill, 1979), 163–64). 
80 The various ways translations render this clause is illustrated by the following examples: “And 
you offer your compassion to the hungry” (NJPS); “if you offer your food to the hungry” (NRSV); “And if 
you give yourself to the hungry” (NASB); “if you pour yourself out for the hungry” (RSV); “and if thou 
draw out thy soul to the hungry” (OJPS/ASV); “if you pour yourself out for the hungry” (ESV); “and if you 
spend yourselves in behalf of the hungry” (NIV); “And if thou draw out thy soul to the hungry” (KJV); 
“And dost bring out to the hungry thy soul” (YLT). 
81 Victor Avigdor Hurowitz, “A Forgotten Meaning of Nepeš in Isaiah 58,10,” Vetus Testamentum 
47 (1997): 43–46. While sympathetic to Hurowitz’ proposal, Hrobon finds his rejection of proposals to 
emend 58:10a the strongest. He writes: “Until a new evidence is brought up, sheer prudence requires 
Hurowitz’s proposal to remain an isolated voice. Nevertheless, his argument against the emendation of 
 in v. 10aA is solid, and, for now, it seems best to retain the ambiguity of this verse by rendering it as ַנְפֶׁשָך




the first and third is between seeing the clause as primarily referring to attitude or action. 
The second alternative differs most from the others. LXX has been taken as support for it 
with its καὶ δῷς πεινῶντι τὸν ἄρτον ἐκ ψυχῆς σου (“and if you give to the hungry the 
bread from your person”).82 The Targum Jonathan can be taken as support of the first 
with its ְוִתַתַפח ֳקָדם ָכְפָנא ַנפָשך (“your soul will ignite before the hungry”). Hurowitz, 
however, rightly points out that the LXX “is actually the first witness to the tradition of 
compound interpretation” of ַנְפֶׁשָך in Isa 58:10, rendering it as both ‘bread’ and ‘your 
person’. He continues: “Had the LXX read only ‘if you give bread,’ it could indeed 
support a reading lahmekā. However, such a reading is excluded by the addition ‘from 
your soul.’ This can be based on napšekā, but certainly not on lahmekā. . . . Contrary to 
the scholarly consensus, the LXX is in fact supportive of the MT rather than indicative of 
a variant Vorlage.”83 Likewise, it could also be argued that the Targum Jonathan supports 
the MT ַנְפֶׁשָך. The difference here is not in the noun, but the verb. It replaces the MT hifil 
 giving the more reflexive meaning. It thus resembles the ,ְוִתַתַפח with a hitpaal ְוָתֵפק
replacement of ענה in piel + ֶנֶפׁש with the ענה in hitpael mentioned above. Both the LXX 
and Targum Jonathan are therefore supportive evidence of MT.84 
Hurowitz continues by arguing that ֶנֶפׁש should be read as a poetic ellipsis of 
“(sustenance) of life”, analogical to certain usages of napištum in Akkadian. He believes 
this meaning might also be found in a few other biblical passages. He sees “He granted 
                                               
82 Oswalt writes: “‘Bread’ is a much easier reading in the context, and it is hard to explain how 
‘soul’ could have replaced it even by accident. Thus MT is preferable” (Oswalt, Isaiah 40–66, 500). 
83 Hurowitz, “A Forgotten Meaning of Nepeš in Isaiah 58,10,” 46. 





their request, but diminished their sustenance (ַוְיַׁשַּלח ָרֹזון ְּבַנְפָׁשם)”) as a “highly likely” 
reading of Ps 106:15, and “They tested God in their heart by asking bread for their 
sustenance (ִלְׁשָאל־ֹאֶכל ְלַנְפָׁשם)” in Ps 78:18 and “because bread for their sustenance (ִּכי־
 will not enter the temple of YHWH” in Hos 9:4 as “not definite but (ַלְחָמם ְלַנְפָׁשם
certainly possible” cases.85 Finally, Hurowitz explains the choice of this meaning for ֶנֶפׁש 
in Isa 58:10 as a pun: “The reason a word with a rare meaning is used is to provide a pun 
on napšô, ‘his throat’, used immediately afterwards in the same verse. Quite frequently, 
the same word will be used twice in close proximity, each time bearing a different 
meaning.”86 
Still, it seems appropriate to ask: if the author meant ‘bread’ why did he not 
simply use the word ֶלֶחם as in 58:7a,  ָלָרֵעב ַלְחֶמָךֲהֹלוא ָפֹרס  (“Is not this to break your 
bread for the hungry?”)?87 Can poetic variation alone explain this? Even if I believe 
Hurowitz is correct in seeing the LXX as supportive evidence for the MT, and his 
suggestion that ֶנֶפׁש in Isa 58:10 might be an ellipsis of ‘(sustenance) of life’ is 
intriguing,88 this reading of ֶנֶפׁש does not seem to exhaust the possible reasons why the 
                                               
85 Hurowitz, “A Forgotten Meaning of Nepeš in Isaiah 58,10,” 49–50. Hurowitz is followed by 
Paul in Paul, Isaiah 40–66, 490. 
86 Hurowitz, “A Forgotten Meaning of Nepeš in Isaiah 58,10,” 52. Hurowitz renders the entire 
verse as follows: “(If) you extend your sustenance to the hungry, and satisfy the starved throat, then your 
light will shine forth in the darkness, and your gloom shall be like the afternoon.” 
87 The argument that it is simply a variation of the same idea, namely sharing one’s bread, could 
be supported by that the verbs used simply seem to be synonymous for “share” (ָפֹרס ָלָרֵעב ַלְחֶמָך in 
 .(in 58:10 ְוָתֵפק ָלָרֵעב ַנְפֶׁשָך/58:7
88 Tov shows how there is an interchange of ה and ח in Jer 16:7 LXX where it has ἄρτος while MT 
 lit. “they shall not break for them”) in Jer 16:7 is probably an interchange based) יפרסו להם The phrase .להם





author of Isa 58 would have chosen this awkward formulation. Even if Hurowitz is 
correct, the author would likely have been aware that he chose to formulate himself in an 
enigmatic manner. Hurowitz’ own examples of other passages possibly also using ֶנֶפׁש in 
the meaning of ‘sustenance,’ demonstrate its rarity in BH. I am not even convinced his 
suggested reading ‘sustenance’ is the best here, as ‘for their person’ seems just as 
appropriate. Saying that this is a pun in Isa 58 appears too weak an explanation. The same 
could be said of G. R. Driver’s earlier suggestion that ֶנֶפׁש here should be understood as 
‘abundance’ based on the Akkadian napāšu. For him also rendering ְוָתֵפק ָלָרֵעב ַנְפֶׁשָך as 
“‘thou pourest (i.e. expendest thyself) on the hungry’ is admittedly unsatisfactory.”89 As I 
will suggest below, rather than seeing an etymological solution to the conundrum and 
even if both Hurowitz and Driver help us become aware of the problem in 58:10a, I will 
rather suggest that it is part of Isaiah’s strategic reworking of the reused phrase ענה ֶנֶפׁש. 
To me it seems that the author intended to say something more than in 58:7a 
 in Isa 58:10 is merely a ֶנֶפׁש If Hurowitz is correct in saying that .(ֲהֹלוא ָפֹרס ָלָרֵעב ַלְחֶמָך)
pun, then 58:10a (ְוָתֵפק ָלָרֵעב ַנפְ ֶׁשָך) would be tautological in light of 58:7a.90 This is, of 
course, possible as an author might choose to repeat himself with variation in formula. 
But to me 58:10a is better understood as a strategic replacement of words to say 
something more than 58:7a. It may be that if Hurowitz is right in proposing that ֶלֶחם and 
 may have been understood as synonymous, this could have invited the interchange in ֶנֶפׁש
                                               
89 G. R. Driver, “Hebrew Notes,” ZAW 52 (1934): 53. 
90 This reading seems supported by Oswalt, even if he does not develop the point in terms of a 
reuse of Lev 16: “Some evidence argues for ‘bread’ instead of ‘soul’ as the correct reading. When one 
understands the point of the allusion to fasting, however, the MT is clearly correct. Fasting was called 
‘affliction of soul’ (e.g., Lev 16:31, AV). Thus the worshiper was pouring out his or her soul to God in an 




58:10a as part of the author’s general reworking of the phrase ֶנֶפׁש + ענה in the chapter. 
The key phrase ֶנֶפׁש + ענה in the reuse of Lev 16; 23 seems to influence this puzzling 
formulation. By replacing ֶלֶחם in 58:7a with ֶנֶפׁש in 58:10a, the author is able to integrate 
the message of the Day of Atonement with the people’s relation “to the hungry” (ָלָרֵעב). 
The affliction (ענה) of one’s self (ֶנֶפׁש) requires him to place his self at the disposal of the 
hungry.91 Isa 58:10a says nothing about giving yourself (ַנְפֶׁשָך) to the hungry (ָלָרֵעב) for 
him or her to eat, as if it would imply cannibalism. It simply says that one should give, in 
the meaning of placing at disposal, oneself for the needs of the hungry. This reading is 
supported by NASB rendering the clause “And if you give yourself to the hungry.” The 
puzzling formulation of 58:10a (ְוָתֵפק ָלָרֵעב ַנְפֶׁשָך) therefore seems to indicate Isa 58’s 
dependence upon the language of Lev 16; 23. 
Second, and closely related to the previous point, ְוָתֵפק ָלָרֵעב ַנְפֶׁשָך (“and you offer 
your person to the hungry”) in Isa 58:10a appears to be part of a pervasive strategic 
reworking of and word play on the phrase ֶנֶפׁש + ענה, as already mentioned.92 The root 
 appear in Isa ֶנֶפׁש + ענה in Isa 58: 3, 5, 10, 11, and ֶנֶפׁש ,is used in Isa 58:3, 5, 9, 10 ענה
58:3, 5, 10. In 58:3c ֶנֶפׁש + ענה is largely used as we find it in Lev 16; 23, namely for 
affliction in the form of fasting. The phrase ֶנֶפׁש + ענה in 58:5d is somewhat ambiguous, 
                                               
91 The idea of loving your neighbor and alien as yourself (ְוָאַהְבָּת ֹלו ָּכֹמוָך) from Lev 19:18, 34 
might not be far away in the author’s mind. 
92 Fishbane writes: “The thick rhetorical structure of this homiletical piece [Isa 58] cannot be 
missed: the key terms (particularly ִעָּנה ;ֶנֶפׁש ;ֵחֶפץ, and their variants) echo throughout the piece in punning 
allusion. . . . One may even wonder whether the attentive ear of the people would have also heard this 
rebuke as a deliberate allusion to the afflictions of Yom Kippur. Ancient rabbinic tradition surely did hear it 
this way and assigned chapter 58 as the prophetic lection for the Day of Atonement, when Leviticus 16 is 
recited as the Pentateuchal portion” (Michael Fishbane, “The Hebrew Bible and Exegetical Tradition,” in 




something I will return to later.93 This is supported by the use of the noun צֹום or verb צום 
in Isa 58:3-6 and only here in the chapter. When speaking of the people’s צֹום/ צום  in 
58:3–4 it refers to fasting. But as the lexeme is used to describe YHWH’s צֹום in 58:5–6 
an ambiguity is also introduced. Here YHWH’s צֹום is described in terms of self-denying 
for the sake of the needy. As we come to vv. 9–11 the meanings of ֶנֶפׁש + ענה are altered. 
In 58:9b ענה is no longer II ענה in piel (‘to afflict’), but Isaiah has changed it to I ענה (‘to 
answer’).94 It is a promise about God’s response as part of the first apodosis (58:8a–9e, 
see above). In 58:3a–d the people complained over the silence of God, that he did not 
respond to their religious practice. In 58:9b God promises that he will again answer (I 
 his people if they correct their social practice.95 (ענה
Above I looked closer at ֶנֶפׁש in 58:10a. Here I will only add that as this clause 
comes among those verses altering the meaning of ענה and ֶנֶפׁש again supports the reading 
that it is not simply a literary pun, but part of the author’s strategic reversal of the 
meaning of ֶנֶפׁש + ענה in 58:10b. The phrase ֶנֶפׁש + ענה no longer means self-affliction. It 
is now used for the person being afflicted by others, indicated by the use of the niphal. A 
noun (ֶנֶפׁש) + participle (ַנֲעָנה) construction “is the representation of an action as ongoing 
at a reference time.”96 This is not simply a temporary situation, on one day as in the case 
of the Day of Atonement—and it could be argued that the Day of Atonement itself was 
                                               
93 Cf. Westermann, Isaiah 40–66, 336 who also points out a surprising shift from v. 5 and 
onwards. 
94 Paul, Isaiah 40–66, 481. 
95 Jonathan Kline has also seen this as a wordplay (Kline, Allusive Soundplay, 85). 




only the climax of ongoing repentance and loyalty to YHWH throughout the year of.97 
Isa 58:10 is a call to satisfy the needs of a person caught in a more permanent and 
desperate state of degradation. 
The phrase ַנְפֶׁשָך is used again in 58:11b,  ֶָךְוִהְׂשִּביַע ְּבַצְחָצֹחות ַנְפׁש  (“and He will 
satisfy your person in desert land”), now again as part of a promise in an apodosis, this 
time apodosis 2 (58:10c–12f, see above). The ֶנֶפׁש is no longer the one that is afflicted, 
but the one having helped the afflicted one. It is as if the single ענה in apodosis 1 in 58:9b 
and the single ֶנֶפׁש in apodosis 2 in 58:11b separately elaborate ֶנֶפׁש + ענה into a promise. 
In 58:11b ַנְפֶׁשָך is used in the promise that God will now satisfy the person who has taken 
care of the afflicted and hungry. The alteration of ׁשֶנפֶ  + ענה  in Isa 58 therefore seems to 
be a strategic reversal of the meaning of ֶנֶפׁש + ענה in Lev 16; 23; and Num 29:7, and 
supports the claim that Isa 58 is dependent upon Lev 16; 23; 25; Num 29:7. 
Third, while Lev 16 speaks of afflicting one’s own person, Isa 58 appears to be 
somewhat ambiguous in 58:5a–d: 
Will this be the fast I choose: 
A day to afflict a man (ָאָדם) his person (ַנְפֹׁשו)? 
Is it to bow down his head (רֹאֹׁשו) as a rush, 
spreading ( ַַיִּציע) out sackcloth and dust? 
The question is who the ָאָדם ַנְפׁשֹו and רֹאֹׁשו with their 3ms suffixes refer to.98 I have 
already mentioned above how the meaning of ענה and ֶנֶפׁש are altered after v. 5. The 
question is if this change also occurs already in 58:5b? 1QIsab might have seen the 
                                               
97 Roy E. Gane, Altar Call (Berrien Springs, MI: Diadem, 1999), 319–20; Gane, Cult and 
Character, 301, 305–33. 
98 1QIsaa confirms MT here together with LXX reading ταπεινοῦν ἄνθρωπον τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ. 





ambiguity in  ֹורֹאׁש , and tried to clarify it by rendering it ראשך instead. It did, however, 
change the second instance 3ms suffix, but retained נפשו. It is the only time we find ָאָדם 
as the object of the verb ענה. Might it be that Isaiah consciously formulated himself 
ambiguously here, as a double entendre? On the one hand, 58:5 could be read as the 
regular practice on the Day of Atonement, with fasting and putting on sackcloth and 
ashes. On the other hand, it could also be understood as an affliction of another person. 
Isaiah 58:5c would then refer to forcefully bending another person down like a rush.99 As 
 does not have the reflexive sense of the hithpael, but is rather a hifil, it is not clear ַיִּציעַ 
that this is something one did to oneself. Isaiah’s inclusion of ָאָדם in 58:5b could then 
signal that the prophet refers to the social oppression of another. This again could 
indicate word play that inclines us to believe that Isa 58 is the borrowing text. 
Fourth, is the cessation of labor. In Lev 16:29 we read לֹא ַתֲעׂשּו ְוָכל־ְמָלאָכה  (“and 
you shall not do any work”). The same is restated in 23:28, 30, 31. Milgrom writes:  
The prohibition of labor on the Sabbath and the Day of Purgation is described by the 
phrase kol-mĕlāʾkâ (23:3, 28; Num 29:7), whereas on the festivals it is described as 
mĕleʾket ʿăbōdâ ‘laborious work’ (23:7, 8, 21, 25, 35, 36; Num 28:18, 25, 26; 29:1, 
12, 35). The implication is that on the festivals, light work, unrelated to one’s 
livelihood, would be permitted, whereas on the Sabbath and Day of Purgation even 
the slightest exertion would be forbidden.100  
Isaiah never uses the word ְמָלאָכה. Instead of עׂשה + ְמָלאָכה in Lev 16 and 23, we do 
                                               
99 Can we read the hiphil  ַיַ ּצִ יע in  ַוְ ׂשַ ק ָוֵאֶפר יַ ּצִ יע (“to spread out sackcloth and dust”) in 58:5d as 
YHWH indicating that sackcloth and dust was forced upon others? Paul: “Cf. Esth 4:3: ‘Sackcloth and 
ashes were spread out (יַֻּצע) for the masses.’ For the root יצע denoting ‘laying, spreading out,’ see also Isa 
14:11; Ps 139:8. For sackcloth as the garb of fast days, see 1 Kgs 21:27; Joel 1:8; Jonah 3:5–7” (Paul, 
Isaiah 40–66, 486). Cf. Park, Die Gerechtigkeit Israels, 258–65. 




however find עׂשה + ֵחֶפץ in Isa 58:13.101 Isaiah 58:3 seems to give a basis for saying that 
 in Isa 58 is not simply used as ‘desire, delight,’ but also for ‘business, occupation.’102 ֵחֶפץ
Here ֵהן ְּבֹיום ֹצְמֶכם ִּתְמְצאּו־ֵחֶפץ (“Behold, on the day of your fast you seek business”) is 
followed by ְוָכל־ַעְּצֵביֶכם ִּתְנֹּגׂשּו (“and oppress all your laborers!”). The lexeme ֵחֶפץ in v. 3 
thus seem to slightly favor the meaning of ‘business, occupation’ over ‘desire, delight,’ 
even if both might be intended.103 While the meaning of ‘business, occupation’ appears to 
                                               
101 The noun ֵחֶפץ is found in the book of Isaiah in Isa 44:28; 46:10; 48:14; 53:10; 54:12; 58:3, 13. 
Besides 53:10 (where it has the meaning ‘precious’) and 58:13 the word is used in the meaning of 
‘purpose,’ ‘will’, and ‘intention’. The construction is found in עׂשה + ֵחֶפץ in 1 Kgs 5:22–23; Isa 46:10; 
48:14; 58:13; Prov 31:13, indicating that it is part of Isaianic parlance. Given this attestation we can 
therefore not claim that Isa 58:13 is somehow dependent on עׂשה + ְמָלאָכה in Lev 16 and 23, even if it is 
possible that Isa 58:13 used an Isaianic expression to play on the locution in Lev 16 and 23. In Jub 10:19, 
where it and the surrounding verses seem to blend Deut 5:12–15 and Isa 58:13 together, the lexemes used 
to describe prohibited work are עבודה and מלאכה based on Deut 5:13, not ץחפ  as in Isa 58. In Jub 10:20–21 
ץחפ  is used as an adjective to qualify עבודה, in the infinitival clause השבת( ביום)לעשות את עבידאת חפצו   
(“his desired work”), likely to clarify the ambiguous ֵחֶפץ of Isa 58:13 MT as referring to work-related 
pursuits. Jassen writes: “The introduction of עבודה in CD 10:20 is motivated by both exegetical and 
semantic factors. Exegetically, the introduction of this word is based on textual analogy with the Sabbath 
law in the Decalogue . . . . Semantically, it is likely that the use of עבודה is intended to refer to physical  
labor” (cf. Jassen, Scripture and Law, 140. Cf. also pp. 82–84, 139–44, 155–56, 158). This is also 
corroborated by Isa 58:13 LXX which gives τὰ θελήματά σου (“the things you wish” (NETS)) for the MT 
 than finding your“) ִמְּמצֹוא ֶחְפְצָך your business”) but ἐπʼ ἔργῳ (“for work” (NETS)) for MT“) ֲחָפֶציָך
business”). The double occurrence of ֶיְחָּפצּון (“they desire”) in Isa 58:2 MT is rendered as ἐπιθυμοῦσιν 
(“they desire”) in Isa 58:2 LXX, and in 58:3 MT ֵחֶפץ (“business”) with LXX τὰ θελήματα ὑμῶν (“your 
own wishes” (NETS)). As mentioned in my discussion on Jer 17, ַמָּׂשא in Jer 17 and ֵחֶפץ in Isa 58 find a 
similar reception in Second Temple Judaism. They were both seen as too ambiguous for precise 
application, and were extensively debated so as to clarify their precise meaning. For a discussion of ֵחֶפץ in 
Isa 58:13 see Hudyard Y. Muskita, “Justice, Cultus, and Salvation in Isaiah 56–59: A Literary-Theological 
Study” (Ph.D. diss., Andrews University, 2016), 215–19. 
102 For the scholarly debate on the meaning of ֵחֶפץ see Jassen, Scripture and Law, 70, 139. Moshe 
Weinfeld wrote commenting on Isa 58:13: “In fact all the three stipulations in this verse—מצא חפץ [['do 
business']], עשות דרך [['carry out an enterprise']], דבר דבר [['make an agreement']]—are associated with 
business transactions. Like מצא חפץ , . . . דבר דבר and עשות דרך have their semantic equivalents in 
Akkadian expressions that are clearly connected with business transactions and business journey, and it 
even seems that we meet here with Babylonian influence on the rhetoric of the prophet. . . . Furthermore, in 
the Neo-Babylonian sources we find side-by-side the expressions for undertaking a journey and doing 
business in the same vein as Isa 58:13” (Moshe Weinfeld, “The Counsel of the "Elders" to Rehoboam and 
Its Implications,” in Reconsidering Israel and Judah: Recent Studies on the Deuteronomic History, eds. 
Gary N. Knoppers and J. Gordon McConville (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2000), 531–32). 




be in the foreground in 58:3e, the double use of the verb חפץ in v. 2 seems to have the 
meaning ‘desire, delight’ in the foreground.104 Isa 58:13b and 58:13g might use ֵחֶפץ in 
both meanings. To me it is not clear that it is possible to exclusively reduce ֵחֶפץ in v. 13 
to either one of the meanings.105 It is therefore possible that Isa 58 plays on both the 
meaning of ֵחֶפץ as ‘desire, delight’ and as ‘business, occupation’ as a double entendre. If 
this was intended it is reasonable to think that the author chose this one word, and it 
would explain the choice of ֵחֶפץ rather than 106.ְמָלאָכה 
It strengthens the sense that word play is present when we observe that God in 
58:3e uses the noun ֵחֶפץ (“desire, delight”) when he again speaks after the interruption of 
                                               
13) denotes commercial activity, as does its Akkadian semantic cognate, ṣibûtam kašādu (CAD Ṣ:169–70)” 
(Paul, Isaiah 40–66, 484). See also Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 304. In his 2013-
presentation Jan Joosten pointed out that the lexeme underwent a semantic development between CBH and 
LHB: “חפץ ‘desire’ in Samuel-Kings turns up with the meaning ‘thing, affair’ in Ecclesiastes. The latter 
meaning derives from the first by a process of generalization that is well understood” (Jan Joosten, “The 
Use of Linguistic Arguments in Dating the Pentateuch” (paper presented at Convergence and Divergence in 
Pentateuchal Theory: Bridging the Academic Cultures of Israel, North America, and Europe. Jerusalem, 
2013), 16). This comment is not included in the published version of the paper, Joosten, “Diachronic 
Linguistics,” 327–44. The term is neither discussed in Hurvitz, A Concise Lexicon of Late Biblical Hebrew. 
W. E. Staples confirms in his study that חפץ in Ecclesiastes has the meaning “business or facts” (W. E. 
Staples, “The Meaning of Ḥēpeṣ in Ecclesiastes,” JNES 24, no. 1–2 (1965): 110–12). Isa 58 could therefore 
be said to incoorporate both meanings of חפץ in CBH and LBH. 
104 The meaning ‘to work, to do one’s business or occupation’ for the verb I חפץ seems to be 
unattested (Koehler et al., HALOT, 340; Brown et al., BDB, 342–43). II חפץ (‘to bend down, make lower’) 
could be said to have been fitting for the context of Isa 58, but then this root does not seem to have been in 
common use. It is only attested in Job 40:17. 
105 Contra Paul, Isaiah 40–66, 494. See also Isa 65:12; 66:4. Oswalt writes: “the frequent 
suggestion (e.g., Whybray) that ḥāpēṣ should be translated as ‘business’ here misses the point. But 
‘pleasure,’ as though people were not to smile on the Sabbath day, misses it as well. The point is that one 
should never engage in religious ceremony to further one’s own purposes (ways; cf. 55:8) as opposed to 
God’s” (Oswalt, Isaiah 40–66, 508). Of course, the two points about the meaning of ֵחֶפץ as 
‘business’/‘desire’ does not exclude the more overall point of the contrast between one’s own ֵחֶפץ in 
contrast to God’s. The two thoughts can be kept in mind together. 





the people’s accusation of God’s neglect in 58:3a–d.107 It reminds the reader of the last 
word in God’s previous speech, the verb חפץ (‘desire, delight’) in 58:2f.108 It is as if God 
says: “So you pretend to desire my nearness (58:2f), while your real desire is your own 
business (58:3e)!”109 
                                               
107 This presupposes that it is God speaking in 58:3e–4. Another possibility might be that it is 
Isaiah speaking. In this case we could understand 58:3e–4 as Isaiah’s fulfilment of the imperatives directed 
toward him in 58:1, to make known to the people their sins. Supportive arguments could be that the shift of 
speaker is not announced between 58:2f and 58:3a, and is therefore not required between 58:3d and 58:3e. 
Further, the reference to God in the 3ms pronoun in 58:9d, 58:11b, and possibly 58:13c, together with the 
use of His personal name יהוה as though referring to Him, could again be taken as evidence for God 
speaking. Nevertheless, since a speaker, including God, can refer to him or herself in the third person, but 
the 1cs is a prerogative of the speaker in a clause, the use of 1cs in 58:5b, 58:6b, 58:13b and 58:14b seem to 
provide the stronger argument for saying that God is the speaker in 58:3e–14. There are no discourse-shifts 
implying a new speaker after 58:3e. 58:14d, ִּכי ִּפי ְיהָוה ִּדֵּבר, could be taken as an indication that it might 
even be a synthesis of the two, that God and the prophet have spoken in symphony by uttering the same 
words, even if also this clause could be read as spoken by God. 
108 Is this a Wiederaufnahme indicating the discursive/oral character of the chapter? But then this 
Wiederaufnahme would also indicate a semantic shift, where God takes up his discourse only to redirect its 
meaning. Both LXX (λέγοντες) and Targum Jonathan (ָאְמִרין) introduces v. 3 with the masculine plural 
participle ‘saying.’ The effect of this is incorporating the people’s statement into God’s own speech. While 
the MT quotation creates a fictive dialogue in the text, even if this might represent the actual attitude of the 
people, LXX and Targum Jonathan loses this type of dialogue by incorporating the people’s words into 
God’s own speech. 
109 See Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 304. Another possible wordplay may be 
found in נגׁש. The verb נגׁש (“to approach”) is typically used of approaching God, even in Isaiah (Exod 
19:22; 20:21; 21:6; 24:2; 28:43; 30:20; 32:6; Lev 2:8; 8:14; 21:21, 23; Num 4:19; 8:19; Josh 3:9; Judg 
6:19; 1 Sam 14:34; Isa 29:13; 41:1; 45:20–21; 65:5; Jer 30:21; Ezek 44:13; Amos 5:25; Mal 1:7–8, 11; 
2:12; 3:3; 2 Chr 29:31). We could for example have expected Isa 58:2–3 to have formulated itself in terms 
of Isa 29:13:  ְַּבִפיו ֶּזהָהָעם הַ  ַּגׁשנִ  ִּכיֲאֹדָני ַיַען  ּיֹאֶמרו  (“The Lord said: Because this people draw near (נגׁש) with 
its mouth”). But when speaking of ִקְרַבת ֱאֹלִהים (“nearness of God”) in 58:2f נגׁש is not used. Instead we 
find the verb נגׂש (‘to oppress’) used in 58:3f. May this be a play on the verb נגׁש (‘to approach’)? If so, the 
text is saying that in the people’s pretense to נגׁש (“approach”) God, they actually נגׂש (“oppress”) their 
laborers. Further, as pointed out by Hrobon, it may be a reason why Isa 58 prefers to formulate itself in 
terms of ִקְרַבת ֱאֹלִהים instead of נגׁש. Lev 16:1–2 opens the chapter on the Day of Atonement as follows: 
“The LORD spoke to Moses after the death of the two sons of Aaron who died when they drew too close to 
the presence of the LORD ( ִלְפֵני־ְיהָוה ְּבָקְרָבָתם ). The LORD said to Moses: Tell your brother Aaron that he is 
not to come at will into the Shrine behind the curtain, in front of the cover that is upon the ark, lest he die; 
for I appear in the cloud over the cover” (NJPS). Hrobon explains the possible dependence in Isa 58:2 on 
Lev 16:1: “The parallel with Isa 58 is tangible: here the people ‘delight to draw near to God  ַת ֱאֹלִהיםִקְרב )’ 
(v. 2), and the role of the prophet is to change this approaching from being ineffective (v. 3a and 4b), even 
offensive to God (v. 5), into being efficacious (vv. 8–9a, 10b–12, 14) and pleasing to him (v. 6a). The 
prophet carries out this task in the two interwoven stages: announcing to people their ַחָּטאת and ֶּפַׁשע, and 




Conceptual dependence: The double mention of the ַׁשָּבת (“Sabbath”) in Isa 58:13 
also underlines the idea of cessation from labor. In Leviticus it was only the weekly 
Sabbath, the Day of Atonement and the sabbatical year that were called ַׁשַּבת ַׁשָּבֹתון 
(“Sabbath of Sabbaths” or “Cessation of cessations”; Lev 16:31; 23:32; see Ex 31:15; 
35:2; Lev 23:3; 25:4).110 It is not clear whether Isa 58 has the absolute cessation of labor 
in mind. It is also a question whether the author of Isa 58 refers to the weekly Sabbath, or 
only the Day of Atonement named ‘sabbath,’ or even more narrowly the Day of 
Atonement upon which the Year of Jubilee was announced. As there is nothing singling 
out the reference to the ַׁשָּבת as primarily the weekly Sabbath in vv. 13–14,111 and the 
                                               
of Jubilee, and the Day of Atonement, in order to bring out the ethical dimension of what is essentially a 
cultic issue” (Hrobon, Ethical Dimension, 204). 
110 Gane, Cult and Character, 315; Martin Pröbstle, “Truth and Terror: A Text-Oriented Analysis 
of Daniel 8:9-14” (Ph.D. diss., Andrews University, 2006), 490–91. 
111 Most Bible commentaries simply assume that ַּׁשָּבת here refers to the weekly Sabbath, but 
without providing any evidence for this (Blenkinsopp, Isaiah 56-66, 181–82; Keil and Delitzsch, Isaiah, 
558–59; McKenzie, Second Isaiah, 165; Francis D. Nichol, ed., Isaiah to Malachi (The Seventh-Day 
Adventist Bible Commentary [SDABC]; ed. Francis D. Nichol; Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald 
Publishing Association, 1976), 307). Watts claims that the phrase תשיב רגלך in v. 13 “refers to restrictions 
on travel on the Sabbath” in Exod 16:29 (John D. W. Watts, Isaiah 34-66, WBC 25 (Waco, TX: Word 
Books, 1987), 844). I am not, however, convinced by this interpretation, as this would only be a loose 
thematic link between these two passages. Paul’s suggestion is more convincing, seeing it rather as a more 
general expression: “The unique expression השיב רגל מ-  (“turn back your foot from”) is similar to  מנע רגל
-מ  (Prov 1:15); כלא רגל מ-  (Ps 119:101); and הסיר רגל מ-  (Prov 4:27). Its meaning is spelled out in the 
following clauses.” He might also be closer by suggesting the affinity between  ֹוׁש ְיהָוהִלְקד  in Isa 58:13 and 
הֹקֶדׁש ַליהוָ   in Exod 31:15, but again due to the variation in syntactic construction I do not find this 
conclusive (Paul, Isaiah 40–66, 494). The expression ּבְ  + יֹום + ֹקֶדׁש is only found in Isa 58:13 and Neh 
10:32. In the latter is seems to be used for other holy days in contrast to the Sabbath. This undermines using 
 .as an argument that the phrase necessarily refers to the weekly Sabbath day (Myers, Ezra ּבְ  + יֹום + ֹקֶדׁש
Nehemiah, 178; Williamson, Ezra, Nehemiah, 334; Batten, Ezra and Nehemiah, 376; Francis D. Nichol, 
ed., 1 Chronicles to Song of Solomon (SDABC; ed. Francis D. Nichol; Hagerstown, MD: Review and 
Herald Publishing Association, 1977), 435. The strongest evidence that the ַׁשָּבת here refers to the weekly 
Sabbath, is probably in the word ַׁשָּבת itself. 
Blenkinsopp points out that 1QIsaa acknowledges the “distinctive character” of vv. 13–14 by 
having “an almost entirely blank line preceding it” (Blenkinsopp, Isaiah 56-66, 181). McKenzie goes 
further and claims that vv. 13–14 was “an afterthought” and “a secondary addition to the original poem” 
(McKenzie, Second Isaiah, 165). While the spacing in 1QIsaa is clearly the case, the close lexical and 




Year of Jubilee is only hinted at with the use of ׁשֹוָפר and the theme of liberation, it seems 
safest to say that the Day of Atonement appears to be in the foreground, with the other 
two holy days in a likely background. But even if Isa 58 does not use the characteristic 
phrase ַׁשַּבת ַׁשָּבֹתון (see Lev 16:31; 23:32), the mention of ַׁשָּבת would evoke ideas of 
festive cessation from labor. The ambiguity of the term ַׁשָּבת, possibly both referring to 
the Day of Atonement and the weekly Sabbath, might again be intentional. It would fit 
the pattern of other cases in the chapter that may be intentionally ambiguous or appear as 
conundrums, as the lexemes ָאָדם ַנְפׁשֹו ,(13 ,3–58:2) ֵחֶפץ/חפץ and רֹאֹׁשו in 58:5, ַּבִית in 58:7 
(see below), and the clause  ֶׁשָךָלָרֵעב ַנפְ ְוָתֵפק  (58:10). It seems that their shared theme of 
cessation from labor, more precisely the putting aside of one’s own business and delight, 
is the shared concept behind the two, providing the rationale for why the weekly Sabbath 
might be brought into Isa 58 at this point.112 The contrast established earlier in the chapter 
between seeking one’s business and delight in contrast to filling the needs of the poor and 
                                               
difficult to imagine these verses as a later interpolation. The phrase ָלָשֶבת seems to be used in Isa 58:12 
proleptically to the theme of the Sabbath in vv. 13–14. The use of the roots ׁשוב ,יׁשב ,ׁשוב for the second 
time, and ַׁשָּבת in 58:12e–13a might also be intentional to create a phonetic play. Paul has also noticed this 
play on words (Paul, Isaiah 40–66, 493). Cf. Kline, Allusive Soundplay. This would be an argument 
contrary to those claiming that vv. 13–14 did not originally belong to Isa 58. Paul also notes that 1QIsaa 
leaves an empty space after v. 12, and begins a new line with v. 13, thus marking a gap: “The final segment 
(vv 13–14) is generally taken to be an addendum (we might call it a minisermon on Sabbath observance), 
and its distinctive character is acknowledged in 1QIsaa by an almost entirely blank line preceding it” 
(Blenkinsopp, Isaiah 56-66, 181). The question is however whether this should be given any weight, as this 
might simply be a scribal decision not reflecting the unity between v. 12 and 13 noted above. For 
references to scholars who see Isa 58:13–14 as a later addition, and those arguing that Isa 58 as a whole 
constitutes a literary unit see Kline, Allusive Soundplay, 86n. Hrobon writes that “if Isa 58:1–12 is read 
through the lens of the Sabbath, the Sabbatical year, the Year of Jubilee, and the Day of Atonement 
regulations in Leviticus, the sabbath concept turns out to be all-encompassing in Isa 58, and vv. 13–14 then 
come naturally as the chapter’s grand finale” (Hrobon, Ethical Dimension, 205). 
112 Hrobon writes: “One should think of the sabbath concept as represented not only by the 
Sabbath day, but also by the Sabbath year, the Year of Jubilee, and the Day of Atonement. Once these 
festivals are taken into consideration, the connections between Isa 58:13–14 and the rest of the chapter are 
manifold” (Hrobon, Ethical Dimension, 202). Cf. Westermann, Isaiah 40–66, 340 seeing the weely Sabbath 




afflicted on the Day of Atonement, now seems to inform and flow into the meaning of the 
Sabbath in the latter part of the chapter. The difference, however, is that the contrast is 
now between seeking one’s business and personal delight in contrast to honoring God. I 
will return to this point below. Here it should be noted that the idea of cessation from 
labor in Isa 58 seems conceptually dependent on Leviticus. In Isa 58 it is not clear why 
the ַׁשָּבת is suddenly mentioned. Leviticus seems to provide the explanation for this, 
indicating that Isa 58 is dependent on Leviticus. Both the Day of Atonement and the 
weekly Sabbath are called ַׁשַּבת ַׁשָּבֹתון, and both are given an absolute prohibition against 
any work in Leviticus. This seems to be the rationale for linking the two together in Isa 
58. In concluding this chapter, I therefore agree with Paul in claiming that Isa 58 was 
dependent on Lev 16; 23; 25. Paul writes: “This prophecy [Isa 58] was deeply influenced 
by the injunctions regarding the observation of the Day of Atonement found in Lv 16; 
23:24–32; 25:9–10.”113 
To me it does not seem possible to determine whether Isa 58 reused ֶנֶפׁש + ענה 
from one of the passages Lev 16; 23; or Num 29:7 or rather borrowed this locution 
conceptually linked to the Day of Atonement from all three passages. However, Milgrom 
has pointed out a chiasm in Lev 16:29–31, highlighting the command to afflict one’s soul 
and prohibition against labor:114 
A.  And this shall be for you a law for all time ( עֹוָלם ַּקתְוָהְיָתה ָלֶכם ְלחֻ  , 16:29a): 
 B. . . . you shall practice self-denial ( ֹׁשֵתיֶכםֶאת־ַנפְ  ְּתַעּנּו , 16:29b) 
  C. and you shall do no manner of work . . . . ( ׂשּוְוָכל־ְמָלאָכה לֹא ַתעֲ  , 
16:29c) 
   X. For on this day shall purgation be effected on your behalf to  
                                               
113 Paul, Isaiah 40–66, 480. 




purify you of all your sins; you shall become pure before the 
Lord (16:30). 
  C′. It shall be a sabbath of complete rest for you ( ִהיא ָלֶכם ַׁשָּבתֹון ַׁשַּבת , 
16:31a), 
 B′. and you shall practice self-denial ( ֹׁשֵתיֶכםֶאת־ַנפְ  ִּניֶתםְועִ  , 16:31b); 
A′. It is a law for all time ( עֹוָלם ַּקתחֻ  , 16:31c). 
The command to afflict one’s self and prohibition against work, highlighted in Lev 
16:29–31 through this chiasm, are exactly the two locutions upon which I argue that Isa 
58 plays upon.115 Paul points out another paronomasia in Isa 58:12c–13a: “And call you 
‘restorer ( ֹׁשֵבבמְ  ) of a breach, Restorer of paths, in order to dwell ( ָׁשֶבתלָ  )’. If you turn back 
 Further, Kline here sees an allusive 116”. . . . (מִ ַּׁשָּבת) your foot on the Sabbath (ָּתִׁשיב)
word play, this time linking the passage to the similar allusive wordplay in Lev 23:31–32: 
“You shall not do any work. It is a regulation forever throughout your generations in all 
your dwellings ( ְׁשֹבֵתיֶכםמֹ  ). It is a Sabbath of complete rest ( ַׁשָּבתֹון ַׁשַּבת ) for you . . . from 
evening to evening you shall keep your Sabbath (117”.(ִּתְׁשְּבתּו ַׁשַּבְּתֶכם 
Linguistic dating: Had the noun יֹוֵבל been used in Isa 58, the link with Lev 25 
would have been stronger. But there might be reasons why this word is not used. If we 
check the distribution we only find the lexeme used in Torah and the book of Joshua, 
with 21 of a total of 27 occurrences in the HB in Leviticus itself, with 14 of these only in 
Lev 25.118 The lexeme ׁשֹוָפר is attested 63 times in the HB.119 Isa 58:1 uses ׁשֹוָפר instead 
                                               
115 For another who has made a similar point see Kline, Allusive Soundplay, 85. 
116 Paul, Isaiah 40–66, 493. 
117 Kline, Allusive Soundplay, 80–82, 86. 
118 Exod 19:13; Lev 25:10-13, 15, 28, 30-31, 33, 40, 50, 52, 54; 27:17-18, 21, 23-24; Num 36:4; 
Josh 6:4-6, 8, 13. 
119 The lexeme ׁשֹוָפר attested in the HB in Exod 19:16, 19; 20:18; Lev 25:9; Josh 6:4–6, 8–9, 13, 




of יֹוֵבל, in harmony with the changes in Hebrew as to how to refer to the Day of 
Atonement. Bergsma writes concerning יֹוֵבל:  
It does not occur in undisputed exilic or post- exilic literature in the Hebrew Bible; in 
Ezekiel’s reference to the jubilee year (Ezek 47:17) it is simply called “the year of 
release” (שנת דרור) perhaps indicating that by the time Ezekiel was composed, the 
term יובל had fallen out of general use. Significantly, however, the statement of Lev 
25:10, “It [the fiftieth year] will be a Jubilee for you,” assumes that the reader/listener 
knows what a jubilee is, i.e. the text presupposes some prior knowledge of the 
meaning of יובל. . . . In the opinion of the majority of scholars, יובל is an antique term 
for “ram’s horn,” which was gradually replaced with שפר. Joshua 6:4, 6, 8, 13 are 
cited as evidence for this, since in these verses the term יובלים appears glossed with 
 120.שופרות
Multiplicity: I have argued that it is Isa 58 that reuses and depends upon Lev 16; 
23; 25. My four main arguments have been (1) the concentration of lexical and thematic 
parallels in Isa 58:1 almost as an introduction to the textual basis for the chapter, to the 
announcement of the Year of Jubilee on the Day of Atonement in Lev 25:9–10, (2) the 
puzzling phrase ְוָתֵפק ָלָרֵעב ַנְפֶׁשָך (“and you offer your person to the hungry”) as part of a 
general and strategic alteration in Isa 58 of the phrase ענה in piel + ֶנֶפׁש used in the 
command in Lev 16 and 23 for the people to fast on the Day of Atonement, (3) the likely 
intentional reworking of the second command directed to the people in Lev 16 and 23 on 
the Day of Atonement, namely abstention from work, through the lexemes ֵחֶפץ/חפץ, and 
(4) the possible transition between v. 12 and 13, from the Day of Atonement to where the 
weekly Sabbath possibly and abruptly comes into view;121 abrupt in Isa 58 itself but fully 
                                               
1:34, 39, 41; 2 Kgs 9:13; Isa 18:3; 27:13; 58:1; Jer 4:5, 19, 21; 6:1, 17; 42:14; 51:27; Ezek 33:3–6; Hos 5:8; 
8:1; Joel 2:1, 15; Amos 2:2; 3:6; Zeph 1:16; Zech 9:14; Ps 47:6; 81:4; 98:6; 150:3; Job 39:24–25; Neh 4:12, 
14; 1 Chr 15:28; 2 Chr 15:14. 
120 Bergsma, The Jubilee from Leviticus to Qumran, 61. 
121 The strongest evidence that the ַׁשָּבת here refers to the weekly Sabbath, is probably in the word 




understandable through the shared concept of cessation of labor between the Day of 
Atonement and weekly Sabbath in Leviticus. I suggest that recognizing the reuse of Lev 
16; 23; 25 in Isa 58 seems to offer a more adequate explanation than the etymological 
explanation of the puzzling phrase ְוָתֵפק ָלָרֵעב ַנְפֶׁשָך (“and you offer your person to the 
hungry”) in Isa 58:10 and that the abrupt transition between Isa 58:12 and 58:13, as well, 
is better understood in this way in contrast to the proposed source critical explanations. It 
is preferable to adopt the single proposal that Isa 58 reuses Lev 16; 23; 25 in order to 
explain both phenomena, as opposed to having to manage a separate explanation for each 
phenomenon. 
Appropriation 
In the above discussion, I have argued that Isa 58 reuses Lev 16; 23; and 25 to 
form its unique message.122 Strictly speaking, it is possible both to argue that there is a 
literary dependence in Isa 58 upon Lev 16; 23; 25 and that Isa 58 is drawing upon a cultic 
setting framed by instructions like those we find in Lev 16; 23; 25. The objection can be 
made that there is no decisive evidence for claiming it as necessary to see direct literary 
dependence, but, on the other hand, the accumulation of parallels makes it most 
reasonable to acknowledge a reuse in Isa 58 of a cultic setting as outlined in Lev 16; 23; 
25. For practical purposes we can therefore speak of literary reuse and dependence. 
                                               
122 Terms like ‘intertexuality’, ‘allusion’, ‘echo’ and ‘exegesis’ all seem inadequate to explain 
what is really going on in Isa 58. ‘Intertextuality’ seems to weak, as there seems to be intentional reuse and 
a chronological relation between the two. Both ‘allusion’ and ‘echo’ also seem inappropriate to catch the 
strategic play and alteration of meaning found in this chapter. Finally, God in the words of Isaiah is not 
simply exegeting Lev 16 and 23, even if the Year of Jubilee in Lev 25 seems to provide a hermeneutical 




We find the material most clearly reusing elements from Lev 16; 23 and 25 in the 
prologue in section 1 (see above), the people’s response in section 3, God’s accusation 
and exposition of the false Day of Atonement in sections 4a and 4b, and then afterwards 
in the protasis-sections. The reuse of Lev 16; 23; and 25 in the protases signifies 
conditionality. Bringing their moral conduct up to the true meaning of the cultic practice 
is part of God’s grand scheme of restoring His people to the blessings of the covenant 
relationship with Him. If the people will remain faithful to the true meaning of the fast 
and cessation of labor on the Day of Atonement and cessation of labor on the weekly 
Sabbath, God will turn the peoples’ fast to a feast. 
Fishbane correctly points out that even if there is a tension in Isa 58 between 
cultic fasting and morality, the chapter is not antinomian:  
Given the compact congruence between the imagery and linguistic forms found in 
Isa. 58:1–12 and Lev. 16 and 23:24–32, and the shift in focus and concern, it may be 
concluded that the former is a deliberate piece of homiletical-aggadic exegesis. The 
Pentateuchal legal materials dealing with the rules and regulations of the Day of 
Atonement thus serve as the linguistic and ideological matrix for the inversion and 
reapplication in Isaiah’s discourse. The powerful spiritual redefinition of fasting 
undertaken by the prophet so balances the old cult practices on the edge of rhetorical 
hyperbole that the hermeneutical tension between the two is taut and unyielding. 
However, it must be stressed that Isa. 58:1–12 is not antinomian: it neither attempts to 
weaken nor to reject the Pentateuchal law. In fact, the text specifically condemns 
work on the fast day (v. 3). Accordingly, what the prophet ultimately seeks to effect is 
a social-spiritual extension of an authoritative religious practice.123 
As we saw in Jer 34, Isa 58 can also be said to contain an expansionistic reading of 
Torah. Isaiah 58 presents God as the one interpreting the true meaning of the Day of 
Atonement. At the same time the people are rebuked for their narrow concepts of the fast. 
                                               
123 Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 305. Hrobon adds that this “social-spiritual 




They should have known better. While the people were commended in Jer 34 for their 
expansionistic reading of the manumission instructions, and later held accountable for 
their covenant based on this reading, in Isa 58 the people are criticized for not having 
seen the expansionistic reading implied by Lev 25:9–10. God, speaking through the 
prophet, exposes the textual indicators that could have led the people to see the radical 
truths implied in Torah. The chapter opens in Isa 58:1 by reusing locutions that remind 
the people of the call to a religious assembly (ְקָרא ְבָגרֹון ַאל־ַּתְחֹׂשְך ַּכּׁשֹוָפר ָהֵרם קֹוֶלָך), now 
for the purpose of disclosing the sins of the people (ְוַהֵּגד ְלַעִּמי ִּפְׁשָעם ּוְלֵבית ַיֲעֹקב ַחּטֹאָתם), 
and I have argued that it is reasonable to see a parallel to Lev 25:9–10 and the 
announcement of the Year of Jubilee on the Day of Atonement. The people’s response in 
 ties the assembly even closer to key (ָלָּמה ַּצְמנּו ְולֹא ָרִאיָת ִעִּנינּו ַנְפֵׁשנּו ְולֹא ֵתָדע) 58:3
locutions in the Day of Atonement. Their literal reading of the cultic passages of Lev 16 
and 23 had led them to believe that abstaining from food was sufficient. Furthermore, the 
fast, presumably on the Day of Atonement, together with a display of generally pious 
behavior throughout the year (58:2) appears to have been considered by the people as 
good enough. The statement ֵהן ְּביֹום ֹצְמֶכם ִּתְמְצאּו־ֵחֶפץ ְוָכל־ַעְּצֵביֶכם ִּתְנֹּגׂשּו (“Behold, on the 
day (ְּבֹיום) of your fast you seek business and oppress all your labors”) in 58:3 seems to 
underline the incommensurability of the fast on the Day of Atonement itself with 
cotemporaneous social oppression. It here reminds of לֹא־אּוַכל ָאֶון ַוֲעָצָרה (“I cannot take 
iniquity and assemblies”) in Isa 1:13.124 We can also think of Isa 29:13:  וַ ּיֹאֶמר ֲאֹדָני ַיַען ִּכי
ָּמָדהְמלֻ  ִׁשיםֹאִתי ִמְצַות ֲאנָ  ָאָתםִיְר  ְּתִהיוַ  ֶּמִּניִרַחק מִ  ּבֹוְולִ  ִּכְּבדּוִני ּוִבְׂשָפָתיו ְּבִפיו ֶּזהָהָעם הַ  ַּגׁשנִ   (“The 
                                               
124 LXX makes the link with Isa 58 even stronger by rendering it νηστείαν καὶ ἀργίαν (“fast and 




Lord said: Because this people draw near with its mouth and its lips honor me, while its 
heart is far from me, and their fear of me is a human commandment learned by rote”). 
After YHWH’s rhetorical questions in 58:4 he then starts reworking the meaning 
of ענה ֶנֶפׁש. As we have seen, Lev 25 and its message of social justice each Year of 
Jubilee is injected into the message of the annual Day of Atonement—a message not 
found in Lev 16 and 23—so as to characterize every day every year as a time of social 
justice, not least the Day of Atonement itself. Thus, the opening in Isa 58:1 points us to 
the textual basis in Lev 25:9–10 for this radicalized reading of Torah. Implicit in the 
message of Isaiah 58 is the idea that true readers of Torah should have been able to grasp 
the message of Isa 58 on the basis of Leviticus itself.125 
Further, with the prohibition against any form of labor on the Day of Atonement, 
Isa 58 seems to recognize the similar prohibition on the weekly Sabbath. On this basis, 
the author seems to have established the following analogy: Just as the Day of Atonement 
is about setting oneself and one’s business-desires aside for the afflicted, the weekly 
Sabbath is about setting oneself and one’s business-desires aside for God. It is even 
possible that the author of Isa 58 built his integration of themes from the Year of Jubilee, 
Day of Atonement, and weekly Sabbath upon Lev 25:1–12, as all three are mentioned 
there—that is, if we derive the Sabbath-theme from the Sabbatical year in vv. 2-4. 
                                               
125 Bergsma writes “that there is nothing arbitrary about the proclamation of the jubilee on yom 
kippur, on the contrary, there may be the most intimate conceptual relationship between the purgation of 
the temple and the restoration of social justice in Israel” (Bergsma, The Jubilee from Leviticus to Qumran, 
31). Drawing upon the akîtu festival he writes on the same page: “The nature of the akîtu festival is yet 





Shalom Paul claims that the main problem is “their lack of abstinence from 
commerce on communal fast days.”126 I am not able to see this as the primary issue in the 
chapter. Rather, it is the rampant social abuse that serves as the focal point of which their 
trade on fast days is only a part. Gane argues that the purpose of the fast on the Day of 
Atonement in Lev 16 and 23 was to express continuing loyalty to God. He writes: 
The purpose of self-denial on the Day of Purgation appears to be basically the same 
as that of this practice at other times: to humbly acknowledge total dependence on 
God at a time of special need. . . . On this occasion the Israelites’ need is to receive 
moral cleansing through purgation of the sanctuary on their behalf from sins for 
which they have already been forgiven (Lev. 16:30). We can conclude that the 
Israelites who practice self-denial as an outward token of sincere inner repentance and 
who keep Sabbath on the Day of Purgation express their ongoing loyalty and humble 
submission to their holy Lord.127 
In Isa 58 the problem is not that the people do not fast or abstain from labor as 
such. They did both. The problem is that their religious conduct is not for the good of 
those around them; their religious praxis exhibits an utter lack of morality and may even 
preclude it. While they are fasting no one else is fed, and while they afflict themselves 
their affliction of others is not relieved. Their lack of true repentance bars them from 
receiving the benefit of the Day of Atonement. So on the Day of Atonement, when sin 
truly could have been purged from the people, their sins are prosecuted with even a 
greater degree of enthusiasm. Commenting on Isa 58 and the link to Lev 16; 23; and 25 
Gane writes: “On the Day of Purgation, when the sins of the Israelites were purged out of 
the sanctuary so that they could be morally pure (ch. 16), it was more inappropriate and 
                                               
126 Paul, Isaiah 40–66, 480. 





hypocritical than ever to commit more rebellious faults and sins of social unkindness (Isa 
58:1–5).”128 This once more highlights the fluidity between the moral and cultic 
instructions in Torah. Isa 58 clearly reads the cultic instructions as being deeply rooted in 
the moral instructions. Cult without morals is a defiance of YHWH’s instructions.  
Isaiah 58:6b–7e lists eight injunctions concerning the true fast: (1) to loose bonds 
of wickedness, (2) to untie ropes of the yoke, (3) to let oppressed go free, (4) to break all 
yokes, (5) to break your bread for the hungry, (6) to bring afflicted poor and homeless to 
a house,129 (7) to clothe the naked, and (8) not to turn away from your own kin. In this list 
only #8 is in the negative form.130 Paul writes: “The prophet, however, reinterprets these 
                                               
128 Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 447. For a thematic link to Rev 14:12 see Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 
413. Paul comments on v. 2: “Ridicule is inherent in the structure of this verse: If they ‘eagerly desire’ the 
‘nearness of God’ (v. 2), how can they eagerly (חפץ) continue to do business on a fast day?!” (Paul, Isaiah 
40–66, 484–85). 
129 A question is what the indeterminte ‘house’ (ַּבִית) in v. 7 refers to? LXX adds the 2. pers. 
pronoun “your” in εἰς τὸν οἶκόν σου (“into your house”). Oswalt points out that the following word begins 
with a kaph and might suggest that a 2ms suffix was lost through haplography (Oswalt, Isaiah 40–66, 500). 
But both 1QIsaa and 1QIsab support MT. Does ַּבִית refer to one’s own house or to the afflicted one’s house? 
Oswalt comments that “if the MT is correct, it is not so much that the homeless need to be taken into one’s 
own home as that shelter should be procured for them” (Oswalt, Isaiah 40–66, 504). As the people would 
go up to the Temple on the Day of Atonement (cf. Lev 16:11–12, 15, 17), it could also be that a contrast is 
intended here between the Temple and one’s own house. Rather than bringing the afflicted up to the 
Temple, the message of the Day of Atonement is rather to bring them to one’s own house. With the return 
to one’s property and family in the Year of Jubilee (Lev 25:10), it might even be that the ‘house’ here refers 
to bringing the afflicted back to their own family house (see Weinfeld, Social Justice in Ancient Israel, 14–
15). Lev 25:29–33 deals specifically with the question of the loss of one’s ַּבִית. As the personal pronoun is 
missing, the radical message might even be that the individual Israelite has a responsibility to provide a 
house even for the one who has never owned a house. I am therefore inclined to see the reuse and parallel 
to Lev 25:10 as a likely explanation for the the ambiguity of ַּבִית in Isa 58:7. Cf. Polan, In the Ways of 
Justice, 34 pointing out the analogy between God bringing stranger to his Temple in Isa 56:7 and the 
people providing shelter for the homeless. 
130 Paul only lists four points: “(1) providing food for the hungry; (2) housing of indigents; (3) 
clothing them; and (4) paying heed to destitute kin” (Paul, Isaiah 40–66, 487). Weinfeld also summarize it 
in four points “both negatively and positively: the release of prisoners, the setting free of the oppressed, on 
the one hand, and the supplying of the needs of the poor and indigent on the other hand” (Weinfeld, Social 
Justice in Ancient Israel, 220–21). But following the clause divisions, it seems more appropriate to me to 
see eight actions called for. Weinfeld continues: “However, unlike in Ezekiel [18:7–8, 16–17], where 




edicts and concentrates on their social ramifications. He is thus very much akin to his 
prophetic predecessors who denounced animal offerings, observation of holidays, and 
even prayer, if they were not accompanied by moral uprightness (see Isa 1:1–17; Jer 
7:21–23; Hos 6:6; Amos 5:21–24). All ritual is secondary and dependent on morality.”131 
The promise is that God will respond, when the people respond to the needy.132 Isaiah 58 
demonstrates an inner unity between ritual and morality, or rite and right. The former 
does not make sense without the latter. As Fishbane puts it: “In this fiercely ironical 
rebuke, the Israelites are told that they cannot force divine favour by fasting, but that they 
can elicit it by feeding the hungry.”133 
Let me finally say some words about the Sabbath in vv. 13–14. As mentioned, 
Hrobon finds the Sabbath concept to be “all-encompassing in Isa 58.”134 The weekly 
Sabbath, the Sabbatical year, the Year of Jubilee, and the Day of Atonement come 
together in this chapter as an organic whole. Like Deut 5:12–15 and Isa 56:2–8, Isa 58 
could have brought out the social element of the Sabbath.135 It would have been an 
                                               
sphere” (Weinfeld, Social Justice in Ancient Israel, 221). For a discussion on Isa 58:5 and how it uses 
‘negative dialectics,’ see Heinz Kruse, “Die “Dialektische Negation” Als Semitisches Idiom,” VT 4, no. 1 
(1954): 396. 
131 Paul, Isaiah 40–66, 481. And again: “The prophet warns the people that in order to be near to 
God and to know His ways it is not sufficient to fast and offer sacrifices, since ritual has no value in and of 
itself if not accompanied by morally and socially responsible conduct. It is not enough to humble one’s 
heart and deprive one’s body, because ‘He has told you, O man, what is good, and what the Lord requires 
of you: Only to do justice, and to love loyalty, and to walk wisely with your God’ (Mic 6:8). If they 
conduct themselves in this manner, they shall be saved” (Paul, Isaiah 40–66, 484). 
132 See Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 304; Paul, Isaiah 40–66, 480. 
133 Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 304. 
134 Hrobon, Ethical Dimension, 205. 




appropriate link to make explicit in this chapter. But the author chose not to focus on this, 
but rather, changed the focus to loyalty toward God. The shift in focus in vv. 13–14 is 
significant: “There is, at any rate, no longer a concern for the humanitarian or 
philanthropic aspect of the Sabbath rest, comparable to the accusation of exploiting the 
fast days in 3b–4, and in agreement with the Deuteronomic formulation of the Sabbath 
command (Deut 5:12–15). Sabbath observance is considered exclusively an act of 
obedience and devotion to God.”136 Watts writes concerning the Sabbath: “here it is seen 
as a test by which one restrains common desires in order to conform to God’s expressed 
will.”137 While fasting and cessation of labor constituted a test of loyalty to YHWH on 
the Day of Atonement according to Lev 16; 23, fasting and cessation of labor in Isa 58:1–
12 is taken as signifying social justice rather than loyalty to God. As we come to vv. 13–
14, however, the Sabbath cessation of labor becomes again a test of loyalty to YHWH, as 
on the Day of Atonement.138 If Isa 58:13–14 should be read in terms of the weekly 
Sabbath, it is then colored by the concepts of the Day of Atonement through the theme of 
loyalty to YHWH.139 If read in this way, the chapter brings us along a trajectory that 
                                               
136 Blenkinsopp, Isaiah 56-66, 181. 
137 Watts, Isaiah 34-66, 844. Paul writes: “In the preceding verses, divine favor was made 
conditional upon social reform (conduct relative to one’s fellow), while here it is conditional upon Sabbath 
observance (conduct relative to God)” (Paul, Isaiah 40–66, 493–94). 
138 “The duty of keeping the Sabbath is also enforced by Jeremiah (Jer. 17:19ff.) and Ezekiel 
(Ezek. 20:12ff., 22:8, 26), and the neglect of this duty severely condemned. Ch. 56 has already shown the 
importance attached to it by our prophet” (Keil and Delitzsch, Isaiah, 558). 
139 McKenzie claims that the Sabbath observance of Isa 58 is unique in the HB: “The ideal of 
Sabbath observance proposed here is found in no other passage of the OT” (McKenzie, Second Isaiah, 
165). Keil and Delitzsch on their side do not see any new precepts being included, contrary to McKenzie: 
“The prophet does not hedge round this commandment to keep the Sabbath with any new precepts, but 





begins with the Day of Atonement, is elaborated in terms of the Jubilee year, and, finally, 
shows us that the content of both were already implicit in the weekly Sabbath itself. In 
regard to Lev 16 and 23, we could say that vv. 13–14 again takes up the theme of 
cessation from labor as a sign of loyalty to God.140 This connects with a remarkable irony 
in Isaiah 58; namely, that the chapter that began by speaking about the people fasting, 
ends with a promise of the people feasting.141 
Isaiah 58 is therefore a prime example of an expansionistic reading of the Torah 
instructions. A close reading of the Levitical instructions detects a bridge between the 
cultic regulations of the Day of Atonement and the moral obligation to release one’s 
                                               
140 Blenkinsopp also claims there is a reuse of other biblical passages in apodosis 3, in v. 14: “The 
promises, the fulfillment of which is to be contingent on Sabbath observance, are formulated on the basis of 
familiar and unspecific expressions of reassurance. ‘You will take delight in YHVH’ is reminiscent of Job 
22:26, and ‘I shall set you astride on the heights of the earth’ is taken almost verbatim from the Song of 
Moses (Deut 32:13a), which also suggests the promise about Jacob’s heritage (Deut 32:9, 13a). The finale, 
‘this is what YHVH has spoken,’ is borrowed from Isa 40:5 in order to confer the character of a prophetic 
pronouncement on what is, in effect, a very brief homiletic admonition” (Blenkinsopp, Isaiah 56-66, 182). 
Paul writes even more detailed about this reuse: “The Song of Moses left its linguistic and thematic imprint 
on this verse: ‘For the Lord’s portion is His people, Jacob His own allotment. . . . He set him atop heights 
of the earth to enjoy the yield of the fields’ (Deut 32:9, 13). Thematically, the Mosaic promise in the song 
will be fulfilled, provided that the Israelites observe the Sabbath, as delineated in v. 13. Linguistically, the 
very distinctive idiom הרכיב על במתי ארץ (‘to set astride the heights of the earth’) appears only here and in 
Deuteronomy, and both are accompanied by a similar image: ‘He [Israel] shall enjoy (ויאכל) the yield of the 
fields’ (Deut 32:13); and here: ‘I shall let you enjoy (והאכלתיך) the heritage of your father Jacob.’ . . .  
(Perhaps one should add another linguistic item to this comparison: Both Deut 32:12 and v. 11 here feature 
the verb נחי [‘the Lord alone did guide him (ַיְנֶחּנּו),’ and ‘The Lord will guide you (ְוָנֲחָך) always’].) In spite 
of these common images, there is an important difference between Deuteronomy and Deutero-Isaiah: In the 
former Israel is the Lord’s allotment or heritage, while in the latter the land of Israel is the nation’s heritage 
or reward, which accords with the usual emphasis on return and inheritance in Deutero-Isaiah’s prophecy” 
(Paul, Isaiah 40–66, 495). As this reuse is outside of textual parameters set for this study, I let it suffice 
with these remarks here. Still, they do support the overall claim that Isa 58 is a borrowing text. 
141 Paul: “There may be a hidden wordplay here, since the chapter begins with the theme of fasting 
and ends with ‘eating’ (והאכלתיך), at least in the metaphorical sense. Moreover, the reward of the nation 
that provides for the hungry (vv. 7, 10) is that they themselves shall have the enjoyment of ‘eating’ 
 Paul, Isaiah 40–66, 496). It is therefore a lex talionis operative here, just as we saw it in Jer 34) ”(והאכלתיך)
as well. And again: “Moreover, the observance of the Sabbath was especially emphasized during the period 
of the exile and the return (see Isa 56:2, 4, 6; 66:23), since the desecration of the Sabbath was considered 
one of the reasons for the national disaster (see Jer 17:24, 27; Ezek 20:12, 13, 15, 20, 21, 24; 22:8, 26; Neh 
13:15–18). The prophet therefore promises that if they observe the Sabbath properly, they shall be 




neighbor from oppression and affliction. This bridge is the announcement of the Year of 
Jubilee on the actual Day of Atonement. This also demonstrates a semi-permeable 
membrane between so-called cultic and ethical instructions in the mind of the author of 
Isa 58, and confirms that the two are seen as fundamentally belonging together in a life 
lived with YHWH. The chapter, therefore, simultaneously challenges a literalistic reading 
that limits religion to the plain sense of the text on the one hand, and an irresponsible 
creative reading that is not controlled by the text on the other. Instead, Isa 58 holds its 
reader accountable for not having seen the expansionistic potential it unfolds in the Torah 
instructions. As readers, we are not entitled either to only “stick with the text” or “move 
beyond the text.” It is through a thorough familiarity both with the text and with YHWH 
that we are enabled or led to detect textual potentialities that truly set us on the walk in 











PASTICHES OF TORAH IN JER 7:1–15 AND EZEK 18 AS  
AN ENTRY INTO A REFLECTION ON IMPLICATIONS  
FOR POSSIBLE PROTO-HALAKHIC ELUSIVE  
REUSE IN THE PROPHETS 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I will change the mode of analysis and reflection as I approach 
more elusive cases of reuse between Torah and the Prophets. As my point of departure, I 
will briefly reflect on the reuse of Torah in Jer 7:1–15 and Ezek 18. In each case, we find 
what seems to be a list of reuses of Torah-passages. Jer 7 and Ezek 18 display a series of 
more atomistic types of reuse in that they reuse smaller segments from a single passage 
combined with less creative reuse. By reiterating lexemes, phrases, and themes from 
Torah they create a pastiche, as it were. But since parallels are more limited to one lexical 
set or phrase between Jer 7 or Ezek 18 on the one hand and Torah on the other, it is more 
difficult to speak confidently of reuse and direction of dependence. It is rather the 
accumulation of parallels between Jer 7 or Ezek 18 on the one hand and various passages 
in Torah on the other that constitute the strongest argument for reuse and direction of 
dependence in these cases. The character of reuse in Jer 7 and Ezek 18 is therefore 




lists in Ezek 18 and 22 seems to have “served a pedagogical and hortatory function.”1 
The same seems to apply to Jer 7.  
Jeremiah 7 and Ezekiel 18 can be characterized as more elusive cases of reuse 
compared to the previous cases studied, so much so that the strength of a case for reuse 
and direction of dependence is significantly reduced. While the passages deserve close 
attention in their own right as proto-halakhic discourse, the relatively weaker cases for 
reuse and direction of dependence place them more in the periphery of the present study. 
Instead of proceeding to a discussion of the character of appropriation in these passages, I 
will therefore use them as an entry to the larger question of how to relate to possible 
proto-halakhic elusive reuse in the Prophets in general. And as an entry point, I will only 
briefly touch upon this question by way of offering some reflections. 
In the former discussion, given the phenomenon of repetition with variation in the 
concrete cases, it was the evidence demonstrating exact or near to exact linguistic 
parallels between passages that provided a basis for speaking of reuse and direction of 
dependence with a certain degree of confidence. This evidence, further, gave the basis for 
exploring the more creative and elusive ways in which a passage reused its source(s). But 
what about cases where we do not have the same degree of evidence for exact or close to 
exact linguistic parallels, where we might only have an author’s more atomistic or 
creative reuse? Can we imagine that some authors or authors sometimes operated more 
freely in regard to their sources, using them as part of their language game while still 
                                               
1 Michael Fishbane, “Sin and Judgment in the Prophecies of Ezekiel,” Interpretation 38 (1984): 
146. Matties writes regarding Ezek 18: “This is one of the few texts in Ezekiel that is hortatory, that calls 




intending to remain faithful to them? I will argue that such an imagination is warranted 
given the pattern of repetition with variation already seen. The authors do not seem to 
have viewed themselves as restricted and bound to the precise formulations found in their 
sources. But can we move from here to demonstrate that such elusive parallels are actual 
cases of reuse? Here I am more pessimistic. However, elusive cases of reuse might be 
possible to identify in cases where we have some kind of additional supporting evidence, 
as I will argue may be the case in the lists of Jer 7 and Ezek 18. These cases, therefore, 
show that we should be open to the possibility of more elusive literary reuse of Torah in 
the Prophets, even when we cannot demonstrate such reuse with confidence. This is an 
alternative approach to those either arguing confidently for reuse and direction of 
dependence when the evidence is thin, or those who, with equal confidence, explain them 
as merely coincidental or as simply reflecting a common tradition. 
In the following I will briefly discuss Jer 7 and Ezek 18, focusing only upon the 
relatively stronger parallels between them and Torah, before reverting to a final reflection 
on the more general question of elusive parallels between Torah and the Prophets. 
Jeremiah 7:1–15 
Jeremiah 7:3 can be read as a summary statement of the following, with a 
presentation of YHWH as speaker (ֹּכה־ָאַמר ְיהָוה ְצָבאֹות ֱאֹלֵהי ִיְׂשָרֵאל), admonishing the 
people to correct their ways and deeds ( ּוַמַעְלֵליֶכםֵהיִטיבּו ַדְרֵכיֶכם  ), with a conditional 





 Jeremiah 7:4 disputes the religious confidence placed in the Temple of YHWH 2.(ַהֶּזה
 .itself (ֵהיַכל ְיהָוה)
Jeremiah 7:5–6 constitutes a protasis, including a series of conditions, with 7:7 as 
the apodosis containing a promise to the people of dwelling forever in the land. While Jer 
7:3 gave the promise of YHWH’s dwelling with the people in the Temple, 7:7 promises 
that the people will continue forever in the land. 
Jeremiah 7:3–9 seems to contain a panel structure3: 
 
                                               
2 In the following I will limit the contextual information and survey of discussions on the 
passages. Some points might however be in place. Based on the date given in Jer 26:1 it is common to date 
the delivery of the Temple Sermon to 609–608 B.C. (e.g. G. Ernest Wright, The Rule of God: Essays in 
Biblical Theology (New York: Doubleday, 1960), 81; Weippert, Die Prosareden des Jeremiabuches, 28; 
Jay A. Wilcoxen, “The Political Background of Jeremiah's Temple Sermon,” in Scripture in History and 
Theology: Essays in Honor of J. Coert Rylaarsdam, eds. Arthur L. Merrill and Thomas W. Overholt 
(Pittsburgh, PA: Pickwick), 152; Holladay, Jeremiah 1–25, 240; Craigie et al., Jeremiah 1-25, 119). Mark 
Leuchter writes: “Though scholars are divided on whether the Temple Sermon may be regarded as the 
prophet’s ipsissima verba or if it derives from the hand of a later scribe, it is widely regarded as preserving 
the essence of the prophet’s early post-Josianic declarations” (Mark Leuchter, “The Temple Sermon and 
the Term מקום in the Jeremianic Corpus,” JSOT 30, no. 1 (2005): 97). Cf. Weippert, Die Prosareden des 
Jeremiabuches, 29–30, 41; McKane, Jeremiah, 158–69; Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer der Tora, 62–63. For an 
enlightening study on the political background of the Temple Sermon see Wilcoxen, “The Political 
Background of Jeremiah's Temple Sermon,” 151–65. For a discussion on Jer 7 in its literary context, and 
how it among other things challenges the confidence of Judah addressed in Jer 2–6 and shows how this 
confidence in part derived from its temple ideology see Stulman, Order Amid Chaos, 40–42, 54. Holladay 
claims “that the temple sermon served to close off the first scroll which Jrm dictated to Baruch” (Holladay, 
Jeremiah 1–25, 236). Stulman sees Jer 7:1–10:16 as one literary macro-unit, giving it the title “Dismantling 
Temple Ideology” (Stulman, Order Amid Chaos, 31). Cf. Smelik’s discussion on the interrelationship 
between Jer 7; 25; and 34 (Smelik, “The Inner Cohesion of Jeremiah 34:8–22,” 246–50). For Georg 
Fohrer’s argument that Jer 7:1–15 is really Hebrew poetry, Kurzversen, and McKane’s critique of this 
proposal, see Georg Fohrer, “Jeremias Tempelwort (Jeremia 7:1–15,” in Studien zur Alttestamentlichen 
Prophetie (1949–1965), BZAW 99 (Berlin: Verlag Alfred Töpelmann, 1967), 190–203; McKane, 
Jeremiah, 168–69. John Day argues that Jer 7 support an 11th century destruction of Shiloh, since it would 
not make sense that Jeremiah referred to an 8th century destruction of the sanctuary at Shiloh if the 
Jerusalem Temple had in every way replaced its function a couple of centuries prior (John Day, “The 
Destruction of the Shiloh Sanctuary and Jeremiah 7:12, 14,” in Studies in the Historical Books of the Old 
Testament, ed. J. A. Emerton (Leiden: Brill, 1979), 87–94). Maier does not find his arguments convincing, 
since Deuteronomy already presupposed the existence of multiple sanctuaries (Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer 
der Tora, 84). 
3 In contrast Holladay proposes to see four sections: 7:3–4, 7:5–8, 7:9–11, and 7:12 (Holladay, 




A Promise that YHWH will dwell with the people in the Temple ( ַוֲאַׁשְּכָנה ֶאְתֶכם
 (7:3,ַּבָּמקֹום ַהֶּזה
B Admonition not to trust in false words about the Temple ( ָלֶכם  ַאל־ִּתְבְטחּו
...ֶאל־ִּדְבֵרי ַהֶּׁשֶקר ֵלאֹמר ֵהיַכל ְיהָוה  , 7:4) 
      C   Conditions that Possibly Reuse Instructions in Torah (7:5–6)4 
A’ Promise that the people will dwell in the land ( ְוִׁשַּכְנִּתי ֶאְתֶכם ַּבָּמקֹום ַהֶּזה ָּבָאֶרץ
..., 7:7)5 
B’  Criticism for trusting in false words (ִהֵּנה ַאֶּתם ֹּבְטִחים ָלֶכם ַעל־ִּדְבֵרי ַהָּׁשֶקר, 
7:8)6 
      C’   Criticism that Possibly Reuse Instructions in Torah (7:9)7 
The majority of scholars see Jer 7:1–15 as reusing instructions from the Torah, or note 
the parallels without concluding that they constitute reuse.8 Nevertheless, some have 
                                               
4 If we take a closer look at Jer 7:5a (ִּכי ִאם־ֵהיֵטיב ֵּתיִטיבּו ֶאת־ַּדְרֵכיֶכם ְוֶאת־ַמַעְלֵליֶכם) it repeats the 
admonition from 7:3 (ֵהיִטיבּו ַדְרֵכיֶכם ּוַמַעְלֵליֶכם) to correct one’s ways, but now as part of a condition in the 
protasis. As mentioned above, 7:3 seems to be a summary statement for the rest of the admonitions and 
conditions given in the Temple Sermon. 
5 The promises in Jer 7:7 are also similar to those at the end of Jer 17, promising the endurance of 
the city Jerusalem. 
6 It is possible to see these false words as either referring to the claim that the Temple was 
inviolable (7:4) or that the people were safe (7:10). Holladay and Maier claim it is the first (Holladay, 
Jeremiah 1–25, 242; Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer der Tora, 79), while Lundbom argues the reference might 
be to both (Lundbom, Jeremiah 1–20, 465, 472). 
7 The passage returns in Jer 7:10–11 to the worshippers on the Temple precincts, and their 
illusions about being able to continue with their present conduct. In 7:11c YHWH reminds them that he 
sees what is going on ( ָרִאיִתי ְנֻאם־ְיהָוה ֵּנההִ  ָאֹנִכי ַּגם ). Jeremiah 7:12 draws the analogy to the sanctuary at 
Shiloh and its destruction. In 7:13 YHWH reminds them how he constantly warned them, before stating 
that he will do the same to the present Temple as with Shiloh (7:14) and cast the people away as he did 
with the seed of Ephraim (7:15). This is how the Temple Sermon as recounted ends. In brief, while the 
people have sought their security in the holiness of the Temple (7:4, 8), Jeremiah responds by saying that it 
is only if the people live up to the instructions of Torah (7:3, 5–6, 9–10) that God will literally place them 
on secure ground (7:3, 7). But since the people reject to listen he will destroy the Temple in which they 
falsely found security (7:11–15). Holladay writes: “But what is this search for security and protection? Jrm 
asks; why center one’s attention on the holiness of the temple? Only if our lives are lived in radical 
obedience to the demands of Yahweh’s covenant, the ethical expectations of the Decalogue, will Yahweh 
continue to sponsor us and protect us” (Holladay, Jeremiah 1–25, 249). 
8 Helga Weippert writes: “Der Prophet greift deshalb zurück auf die aus der Tradition bekannte 
Forderung die sozial Schachen zu schützen (Ver 6), und auf die Gebote des Dekalogs (Vers 9)” (Weippert, 
Die Prosareden des Jeremiabuches, 48). Maier writes: “Der Bezug auf die Kurzreihe des Dekalogs ist 
denkbar, der Dekalog als ganzer jedoch in Jer 7:9 nicht vorausgesetzt” (Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer der 
Tora, 80). Holladay writes that while it is common to name Jer 7:1–15 a parenesis, a moral exhortation, 




argued for the reverse relationship.9 In the following, I will briefly give some of the main 
arguments for seeing Jer 7 as an instance of what I have termed a pastiche containing 
elusive reuses of Torah. This is not meant as a comprehensive discussion of the question 
of reuse and direction of dependence in Jer 7 as such, but only as a brief overview of the 
main points, in order to open the discussion up to the general  
                                               
Jeremiah 1–25, 239). Cf. my discussion of Torah as “covenantal instructions” in chapter 2. John Day takes 
Jer 7:9a and Hos 4:2 as the “two passages in the prophets which appear to contain a direct echo of [the 
Decalogue]” (Day, “Inner-biblical Interpretation in the Prophets,” 231). 
It is common to see the Temple Sermon as the product of a Deuteronomic redactor (e.g. Thiel, 
Jeremia 1-25, 107–114). Holladay argues, however, that the phrases found in it “are not specifically 
‘Deuteronomistic.’” He explains the closer parallels to Deuteronomy rather as an intentional reuse: “Thus 
‘make good’ (יטב hip‘il, vv 3*, 5*) is not Deuteronomistic but is part of Jrm’s vocabulary; ‘ways’ paired 
with ‘doings’ is likewise not Deuteronomistic but is part of Jrm’s vocabulary. It is true, the triad ‘stranger, 
orphan and widow’ (v 6*) is found in Deuteronomy, but if Jrm wished to cite a legal norm of this sort, it 
would be hard to avoid using the phrase. The phrase ‘walk after other gods’ (vv 6*, 9*) is Deuteronomistic, 
but then the component phrases ‘walk after’ (in religious contexts) and ‘alien gods’ are found in Jrm’s 
poetry (2:5*, 23*, 36*; 5:19*) as well. The phrase ‘house which bears my name’ (vv 10*, 11*, 14*) is not 
found in Deuteronomy. In short, there is some overlap in phraseology between this passage and 
Deuteronomistic material but not to a significant degree. . . . One cannot therefore call the passage 
‘monotonous’ or ‘repetitive,’ as ‘Deuteronomistic’ prose is often thought to be; rather it is carefully crafted 
and precise. There is nothing here that suggests exilic authorship or late reflection on an earlier event and 
much that suggests immediacy and emotion. . . . It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the phraseology 
of the present passage reflects what Jrm said on that occasion, or at least what he himself recalls having 
said on that occasion” (Holladay, Jeremiah 1–25, 240). Cf. Weippert, Die Prosareden des Jeremiabuches, 
46–48; McKane, Jeremiah, 162, 164–67; Craigie et al., Jeremiah 1-25, 117–19, 121; Craigie et al., 
Jeremiah 1-25; Theodor Seidl, “Jeremias Tempelrede: Polemik gegen die joschijanische Reform? Die 
Paralleltraditionen Jer 7 und 26 auf ihre Effizienz für das Deuteronomismusproblem in Jeremia befragt,” in 
Jeremia und die 'deuteronomistische Bewegung', ed. Walter Groß, BBB 98 (Weinheim: Beltz Athenäum, 
1995), 141–79. For additional sources on the relation between Deuteronomy and Jeremiah see Fischer, 
“Der Einfluss des Deuteronomiums auf das Jeremiabuch,” 247. 
Fischer sees all the books of Torah as available to the author of Jeremiah, with strong ties to 
Exodus and particularly Deuteronomy (Fischer, Jeremia 1–25, 68, 71). Regarding Jeremiah’s reuse of 
Deuteronomy, he comments: “In der Regel ist die Verwendungsweise bei Jer langer und komplexer, ofters 
auch kritisch” (Fischer, “Der Einfluss des Deuteronomiums auf das Jeremiabuch,” 254). And again: “Die 
Berührungen finden sich mehrheitlich in jer Prosa, doch auch in Poesie (Jer 8,8; 10,10), und sie sind breit 
über das ganze Jeremia-Buch gestreut (hier c7 bis c35)” (Fischer, “Der Einfluss des Deuteronomiums auf 
das Jeremiabuch,” 254). Cf. Eustace J. Smith, “The Decalogue in the Preaching of Jeremias,” CBQ 4 
(1942): 197–209; Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer der Tora, 74–81; Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 
143–56, 167; Lundbom, Jeremiah 1–20, 463–65; Fischer, “The Relationship of the Book of Jeremiah to the 
Torah,” 901. 
9 Edwin Firmage is an example of scholars that argue that Jer 7 may be the source for the 
Decalogue, and that the direction of dependence therefore goes the other way (Firmage, “Jeremiah, 
Deuteronomy, and the Metamorphosis of Israel,” 49; Firmage, “Jeremiah, Deuteronomy, and the Priestly 




problem of how to deal with more elusive reuse in the Prophets and HB. 
In my view, there are several reasons as to why Jer 7 should be characterized as 
an elusive reuse of Torah. First, while Jer 7, as already seen, occurs in the book of 
Jeremiah together with other more clear cases of reuse—and most commentators will at 
least admit that there is a link between the prose sections of Jer 7, 17, and 34—it is more 
likely that the parallels between Jer 7 and passages in Torah are instances of literary reuse 
which is more elusive in character.10 
                                               
10 Before entering a more detailed study of Jer 7:1–15 itself, it is helpful to briefly survey some of 
the issues raised in the context of this passage. How do we understand the לֹא־ִדַּבְרִּתי ֶאת־ֲאבֹוֵתיֶכם ְולֹא ִּכי 
 For I did not speak to your fathers nor did I“) ִצִּויִתים ְּביֹום הֹוִציִא אֹוָתם ֵמֶאֶרץ ִמְצָרִים ַעל־ִּדְבֵרי עֹוָלה ָוָזַבח
command them regarding burnt offerings and sacrifices in the day when I brought them from the land of 
Egypt”) in Jer 7:22? There are two main interpretations of this passage, one which “distinguishes sharply 
between Deuteronomic (D) and Priestly (P) strands in the Pentateuch and assumes that Jeremiah is here 
reflecting the view of Deuteronomy, according to which only the Ten Commandments were given to Israel 
at Sinai (Deut 5:22); the remainder of the Law came later” while the second “sees Jeremiah employing a 
type of distributio in Hebrew rhetoric, where a first statement is negated only to emphasize a second 
statement that matters more” (Lundbom, Jeremiah 1–20, 481–82). For example, Moshe Weinfeld argued 
that Jer 7:22 is a “slap in the face of the Priestly with all its details” (Moshe Weinfeld, “Jeremiah and the 
Spiritual Metamorphosis of Israel,” ZAW 88 (1976): 53). Others have argued that the passage was 
formulated in contrast to a Deuteronomistic theology (Francis K. Kumaki, “The Temple Sermon: 
Jeremiah's Polemic against the Deuteronomists (Dtr1)” (Ph.D. diss., Union Theological Seminary, 1980)). 
In contrast, Heinz Kurse argues it should be understood as a “dialectical negation” (Kruse, “Dialektische 
Negation,” 385–400, esp. 386, 388, 391, 393–95). Cf. Smith, “The Decalogue in the Preaching of 
Jeremias,” 208; Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer der Tora, 63–68. Jacob Milgrom, “Concerning Jeremiah’s 
Repudiation of Sacrifice,” ZAW 89 (1977): 273–75 argued that Jer 7:22 only denounced voluntary 
sacrifices, and thus might simply mean that piety is only worthwhile if accompanied by just action. 
This is not the place to discuss the passage in detail, but commentators in general seem to agree 
that the key point in this verse is that obedience is more important than sacrifice. Hyam Maccoby writes: 
“Scholars have ceased to say that the prophets were opposed to ritual as such; it is now well understood that 
the prophets wanted the holiness code to be observed, but not at the expense of morality” (Maccoby, Ritual 
and Morality, 194). Cf. M. Sekine, “Das Problem der Kultpolemik bei den propheten,” Evangelische 
Theologie 28 (1968); Greenberg, “Three Conceptions of the Torah,” 14; Milgrom, “Concerning Jeremiah’s 
Repudiation of Sacrifice,” 17–56; Craigie et al., Jeremiah 1-25, 124. For other passages frequently referred 
to as cult-polemic see Amos 5:25; Ezek 20:25; Hos 2:18–25. Georg Fischer also mentions more immediate 
reuse of Torah in the context of Jer 7:1–15, pointing out the parallels between 7:22–23 and Exod 19:5 
(Fischer, “The Relationship of the Book of Jeremiah to the Torah,” 901). If Fischer is correct, it may be that 
we should read Jer 7:22–23 as a reference to the initial address to the people upon arrival at Sinai in Exod 
19, and not the subsequent cultic instructions (cf. ְּביֹום in Jer 7:22 and the enigmatic ֶּזההַ  ַּבּיֹום  in Exod 19:1). 
Kruse, however, argued that this is a misreading of Jer 7:22, and that instead of such a temporal 
harmonization it should be understood as employing a ‘dialectical negation’ (Kruse, “Dialektische 
Negation,” 395). For a discussion of other possible reuses in Jer 7 from the HB other than Torah, see 




Second, since Jer 7 seems to take the form of a pastiche of instructions drawn 
from Torah: each case of a possible reuse becomes more likely because it is placed in a 
list of other possible cases of reuse. Given the strength or weakness—depending on the 
perspective—of each individual parallel between Jer 7 and passages in Torah, Jer 7 also 
raises the question of how we ought to deal with the accumulation of weaker parallels? 
Does the accumulation of many weak parallels add up to a strong case? Does the 
accumulation in Jer 7 of individual parallels demonstrate a type of reuse that would 
otherwise be difficult to establish if such individual parallels occured alone? While we 
can wish that the evidence had indicated a stronger link to possible sources, it would be 
difficult to avoid recognizing that the lists strongly hint at some kind of reuse. 
Third, there seem to be close parallels between Jer 7:6 and 22:3. While the 
possible reuse of Torah in Jer 22:3 could be studied in its own right, for the present, it is 
enough to compare it with Jer 7. Jer 22:3 also seems to be a list of injunctions based on 
reuse of instructions in Torah much like those we find in Jer 7:5–6, 9. The parallels with 
Jer 22:3 thus strengthen the case for reading 7:5–6, 9  
                                               
Jeremiah 7:23 refers to a previous instruction, possibly found in Deut 5:33 (cf. Deut 10:12–13; 
Mic 6:8). The parallels between Deut 5:33 ( ְּבָכל־ַהֶּדֶרְך ֲאֶׁשר ִצָּוה ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֵהיֶכם ֶאְתֶכם ֵּתֵלכּו ְלמַ ַען ִּתְחיּון ְוטֹוב ָלֶכם
) and Jer 7:23 (ְוַהֲאַרְכֶּתם ָיִמים ָּבָאֶרץ ֲאֶׁשר ִּתיָרׁשּון ָתם ֵלאֹמר ִׁשְמעּו ְבקֹוִלי ְוָהִייִתי ָלֶכם ִּכי ִאם־ֶאת־ַהָּדָבר ַהֶּזה ִצִּויִתי אֹו
 are particularly strong. Cf. Carl (ֵלאֹלִהים ְוַאֶּתם ִּתְהיּו־ִלי ְלָעם ַוֲהַלְכֶּתם ְּבָכל־ַהֶּדֶרְך ֲאֶׁשר ֲאַצּוֶ ה ֶאְתֶכם ְלַמַען ִייטַ ב ָלֶכם
Friedrich Keil and Franz Delitzsch, Jeremiah, Lamentations, Commentary on the Old Testament 8 
(Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2001), 102; Smith, “The Decalogue in the Preaching of Jeremias,” 200, 203, 
209; Fischer, “Der Einfluss des Deuteronomiums auf das Jeremiabuch,” 252. 
Even if Jer 7:31 has weak lexical links to Lev 18:21; 20:2; Deut 18:10, the thematic 
correspondence seems to be very strong and unique to biblical law. Cf. Firmage, “Jeremiah, Deuteronomy, 
and the Metamorphosis of Israel,” 46. There is an analogy between Jeremiah denouncing reliance upon the 
materiality of the Temple itself (7:4, 10–14) and his denunciation of the reliance upon the expiatory 
strength of the sacrifices (7:22) (Smith, “The Decalogue in the Preaching of Jeremias,” 203). The statement 
 which I did not command and did not come into my heart”) in Jer 7:31 is a“) ֲאֶׁשר לֹא ִצִּויִתי ְולֹא ָעְלָתה ַעל־ִלִּבי
denial of the content of a previous instruction. By this negation, it simultaneously raises the possibility of a 




as a pastiche reusing instructions from Torah, as illustrated in Table 21: 
 
Table 21. Jer 7:6 and 22:3 
Jer 7:6 Jer 22:3 
אל־ דם נקילא תעׁשקו ו גר יתום ואלמנה 6
ואחרי אלהים אחרים לא  במקום הזה תׁשפכו
 לכם׃תלכו לרע 
כה אמר יהוה עׂשו מׁשפט וצדקה והצילו  3
אל־תנו ואלמנה  גר יתוםגזול מיד עׁשוק ו
 ׃במקום הזה אל־תׁשפכו דם נקיאל־תחמסו ו
 
6 [if] you do not oppress a stranger, orphan, or 
widow, or do not shed innocent blood in this 
place, or do not follow after other gods, to harm 
yourself, . . . 
3 Thus says YHWH: Do justice and 
righteousness, rescue the robbed from the hand 
of the oppressor, and do not wrong a stranger, 
orphan or widow, do not be violent, and do not 
shed innocent blood in this place. 
 
Fourth, an interesting comparison can be made between Jer 7:1–15 and 26:1–6; 
what are commonly accepted as two different versions of Jeremiah’s Temple Sermon. 
While Jer 7 presents the speech in “the sermonic style,” Jer 26 places the sermon in a 
biographical setting recounting what happened to Jeremiah afterwards as well.11 So we 
have the same sermon reported in two different settings for two different purposes. The 
two accounts supplement one another.12 Between the two we find overlapping material. 
                                               
11 According to Stuhlman, Jer 26 is the introduction to the second scroll in the book of Jeremiah, 
i.e. Jer 26–52. He writes: “Jeremiah 26, the prose introduction to the second scroll, for example, 
abbreviates and backgrounds the so-called ‘Temple Sermon’, and instead foregrounds a variety of narrative 
responses to the message. That is, the text narrates the various responses to the message more than the 
message itself” (Stulman, Order Amid Chaos, 103). See also p. 66. Holladay writes: “The logic of 26:4* 
and 6* is by itself not clear: why should the temple be destroyed because of the sins of the people? It is the 
present passage which supplied the missing link: the people have put false trust in the temple, so the temple 
must be destroyed. That is, the abbreviated narrative in chapter 26 assumes the availability of the text of 
7:3–12* and refers to it in summarizing fashion” (Holladay, Jeremiah 1–25, 240). Cf. Weippert, Die 
Prosareden des Jeremiabuches, 28–37, 47–48; Wilcoxen, “The Political Background of Jeremiah's Temple 
Sermon,” 151; Seidl, “Jeremias Tempelrede,” 164–68; Mark Leuchter, The Polemics of Exile in Jeremiah 
26–45 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 25–38; Otto, “Jeremia und die Tora,” 531–39. 
12 For discussions on “histories twice told” in ANE and biblical literature see Savran, Telling and 




What is of particular interest for the present is that we do not find a verbatim 
correspondence in Jer 26 to the particular verses to be studied below, containing the 
parallels with Torah; namely, 7:5–6, 9. In their place we find the interesting statement 
ִלְפֵניֶכם ָלֶלֶכת ְּבתֹוָרִתי ֲאֶׁשר ָנַתִּתי  (“to walk in my Torah which I placed before you”) in 
26:4.13 Both the idea of walking in ( ְָלֶלֶכת ּב) as well as placing before (ָנַתִּתי ִלְפֵניֶכם) 
indicate some kind of external ּתֹוָרה. As an independent oral or written instruction 
previously given, it becomes likely that Jer 7 as well might have reused a ּתֹוָרה. And since 
this ּתֹוָרה has close literary parallels to the written ּתֹוָרה as we find it in the MT, it 
strengthens the claim that both Jer 7 and 26 are referring to a text similar to the one we 
call Torah.14 
All these four points, however, are external to the elusive parallels between Jer 7 
and Torah themselves. An elusive parallel in itself is not sufficient to establish a case of 
literary reuse. We have, however, in the previous cases studied seen that repetition with 
                                               
Told,” 229–50; Berman, Inconsitency in the Torah, 81–103. 
13 I am not able to see that Jer 26:4 is a “specific reference to the Decalogue,” as Smith claimed 
(Smith, “The Decalogue in the Preaching of Jeremias,” 201). He argues this on the basis of an analogy with 
Jer 7:9, and the likely reuse of the Decalogue there. But as I will show below, the reuse in Jer 7:5–6, 9 is 
not limited to the Decalogue, but rather selected passages from a wide array in Torah. On p. 202 Smith 
gives a table of which specific commands in the Decalogue are used in Jeremiah, using the traditional 
Catholic division of the Decalogue. Many of these cases, however, seem not to be limited to the Decalogue 
as such, but have stronger parallels with other passages in the Torah. In this table, as well as on p. 203, it 
becomes clear that he overlooks the reuse in Jer 7:5–6. This might be arguably on the basis that these 
verses do not show a particular affinity to the Decalogue itself, but other passages in Torah. However, if the 
 in Jer 7:9 is seen as a reuse of the Decalogue, it is strange to ignore the same ַאֲחֵרי ֱאֹלִהים ֲאֵחִרים + הלך
locution in 7:6. In Jer 7:6 Smith only sees a reuse of the sixth commandment, prohibiting murder (his fifth 
according to the Catholic division). But as I will argue below, this parallel seems forced. On p. 205 he also 
sees a parallel between Jer 26:15–19 and the same commandment. I also believe this should be read 
otherwise, as will be shown in the following. 
14 Given the rediscovery of the book of Torah during the reign of Jehoiakim’s father, Josiah (2 Kgs 





variation is typical in the HB. In this spectrum of types of reuse, individual elusive 
parallels are frequent. It has shown that elusive reuse is common in the HB. Therefore, 
when we come to a case like Jer 7, containing an accumulation of various elusive 
parallels supported by the above four external arguments for reuse, it therefore seems 
reasonable to take Jer 7 as a pastiche of Torah. Jer 7 therefore helps us establish the 
phenomena of elusive reuse of Torah among the Prophets, even if we often may only be 
entitled to speak of the possibility of elusive reuse in cases containing one or very few 
parallels. 
Added to this, we can also mention the oral dimension of Jer 7 as a written 
composition. As discussed in the first chapter, a text-supported memorized reuse can also 
help us appreciate the more elusive type of reuse. The oral dimension of Jer 7 is 
witnessed in the orality of YHWH’s words having come to Jeremiah.15 Jeremiah 7 can 
therefore also be read as representing a symbiosis between orality and writing.16 
Following is a survey of the stronger parallels between Jer 7 and Torah. 
The Place as the Dwelling of YHWH’s Name in Jer 7:3, 7, 12 and Deut 12:11; 
                                               
15 Cf. ַהָּדָבר ֲאֶׁשר ָהָיה ֶאל־ִיְרְמָיהּו ֵמאֵ ת ְיהָוה ֵלאֹמר in 7:1; ֹּכה־ָאַמר ְיהָוה in 7:3 (in a way YHWH speaks 
through the written words); ְנֻאם־ְיהָוה in 7:11, 13; and referring to past addresses ֲאֵליֶכם ַהְׁשֵּכם ְוַדֵּבר ְולֹא
 in 7:13). Further, the words now written in the passage are to be orally ְׁשַמְעֶּתם ָוֶאְקָרא ֶאְתֶכם ְולֹא ֲעִניֶתם
proclaimed in the gates ( ְָוָקָראָת ָּׁשם ֶאת־ַהָּדָבר ַהֶּזה ְוָאַמְרּת in 7:2). The people are adjured to listen (ִׁשְמעּו ְדַבר־
 .(in 7:2 ְיהָוה
16 To me it is not clear, however, that Jer 7 is much different from for example Jer 3; 17; and 34 
what orality is concerned, and this therefore does not explain why Jer 7 may be more elusive in character 
than these other cases. They should all possibly be seen as part of a text-supported memorized reuse, only 
varying in degree as to the exact reuse and elusiveness present in each individual case. It is no obvious 
reason why Jer 7 is more elusive than the other cases. It may simply be that it was perceived to be more 
appropriate for the occasion of the Temple Sermon, or that an elusive pastiche served sufficiently its 
rhetorical and hortatory purposes. 




14:23; 16:2, 6, 11; 26:2: Only Deut 26:2 and Jer 7:7 use the lexical set נתן + ֲאֶׁשר + ֶאֶרץ + 
 .in close proximity in the HB.17 This lexical set is thus unique to these verses ׁשכן + ָמקֹום
In Deuteronomy we find the lexical set ׁשכן + ָמקֹום + נתן + ֲאֶׁשר + ֶאֶרץ used in a somewhat 
standardized formula, with some minor variation.18 Still, the formulation seems relatively 
standardized. Jer 7:1–15 seems to contain interspersed abbreviations, fragments, or 
modifications of this formula.19 The greater variation over this locution in Jer 7:1–15 may 
                                               
17 It can also be argued that there is a certain inversion of the order of the parallel locutions 
between these two passages. Given these parallels we also notice a possible reuse between  ְלכּו־ָנא ֶאל־ְמקֹוִמי
ֶׁשרְוָהַלְכָּת ֶאל־ַהָּמקֹום אֲ  in Jer 7:12 and ֲאֶׁשר  in Deut 26:2. 
18 We find the following formulations in Deuteronomy: ַהָּמקֹום ֲאֶׁשר־ִיְבַחר ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֵהיֶכם ּבֹו ְלַׁשֵּכן ְׁשמֹו
ָׁשםַּבָּמקֹום ֲאֶׁשר־ִיְבַחר ְיהָוה ְלַׁשֵּכן ְׁשמֹו  ,(14:23) ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֶהיָך ַּבָּמקֹום ֲאֶׁשר־ִיְבַחר ְלַׁשֵּכן ְׁשמֹו ָׁשם ,(12:11) ָׁשם  (16:2), 
 .(16:11) ַּבָּמקֹום ֲאֶׁשר ִיְבַחר ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֶהיָך ְלַׁשֵּכן ְׁשמֹו ָׁשם ,(26:2 ;16:6) ַהָּמקֹום ֲאֶׁשר־ִיְבַחר ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֶהיָך ְלַׁשֵּכן ְׁשמֹו ָׁשם
The combination of ָמקֹום + ׁשכן is found in 17 cases (Num 9:17; Deut 12:11; 14:23; 16:2, 6, 11; 26:2; 2 
Sam 7:10; Jer 7:3, 7, 12; Ezek 43:7; Nah 3:17-18; Job 38:19; Neh 1:9; 1 Chr 17:9). The lexeme ׁשכן + the 
preposition  ְּב occur in 53 cases in the HB (Gen 9:27; 14:13; 26:2; 35:22; Exod 25:8; 29:45-46; Lev 16:16; 
Num 5:3; 10:12; 14:30; 23:9; 35:34; Judg 8:11; 1 Kgs 6:13; 8:12; Isa 8:18; 32:16; 34:11, 17; Jer 7:3, 7, 12; 
17:6; 25:24; 48:28; 49:16; Ezek 43:7, 9; Joel 4:17, 21; Obad 1:3; Mic 4:10; 7:14; Zech 2:14-15; 8:3, 8; Ps 
15:1; 65:5; 69:37; 74:2; 78:55, 60; 85:10; 139:9; Job 4:19; 11:14; 18:15; 29:25; Prov 2:21; 1 Chr 23:25; 2 
Chr 6:1). It is therefore not possible to establish a case of reuse on the basis of these constructions 
themselves. There is a certain thematic similarity between Exod 25:8 and Jer 7:3, in YHWH dwelling with 
the people in his sanctuary, but due to the use of different words and contexts it seems difficult to claim 
there is reuse here. The only place ׁשכן + the preposition  ְָמקֹום + ּב is found, in this given order, is in Jer 7:3, 
7. The reverse order, the preposition  ְׁשכן + ָמקֹום + ּב, we find in 4 cases (Num 9:17; Deut 14:23; 16:2, 11). 
Num 9:17 is set in the context of the desert wanderings, describing the lifting and settling of the cloud. In 
Deut 14:23; 16:2, 11 the preposition  ְׁשכן + ָמקֹום + ּב is used to describe the place YHWH has chosen to let 
his name dwell. Deut 12:11 and 26:2 uses ׁשכן + ָמקֹום, without the preposition  ְּב, to describe the same. The 
lexical set ָׁשם + ֵׁשם + ׁשכן is found within one clause in Deut 12:5, 11; 14:23; 16:2, 6, 11; 26:2; Jer 7:12. Cf. 
Ezek 43:7 and Neh 1:9 using the lexical set ָמקֹום + ָׁשם + ֵׁשם + ׁשכן, but not in one clause. The words are 
used in a clause with some variation in the formulations: ָֹלׂשּום ֶאת־ְׁשמֹו ָׁשם ְלִׁשְכנו  in Deut 12:5, ְלַׁשֵּכן ְׁשמֹו ָׁשם 
in Deut 12:11; 14:23; 16:2, 6, 11; 26:2, and ִׁשַּכְנִּתי ְׁשִמי ָׁשם in Jer 7:12. All these verses also use the lexeme 
 .ָמקֹום
19 We find the following formulations in Jer 7: ַוֲאַׁשְּכָנה ֶאְתֶכם ַּבָּמקֹום ַהֶּזה in 7:3c, ַּבָּמקֹום ַהֶּזה in 7:6b, 
ֶׁשר ָנַתִּתי ַלֲאבֹוֵתיֶכםְוִׁשַּכְנִּתי ֶאְתֶכם ַּבָּמקֹום ַהֶּזה ָּבָאֶרץ אֲ   in 7:7, ְלָפַני ַּבַּבִית ַהֶּזה ֲאֶׁשר ִנְקָרא־ְׁשִמי ָעָליו in 7:10,  ְלָפַני
ַלַּבִית ֲאֶׁשר ִנְקָרא־ ,in 7:12 ְמקֹוִמי ֲאֶׁשר ְּבִׁשילֹו ֲאֶׁשר ִׁשַּכְנִּתי ְׁשִמי ָׁשם ָּבִראׁשֹוָנה ,in 7:11 ַּבַּבִית ַהֶּזה ֲאֶׁשר ִנְקָרא־ְׁשִמי ָעָליו
 in 7:6b seems to be the only ַּבָּמקֹום ַהֶּזה in 7:14. The phrase ְוַלָּמקֹום ֲאֶׁשר־ָנַתִּתי ָלֶכם ְוַלֲאבֹוֵתיֶכם and ְׁשִמי ָעָליו
addition to the list of reuse in 7:6, besides ְלַרע ָלֶכם. Leuchter points out a slight modification in Jer 7:3 of 
the supposed Deuteronomic locution ַּבָּמקֹום ַהֶּזה: “While this invokes a multitude of passages in the 
Deuteronomic Torah that employ this language, there is a notable circumstantial shift. It is no longer 
YHWH’s name that he will cause to dwell in the temple; the שם terminology so typical of Deuteronomic 




be taken as an argument for seeing the more standardized Deuteronomic locution as a 
source, referring to it by abbreviations, fragments, and/or modifications.20  
Despite the unique use of the lexical set ׁשכן + ָמקֹום + נתן + ֲאֶׁשר + ֶאֶרץ in Deut 
26:2 and Jer 7:7, I am inclined to see Jer 7:3, 7, 12 as picking up a locution that is distinct 
to Deuteronomy, found in Deut 12:11; 14:23; 16:2, 6, 11; 26:2, without being exclusive 
to any one passage within Deuteronomy. 
It is somewhat perplexing to discover Jer 7’s silence regarding the name of 
Jerusalem as the dwelling place of God in the days of Jeremiah. This is rather projected 
as a future possibility. The clause  ַהֶּזהַוֲאַׁשְּכָנה ֶאְתֶכם ַּבָּמקֹום  (“and I will dwell with you in 
this place”) in Jer 7:3 is given as a promise on the condition that the people correct their 
ways.21 By comparison, Deut 12:11; 14:23; 16:2, 6, 11; 26:2 are predictive and 
                                               
actions that were heralded by the Deuteronomic ideology. Rather, the focus is on the people themselves 
rather than the architectural structure surrounding them. The verse employs the indicative pronoun אתכם 
(‘you’), that is, those to whom the Sermon is addressed. It is they as a nation who will have their existence 
sustained by YHWH” (Leuchter, “The Temple Sermon,” 98). Cf. Wouter C. van Wyk, “The Translation of 
MQWM (land) in the Temple Speech of Jeremiah,” in Papers Read at the 24th meeting of Die Ou-
Testamentiese Werkgemeenskap in Siuder-Afrika, eds. Ferdinand Deist and James Alfred Loader, OTS  
(Stellenbosch: Ou-Testamentiese Werkgemeenskap in Siuder-Afrika, 1982), 103–9; Maier, Jeremia als 
Lehrer der Tora, 82–85; Lundbom, Jeremiah 1–20, 461, 464. 
20 Weippert writes: “Die Wendung אשר שכנתי שמי שם nimmt Bezug auf die vom Deuteronomium 
geprägte Theologie, daß Jahwe sich einen Ort erwählt habe, um dort seinen Namen wohnen zu lassen” 
(Weippert, Die Prosareden des Jeremiabuches, 40. Cf. p. 43). In Deut 12:1–17 the three pilgrimage 
festivals, the Pesach, Shavout, and Sukkot, are prescribed. It raises the question whether the people coming 
through the gates of the house of YHWH in Jer 7:2 may have gathered for the occasion of any one of the 
annual festivals. Its use of ָּכל־ְיהּוָדה ַהָּבִאים (“all of Judah coming”) may indicate that the occasion was a 
general assembly of the entire people during a festival. Cf. Wright, The Rule of God, 80; Fohrer, “Jeremias 
Tempelwort (Jeremia 7:1–15,” 191; Craigie et al., Jeremiah 1-25, 120; Lundbom, Jeremiah 1–20, 460, 471. 
For a suggestion to read  ֵָּמהֵהיַכל ְיהָוה ה  in Jer 7:4 as “‘. . . the temple of Jahweh.’ What?” instead of the 
more common “‘. . . the temple of Yahweh are these (buildings)” see Charles F. Whitley, “A Note on 
Jeremiah 7:4,” Journal of Theological Studies 5, no. 1 (1954): 57–59. 
The absence of בחר in Jer 7, so central to the Deuteronomic locution, could either be seen as an 
addition in Deuteornomy or substraction in Jer 7. The modification is open to a direction of dependence 
either way. 
21 For the name-theology cf. Deut 28:10; 1 Kgs 8:43; Jer 7:11, 14, 30; 14:9; 15:16; 25:29; 32:34; 




prescriptive regarding the dwelling of YHWH’s name as the place he will choose. In 
other words, both Deuteronomy and Jer 7 present God’s dwelling with his people as a 
future possibility. Admittedly, Jer 7:10–11, 14, 30 describes the Temple presently as the 
place ָעָליו ְׁשִמיִנְקָרא־  (“which is called by my name”). This niphal-construction leaves the 
impression that while the people regard the Temple as belonging to YHWH, he has not 
made his name to dwell there as a fulfillment of the Deuteronomic promise.22 
However, resembling the Deuteronomic usage we find ֲאֶׁשר ִׁשַּכְנִּתי ְׁשִמי ָׁשם 
(“where I let my name dwell”) in Jer 7:12. This formulation is not used about the Temple 
in Jerusalem, but the Tabernacle at Shiloh. In other words, both Deuteronomy and Jer 7 
present the dwelling of YHWH in the chosen place or Jerusalem as a future possibility, 
except Jer 7:12. Here Jeremiah affirms that YHWH did dwell in the Tabernacle at Shiloh. 
Since Deuteronomy contains descriptions of the fulfilled promise of a dwelling at Shiloh 
or any other chosen place, it therefore seems reasonable to take Jeremiah’s affirmation 
that it was fulfilled in Shiloh as post-dating the Deuteronomic promise. In other words, 
first the Deuteronomic promise was given about a place to be chosen for the dwelling of 
YHWH’s name, and then it was fulfilled with Shiloh according to Jer 7:12. While Deut 
                                               
Diachrony in the Composition of I Kings 8,14-61, trans. Gonni Runia-Deenick (Kampen: Kok Pharos, 
1993). 
22 Holladay as well points out the irony between the promise of YHWH dwelling with the people 
and what the Temple is called (Holladay, Jeremiah 1–25, 246). Leuchter proposes “that the Jerusalem 
Temple may indeed be regarded as YHWH’s מקום as well, though like Shiloh, this is not contingent upon 
the presence of YHWH’s name residing therein” (Leuchter, “The Temple Sermon,” 105). Weippert writes: 
“Die Tempelrede wendet sich demnach nicht gegen eine Hochschätzung des Tempels, wie sie etwa aus 
dem Deuteronomium ableitbar ist, sondern gegen die Volksfrömmigkeit, die sich auf ein falsch 
verstandenes Deuteronomium beruft. Der Tempel ist für das Volk nicht mehr ein Weg zu Jahwe, sondern 
Ziel der Frömmigkeit. Auf diese Weise wird der Tempel zum Hindernis zwischen Jahwe und seinem Volk. 





26:2 says that the people “shall go to the place which” YHWH will choose, bringing the 
produce of the land he has given as a covenant blessing, Jer 7:12 admonishes the people 
to “go up to my place which” YHWH destroyed due to covenant breaches. This may 
indicate a direction of dependence going from Deuteronomy to Jer 7. 
Judging between Person in Jer 7:5b and Exod 18:16: The only two cases where 
the formula  ֵין ִאיׁש ּוֵבין ֵרֵעהּוּב  (“between a man and his neighbor”) occurs in the HB are in 
Exod 18:16 and Jer 7:5. It is, thus, a locution unique to these two passages. In addition, 
Exod 18:16 precedes the formulation with ְוָׁשַפְטִּתי (“and I decide”), while Jer 7:5 has 
 do justice”).23 The use of this same root in both passages strengthens the“) ַתֲעׂשּו ִמְׁשָּפט
case of a reuse between the two. At the same time, this case may also be explained as the 
two passages drawing upon a common source; namely, from established legal language 
and tradition. If this was a common legal formula we would, however, expect to 
encounter it more times in the HB. 
In Exod 18:16 it is Moses that says ְוָׁשַפְטִּתי ֵּבין ִאיׁש ּוֵבין ֵרֵעהּו (“and I judge between 
a man and his neighbor”). In other words, the just judgment is Moses’ responsibility. By 
comparison Jer 7:5 uses the locution ֵּבין ִאיׁש ּוֵבין ֵרֵעהּו to speak of a responsibility of all 
the people. It is possible to argue that Exod 18 transfers Moses’ responsibility to the 
judges and Jer 7 to all the people, but it is difficult to see evidence for Exod 18 modifying 
Jer 7; it follows that this does not offer a sound rationale for the direction of dependence. 
Again, it is the occurrence in the list of possible reuses in Jer 7:5–6, 9 that may constitute 
the strongest argument for Jer 7:5b being dependent upon Exod 18:16, and not vice versa. 
                                               
23 In Ezek 18:8 we find מִ ְׁשַּפט ֱאֶמת ַיעֲ ֶׂשה ֵּבין ִאיׁש ְלִאיׁש. Cf. Weinfeld, Social Justice in Ancient 




The Stranger, Fatherless, and Widow in Jer 7:6a and Deut 24:17, 19: We find the 
lexical set ֵּגר (“stranger”) + ָיתֹום (“orphan”) + ַאְלָמָנה (“widow”) several places in the 
HB.24 Beside the lexical set ַאְלָמָנה + ָיתֹום + ֵּגר, Jer 7:6a seems thematically close to Exod 
22:20–21; Deut 24:17; and 27:19. In all cases mistreating the three groups is prohibited 
or cursed. Exod 22:20–21 prohibits oppressing the stranger (ְוֵגר לֹא־תֹוֶנה ְולֹא ִתְלָחֶצּנּו) and 
mistreating the widow and fatherless (ָּכל־ַאְלָמָנה ְוָיתֹום לֹא ְתַעּנּון); using a different word for 
oppression (ינה) than Jer 7:6 ( ׁשקע ). Deut 24:17 speaks against perverting the justice of 
the stranger and fatherless (לֹא ַתֶּטה ִמְׁשַּפט ֵּגר ָיתֹום) and not taking the garment of the 
widow in pledge (ְולֹא ַתֲחֹבל ֶּבֶגד ַאְלָמָנה). Deut 27:19 curses the one who perverts the 
justice of the stranger, fatherless, and the widow (ָארּור ַמֶּטה ִמְׁשַּפט ֵּגר־ָיתֹום ְוַאְלָמָנה). 
In the Torah, with the exception of Exod 22:20–21, this triad is found exclusively 
in Deuteronomy. Further, the order ַאְלָמָנה/ָיתֹום/ֵּגר is found in Deut 14:29; 16:11, 14; 
24:17, 19–21; 26:12–13; 27:19, the same order as in Jer 7:6, while Exodus has the order 
 in two separate clauses with a relative clause in between.25 ,ָיתֹום/ַאְלָמָנה/ֵּגר
I am inclined to see Jer 7:6a in a similar way as 7:3, 7, 12 discussed above, as 
picking up a general locution from Deuteronomy without necessarily reusing a specific 
passage. The evidence for direction of dependence is, however, too weak to identify with 
                                               
24 Cf. Exod 22:20-21; Deut 10:18-19; 14:29; 16:11, 14; 24:17, 19-21; 26:12-13; 27:19; Jer 7:6; 
22:3; Ezek 22:7; Zech 7:10; Mal 3:5; Ps 94:6; 146:9. Cf. Isa 1:17. The lexical set עׁשק + ַאְלָמָנה + ָיתֹום + ֵּגר 
is only found in Jer 7:6; Zech 7:10; Mal 3:5. The formulation in Zech 7:10 is quite similar to Jer 7:6, except 
it adds ְוָעִני and uses ַאל instead of לֹא. Cf. how Mal 3:5, like Jer 7:9, also speak of swearing falsely 
( ָּׁשֶקרלַ  ּוַבִּנְׁשָּבִעים ). Since Deut 24:17 reads לֹא ַתֶּטה ִמְׁשַּפט ֵּגר ָיתֹום ְולֹא ַתֲחֹבל ֶּבֶגד ַאְלָמָנה, it may possibly also be 
a relation here to Jer 7:5b, with the context of executing ִמְׁשַּפט. The same is the case for Deut 27:19,  ָארּור
 ;Cf. Weippert, Die Prosareden des Jeremiabuches, 42 .ַמֶּטה ִמְׁשַּפט ֵּגר־ָיתֹום ְוַאְלָמָנה ְוָאַמר ָּכל־ָהָעם ָאֵמן
Holladay, Jeremiah 1–25, 243. 




much confidence. Christl Maier and Karel van der Toorn have pointed out that part of the 
ANE tradition and ethos was a concern for the three personae miserae.26 Therefore, we 
cannot discount the possibility that Jer 7 and Deuteronomy share a common tradition that 
explains the parallels as opposed to claiming that they show literary dependence. 
Pouring out the Blood of the Innocent in Jer 7:6b and Deut 19:10: The lexical set 
 is found in 13 cases in the HB.27 Deut 19:10 is set in the context of ָנִקי + ָּדם + ׁשפך
unintentional murder and cities of refuge. The innocent (ָנִקי) is the one who has murdered 
another unintentionally, and the person liable to shed his blood is the blood-avenger.28 In 
Deut 21:7–8 the innocent is a person found killed in the field with no witnesses around. It 
prescribes the heifer rite to purify for the shed blood. 2 Kgs 21:16; 24:4 denounce the 
innocent blood shed in Jerusalem. Joel 4:19, 21 speaks of the shedding of the blood of 
innocent Jews by foreign nations, and how the Jews are vindicated by YHWH. Isa 59:7; 
Ps 106:38; Prov 6:17 speak of the shedding of innocent blood in general terms, and, thus, 
raise the question whether Jer 7:6b may not also express a moral idiom and, therefore, not 
qualify as an instance of literary reuse.29 
                                               
26 van der Toorn, Sin and Sanction, 16; Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer der Tora, 74–75. 
27 Deut 19:10; 21:7-8; 2 Kings 21:16; 24:4; Isa 59:7; Jer 7:6; 22:3, 17; Joel 4:19, 21; Ps 106:38; 
Prov 6:17. Lundbom sees the Deuteronomic passages as background to Jer 7:6 (Lundbom, Jeremiah 1–20, 
464). Cf. Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School, 356. 
28 Cf. Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer der Tora, 75. 
29 Smith claims that the formulation in Jer 7:6, “‘Shed not innocent blood in this place and walk 
not after strange gods to your own heart’ throw into perspective the fifth and first commandments 
respectively” (Smith, “The Decalogue in the Preaching of Jeremias,” 203). Below I will argue that הלך + 
 is more likely a general Deuteronomic locution picked up by Jer 7, rather than a specific ַאֲחֵרי ֱאֹלִהים ֲאֵחִרים
reuse of the first commandment in the Decalogue. Here I will question the lexical basis for Smith’s parallel 
to the sixth commandment against murder (his fifth according to the Catholic division). It is clearly a 
difference between  ֶּזההַ  ַּבָּמקֹום ַאל־ִּתְׁשְּפכּוְוָדם ָנִקי  in Jer 7:6 and  ִּתְרָצחלֹא  in Exod 20:12 and Deut 5:17. 




In the context of Jer 7, the indictment against shedding innocent blood seems best 
understood in light of the execution of Uriah son of Shemaiah from Kiriath-jearim, who 
delivered a similar message as Jeremiah (26:20–23) just prior to Jeremiah’s own Temple 
Sermon. This might be the concrete historical event referred to in Jer 7 and 26. This 
appears to be supported by Jeremiah’s own statement to the officials and all the people 
that they could do with him as they pleased, but should they kill him for delivering the 
Temple Sermon, as Uriah had been killed, then they would bring the guilt of innocent 
blood upon themselves (26:15 ,ָדם ָנִקי ַאֶּתם ֹנְתִנים ֲעֵליֶכם). This would be an argument 
based on the thematic correspondence between Jer 7:6b; 26:15, 20–23.30 
Since it does not seem possible to conclude with confidence on the question of 
reuse based on ָנִקי + ָּדם + ׁשפך alone, neither is it possible to reach a conclusion on the 
question of the direction of dependence.31 
Following Other Gods in Jer 7:6c, 9d and Deut 11:28; 13:3: The lexical set הלך + 
ֲאֵחִריםַאֲחֵרי ֱאֹלִהים   is found in Deuteronomic passages or those often called 
Deuteronomistic.32 The majority of them are found in either Deuteronomy or Jeremiah. 
                                               
dependence. Further, the repetition within Jer 7 itself of ַאֲחֵרי ֱאֹלִהים ֲאֵחִרים + הלך in 7:6, 9—even if 7:9 also 
adds ֲאֶׁשר לֹא־ְיַדְעֶּתם—shows that the author of Jer 7 also could use exact reproduction of locutions. While 
we have by now become used to the phenomena of exact or near to exact repetition combined with 
variation in the same passages, it is not clear why Jer 7:6 preferred the locution  ֶּזההַ  ַּבָּמקֹום ַאל־ִּתְׁשְּפכּוְוָדם ָנִקי  
if it meant to reuse the sixth commandment. 
30 Jeremiah’s critique in 22:17 of Jehoiakim shedding innocent blood would also support a certain 
Sitz im Leben of this locution: “For your eyes and heart are on nothing except unjust gain, on shedding 
innocent blood (ְוַעל ַּדם־ַהָּנִקי ִלְׁשּפֹוְך), and on doing oppression ( ֶׁשקָהעֹ  ) and violence.” The lexical parallels 
with 7:6 are here clear: “[if] you do not oppress (ַתֲעֹׁשקּו) a stranger, an orphan, or a widow, or do not shed 
innocent blood (ְוָדם ָנִקי ַאל־ִּתְׁשְּפכּו) in this place, or do not walk after other gods, to harm yourself.” Cf. 
Lundbom, Jeremiah 1–20, 464. 
31 A similar point is made by Firmage, “Jeremiah, Deuteronomy, and the Priestly Corpus,” 31. 




While ַאֲחֵרי ֱאֹלִהים ֲאֵחִרים is a set formula in both books, the verbal form of הלך varies, 
dependent on the syntax of the passage.33 In Deut 11:28; 13:3; and Jer 7:9 we find a 
variation on the verb ֲאֶׁשר לֹא־ְיַדְעֶּתם + ַאֲחֵרי ֱאֹלִהים ֲאֵחִרים + הלך. Syntactically the closest 
parallels are between Deut 11:28 and Jer 7:9.34 Jer 7:6c therefore seems to be an 
abbreviated form of this longer locution, using only ַאֲחֵרי ֱאֹלִהים ֲאֵחִרים + הלך, and not 
 It seems reasonable to see a reuse of this locution between Jer 7:6, 9 and .ֲאֶׁשר לֹא־ְיַדְעֶּתם
Deut 11:28; 13:3.35 
                                               
16:11; 25:6; 35:15. Cf. 1 Kings 9:6; 11:4-5. Fischer points to Deut 6:14 as the verse mentioning the 
prohibition against following other gods first (Fischer, “Der Einfluss des Deuteronomiums auf das 
Jeremiabuch,” 255). Maier points out that it is only in Deut 6:14 and Jer 7:6 that we find ַאֲחֵרי ֱאֹלִהים + הלך
 :as prohibitive statements (Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer der Tora, 76. See also p. 81). She writes ֲאֵחִרים
“Allein im Verbot der Fremdgotteverehrung (Jer 7,6b) findet sich ein literarisch nachweisbarer Bezug auf 
eine Stelle im Deuteronomium (Dtn 6,14). Die übrigen Gebote sind in Anlehnung an die dtn. 
Sozialgesetzgebung formuliert, ohne jedoch deren Wortlaut zu übernehmen” (Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer 
der Tora, 90). Weinfeld as well lists ֶּתםֲאֶׁשר לֹא־ְיַדעְ  +) ַאֲחֵרי ֱאֹלִהים ֲאֵחִרים + הלך ) as a “Deuteronomic 
phraseology” (Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School, 320, 324, 357). The prohibitive form 
is, however, not sufficient reason to single this out as the source. We need to look at the distribution in the 
entire HB and see which of the alternatives is the more likely. He points out the parallels between the 
prohibition against following other gods in Deut 6:14 and Jer 7:6, and the parallels in Deut 6:18 ( ְוָעִׂשיָת
) and Jer 26:14 (ַהָּיָׁשר ְוַהּטֹוב ְּבֵעיֵני ְיהָוה ֹוב ְוַכָּיָׁשר ְּבֵעיֵניֶכםעֲׂשּו־ִלי ַּכּט ). This strengthens the case that there might 
be a specific reuse of Deut 6 in the Temple Sermon. Further, we might also see a reversal of the phrase 
 in Deut 6:24; 10:13; Jer 32:39 (also in Eccl 2:26; 2 Chr 10:7, and therefore not as exclusive as ְלטֹוב ל
Fischer claims between Deuteronomy and Jeremiah. Cf. Fischer, “Der Einfluss des Deuteronomiums auf 
das Jeremiabuch,” 255) in the phrase ְלַרע ָלֶכם in Jer 7:6. The other cases of reuse between Deut 6 and Jer 
7:6, as pointed out above, strengthens this possibility. This could explain this somewhat strange appendix 
in 7:6. 
33 Again Lundbom sees the Deuteronomic locution as background to Jer 7:6, 9 (Lundbom, 
Jeremiah 1–20, 464). Weippert writes concerning the locution ֲחֵרי ֱאֹלִהים ֲאֵחִריםַא + הלך : “Die Wendung 
gehört auch zum deuteronomisch-deuteronomistischen Formelschatz; dennoch kann sie nicht einfach als 
Indiz für die redigierende Hand eines deuteronomistischen Verfassers gelten” (Weippert, Die Prosareden 
des Jeremiabuches, 41–42). 
34 The clause ֲאֶׁשר לֹא־ְיַדְעֶּתם or equivalents are found in several places in the HB: Gen 19:8; Exod 
1:8; Num 31:18, 35; Deut 1:39; 8:3, 16; 11:2, 28; 13:3, 7, 14; 28:33, 36, 64; 29:25; 31:13; Judg 2:10; 3:1; 
21:12; 1 Sam 25:11; 1 Kgs 18:12; Isa 29:12; Jer 7:9; 9:15; 10:25; 16:13; 17:4; 19:4; 22:28; 44:3; Ezek 32:9; 
Jonah 4:11; Zech 7:14; Ps 35:11; 79:6; Ruth 2:11; Eccl 4:13; 10:15; Dan 11:38). The exact formulation 
 .is only found in Deut 11:28; 13:3, 14; Jer 7:9; 16:13; Ezek 32:9 ֲאֶׁשר לֹא־ְיַדְעֶּתם
35 There might be a relation to the first word in the Decalogue,  ַלֹא ִיְהֶיה־ְלָך ֱאֹלִהים ֲאֵחִרים ַעל־ָּפָני 




Deuteronomy 11:28 is set in the context of blessings for obedience to the 
commandments of YHWH (11:27 ,ֶאת־ַהְּבָרָכה ֲאֶׁשר ִּתְׁשְמעּו ֶאל־ִמְצֹות ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֵהיֶכם), and 
curses for disobedience (11:28 ,ְוַהְּקָלָלה ִאם־לֹא ִתְׁשְמעּו ֶאל־ִמְצֹות ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֵהיֶכם). Deut 13:3 is 
found in the context of the warning against and punishment upon the prophet or dream-
diviner attempting to lead the people into idolatry (13:2–6). With the curse-passage in 
Deut 27:19 as a possible source for Jer 7:6a (see above), it may be that Jer 7:6, 9 also 
evokes the Deuteronomic curses. Alternatively, we may see a parallel between the 
denouncement of false prophets in Deuteronomy and Jeremiah as an instance of possible 
thematic correspondence (e.g. Jer 8:8).36 The phrase ְלַרע ָלֶכם (“to harm yourself”) in Jer 
7:6 may be read as alluding to the curse that would be upon them if they followed other 
gods.37  
With the exception of the arguments for Jer 7:6, 9 reusing Deut 11:28 and/or 13:3, 
mentioned above, I do not see any strong indicators in how Deuteronomy and Jeremiah 
use the locution ֲאֶׁשר לֹא־ְיַדְעֶּתם + ַאֲחֵרי ֱאֹלִהים ֲאֵחִרים + הלך to settle the question of 
direction of dependence.38 
                                               
most likely be seen as indirect, as the formulation is developed in the other Deuteronomic passages. 
36 Like Jer 7:6c, the lexical set ַרע + ַאֲחֵרי ֱאֹלִהים ֲאֵחִרים + הלך is also found in Jer 13:10; 35:15. In 
these two cases, however, the people are predicated as being evil and therefore follow other gods, while in 
Jer 7:6 the evil is seen as a consequence of them following after other gods. 
37 Weinfeld points out that ְלַר ע ָלֶכם in Jer 7:6 and 26:7 is the inverse formulation of the 
“Deuteronomic phraseology וטוב/לטוב לך/לכם/לנו (Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School, 
346). He refers to Deut 5:30; 6:24; 10:13; 19:13. I assume he was thinking of Deut 5:29 instead of 5:30, 
and Deut 30:9 should be added to the list. We should also include the 2 + ל + יטבms/pl suffix in Deut 4:40; 
5:16, 29; 6:3, 18; 12:25, 28; 22:7. The phrase ְלטֹוב ל is, however, also found in Eccl 2:26; 2 Chr 10:7, and 
is therefore not as exclusive as Fischer claims for Deuteronomy and Jeremiah. Cf. Fischer, “Der Einfluss 
des Deuteronomiums auf das Jeremiabuch,” 255. 
38 In both Jer 7:5–6 and 7:9 the human realm is mentioned prior to the divine-human. The order is 




Murder, Adultery, and Robbery in Jer 7:9a and Exod 20:13–15; Deut 5:17–19: 
The lexical set גנב + נאף + רצח is used in Exod 20:13–15; Deut 5:17–19; Jer 7:9; Hos 4:2; 
Job 24:14–15.39 While Exod 20:13–14 and Deut 5:17–19 have the order רצח (“to 
murder”)/ נאף   (“to commit adultery”)/ גנב   (“to steal”), Jer 7:9 gives the order as 
 40.נאף/גנב/רצח Hos 4:2 and Job 24:14–15 as ,נאף/רצח/גנב
                                               
here? Why is the divine-human realm described in rather similar formulations, with little variations 
between 7:6c (ְוַאֲחֵרי ֱאֹלִהים ֲאֵחִרים לֹא ֵתְלכּו ְלַרע ָלֶכם) and 7:9c–d ( ַעל ְוָהֹלְך ַאֲחֵרי ֱאֹלִהים ֲאֵחִרים ֲאֶׁשר ְוַקֵּטר ַלּבָ 
ֲאֶׁשר  in 7:9c, and ְוַקֵּטר ַלָּבַעל ,in 7:6c ְלַרע ָלֶכם Of differences can be mentioned the additions of ?(לֹא־ְיַדְעֶּתם
ְוַאֲחֵרי ֱאֹלִהים ֲאֵחִרים לֹא in 7:9d. Further, the word order and form of the verb also differ between לֹא־ְיַדְעֶּתם
 .in 7:9d ְוָהֹלְך ַאֲחֵרי ֱאֹלִהים ֲאֵחִרים in 7:6c and  ֵתְלכּו
39 The combination of גנב + רצח is found in Isa 1:21, 23, and גנב + נאף in Hos 4:2; 7:1, 4; Ps 
50:18; Job 24:14-15; Prov 6:30, 32. The combination נאף + רצח is never found except in the above quoted 
cases. 
Given that Jeremiah often seems close to Hosea, even reusing this text at points, we need to ask 
whether Jer 7:9a might be reusing Hos 4:2, rather than directly the Decalogue in Exod 20 and Deut 5. 
Based on the infinitive forms in Jer 7:9, with ֲהָגֹנב ָרֹצַח ְוָנֹאף, it is a question whether it may not be a case of 
reuse between Jer 7:9 and Hos 4:2. I concur with Holladay as he writes: “Both prophets thus cite various 
commandments, but there is no discernible pattern either between the lists of the two prophets or in the 
order of choice that either prophet makes from the longer list of the Decalogue” (Holladay, Jeremiah 1–25, 
244). Cf. Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer der Tora, 77–78, 90. Weippert is more confident of a reuse of the 
Decalogue: “Die Verbalreihe von Vers 9 ist sicher auf dem Hintergrund des Dekalogs zu verstehen; der 
Propheten wirft also dem Volk die Nichtbeachtung des Gesetzes vor” (Weippert, Die Prosareden des 
Jeremiabuches, 34). Hos 4:2 comes at the beginning of a diatribe against the inhabitants of the land ( ִּכי ִריב
) The absence of honesty, goodness and knowledge of God .(4:1 ,ַליהָוה ִעם־יֹוְׁשֵבי ָהָאֶרץ ת ְוֵאין־ֶחֶסד ִּכי ֵאין־ֱאמֶ 
 has led to profanity and immorality, with Hos 4 focusing especially upon (4:1 ,ְוֵאין־ַּדַעת ֱאֹלִהים ָּבָאֶרץ
idolatry and adultery. The ַעל־ֵּכן (“therefore”) of Hos 4:13 even establish an explicit link between idolatry 
and adultery, with adultery following as a result of idolatry. It is common to see 4:1 as introducing a new 
major section in the book of Hosea.  
40 Smith claims that compared to the Decalogue we find the “order actually inverted” in Jer 7:9 
(Smith, “The Decalogue in the Preaching of Jeremias,” 203). If this was correct, it might have led us to 
think that it was a case of Seidel’s law of inversion. But that Smith is wrong in claiming that the order is 
inverted is shown in the following table. Here is an overview of the different orders in some of the most 
important manuscripts:  








MT, 4QDeutn, Sam. Pent., LXX, 
Targum, Peshitta, Vulgate, 
4QPhyla, XQPhyl, 1QPhyl 
  PapNash, 
LXX 
 
Jer 7:9 LXX  MT   




While there seems to be a likely reuse between some of the passages Exod 20:13–
15; Deut 5:17–19; Jer 7:9; Hos 4:2; Job 24:14–15, it can also be argued that all or some 
share a common legal tradition.41 Based on the occurrence of the lexical set נאף + רצח + 
  itself it does not seem possible גנב
to conclude on the question of the direction of dependence. 
False Swearing in Jer 7:9b and Exod 20:16; Lev 19:11–12: The lexical set ׁשבע + 
 .is found in Gen 21:23; Lev 5:24; 19:11-12; Jer 5:2; 7:9; Zech 5:4; Mal 3:5 ֶׁשֶקר + לְ 




 LXX   MT 
In the manuscripts it therefore seem to be a clear tendency to prefer the order נאף/רצח/ גנב  in Deut 
5:17–19. PapNash and LXX are here the exceptions. This may cast some doubt as to the originality of the 
order also for Exod 20:13–15 LXX, and support Exod 20:13–15 MT. Strangely enough, the order in Jer 7:9 
LXX aligns with the order given in the versions of the Decalogue in MT. It is possible the translator of Jer 
7:9 LXX recognize a reuse and render his translation closer to that of the versions of the Decalogue in his 
Hebrew Vorlage, even if the LXX itself chose to render the order in the Decalogue different than as found 
in MT. This overview also raises the question whether there might be a case of reuse between Hos 4:2 and 
Job 24:14–15, as we find the same order both in MT and LXX in the two passages. This, however, takes us 
beyond the parameters of the present study. The parallels between Deut 5:29 ( ִמי־ִיֵּתן ְוָהָיה ְלָבָבם ֶזה ָלֶהם
םָּכל־ַהָּיִמים ְלַמַען ִייַטב ָלֶהם ְוִלְבֵניֶהם ְלֹעלָ ְלִיְרָאה ֹאִתי ְוִלְׁשֹמר ֶאת־ָּכל־ִמְצֹוַתי  ) and Jer 32:39 ( ְוָנַתִּתי ָלֶהם ֵלב ֶאָחד ְוֶדֶרְך
 .can be taken as support of reuse of Deut 5 in Jeremiah (ֶאָחד ְלִיְרָאה אֹוִתי ָּכל־ַהָּיִמים ְלטֹוב ָלֶהם ְוִלְבֵניֶהם ַאֲחֵריֶהם
Fischer writes: “Die beiden Passagen stellen die langste Ubereinstimmung zur Kombination der Elemente, 
geben, Herz, mich furchten, alle Tage, gut, ihnen und ihren Kindern’ dar” (Fischer, “Der Einfluss des 
Deuteronomiums auf das Jeremiabuch,” 251).  
41 For a discussion on the prohibitions against murder, adultery, theft, and false witness in the 
ANE, see van der Toorn, Sin and Sanction, 15–20. Cf. Fitzpatrick-McKinley, The Transformation of 
Torah, 118–45. Commenting on the parallels between Hos 4:2 and Jer 7:9 and the versions of the 
Decalogue, de Vos writes: “Für diese beiden Texte gilt das Gleiche wie für Hos 13,4: Es ist unsicher, ob 
hier bewusst auf den Dekalog angespielt wird, und wir wissen nicht, ob der Dekalog beiden Autoren schon 
vorlag. Eher darf man davon ausgehen, dass sowohl der Dekalog als auch die eben erwähnten Texte auf 
traditionelle Normen zurückgehen, die schriftlich auf verschiedene Weise zum Tragen kommen konnten” 
(J. Cornelis de Vos, Rezeption und Wirkung des Dakalogs in jüdischen und christlichen Schriften bis 200 
n.Chr., Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity 95 (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 17). Maier writes: “Die haüfig 
verhandelte Frage, ob Hos 4,1–3 und Jer 7, den Dekalog voraussetzen oder auf die Gebotsformulierungen 
erst hinführen, läßt sich kaum zweifelsfrei beantworten” (Maier, Jeremia als Lehrer der Tora, 78). 
Since Jer 7:9b can be read as a possible reuse of the ninth word of the Decalogue (see below), as 
relating to false swearing or testimony (ְוִהָּׁשֵבַע ַלֶּׁשֶקר, see below), this also strengthens the case for reuse of 





Could this be a case of reuse of the ninth commandment in the Decalogue, prohibiting 
false testimony (לֹא־ַתֲעֶנה ְבֵרֲעָך ֵעד ָׁשֶקר)? This possibility is limited to Exod 20:16, as the 
Deuteronomic version of the Decalogue uses ָׁשְוא instead of ֶׁשֶקר. The use of the lexeme 
 in itself is of course too meagre a basis for reaching a conclusion, but since Jer 7:9a ֶׁשֶקר
may be understood as reusing the sixth to eighth commandments in the Decalogue (see 
above) and 7:9b the ninth commandment of the Decalogue, they mutually strengthen one 
another’s case of reuse of the Decalogue.42 
Lev 19:11–12 may be of special interest here, as it ties together stealing ( לֹא
ְולֹא־) and false swearing by the name of YHWH ,(ְולֹא־ְתַׁשְּקרּו ִאיׁש ַּבֲעִמיתֹו) lying ,(ִּתְגֹנבּו
 .It resembles Jer 7:9 also speaking of stealing and swearing falsely 43.(ִתָּׁשְבעּו ִבְׁשִמי ַלָּׁשֶקר
The lexical set ֶׁשֶקר + לְ  + ׁשבע seems to be used specifically for swearing by YHWH’s 
name (Lev 19:12; Jer 5:2; Zech 5:4, cf. Gen 21:23), while Jer 7:9 does not specify 
whether this is swearing falsely by YHWH’s name. Nevertheless, ְוִהָּׁשֵבַע ַלֶּׁשֶקר in Jer 7:9b 
may be related to the ִּדְבֵרי ַהֶּׁשֶקר in 7:4, 8. If they are to be understood as referring to the 
same, they would both denounce swearing falsely by the Temple. Reading  ַַלֶּׁשֶקר ְוִהָּׁשֵבע  in 
Jer 7:9b as swearing by YHWH’s name thus seems reasonable as well. On the other 
hand, while ִּדְבֵרי ַהֶּׁשֶקר in 7:4, 8 may be understood as false confidence in the Temple 
                                               
42 Holladay writes: “there is reason to connect the prohibition here and in Hos 4:2* with the 
commandment in the Decalogue, “You shall not take the name of Yahweh your God in vain” (Holladay, 
Jeremiah 1–25, 245). Maier characterizes the expression  ַַלֶּׁשֶקר ְוִהָּׁשֵבע  as post-exilic (Maier, Jeremia als 
Lehrer der Tora, 79). Cf. Weippert who questions seeing ּתֹוֵעָבה in Jer 7:10 as a reuse of the syncretistic 
definition the term has in Deuteronomy. She concludes that it “entsprechen damit aber nicht einem speziell 
deuteronomischen, sondern allgemein üblichen Sprachgebrauch . . . . In sprachlicher Hinsicht hebt sich das 
Jeremiabuch im Gebrauch von תועבה sowohl vom Deuteronomium als auch vom Deuteronomisten ab. Die 
für das Deuteronomium typische Wendung יהוה תועבה  hat im Jeremiabuch keine Entsprechung” (Weippert, 
Die Prosareden des Jeremiabuches, 43). 




itself, 7:9b may be understood more as swearing falsely in general. Exod 20:16 concerns 
a false testimony given in a court setting. Given thematic correspondence, Jer 7:9b seems 
closer to Lev 19:11–12 than Exod 20:16. 
Again, the individual locutions seem insufficient to make strong conclusions 
regarding reuse and direction of dependence. It is rather the overall structure of Jer 7:1–
15, more specifically what seem to be cases of pastiche in 7:5–6, 9, that make the 
strongest argument for reuse and direction of dependence, where Jer 7:5–6, 9 
accumulates abbreviated cases of reuse of Torah instructions in list-form. 
We now move to the case of Ezek 18, which, very similarly to Jer 7, contains 
what looks like a pastiche of Torah-passages. 
Ezekiel 18 
Ezekiel 18:2 opens with the proverb spoken among the people that children suffer 
for the acts of their fathers, ָאבֹות יֹאְכלּו ֹבֶסר ְוִׁשֵּני ַהָּבִנים ִּתְקֶהיָנה (“fathers eat sour grapes and 
the sons’ teeth are blunt”).44 The people clearly thought that their exilic destiny resulted 
                                               
44 The people’s statements break up the chapter at certain places. As mentioned, the people’s 
proverb referred to in 18:2 constitute the departure of the diatribe. In 18:19, 25, 29 the people object to 
YHWH’s countering their proverb, and is met by a further elaboration of his principle. The same proverb is 
found in Jer 31:30. Note how two different words for sin is used in Jer 31:30 and Deut 24:16. Jer 31:30 
uses  ֹוַּבֲעֹונ  while Deut 24:16 uses  ֹוְּבֶחְטא . Still it is a similar syntactic structure:  +ב+  ֵחְטא/ָעֹון  3ms suffix. 
Greenberg writes: “Contrary to Ezekiel, Jeremiah tacitly admitted the validity of the proverb. In the present 
dispensation, made harsh by Israel’s obduracy, God uses his prerogative against the children of apostates 
(who, though not so bad as their fathers, still do not have clean hands); only in time to come (‘in those 
days’) as part of the ‘new covenant’ God will abandon this harsh measure. Then, but not now, ‘he who eats 
unripe grapes, his teeth shall be set on edge,’ and the proverb will no longer be used. Ezekiel, on the other 
hand, demands that the proverb be given up at once; it gives a false picture of God’s conduct now. To him 
the proverb means that its users regard themselves as innocent” (Greenberg, Ezekiel 1-20, 340). 
Moshe Greenberg divided the book of Ezekiel in two, following more ancient traditions, between 
Ezek 1–24 and 25–48 (Greenberg, Ezekiel 1-20, 3–4). The ancient traditions Greenberg refers to are the 
Babylonian Talmud (Baba Batra 14b) and Josephus (Antiq. 10.5.1 [79]). He entitles Ezek 18 “Retort to an 
epigram impunging God’s justice, a call to repentance.” Zimmerli entitled the chapter “The Freedom to 




from their fathers’ sins, not their own.45 The rest of the chapter is a refutation of this 
proverb by YHWH.46 Ezek 18:3 declares that the proverb shall be spoken no more in 
Israel. The basic premise of the refutation is given in 18:4, namely that all persons belong 
to YHWH, both fathers and sons (47.(ֵהן ָּכל־ַהְּנָפׁשֹות ִלי ֵהָּנה ְּכֶנֶפׁש ָהָאב ּוְכֶנֶפׁש ַהֵּבן ִלי־ֵהָּנה He is 
thus entitled to judge, and the principle by which he operates is that “the person who sins, 
that one shall die” (ַהֶּנֶפׁש ַהֹחֵטאת ִהיא ָתמּות). Each one will be rewarded for their own 
actions. Implicitly, members of the present generation are not suffering for their fathers’ 
sins, but their own. Ezek 18 is thematically paralleled by Ezek 33:10–20. This passage 
begins with the question ְוֵאיְך ִנְחֶיה in 33:10.48 The question could be read ethically as 
“how then should we live?”; the same question with which I introduced this study. But 
given the larger context of 33:10, the ethical question must accomodate an immediate 
existential question; namely, “how can we survive?” The opening ethical question in this 
study therefore receives an existential sense as well. 
Then we are given a description of three generations, largely in similar terms, and 
basically alternating between walking in YHWH’s commands and keeping/doing his 
rulings or contrary doing what is an abomination for him. The first generation (18:5–9) is 
                                               
Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979), 386). For parallel passages in Ezekiel see Ezek 22:6–12 and 
33:10–20. 
45 Cf. Graffy, A Prophet Confronts His People, 58–60. 
46 Cooke saw precedents in the book of Ezekiel to the themes in Ezek 18, in that “the righteous are 
to be marked out by a sign (9:4); they would at any rate deliver themselves (14:14, 16, 18, 20); repentance 
was still possible (14:6, 11)” (G. A. Cooke, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Ezekiel, 
ICC 21 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1936), 195). 
47 I choose to render ָאב and ֵּבן in this chapter as “father” and “son,” since the use of the 3ms 
suffixes (e.g. ָּדָמיו in 18:13 and ָאִביו in 18:14) in the chapter indicate a focus upon the male lineage. 




summed up as ְּבֻחּקֹוַתי ְיַהֵּלְך ּוִמְׁשָּפַטי ָׁשַמר ַלֲעׂשֹות ֱאֶמת (“he walks in my commandments and 
keeps my rulings to act truthfully”, 18:9). The third (18:14–17) is in reverse order but 
likewise says, ִמְׁשָּפַטי ָעָׂשה ְּבֻחּקֹוַתי ָהָלְך (“he did my rulings and walked in my 
commandments,” 18:17), whereas the middle generation (18:10–13) is described as ֵאת
ֹות ָהֵאֶּלה ָעָׂשהָּכל־ַהּתֹוֵעב  (“the one who has done all these abominations,” 18:13). We can 
compare the similar terminology used to describe the three generations in Table 22. 
While the proverb of 18:2 accused the generation of fathers to be responsible for the 
children’s malady, it is of interest to note that the first generation is described as 
righteous (18:5 ,ַצִּדיק ְוָעָׂשה ִמְׁשָּפט ּוְצָדָקה). Similarly, the third generation is characterized in 
positive terms. The contemporaries of Ezekiel apparently correspond to the second 
generation. They cannot blame their fathers before them, who are implicitly right. It is the 
middle generation that does what is wrong, and will suffer capital punishment (18;13, 
 ,Simultaneously, there is hope in the analogy if their own children .(מֹות יּוָמת ָּדָמיו ּבֹו ִיְהֶיה
corresponding to the third generation, will turn from the evil ways of the present 
generation. The analogy can therefore be read as placing the responsibility of the present 
malady upon the present generation, while optimistically seeing hope for the next 
generation.  
The principle of individual responsibility is explicitly stated in 18:4, 17, 20, 30 As 
mentioned, in 18:4 it is formulated as ַהֶּנֶפׁש ַהֹחֵטאת ִהיא ָתמּות (“the person who sins, that 
one shall die”). Speaking about a son who has turned away from the evil ways of his 
father, 18:17 states that הּוא לֹא ָימּות ַּבֲעֹון ָאִביו ָחֹיה ִיְחֶיה (“he shall not die for the iniquity of 
his father. He shall surely live”). Ezek 18:20 continues saying ַהֶּנֶפׁש ַהֹחֵטאת ִהיא ָתמּות ֵּבן




Table 22. The Three Generations in Ezek 18 
Ezek 18:5–9 
 
Ezek 18:10–13 Ezek 18:14–17 
ואיׁש כי־יהיה צדיק ועׂשה  5
לא  אל־ההרים 6 וצדקה׃ מׁשפט
ועיניו לא נׂשא אל־גלולי  אכל
את־אׁשת רעהו ו בית יׂשראל
ואל־אׁשה נדה לא  לא טמא
ו ואיׁש לא יונה חבלת 7 יקרב׃
לחמו  לא יגזל גזלהחוב יׁשיב 
 ׃לרעב יתן ועירם יכסה־בגד
תרבית לא לא־יתן ו נׁשךב 8
אמת  מׁשפט יׁשיב ידועול מ יקח
 יעׂשה בין איׁש לאיׁש׃
י ׁשמר מׁשפטו בחקותי יהלך 9
חיה לעׂשות אמת צדיק הוא 
 נאם אדני יהוה׃ יחיה
־פריץ ׁשפך דם בן הולידו 10 
והוא  11 ועׂשה אח מאחד מאלה׃
כי גם  את־כל־אלה לא עׂשה
ואת־אׁשת  אכל ־ההריםאל
 הונהואביון  עני 12 ׃רעהו טמא
ואל־ יׁשיב לא חבל גזל גזלות
תועבה  הגלולים נׂשא עיניו
תרבית ו נתן נׁשךב 13 עׂשה׃
את כל־ יחיהלא  חיו לקח
 יומתהתועבות האלה עׂשה מות 
 דמיו בו יהיה׃
וירא את־ בן הולידוהנה  14 
כל־חטאת אביו אׁשר עׂשה 
על־ 15 ויראה ולא יעׂשה כהן׃
ועיניו לא נׂשא  לא אכל ההרים
את־אׁשת  אל־גלולי בית יׂשראל
ואיׁש לא  16 ׃טמארעהו לא 
גזלה לא ו חבל לא חבל הונה
לחמו לרעב נתן וערום  גזל
 הׁשיב ידו מעני 17 ׃כסה־בגד
י מׁשפט תרבית לא לקחו נׁשך
הוא לא  בחקותי הלךעׂשה 
 ׃חיה יחיהבעון אביו  ימות
 
5 And if a man is righteous, and 
does justice and righteousness, 6 
he does has not eaten on the 
mountains, and he has not lifted 
his eyes to the idols of the house 
of Israel, and has not defiled his 
neighbor’s wife, and not 
approached a menstruant woman,  
7 and has not oppressed anyone, 
returned the debtor’s pledge, not 
robbed a robbery, given his bread 
to the hungry, and covered the 
naked [with] clothe, 8 not lent 
with interest, not taken profit, 
kept his hand from injustice, 
done true justice between a man 
and a man, 9 walks in my 
ordinances and keeps my 
judgments to act truthfully, he is 
righteous. He shall surely live, 
says the lord YHWH. 
10 But if he begets a violent son, 
shedding blood, and does to a 
brother any of these things 11 — 
though he has not done any of 
these things—if he even eats upon 
the mountains, and has defiled his 
neighbor’s wife, 12 has oppressed 
the poor and needy, robbed 
robbery, not returned a pledge, 
and lifted his eyes to the idols, 
committed abominations, 13 lent 
with interest, taken a profit—and 
shall he live? He shall not live 
who does all these abominations. 
He shall die for certain. His blood 
shall be upon him.  
14 but if he begets a son, and he 
sees all the sins of his father, who 
he [i.e. his father] did, and he sees  
and does not do likewise, 15 he 
does not eat upon the mountains, 
and does not lift his eyes to the 
idols of the house of Israel, has 
not defiled his neighbor’s wife, 16 
and has not oppressed anyone, not 
taken a pledge, nor robbed a 
robbery, given his bread to the 
hungry and covered the naked 
[with] clothe, 17 kept his hand 
from the poor,49 not taken interest 
or profit, done my justice, walked 
in my commands—he shall not 
die in his fathers sins. He shall 
surely live.   
 
 
                                               




person who sins, he shall die. A son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, and a father 
shall not bear the iniquity of the son. The righteousness of a righteous man shall be upon 
him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him”). Ezek 18:30 summarizes by 
stating the basic principle anew, ָלֵכן ִאיׁש ִּכְדָרָכיו ֶאְׁשֹּפט ֶאְתֶכם ֵּבית ִיְׂשָרֵאל (“Therefore, I will 
judge you, O house of Israel, each man according to his ways”). 
We note that Ezekiel operates with an absolute dichotomy between the one who is 
righteous because of one’s righteous acts, and the one who is wicked because of one’s 
wicked acts. There are no grey zones. Neither is there any determinism at work. An 
individual can choose at any time to effect a transition between the two categories. The 
chapter focuses upon the individually chosen disposition expressed in concrete actions. 
There is an almost equal distribution between cultic and moral/social acts in the 
description of the three generations. While the main focus arguably is upon what we 
would call ethical and social interaction, the cultic descriptions indicate that cultic 
participation and ethics go hand in hand.50 
Ezekiel 18:21–24, 26–28 proceeds to radicalize the principle.51 Not only will each 
be rewarded according to his or her own actions, but what really counts are the present 
acts and not the previous ones. Therefore, there is a present possibility for each individual 
                                               
50 Cf. Kaufmann, The Religion of Israel, 433; Greenberg, Ezekiel 1-20, 342; Weinfeld, Social 
Justice in Ancient Israel, 17n. 
51 Commenting on the two sections of Ezek 18, vv. 2–20 and 21–32, Greenberg writes that “a 
feature of this oracle is the interweaving of its parts with an absence of clear formal boundaries” 
(Greenberg, Ezekiel 1-20, 335). On p. 336 he finds this to be an example of the “‘halving’ structure of 
Ezekiel’s oracles.” Cf. Adrian A. Schenker, “Saure Trauben ohne stumpfe Zähne: Bedeutung und 
Tragweise von Ez 18 und 33:10–20 oder ein Kapitel alttestamentlicher Moraltheologie,” in Mélanges 
Doiminique Barthélemy: Etudes Bibliques Offertes à L'occasion de Son 60e Anniversaire, eds. P. Casetti, 





to make a change. One’s destiny is not determined by previous sins, but one can choose 
to change course. Furthermore, one’s previous sins are entirely forgotten if one chooses 
to walk according to YHWH’s commands and rulings (18:22). On the other side, there is 
no meritorious repository of righteous acts than can balance out present sins (18:24). 
Present sins will also cancel out entirely any previous righteous acts. 
Finally, the chapter sums up with a call to all of Israel that they turn from their 
sins, repent, and acquire a new heart and spirit (18:30–32). While it is not clear how they 
can acquire a new heart and spirit in these passages, they clearly have a personal 
responsibility to begin reform through repentance. Ezekiel 11:19–20 and 36:26–27 imply 
divine enabling in this process.52 While I have so far emphasized reading as a disclosure 
of the thought of the heart, Ezek 11:19–20; 18:30–32; 36:26–27—together with Jer 
                                               
52 Greenberg, Ezekiel 1-20, 341; Matties, Ezekiel 18, 6–7. Matties formulates it as follows: “In 
Ezekiel laws are cited not so much to describe reality as to create and evoke a new reality. . . . The call to 
‘get yourselves a new heart and a new spirit’ is an invitation to participate in the process of becoming” 
(Matties, Ezekiel 18, 194–95). And again: “Ezekiel 18 is an attempt to shape a moral community through 
the creative use of language” (Matties, Ezekiel 18, 219). See also 205–208, 218, 224 where he reflects on 
the parallels between repentance and acquiring a new heart/spirit in the book of Ezekiel, and how Ezek 18 
offers “a way of being in the liminal moment between judgment and transformation.” And again: “We need 
to say that Ezekiel saves both God’s honour and the honour of the human community by offering both the 
freedom to act according to the character of the covenantal narrative tradition. That allows Ezekiel to do 
justice to the tension between human and divine interdependence and responsibility” (Matties, Ezekiel 18, 
213). And finally: “Yahweh is an interactive personal agent who has a stake in the fate of the people. This 
God cannot be known apart from embodiment in the life and character of the peoplehood. And this God is 
affected by the actions of that people. Thus, the actions of the community have consequences not only in 
the historical experience of Israel, but also the community’s actions have driven Yahweh from his land. 
Ezekiel 18 therefore addresses the theodicy question by suggesting that the moral architecture of the world 
is known in the real world of human community” (Matties, Ezekiel 18, 223). According to Zimmerli, the 
tension between Ezek 11:19–20 and 36:26–27 on one side and Ezek 18:30–32 on the other side show “that 
in the divine salvation man never appears simply as a vague object, but always as the purposeful subject of 
grace for a new beginning” (Zimmerli, Ezekiel 1, 386). Cf. Paul M. Joyce, Divine Initiative and Human 
Response in Ezekiel, JSOTSup 51 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1989), 107–24; Paul M. Joyce, 
“Ezekiel and Moral Transformation,” in Transforming Visions: Transformations of Text, Tradition, and 





31:31–34—open the possibility, as well, of reading in order to change one’s heart. 
Pursuing this topic, together with the deceptiveness of the heart addressed in Jer 17:9 
mentioned earlier, would take us beyond the parameters of the present study.53 
The following is a summary of the strongest parallels between Ezek 18 and 
passages in Torah. The relation between Ezekiel and Torah has been extensively 
discussed. Lyons summarizes the five different explanation for the parallels between 
Ezekiel and the HI: “Ezekiel the prophet wrote both the book bearing his name and the 
Holiness Code; H draws upon the book of Ezekiel; both H and Ezekiel used a common 
source; both H and Ezekiel underwent a long history of composition and mutually 
influenced each other; the book of Ezekiel used H.”54 More specifically it is rather a 
                                               
53 Joyce writes: “The book [of Ezekiel] is marked by strong tensions, of which none is more 
dramatic than that between the challenge to Israel to get a ‘new heart’ and a ‘new spirit’ in 18.31 and the 
promise that a ‘new heart’ and a ‘new spirit’ will be given to Israel in 36.26–27. These texts represent the 
twin poles of the book: on the one hand, a strong insistence upon Israel’s responsibility before her God and, 
on the other, a remarkable assurance that Yahweh will enable his recalcitrant people to obey him” (Joyce, 
Divine Initiative, 125. Cf. his proposal on pp. 126–29 that the two poles are related in the book of Ezekiel 
through its radical theocentricity). 
54 Lyons, From Law to Prophecy, 35. For a survey and discussion of the various positions see 
Lyons, From Law to Prophecy, 36–46. To Karl Heinrich Graf it seemed that it was Ezekiel that wrote both 
the book by his name and the HI (Karl Heinrich Graf, Die geschichtlichen Bücher des Alten Testaments. 
Zwei historisch-kritische Untersuchungen (Leipzig: Weigel, 1857), 81–82). Julius Wellhausen claimed that 
it was the author of HI that reused Ezekiel (Wellhausen, Prolegomena, 378–79, 384). Georg Fohrer argued 
that Ezekiel and HI used a common source (Georg Fohrer, Introduction to the Old Testament, trans. David 
E. Green (Nashville: Abingdon, 1968), 142). For scholars who have argued that P and Ezekiel belonged to 
the same tradition, see Joon S. Park, “Theological Traditions of Israel in the Prophetic Judgment Speeches 
of Ezekiel” (Ph.D. diss., Princeton Theological Seminary, 1979), 201–22; Zimmerli, Ezekiel 1, 46–52; 
Ronad E. Clements, “The Ezekiel Tradition: Prophecy in a Time of Crisis,” in Israel's Prophetic Tradition: 
Essays in Honour of Peter R. Ackroyd, eds. R. Coggins, A. Phillips and M. Knibb (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982), 130–32. Zimmerli nevertheless calls for a more qualified approach to the question 
of the relation between Torah and Ezekiel, specifically the so-called P source and Ezekiel, calling for 
careful studies of the individual parallels—noticing both similarities and differences: “Even if we exclude 
the view that Ezekiel was the author of H as improbable from the start, we will have to abandon the sharp 
alternatives: Ezekiel was dependent on H or vice-versa; or there was a common source for Ezekiel and H. 
Instead we must make a carefully detailed comparison. The contacts must be carefully studied in detail as 
well as the frequent direct interruptions of contact and the undeniable distinctiveness of the two corpora, 
each of which has its own tradition—and redaction—history” (Zimmerli, Ezekiel 1, 47). Zimmerli 




commonplace in scholarship to note the parallels between Ezek 18 and Torah.55  
                                               
material built into H, or which already underlies it. This dependence appears in regard to the speech forms 
of Leviticus 17, the series of laws of Leviticus 18 (and 20), but less strong in regard to those of Leviticus 
19, but then again in strong measure in regard to the underlying text used by Leviticus 26. Against this 
there are other parts, as Leviticus 21–25, in which the contacts are much less. On the other hand, it can be 
seen most clearly in parts of Leviticus 26 that the prophecy of Ezekiel has exercised a reciprocal influence 
on the development of H, even though the theological basis of H is clearly different, from that of Ezekiel. 
The circles which must have given to H its (pre-P Document) form must not be sought too far from the 
circles which transmitted the book of Ezekiel” (Zimmerli, Ezekiel 1, 52). He is however clear that it is not 
possible to see an influence going from Ezekiel to the so-called P source: “In what has been said it is 
already quite clear that we cannot speak of a dependence of the original words of Ezekiel on the Priestly 
Document (P), into which H in its present form has been worked. . . . P drew from the great stream of 
priestly tradition, from which also the priest-prophet Ezekiel (at an earlier point of time) had also been 
nourished” (Zimmerli, Ezekiel 1, 52). Regarding Ezek 18 specifically, he writes that the chapter makes 
“extensive use of older formulations” (Zimmerli, Ezekiel 1, 386). For scholars who have argued for the 
priority of the so-called Priestly source relative to Ezekiel see e.g. Kaufmann, The Religion of Israel, 432–
35; Menahem Haran, “The Law Code of Ezekiel 40–47 and its Relation to the Priestly School,” HUCA 50 
(1979); Hurvitz, A Linguistic Study; Lyons, From Law to Prophecy; Jacob Milgrom and Daniel I. Block, 
Ezekiel's Hope: A Commentary on Ezekiel 38-48 (Eugene, OR: Cascade Bookes, 2012). Greenberg writes: 
“The priest-prophet’s orientation toward torah meant that for him the ancient ideal would be embodied in 
torah-like individual stipulations” (Greenberg, Ezekiel 1-20, 344). 
55 Greenberg compares the Decalogue, Ezek 18, and other moral lists in the HB: “Compared with 
the Decalogue, Ezekiel’s list is more specific in its moral items but less comprehensive and suggestive; it is 
formally composed of indicative verb sentences, not commands. Other comparable lists describe the ideal 
man “who may sojourn on God’s holy mountain” (Ps 15 at length; briefly Ps 24:3f.; cf. Isa 33:14b–16)—
but they are remarkably divergent from Ezekiel’s list and lack ritual qualifications” (Greenberg, Ezekiel 1-
20, 342). For the pedagogical function of moral lists in the HB, see Greenberg, Ezekiel 1-20, 344–45. Cf. 
Zimmerli, Ezekiel 1, 379–80 who finds in Ezek 18 “an order which recalls the classical Decalogue,” at the 
same time as he notes that “the verbal contacts with the classical Decalogue are surprisingly small.” 
Levinson writes: “Ezekiel . . . uses the proverb as a strategic foil for the far more theologically problematic 
act of effectively annulling a divine law. The prophet in effect ‘devoices’ the doctrine’s original attribution 
to God and then ‘revoices’ it as folk wisdom. By this means, the oracle obscures its subversion of the 
divine instruction found in the Decalogue” (Levinson, Legal Revision, 63). While it is easy to see how the 
Decalogue and Ezek 18 can be read as divergent, as will be seen, it is not as clear to demonstrate an 
intentional literary reworking—not to speak of ‘subversion’—of the Decalogue in Ezek 18. While 
Levinson’s reconstructed relation between the passages is possible, the evidence seems wanting for the 
confidence in which he goes about discussing their relation. The overlap between Exod 20:5; Deut 5:9; and 
Ezek 18:2 in the idea of transgenerational punishment combined with the lexical overlap of ָאבֹות (“fathers”) 
and ָּבִנים (“sons”) is clearly not a strong basis for speaking of reuse. This Levinson himself admits: “the 
overlap is only partial: sufficient for the proverb to resonate with the Decalogue doctrine, but insufficiently 
specific or extensive to point to an explicit citation or reuse of that text” (Levinson, Legal Revision, 62). 
Agreeing with him on the weak basis for speaking of reuse between the two passages, might we not be 
better served by caution than conjecture? It could possibly be argued that the lexical set בֹותָא  (“fathers”) 
and ָּבִנים (“sons”) is used in a distinct manner in Exod 20:5; Deut 5:9; and Ezek 18:2 in the context of 
transgenerational punishment, but Levinson does not try to make such a point. The meager evidence of 
reuse, however, still stands as the major challenge. The combination of ָּבִנים + ָאבֹות, both in the plural, is 




My discussion is not intended to uncover a comprehensive nor exhaustive list of 
possible parallels, but only to focus on the stronger parallels. We find these parallels in 
the lists used to describe the three generations.56 
Individual Responsibility in Deut 24:16 and Ezek 18:4, 20: There seems to be a 
close thematic link between Deut 24:16 and all of Ezek 18, in the principle of individual 
punishment in contrast to transgenerational punishment.57 The lexical set מות + ֵּבן + ָאב + 
                                               
56 For a survey of the scholarly discussion on the function of these lists see Matties, Ezekiel 18, 
92–105, 182–85. Cf. pp. 86–92. 
57 Fishbane writes: “The typical crimes in chap. 18 are derived from Deut 24, precisely the chapter 
which contains the rule of individual responsibility which he cites” (Fishbane, “Sin and Judgment,” 146–
47). On p. 339 he writes that “the sources of Ezekiel’s exegetical imagination are, of course, difficult to 
determine” but nevertheless finds Deut 24:16 to be “a valuable clue” for understanding Ezek 18. He 
continues: “An examination of Ezekiel’s language in 18:7–8, 13, 16, and 8 shows that many of the cases 
which he cites as examples of civil delicts are in fact drawn from a series of cases found in close 
association in Deut. 23:20–1, 24:6, 10–15, 17. . . . it suggests that Ezekiel was drawn to cite these 
deuteronomic cases precisely because they were already associated in his traditum and were found in close 
proximity to a legal principle which rejected vicarious punishments” (Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in 
Ancient Israel, 339). He mentions Ezek 18 as an example of “links between Ezekiel and the Covenant 
Code, via the deuteronomic laws” where the author “lists a sequence of delicts which follows those in 
Exod. 22:10, 24–6 and their reworking in Deut. 24:10–18” (Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient 
Israel, 293). Joyce points out that there is a reversed order of the locutions between Deut 24:16 and Ezek 
18:20 (Joyce, Divine Initiative, 48). On p. 49 he also claims that in Ezek 18:2 the principle of non-
transgenerational punishment is pronounced in the context of divine punishment, while in 18:20 as a legal 
principle. According to Kohn the order in Ezek 18:20 is reversed when compared to Deut 24:16, while 
Ezek 18:20 at the same time is formulated in the language of the so-called P source (Kohn, New Heart and 
A New Soul, 96–97). Cf. Graffy, A Prophet Confronts His People, 63; Leslie C. Allen, Ezekiel 1–19, WBC 
29 (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 1990), 272–73, 277, 281. Greenberg writes: “The literary connection 
of Ezekiel’s theological principle to Deuteronomy’s legal one is suggested by the strict inversion of parts: 
Deut 24:16  Ezek 18:20  
not fathers for sons 1 who sins dies 3 
not sons for fathers 2 not son for father 2 
each dies for his own sin 3 not father for son 1 
—a parade example of Seidel’s rule that literary reference is indicated by inversion. The “normal” 
sequence “fathers—sons” appears in initial position in Deuteronomy; this suggests that Ezekiel was the 
borrower” (Greenberg, Ezekiel 1-20). While there might be a thematic inversion, given the variation in the 
language in the MT, however, the inversion is not as clear: 
Deut 24:16  Ezek 18:20  
 3 החטאת היא תמות שהנפ 1 על־בנים לא־יומתו אבות
 2 בעון האב אשבן לא־י 2 ובנים לא־יומתו על־אבות




 ,is found in the HB in the six cases of Num 27:3; Deut 24:16; 2 Kgs 14:6; Ezek 18:4 חטא
20; 2 Chr 25:4. 2 Kgs 14:6 and 2 Chr 25:4 both describe Amaziah’s execution of his 
father Joash’s murderers. Both verses can be considered a citation from Deut 24:16, as 
they give the exact wording of Deut 24:16 and refer to ַּכָּכתּוב ְּבֵסֶפר ּתֹוַרת־ֹמֶׁשה ֲאֶׁשר־ִצָּוה
 as it is written in the Book of the Torah of Moses, which YHWH“) ְיהָוה ֵלאֹמר
commanded, saying”).58 Num 27:3 may be seen as sharing the same idea as Deut 24:16, 
contrasting Korah who died for his own sins and Zelophehad who was not part of the 
rebellion. Even if Deut 24:16 is a likely source for Ezek 18, it is not possible to establish 
a direct literary influence based on the lexical set חטא + מות + ֵּבן + ָאב. Given the weak 
literary parallels between Deut 24:16 and Ezek 18:4, 20 it does not seem possible to 
either demonstrate literary reuse or direction of dependence even if influence between the 
two is clearly possible.59 
                                               
Syntactically and lexically we see several differences, so much so that the lexical and thematic parallels are 
not strong enough to speak of reuse and direction of dependence with confidence. Thematically Deut 24:16 
stress the invalidity of transgenerational punishment, while Ezek 18:20 speak of the invalidity of 
transgenerational culpability. Cf. Levinson, Legal Revision, 64. In his dissertation on Deuteronomic 
influence in the book of Ezekiel, Gile mentions Ezek 18 only in passing without any extensive discussions 
(Jason Gile, “Deuteronomic Influence in the Book of Ezekiel” [Ph.D. diss., Wheaton College, 2013]). 
58 Both 2 Kgs 14:6 and 2 Chr 25:4 seem to be a citation from Deut 24:16 as they give the exact 
wording of Deut 24:16 ( ָבִנים לֹא־יּוְמתּו ַעל־ָאבֹותלֹא־יּוְמתּו ָאבֹות ַעל־ָּבִנים ּו , “fathers shall not die because of 
sons, nor sons because of fathers”), introduce the citation withַּכָּכתּוב ְּבֵסֶפר ּתֹוַרת־ֹמֶׁשה ֲאֶׁשר־ִצָּוה ְיהָוה ֵלאֹמר 
(“as it is written in the Book of the Torah of Moses, which YHWH commanded, saying”), with a slight 
variation in the explanatory clause (ִּכי ִאם־ִאיׁש ְּבֶחְטאֹו יָֻמות (“for a person shall die only for his own sins”) in 
2 Kgs 14:6 and ִּכי ִאיׁש ְּבֶחְטאֹו ָימּותּו (“for each one shall die for his own sins”) in 2 Chr 25:4 in contrast to 
 each one shall die for his own sins”) in Deut 24:16. Both authors of 2 Kgs 14:6 and 2“) ִאיש ְּבֶחְטאֹו יּוָמתּו
Chr 25:4 clearly claim that Deut 24:16 was already known in the days of Amaziah (796–767 B.C.), or at 
least they interpreted his actions as in accord with Deut 24:16. While both 2 Kgs 14:6 and 2 Chr 25:4 
identify their source as ֵסֶפר ּתֹוַרת־ֹמֶׁשה (“the Book of the Torah of Moses”), it is an open possibility that 
either may have influenced the ideas in Ezek 18, or that they participate in the same conceptual tradition. 
59 For a debate on the meaning of ָּדָמיו ּבֹו ִיְהֶיה (“his blood shall be upon himself”) in Ezek 18:13, 
see Henning Graf Reventlow, “'Sein Blut komme über sein Haupt',” VT 10, no. 3 (1960): 311–27; Klaus 




Related to the question of individual responsibility is the question of whether the 
formulations  ַּותַהֹחֵטאת ִהיא ָתמ ֶּנֶפׁשה  (“The person who sins, only he shall die”) in Ezek 
18:4 and ּוָמתמֹות י  (“he shall surely die”) in 18:13 is related to the ּוָמתי  he shall be“) מֹות 
put to death”)-laws in Torah? First, we notice that while the typical formulation in the 
legal instructions in Torah is the qal inf. מֹות + hof yitqtol 60,יּוָמת in the Writings and 
Prophets the formulation is more commonly qal inf. מֹות + qal yitqtol 61.מות Among the 
Prophets, it is only in Ezek 18:13 that we find the locution ּוָמתמֹות י . Second, while Torah 
prescribes the death penalty ּוָמתמֹות י  for prohibited contact with sacred space (Exod 
19:12), murder (Exod 21:12; Lev 24:17; Num 35:16–18, 21, 31), cursing or striking 
parents (Exod 21:15, 17; Lev 20:9), kidnapping (Exod 21:16), bestiality (Exod 22:18; 
Lev 20:15–16), profaning the Sabbath (Exod 31:14–15; Num 15:35), offering children to 
Molech (Lev 20:2), adultery (Lev 20:10), forms of illicit inner-family sexual relations 
(Lev 20:11–12), homosexuality (Lev 20:13), being a medium and necromancer (Lev 
20:27), blaspheming (Lev 24:16), any being ֵחֶרם (Lev 27:29), Ezek 18:10–13 seems to 
broaden the application of ּוָמתמֹות י  to violence and shedding blood—which could be read 
as referring to murder—, eating upon the mountains, defiling his neighbor’s wife, 
oppressing the poor and needy, committing robbery, not restoring the pledge, lifting 
                                               
Blut,” VT 12, no. 4 (1962): 396–416. Cf. Zimmerli, Ezekiel 1, 383–84; Graffy, A Prophet Confronts His 
People, 63; Kohn, New Heart and A New Soul, 47. 
60 The construction qal inf. מות + hof yitqtol מֹות יּוָמת) מות) occurs in Gen 26:11; Exod 19:12; 
21:12, 15-17; 22:18; 31:14-15; Lev 20:2, 9-13, 15-16, 27; 24:16-17; 27:29; Num 15:35; 35:16-18, 21, 31; 
Judg 21:5; Ezek 18:13. Cf. Matties, Ezekiel 18, 74; Zimmerli, Ezekiel 1, 49. 
61 The construction qal inf. מות + qal yitqtol מות (e.g. מֹות ָימּות) occurs in Gen 2:17; 3:4; 20:7; Num 
26:65; Judg 13:22; 1 Sam 14:39, 44; 22:16; 2 Sam 12:14; 14:14; 1 Kgs 2:37, 42; 2 Kgs 1:4, 6, 16; 8:10; Jer 




one’s eyes to the idols, committing abominations, and taking interest and profit.62 This 
also fits with Fishbane’s claim that Ezek 18 expands Deut 24:16 to include individual 
punishment for civil offences, something not attested in the parallel instructions in 
Torah.63 Third, while there is an affinity between the death penalty being applied 
individually for individual culpability in Deut 24:16 and Ezek 18:4, 20, the locution מֹות
                                               
62 Commenting on how Jer 31:29 and Ezek 18:4 counter the proverb, Greenberg wrote: “Jeremiah 
and Ezekiel transfer this judicial provision to the theological realm, the first promising that in the future, the 
second insisting that, in, the present, each man die for his own sin — but both change  יומת to ימות (Jer. 
31:29; Ezek. 18:4 and passim)” (Greenberg, “Some Postulates of Biblical Criminal Law,” 22). Fishbane 
writes that when Ezek 18:1–32 “revises the older doctrines of collective responsibility, and contends that 
responsibility for offences is solely limited to the offending party, he lists a sequence of delicts which 
follows those in Exod. 22:10, 24–6 and their reworking in Deut. 24:10–18, where the emphasis on 
individual responsibility is particularly marked (v. 16)” (Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 
293).  
63 Fishbane writes: “Like Jeremiah, Ezekiel’s citation of Deut. 24:16 in connection with the 
proverb on ‘sour grapes’ serves to undermine and counter the older doctrine of transgenerational 
responsibility. But Ezekiel’s teaching goes further. First, it is clear from the continuity of his discourse that 
he understands Deut. 24:16 in an expansive sense. For if Deut. 24:16 prohibits vicarious punishment of 
fathers/sons but makes no explicit comment on civil cases, the legal instances which Ezekiel cites to 
support his argument derive from the Pentateuchal civil jurisprudence. For example, the cases referred to in 
18:7–8 (cf. vv. 12–13, 16–17) are derived from such case-types as Exod. 22:20, 24b–26, Lev. 25:36–7, 
Deut. 23:20–1, 24:6, 10–15, 17. These judicial allusions are all the more striking since none of the 
Pentateuchal formulations articulates a penalty; they are rather addressed to the moral will of the person. In 
Ezekiel, by contrast, such cases as the misuse of loans or interest are cited with punishments, capital 
punishments to boot (cf. vv. 14, 18, vs. acquittal as ‘life’ in vv. 9, 19). Since such penalties are unthinkable 
in actual biblical law, one may conclude that Ezekiel’s hyperbolic rhetoric was designed to rebut 
thoroughly the prevailing notions of vicarious guilt, and to emphasize the unilateral application of the 
standard of individual responsibility” (Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 337–38. Italics 
original). He suggests that the insertion of Deut 24:16’s rejection of transgenerational punishment into civil 
jurisprudence without any punishment is done “in order to counter tendencies to exact vicarious 
retributions in cases of economic collapse” (Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 339). For 
parallels between Exod 22:20–23:12 and Deut 24:10–25:1 see Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient 
Israel, 340. While acknowledging the astuteness of Fishbane’s observation, Lyons nevertheless finds that 
“Fishbane may be overstating his case in depicting Ezekiel as an innovator. This same ‘theologizing’ of 
laws can be found within the Holiness Code itself, and Ezekiel is simply basing his arguments in ch. 18 on 
what he reads in Lev 18–20. The highly diverse older laws regarding social justice within Lev 19, to which 
no individual penalties are attached, have been collected together and enveloped within two parallel 
chapters (Lev 18, 20) dealing with sexual misconduct and the worship of chthonic deities. Whatever the 
original settings of and original punishments attached to the ancient laws contained in Lev 18–20, all have 
been collected together and are subsumed under the same heading: ‘observe my statutes . . . which if a man 
does them, he will live by them’ (Lev 18:5)” (Lyons, From Law to Prophecy, 130, Italics original. Cf. p. 
170). Greenberg point out the parallels between Ezek 18:13 and Lev 20:9–27 in the idea of blood being 




ּוָמתי  in Ezek 18:13 is not found in Deuteronomy, and rather seems to draw from the 
Exod–Num tradition.64  
Approaching a Menstruant Woman in Lev 18:19–20 and Ezek 18:6, 11, 15: Lev 
18:19 and Ezek 18:6 are the only two cases where the lexical set קרב + לֹא + ִנָּדה + ִאָּׁשה is 
used together in the HB. The combination is therefore unique to these two verses. The 
clause ְוֶאל־ִאָּׁשה ְּבִנַּדת ֻטְמָאָתּה לֹא ִתְקַרב (“and you shall not approach a woman in her 
menstrual impurity”) in Lev 18:16a and ְוֶאל־ִאָּׁשה ִנָּדה לֹא ִיְקָרב (“and not approached a 
menstruant woman”) in Ezek 18:6d are quite similar, but with some differences. Ezek 
18:6 is the shorter form. Lev 18:16 has the more elaborate ְּבִנַּדת ֻטְמָאָתּה compared to the 
simple ִנָּדה in Ezek 18:16. While Ezek 18:6 uses the 3ms ִיְקָרב, Lev 18:19 speaks in 2ms 
                                               
64 There is an extensive discussion on Ezek 18 in relation to collective and individual 
responsibility in other passages in the HB. Cf. Exod 20:5; Deut 5:9; Lam 5:7; Jer 31:29–30; Ezek 18:1–4; 
Deut 7:9–10; Lev 26:39; 2 Kings 23:26; 24:3. It is not possible to enter this debate here, but some 
references to it can be mentioned. For a list of references to scholars discussing the question of individual 
responsibility in the HB see Matties, Ezekiel 18, 113–14n. A question is to what extent Ezek 18 may be in 
dialogue and possibly countering statements like ֵאל ַקָּנא ֹּפֵקד ֲעֹון ָאֹבת ַעל־ָּבִנים ַעל־ִׁשֵּלִׁשים ְוַעל־ִרֵּבִעים ְלֹׂשְנָאי 
(“a jealous God who visits the iniquity of the fathers upon sons, upon the third and fourth (generation) of 
those who reject me”) in Exod 20:5 (cf. Deut 5:9)? If the references to the third and fourth generation in 
Exod 20:5 and Deut 5:9 is taken as pointing to those who would live contemporaneously within a 
household and be affected by the sins of the central male or female addressed in the instruction, then it 
would also be natural to take the ‘thousands’ (ֲאָלִפים) of Exod 20:6 and Deut 5:10 in the sense of 
contemporaneity, i.e. affecting people living simultaneous with the one loving God and keeping his 
commandments. 
For studies on the concept of collective or transgenerational versus individual punishment, see 
Greenberg, “Some Postulates of Biblical Criminal Law,” 20–27; Weinfeld, “Jeremiah and the Spiritual 
Metamorphosis of Israel,” 35–39; Joyce, Divine Initiative, 112–13; Matties, Ezekiel 18, 113–58; Levinson, 
Legal Revision, 57–88; Jurrian Mol, Collective and Individual Responsibility: A Description of Corporate 
Personality in ezekiel 18 and 20, ed. K. A. D. Smelik. SSN (Leiden: Brill, 2009). Matties summarizes: 
“Without again reverting to the argument of primitive mentality or corporate personality, it is possible to 
say that for Ezekiel the self and the community ‘exist’ in an interactive process in which neither is the 
determinant factor” (Matties, Ezekiel 18, 148). According to Cooke the aim of Jeremiah and Ezekiel “was 
to build up a nation out of converted individuals” (Cooke, Ezekiel, 196). Cf. Levinson, Legal Revision, 66–
67. For a possible dialectics or inconsistency as to individual and collective punishment between Ezek 18 
and 20 see Fishbane, “Sin and Judgment,” 141–48; Joyce, Divine Initiative, 125; Allen, Ezekiel 1–19, 271, 




 Both formulations are well adapted to their respective contexts.65 Further, even if .ִתְקַרב
the combination of טמא + לֹא + ִאָּׁשה is found in several verses,66 there also seems to be a 
close relationship between ְוֶאל־ֵאֶׁשת ֲעִמיְתָך לֹא־ִתֵּתן ְׁשָכְבְּתָך ְלָזַרע ְלָטְמָאה־ָבּה (“And you shall 
not have sexual relations with your neighbor’s wife to defile yourself with her”) in Lev 
18:20 and ֶאת־ֵאֶׁשת ֵרֵעהּו לֹא ִטֵּמא (“has not defiled his neighbor’s wife”) in Ezek 18:15.67 
Again, Ezekiel has the shorter form. It may, therefore, be a reuse between Lev 18:19–20 
and Ezek 18:6, 15 regarding the prohibitions against approaching a menstruant woman or 
neighbor’s wife.68 
As observed above, Lev 18:16 has the more elaborate ְּבִנַּדת ֻטְמָאָתּה compared to 
the simple ִנָּדה in Ezek 18:16.69 The principle of lectio brevior is not a strong basis for 
                                               
65 Besides Lev 18:19–20, of those verses using ִנָּדה + ִאּׁשָ ה (Lev 12:2; 15:19, 24-25; 18:19-20; 
20:21; Ezek 18:6; 22:10-11), Lev 15:24–25 would be the closest to Ezek 18, speaking of sexual relations 
with a menstruant woman. In this case, it seems to be an unintentional act, i.e. the partners are unaware of 
her menstrual impurity. In Lev 18:16 and Ezek 18:6 the sexual relation seems to be despite awareness of 
her menstrual impurity. Cf. Kohn, New Heart and A New Soul, 45–46. 
66 Lev 15:24-25; 18:19-24; 21:11-12; Num 5:13-15, 27-29; Deut 24:4; Ezek 18:6-7, 11-12, 15-16; 
Job 14:2, 4. 
67 For a parallel between Ezek 18:6, 11, 15 and Lev 18:20 in the idea of incurring impurity for 
sexual relations with a neighbor’s wife see Matties, Ezekiel 18, 165–66.  Hurvitz argued that the locution 
 because the ֲעִמיְתָך with ֵרֵעהּו in Lev 18:20, but replaced ֵאֶׁשת ֲעִמיְתָך in Ezek 18:6 reused from ֵאֶׁשת ֵרֵעהּו
former had went out of use (Hurvitz, A Linguistic Study, 74–78). Lyons, however, points out that it may be 
that “Ezekiel has taken the word רע (‘neighbor’) from the parallel law forbidding adultery in Lev 20:10, 
thereby conflating Lev 18:20 with Lev 20:10” (Lyons, From Law to Prophecy, 81n). Cf. Kohn, New Heart 
and A New Soul, 40. 
68 Lyons points out that there is a reverse order between Lev 18:19–20 and Ezek 18:6 regarding 
the prohibition against approaching a menstruant woman and defilement of or by the neighbor’s wife 
(Lyons, From Law to Prophecy, 90). This might be an indicator of reuse, according to Seidel’s law. 
However, it would be desirable with stronger arguments for reuse to conclude with confidence. 
69 Lyons finds an accumulation of reuse of Lev 18 in Ezek 18 (Lyons, From Law to Prophecy, 
129, 163). He gives the following list: (1) Ezek 18:6//Lev 18:19–20; 20:10, (2) Ezek 18:8//Lev 25:36, (3) 
Ezek 18:9//Lev 18:4–5, (4) Ezek 18:11//Lev 18:20; 20:10, (5) Ezek 18:13//Lev 25:36, (6) Ezek 18:15//Lev 
18:10; 20:10, (7) Ezek 18:17//Lev 18:4–5; 25:36, (8) Ezek 18:18//Lev 19:13?, (9) Ezek 18:19, 21//Lev 
18:4–5, (10) Ezek 18:24//Lev 19:15?, 35?, and (11) Ezek 18:26//Lev 19:15?, 35?. If Lyons is correct, this 




determining the direction of dependence, since a borrowing author could easily choose 
either to elaborate or to abbreviate his source.70 Even if a case of literary reuse can be 
made between Lev 18:19–20 and Ezek 18:6, 11, 15, determining the direction of 
dependence is more uncertain.71 
The Interest and Pledge in Exod 22:24–26; Lev 25:36 and Ezek 18:7–8, 12–13, 
16–17: First, it is only in Exod 22:24–25 and Ezek 18:8, 12–13, 16–17 that we find the 
use of the two lexemes ֶנֶׁשְך (“interest”) and the verb חבל (“to take a pledge”) or the noun 
 a pledge”) used together in close proximity. Second, the similarity is especially“) ֲחֹבל
close between Lev 25:36 and Ezek 18:17 using the construction לקח (“to take”) + נׁשך 
(“interest”) + תרבית (“profit”).  This combination within one clause is found only in Lev 
25:36; Ezek 18:17; 22:12.72 It is therefore possible to see Ezek 18:7–8, 12–13, 16–17 as 
                                               
of the stronger parallels see my discussion in the main text. Zimmerli sees “close contacts” between Lev 18 
and Ezek 18:6; 22:10 in the idea of not approaching a menstruant woman (Zimmerli, Ezekiel 1, 48). 
70 Cf. Kilchör, Mosetora und Jahwetora, 38–39. Carr nevertheless operates with a narrow use of 
the lectio brevior principle to determine direction of dependence: “a text tends to be later than its parallel if 
it verbally parallels that text and yet includes substantial pluses vis-a-vis the text. In turn, this would be a 
confirmation of the usefulness of shortness as a criterion for earliness of a given parallel: a text tends to be 
earlier when it is substantially shorter than texts which it otherwise closely parallels” (Carr, “Method in 
Determination of Direction of Dependence,” 124. Italics original). The limited parallels between Lev 
18:19–20 and Ezek 18:6, 11, 15, however, do not seem to entitle us to apply the principle of lectio brevior 
in this case to determine the direction of dependence. 
71 Maccoby writes: “The prohibition against intercourse with a menstruant has put this form of 
impurity into a special category: menstruation (with its analogues) is the only form of impurity that has 
survived the destruction of the Temple and has remained as a subject of practical observance to the present 
day” (Maccoby, Ritual and Morality, 38). And again: “This prohibition has nothing to do with the Temple, 
but only with sexual relations. That is why the prohibition against intercourse with a menstruant is included 
in the list of sexual offences (Lev. 18:19), not in the passage about the ritual impurity of a menstruant (Lev. 
15:19–24)” (Maccoby, Ritual and Morality, 39). Cf. p. 59–60. 
72 Cf. Greenberg, Ezekiel 1-20, 330; Matties, Ezekiel 18, 171. Lyons reads ַּבֶּנֶׁשְך לֹא־יִ ֵּתן ְוַתְר ִּבית לֹא
ָּקחיִ   (“he does not give at interest or take profit”) in Ezek 18:8, 13 as splitting the single clause  ּתֹוֵמאִ  ַאל־ִּתַּקח
ִּביתְוַתְר  ֶׁשְךנֶ   (“Do not take from him interest or profit”) in Lev 25:36 (Lyons, From Law to Prophecy). 
Zimmerli on the contrary is more negative to postulate an influence at this point. He writes: “The 
prohibition of interest, which is expressed in Lev 25:35–38* in connection with a reference to lending to 




drawing both from Exod 22:24–26 and Lev 25:36. If it is accepted that Ezek 18:7–8, 12–
13, 16–17 draws from both Exod 22:24–26 and Lev 25:36, this would define Ezek 18 as 
the borrowing text. But with the scant evidence at our disposal, it seems preferable to 
defer judgment.73  
Reflections on Reuse in Jer 7:1–15 and Ezek 18 
While Jer 7 contain two lists in 7:5–6, 9, Ezek 18 contain three lists in 18:5–9, 
                                               
by Deuteronomy, is totally lacking in Ezekiel. The vocabulary of the Leviticus passage which is unusual 
for Ezekiel (ֵּגר ְותֹוָׁשב ,ָנָטה ָידֹו ,מּוְך fear of God) and the motivation in a saving history forbid us to think of 
an influence on the text” (Zimmerli, Ezekiel 1, 50). 
73 Matties writes: “The laws in Ezekiel 18 are not in fact ‘quoted,’ but terminology, phraseology, 
and traditional concepts are incorporated. There may be connections between the laws and other textual 
units in the Hebrew Bible, but literary (i.e. genetic) relationship cannot always be proven” (Matties, Ezekiel 
18, 162). Cf. also the parallels between Lev 25:14, 17 and Ezek 18:7, 16 in regard to the issue of 
oppression. The lexical set ינה + ִאיׁש is only found in Lev 25:14, 17; Jer 46:16; 50:16; Ezek 18:7, 16; 46:18. 
The economic context in which the locution is used is distinct to Lev 25:14, 17 and Ezek 18:7, 16. Cf. 
Zimmerli, Ezekiel 1, 380. For parallels between Deut 12:1–14 and Ezek 18:6 see Kohn, New Heart and A 
New Soul, 95, and for parallels on the idea of bearing guilt ( ׂשאנ  in Exod–Num and Ezek 18:19–20 (ָעֹון + 
see Kohn, New Heart and A New Soul, 46. On p. 67 she also notes the parallel between Num 16:8; 20:10 
and Ezek 18:25 in the locution ִׁשְמעּו־ָנא (“Hear now!”). Further, the combination ָּפטִמׁשְ  + ָעָׂשה  is a ָעֶול + 
unique lexical set to Lev 19 and Ezek 18; 33 (Lev 19:15, 35; Ezek 18:8–9, 26–27; 33:13–15, 18–19). Cf. 
Matties, Ezekiel 18, 172–73. There are many parallel common words shared between Lev 18:4–5 and Ezek 
18. Ezek 18:9, 17, 19, 21, however, seem to have a particular density of parallels. The lexical set of ׂשהע  +
הלך + ָּקהחֻ  + ׁשמר + ְׁשָּפטמִ   is found in Lev 18:3-5; 1 Kgs 2:3; 6:12; Ezek 11:20; 18:8-10; 20:17-19, 21; 
37:24. We can also mention the parallel between  ְּוֵרֵעה ּוֵבין ׁשִאי ֵּבין ָׁשַפְטִּתיו  (“and I judge between a man and 
his neighbor”) in Exod 18:16 and  ִׁשְלִאי ׁשִאי ֵּבין ֶׂשהֱאֶמת ַיעֲ  ְׁשַּפטמ  (“executes true justice between man and 
man”) in Ezek 18:8 (cf. Jer 7:5 discussed above). Cf. Greenberg, Ezekiel 1-20, 344; Kohn, New Heart and 
A New Soul, 36–37. Relevant for the present study, Weinfeld points out the parallel between ֱאֶמת  ְׁשַּפטמִ 
ׁשְלִאי ׁשִאי ֵּבין ֶׂשהַיעֲ   in Ezek 18:8 and  ֲּוֵרֵעה ּוֵבין ׁשִאי ֵּבין ְׁשָּפטמִ  ׂשּוַתע   (“if you truly act justly one with another” 
(NJPS)) in Jer 7:5, both as referring “to perform deeds of righteousness and truth,” not to pass a righteous 
verdict in a court, finding the same meaning in Isa 58:2, 6–7 (Weinfeld, Social Justice in Ancient Israel, 
220). On pp. 142 and 222 he observes that both in Ezek 18:7, 16 and Isa 58:7 acts of righteousness are 
defined as giving bread to the hungry and clothing the naked. He writes: “The ideal of performing justice 
and righteousness is not confined to abstention from evil; it consists primarily in doing good: in giving 
bread to the hungry and clothing to the naked (Ezek. 18:7, 16)” (Weinfeld, Social Justice in Ancient Israel, 
18). Cf. Greenberg, Ezekiel 1-20, 332. Kohn points out the parallel between Exod 28:42 and Ezek 18:7, 16 
in the image of covering nakedness, but is therefore wrong in claiming that “it is not found elsewhere in the 
HB (Kohn, New Heart and A New Soul, 73). We can also mention the covering of Noah’s nakedness in 
Gen 9:23. For a discussion of possible reuse of Torah in Ezek 18, including other parallels as well than 




10–13, 14–17 (cf. Hos 4:1 and Ezek 22:12, 29). We have seen that there are several 
possible cases of reuse of Torah both in Jer 7:1–15 and Ezek 18:5–17, but since the 
parallels are limited in each case it is difficult to conclude on reuse and the direction of 
dependence with a certain degree of confidence. There is considerable integrity in these 
two chapters to the degree that neither of them merely echo or literalistically apply a 
source text. To the extent that they do reuse a source text, they appropriate it into their 
new composition which has a considerable degree of literary integrity. We can possibly 
see Jer 7:1–15 and Ezek 18:5–17 as examples of Wittgenstein’s “language-game” where 
the author is so immersed in the covenantal tradition of Torah that he does not need to 
visually consult his sources, but lets the language of Torah dynamically flow into his own 
discourse.74  In other words, Jer 7:1–15 and Ezek 18:5–17 might be examples of 
                                               
74 Fishbane might be correct in claiming that Ezek 18, and we can include Jer 7, is aggadah rather 
than halakha: “As distinct from the process of halakhic exegesis, which is concerned with developing and 
expounding the law, aggadic exegesis was at once theological and reflective, moral and practical” 
(Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 281). And further: “Inner-biblical legal exegesis is 
singularly concerned with the reinterpretation (or extension or reapplication) of pre-exisiting legal texts. By 
contrast, aggadic exegesis utilizes pre-exisiting legal materials, but it also makes broad and detailed use of 
moral dicta, official or popular theologoumena, themes, motifs, and historical facts. In a word, aggadic 
exegesis ranges over the entire spectrum of ideas, genres, and texts of ancient Israel. It is these which form 
the basis of its textual transformations, reapplications, and reinterpretations.” And again: “legal exegesis is 
concerned—both theoretically and practically—with actions based on the received traditum or its revised 
tradition. By contrast, aggadic exegesis is primarily concerned with utilizing the full range of the inherited 
traditum for the sake of new theological insights, attitudes, and speculations. Action may, to be sure, be a 
result (or even intent) of a creative theological reworking of the traditum when rhetorically addressed to the 
covenantal community; but action, or its prescription, is not a necessary characteristic of aggadic exegesis.” 
He also makes a distinction between “the existence or perception of some lack in the traditum” as a 
“significant condition for the rise of legal exegesis,” while in aggadic exegesis “fullness is a significant 
condition for its emergence,” i.e. “certain features of the traditum are actively present in the mind of those 
tradents entrusted with its preservation and reformulation.” And finally, “aggadic exegesis is thus not 
content to supplement gaps in the traditum, but characteristically draws forth latent and unsuspected 
meanings from it” (Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 282–83. Italics original). While 
Fishbane discusses Jer 17 under legal exegesis and Isa 58 and Ezek 18 under aggadic exegesis, I am not 
sure how helpful such an anachronistic distinction is in classifying the six cases in the present study. They 
all seem to be intended to have a bearing on how life is lived concretely, they all draw from sources outside 
Torah, like popular sentiments (Isa 58:3; Jer 3:4–5; 7:4, 8, 10; 34:14), contemporary practice (Jer 3:1–2, 7–
8, 10; 17:23; Isa 58:2, 4–5), official actions (Jer 34:8–11, 15–16), common proverbs (Ezek 18:2), and they 




memorized reuse, even if it is probably impossible to demonstrate this point. It is actually 
quite difficult to demonstrate that these two chapters are cases of elusive literary reuse, 
even if there are clear indicators that such reuse is possible, and even likely. A reader 
immersed in Torah might, however, have easily detected resonances with Torah.75 
We, therefore, come back to the question raised at the beginning of this chapter, 
whether the sum of many weak cases can add up to a strong case of reuse and direction of 
dependence? Given the weakness of each individual case of possible reuse, it would seem 
that the supporting evidence external to these individual cases constitutes the strongest 
case for reuse; namely, that they occur within the form of lists of multiple possible cases 
of reuse. 
Witnessing such elusive reuse in Jer 7:1–15 and Ezek 18:5–17 also raises the 
question as to how we ought to relate to other cases of elusive reuse in the prophetic 
literature. Some scholars argue confidently that these are not cases of reuse, while others 
argue with a similar degree of confidence that they are, indeed, cases of reuse. Jeremiah 
7:1–15 and Ezekiel 18:5–17 may help us see that there may be cases of elusive reuse in 
the HB, where this possibility cannot be ruled out. At the same time, we cannot conclude 
with confidence that we have a case of actual reuse in front of us. Such would be the 
                                               
introduce new dimensions—often rooted in trajectories or dialectics in the sources themselves. Seeing 
some as sensing a lack in Torah in contrast to others a presence of Torah does not seem to be a precise way 
of putting it. 
75 Matties writes: “Ezekiel is drawing on a rather fluid and dynamic tradition complex that 
commands no loyalties. Ezekiel forges a new path within Israel.” And again: “What is clear is that Ezekiel 
18 is heir to a long tradition. But it is not the slave of that tradition. A matrix of factors has made Ezekiel 18 
a new entity that builds on the past, but that moves creatively into the future” (Matties, Ezekiel 18, 10). 
While I can somewhat resonate with Matties’ reading, comparing Jer 3; 17; 34; and Isa 58 on the one side 
with the lists in Jer 7 and Ezek 18 invites some nuancing. I do not see the same type of literary creativity in 
Jer 7 and Ezek 18 as attested in the four other cases. While Jer 3; 17; 34; and Isa 58 seem to be a close 




case, for example, where we would have only one or more of the individual cases 
testified in Jer 7:5–6, 9 or Ezek 18:5–17, but not the external arguments that make these 









UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT ON READING AS A 
DISCLOSURE OF THE THOUGHTS  
OF THE HEART 
 
“Tell me how you seek and I will  
tell you what you are seeking.”1 
 
“The truth can be spoken only by one who rests in it;  
not by one who still rests in falsehood, and who  
reaches out from falsehood to truth just once.”2 
Introduction 
Ludwig Wittgenstein pointed out that even if the everyday meaning of ‘reading’ is 
clear to us, it is not clear what really constitutes the act of reading when we analyze it. Is 
reading merely passing one’s eyes along the text? How often have our eyes followed the 
text while our thoughts have wandered? Is reading saying out loud the words in the text? 
But what if a person simply pretends to be reading and recounts the words from memory? 
Or what if a person recounts a text from memory without having it in front of him or her, 
as many ancient scribes likely did; is this reading or not? Is reading taking place when 
one has not seen a text previously and is able to say words corresponding to the 
characters in the text? But how does this differ from a child, not yet having learned the 
                                               
1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, trans. Anthnonty Kenny (Berkley: University of 
California Press, 1974), 370. Italics original. 
The title of this chapter is a reuse of Søren Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript. 
2 Wittgenstein as quoted in Rush Rhees, “Introduction,” in Recollections of Wittgenstein, ed. Rush 




alphabet, who can pronounce one or more correct words—maybe even sentences—when 
sitting with an open book in the belief that they are actually reading when imagining what 
is written? Or what do we mean if we say that a text causes, influences, or guides certain 
words to occur in our mind?3 In the end, it seems that it is only our lived life—the 
response, as it were, to what we have read— that can truly attest to what really took place 
in the act we call reading. 
In this chapter I will refrain from writing a conclusion. As I wrote in the 
introduction, the aim in this study has not been a theory, but an articulation of a way of 
life. The study can therefore not be concluded here, as it can only be brought to an end in 
life itself.4 This chapter is therefore rather a ‘postscript’ approaching the same question 
differently. The question can now be formulated as follows: How does our reading of the 
biblical texts relate to how we should live? This time I am coming more from 
contemporary perspectives making particular use of the philosophers Søren Kierkegaard 
and Ludwig Wittgenstein, in order to find resonances with the reflections found in my 
previous chapters. We have seen that there is a tendency towards an expansionistic 
reading in the prophetic passages of Torah. While a reading is rooted in the source text 
through an apparent close reading, the prophetic authors nevertheless do not appear to 
have been bound by a standard of literalistic repetition. While we moderns may wonder 
                                               
3 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 61e–70e (156–71), 116e–17e (375–76). 
4 Steven Shakespear writes, commenting upon Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript: 
“Closure is at once the indispensable condition and the unattainable dream of the system. . . . It is this 
which leads Climacus to his well-known contention that ‘(a) a logical system can be given; (b) but a system 
of existence cannot be given’ (CUP 109). Logic corresponds to the ‘eternal’ nature of thought, to its 
timeless formal rules. It has an analytic and classificatory task; it cannot be called upon to yield new 
information about the world, to add to our store of facts” (Steven Shakespear, Kierkegaard, Language and 




why the biblical authors did not reuse a passage verbatim, something quite different, such 
as repetition with variation, might have been the norm expected by ancient readers. We 
have also seen that Torah was constructed as a mediator of the covenantal relation 
between YHWH and his people, calling for a holy and righteous life together with the 
holy and righteous YHWH. In the following hermeneutical reflections we shall see that 
such repetition with variation may make prove of vital importance when the goal is a 
lived life loving YHWH, and one’s neighbor. It is through a hard-earned familiarity with 
YHWH through a close reading of the text that we can detect pointers and trajectories in 
the text that truly set us on the path to living in the ways of YHWH. 
The Way 
 
 ה ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֵהיֶכם ֶאְתֶכם לֹא ּוְׁשַמְרֶּתם ַלֲעׂשֹות ַּכֲאֶׁשר ִצּוָ 
 ְּבָכל־ַהֶּדֶרְך ֲאֶׁשר ִצָּוה  ָתֻסרּו ָיִמין ּוְׂשמֹאל׃
 ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֵהיֶכם ֶאְתֶכם ֵּתֵלכּו
“Be careful to do as YHWH your God commanded you, not  
deviating to the right or the left. You must walk in all the  
ways which YHWH your God commands you”  
(Deut 5:32–33). 
 
ὁ δὲ εἶπεν πρὸς αὐτόν· ἐν τῷ νόμῳ τί γέγραπται; πῶς ἀναγινώσκεις; 
“And he said to him: What is written in the law? 
How do you read?” (Luke 10:26). 
 
 “In reading as in other things I have always striven to practice obedience.  
There is nothing more favorable to intellectual progress, for as far as  
possible I only read what I am hungry for at the moment when I  
have an appetite for it, and then I do not read, I eat.”5 
An initial question concerns how to re-present instructive texts like those I have 
focused upon from the Torah and Prophets? Can this be done faithfully through detached 
                                               
5 Simone Weil, Waiting for God, trans. Emma Craufurd (New York: HarperCollins, 2001), 27. Cf. 
Markus P. Zehnder, Wegmetaphorik im Alten Testament: Eine Semantische Untersuchung der 
alttestamentlichen und altorientalischen Weg-Lexeme mit besonderer Berücksichtigung ihrer 




objectivist scholarly methodologies—what is typically referred to as the use of a 
scientific approach? Can a reading that brackets the self and the heart be faithful, even 
realistic? Have the previous chapters read the text faithfully, or have they only been, at 
best, a preparation for faithful reading? Though we are not the original readers, the 
authors of the texts clearly did not intend to leave any reader untouched. At the same 
time, we often read texts without allowing them to radically change or even re-define our 
thinking. So how should we read? It seems that whether we prefer a detached or a more 
receptive posture before the biblical texts; whether we remain a spectator or participant in 
the forms of life indicated by them, we necessarily disclose an inner posture towards the 
texts and their authors in our reading of them. Is it possible that Isa 9:13, namely that 
 this people honor me with its mouth and“) ָהָעם ַהֶּזה ְּבִפיו ּוִבְׂשָפָתיו ִּכְּבדּוִני ְוִלּבֹו ִרַחק ִמֶּמִּני
its lips, but its heart is far from me”) might also apply to us as modern readers? And 
Georg Fischer has reminded us of Jer 2:8, ּוִנילֹא ְיָדע ּתֹוָרההַ  ֵׂשיְוֹתפְ   (“and those handling 
the Torah do not know me”).6 Is our heart so disposed in our handling of the Torah that 
we come to know YHWH, or do we read with a heart determinedly alien to such a 
possibility? 
Søren Kierkegaard says that we need to read Scripture with a hermeneutics of 
love, and in this he resonates clearly with Deut 6:4–9; 10:12. To help us towards this end, 
he asks us to imagine a lover that hast just received a letter from the beloved and to make 
the metaphor address more specifically the one who “insists upon reading Scripture in the 
original language,” he writes: 
                                               




I assume, then, that this letter from the beloved is written in a language that the lover 
does not understand, and there is no one around who can translate it for him, and 
perhaps he would not even want any such help lest a stranger be initiated into his 
secrets. What does he do? He takes a dictionary, begins to spell his way through the 
letter, looks up every word in order to obtain a translation. Let us assume that, as he 
sits there busy with his task, an acquaintance comes in. He knows that this letter has 
come, because he sees it on the table, sees it lying there, and says, “Well, so you are 
reading a letter from your beloved”—what do you think the other will say? He 
answers, “Have you gone mad? Do you think this is reading a letter from my beloved! 
No, my friend, I am sitting here toiling and moiling with a dictionary to get it 
translated. At times I am ready to explode with impatience; the blood rushes to my 
head and I would just as soon hurl the dictionary on the floor—and you call that 
reading—you must be joking! No, thank God, I am soon finished with the translation 
and then, yes, then, I shall read my beloved’s letter; that is something altogether 
different.7 
How often does theology confuse translation with reading? We are sitting with HALOT 
or BDAG trying to understand the meaning of the words, or we are using extra-biblical 
sources or commentaries to understand what is going on in the textual material. But is all 
this really reading the words of the beloved? Kierkegaard continues: 
Let us assume that this letter from the beloved contained not only an expression of 
affection, as such letters ordinarily do, but that it contained a wish, something the 
beloved wished her lover to do. It was, let us assume, much that was required of him, 
very much; any third party would consider that there was good reason to think better 
of it, but the lover—he is off at once to fulfil his beloved’s wish. Let us assume that 
after some time the lovers meet and the beloved said, “But, my dear, that was not at 
all what I asked you to do; you must have misunderstood the word or translated it 
incorrectly.” Do you think that the lover would now regret rushing off straightway 
that very second to obey the wish instead of first entertaining some doubts, and then 
                                               
7 Søren Kierkegaard, For Self-Examination; Judge for Yourself!, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna 
H. Hong, Kierkegaard's Writings 21 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), 26–27. Cf. Søren 
Kierkegaard, En oppbyggelig tale, Samlede Værker (Kjøbenhavn: Gyldendalske Boghandel, 1962), 70. 
Reflecting on Jas 1:22–25 Kierkegaard writes: “If God’s Word is for you merely doctrine, something 
impersonal and objective, then it is no mirror—an objective doctrine cannot be called a mirror; it is just as 
impossible to look at yourself in an objective doctrine as to look at yourself in a wall. And if you want to 
relate impersonally (objectively) to God’s Word, there can be no question of looking at yourself in the 
mirror, because it takes a personality, an I, to look at oneself in a mirror; a wall can be seen in a mirror, but 
a wall cannot see itself or look at itself in a mirror. No, while reading God’s Word you must incessantly say 
to yourself: It is I to whom it is speaking; it is I about whom it is speaking” (Kierkegaard, For Self-
Examination, 43–44). Cf. Timothy Houston Polk, The Biblical Kierkegaard: Reading by the Rule of Faith 




perhaps getting the help of a few additional dictionaries, and then having some more 
misgivings, and then perhaps getting the word translated correctly and consequently 
being exempt—do you believe that he regrets the mistake, do you believe that he 
pleases his beloved less?8 
Would a true lover read such a letter in a detached (objectivistic) manner or, alternatively, 
in a self-absorbed (subjectivistic) way? Ellen White phrased it in the following sober 
tone: “One reason why many theologians have no clearer understanding of God’s word 
is, they close their eyes to truths which they do not wish to practice. An understanding of 
Bible truth depends not so much on the power of intellect brought to the search as on the 
singleness of purpose, the earnest longing after righteousness.”9 Or as Heschel put it, we 
fail to understand God “not because we do not know how to extend our concepts far 
enough, but because we do not know how to begin close enough.”10 Might it not be that 
much theological reasoning, philological studies, and cultural investigations hide a desire 
to avoid responding in obedience? A reading in love will not look for the minimum 
compliance but, rather, spontaneously follow every hint of a request. Often it does not 
matter so much which particular theory one adheres to just as long as they distract from 
                                               
8 Kierkegaard, For Self-Examination, 27–28. Cf. Kierkegaard, En oppbyggelig tale, 71. Rhees 
speaking of a man speaking to his beloved: “The language is not the words on paper nor even the reciting 
of them, the language is the way it is used and the role it plays, the language is all it means to him in using 
it and to her in listening” (Rush Rhees, Rush Rhees on Religion and Philosophy [Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997], 307). 
9 Ellen G. White, The Great Controversy between Christ and Satan: The Conflict of the Ages in 
the Christian Dispensation (Mountain View, Calif.: Pacific Press, 1888), 599. 
10 Abraham Heschel, Between God and Man: An Interpretation of Judaism (New York: Harper, 
1959), 181. And again: “A student of philosophy who turns from the discourses of the great metaphysicians 
to the orations of the prophets may feel as if he were going from the realm of the sublime to an area of 
trivialities. Instead of dealing with the timeless issues of being and becoming, of matter and form, of 
definitions and demonstrations, he is thrown into orations about widows and orphans, about the corruption 
of judges and affairs of the market place. Instead of showing us a way through the elegant mansions of the 
mind, the prophets take us to the slums” (Abraham Joshua Heschel, The Prophets (New York: Harper & 




hearing what God says through the text to us as readers. 
A main problem with much academic discourse on the biblical text is that it all 
the time speaks about the text, without letting the text speak about onself. Wolterstorff 
wrote: “It’s the details of texts that resist imposed interpretations. Only by attending to 
the details does it become likely that one is oneself interpreted by the text—or by that 
One who is the author of the text.”11 As already seen, in reuse within the HB it is often 
how the details are read that constitute the shibboleth (cf. Judg 12:6). 
This corresponds somewhat to the dialectic between God’s address and human 
response, which Claus Westermann argues constitutes the central structure within the Old 
Testament in effect claiming that the Old Testament primarily tells a story, “based on 
event rather than concepts”: “the structure of the Old Testament in its three parts [the 
Torah, the Prophets, and the Writings] indicates that the narrative in the Old Testament is 
determined by the word of God occurring in it and by the response of those for whom and 
with whom this story unfolds.”12 Having claimed that human response is “one of the 
three integral parts of the Old Testament,” beside narrative and the word of God, and that 
“all of God’s acts and speaking is directed towards eliciting a response,” he continues: 
 This has trans-historical consequences. In the tradition of Western theology there has 
from the very beginning been a tendency to separate the human response in speaking 
                                               
11 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 202. 
12 Claus Westermann, Elements of Old Testament Theology, trans. Douglas W. Stott (Atlanta, Ga.: 
John Knox, 1982), 10. Cf. p. 9. On p. 11 he also describes the HB as “a story entrusted to us which includes 
the occurrence of God speaking and the response of those who experience these events.” He writes that 
“wisdom has no place within this basic framework of an Old Testament theology, since it originally and in 
reality does not have as its object an occurrence between God and man” (Westermann, Elements of Old 
Testament Theology, 11), but to me it is not clear why we cannot see the Wisdom literature as a human 
response to this same dialectical relation (cf. Gerhard F. Hasel, Old Testament Theology: Basic Issues in 




and action from theology in the real sense, from dogmatics. Thus the basic response is 
often unconsciously regarded as subordinate in significance. It is treated as different 
from theology. Human response as action, to the extent it affects behaviour in daily 
life, is treated in ‘ethics.’ To the extent it affects behaviour in worship, it is 
considered under the heading of ‘liturgy.’ Human response as speaking (prayer) is 
generally treated in either ethics or liturgy. This separation into distinctive, individual 
divisions of study necessarily results in a kind of arbitrariness. It misleads us from 
seeing that human response belongs to the nucleus of theology, that only the Bible in 
its entirety can say what prayer is, what worship is, and what obedience in daily life 
is. A change can occur here from the perspective of the Old Testament if the human 
response is seen as one of the three main parts of the Old Testament.13  
Martin Buber and Franz Rosenzweig writes: 
People today resist Scripture because they cannot abide revelation. To abide 
revelation means to sustain the full decisiveness of the moment, to respond to the 
moment, to be responsible for it. People today resist Scripture because they are no 
longer responsive or responsible. They claim to venture much; but the one true 
venture, the venture of responsibility, they industriously avoid.14 
And George Steiner writes: 
Unlike the reviewer, the literary critic, the academic vivisector and judge, the 
executant invests his own being in the process of interpretation. His readings, his 
enactments of chosen meanings and values, are not those of external survey. They are 
a commitment at risk, a response which is, in the root sense, responsible. To what,  
 
                                               
13 Westermann, Elements of Old Testament Theology, 27–28. Cf. p. 16. Jacques Doukhan writes: 
“Hebrew thought as expressed in the Bible is not a thought. The Bible does not provide any treatise on the 
concept of the world, or of time, etc. Hebrew thought does not construct the truth as a philosophical system; 
rather it is essentially the response to an event. Thus, in Hebrew, it is the thought that follows the event and 
not the reverse. . . . Indeed the mechanism of Hebrew thinking stands at the opposite to the Cartesian 
cogito, the latter being the basic presupposition in Western methodology. Instead of stating ‘I think, 
therefore I am,’ Hebrew thought proclaims ‘I am, therefore I think.’ Here the thought is not initiated and 
controlled by the thought, but is generated and governed by the adventures of history” (Jacques B. 
Doukhan, Hebrew for Theologians: A Textbook for the Study of Biblical Hebrew in Relation to Hebrew 
Thinking (New York: University Press of America, 1993), 192–93. We could possibly take it one step 
further, following the Norwegian philosopher Egil Wyller formulating the Christian view as amor ergo 
sum, “I am loved, therefore I am,” in contrast to Descartes’ cogito ergo sum (“I think, therefore I am”). On 
the basis of God creating, sustaining, and redeeming life in his love, as a historical event, we can therefore 
say “I am loved, therefore I am, therefore I think.” 
14 Martin Buber and Franz Rosenzweig, Scripture and Translation, trans. Lawrence Rosenwald 
and Everett Fox (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994), 9. Hans-Georg Gadamer wrote 
regarding the reader: “he must not try to disregard himself and his particular hermeneutical situation. He 
must relate the text to this situation if he wants to understand at all” (Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and 




save pride of intellect or professional peerage, is the reviewer, the critic, the academic 
expert accountable?15 
Further, Kierkegaard wrote in his well-known section “Subjective Truth, 
Inwardness; Truth is Subjectivity” of his Concluding Unscientific Postscript: “So, then, 
subjectivity, inwardness, is truth. . . . Speculative thought also says that subjectivity is 
untruth but says it in the very opposite direction, namely, that objectivity is truth. 
Speculative thought defines subjectivity negatively in the direction of objectivity.”16 
Steven Shakespear explains that “the ‘objectivity’ that Kierkegaard resists is that of the 
neutral and impartial spectator, who is able to judge what the truth is from an elevated 
vantage point. Objective truth is the correspondence of thought and reality which is valid 
independently of whether or not we happen to accept it. This model of truth presupposes 
that it is timeless, universally valid and accessible to intellectual contemplation.” In 
contrast, “Kierkegaard advocates the maxim that ‘subjectivity is truth’. ‘Subjectivity’ 
here means something like inward, passionate faith which has no objective, external 
guarantee of its validity. The subjective character of truth means that faith is a risk, that 
faith demands commitment and action rather than the speculative gaze of philosophy.”17  
According to Hans Skjervheim there is “an inner connection between factualization, 
                                               
15 George Steiner, Real Presences (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), 8. 
16 Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, trans. 
Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Kierkegaard's Writings 2 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1992), 207. Kierkegaard’s “Inderlighed” is here rendered as “inwardness” by Hong. While ‘inwardness’ 
primarily says something about direction or location, the Danish “Inderlighet” has much more passion 
implied in it, intentionally chosen by Kierkegaard. Passion may even be said to be the primary sense of 
“Inderlighed,” so it could also be rendered with words like ‘heartfelt’ or ‘passionately’. 




objectification, ‘Entfremdung,’ depersonalization, and elimination of the ethical.”18 This 
raises the question whether the objectivist ideal in much contemporary theology dissolves 
the ethical and halakhic?19 But when probing the distinction between the subjective and 
objective, do we not find that a subjectivist approach—accepting no moral normativity 
beyond the subject— also leads to the same dissolution of the ethical and halakhic?20 The 
question is, therefore, whether both an objectivist and subjectivist approach fail to help us 
in the quest of how to authentically read the biblical texts to aid us in how to live life?21 
Heidegger famously found the classical subject-object dichotomy inadequate, and, 
                                               
18 Skjervheim, Deltakar og tilskodar, 86. My translation. See also p. 143.  
19 Cf. Holmer, On Kierkegaard and the Truth, 121. 
20 Shakespear elaborates on Kierkegaard’s statement that truth is subjectivity: “. . . proclaiming the 
‘subjectivity’ of truth does not amount to endorsing subjectivism . . . . One cannot ignore the fact that the 
famous statement that ‘subjectivity is truth’ in the Postscript is counterbalanced by a recognition that 
‘subjectivity is untruth’ – that is, that human subjectivity is always already answerable to, guilty before, an 
otherness which precedes it. Kierkegaard, through Climacus his pseudonym, does not license unbridled 
human subjectivism, for the human will is not deemed to be pure and innocent” (Shakespear, Kierkegaard, 
Language and the Reality of God, 23). And again: “Does this amount to religious subjectivism? Those 
commentators who think not point out that, in principle, it is possible to relate oneself to the (objectively) 
true God, but that one must go about this subjectively, that is, one must appropriate one’s belief in an 
inward way, on the basis of a passionate decision of faith rather than on objective evidences. The 
underlying argument is that the subjectivity of the method or the way does not preclude the objectivity of 
the goal, that is, the extra-human reality of God. This argument has much to commend it. After all, if truth 
is relational, as we have suggested, subjectivism or anti-realism would seem to represent another form of 
closure” (Shakespear, Kierkegaard, Language and the Reality of God, 164). For how Kierkegaard may 
bridge the gap between a subjectivist and objectivist reading by recommending to simultaneously stand at a 
distance to the text and appropriate it inwardly see Shakespear, Kierkegaard, Language and the Reality of 
God, 119.Note that Kierkegaard writes “subjektiviteten,” i.e. ‘truth is the subjectivity’ not simply ‘truth is 
subjectivity’ or ‘truth is subjective’. Cf. Skjervheim, Deltakar og tilskodar, 87; Paul L. Holmer, On 
Kierkegaard and the Truth, eds. David J. Gouwens and Lee C. Barrett III. The Paul L. Holmer Papers 
(Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2012), 151. While I have questioned Wellhausen’s dictum that the prophets are 
orphans, on the question of subjectivity and objectivity in the prophets he seems to parallel Kierkegaard’s 
position: “the subjective in the highest sense, which is exalted above all ordinances, is the truly objective, 
the divine” (Wellhausen, Prolegomena, 397-99). 
21 Cf. Melis Erdur, “A Moral Critique of Moral Philosophy” (Ph.D. thesis, New York University, 
2013). For how a hermeneutics of suspicion easily dissolves any dogmatism, but also leaves us without any 




instead, elaborated on an already given participation with others and belonging in the 
world as a prime characteristic of what it means to be human.22 As Skjervheim wrote: “If 
                                               
22 Heidegger wrote: “There is no such thing as the ‘side-by-side-ness’ of an entity called ‘Dasein’ 
with another entity called ‘world’” (Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward 
Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), 81; Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 
2001), 55). For him the human is primarily something that belongs: “By ‘Others’ we do not mean everyone 
else but me—those over against whom the ‘I’ stands out. They are rather those from whom, for the most 
part, one does not distinguish oneself—those among whom one is too. This Being-there-too [Auch-dasein] 
with them does not have the ontological character of a Being-present-at-hand-along-‘with’ them within a 
world” (Heidegger, Being and Time, 154; Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 118). 
Both kantianism and utilitarianism attempted to ground a universal ethics upon something 
universal in man. They defined man on the basis of pleasure or pain, or duty and responsibility, not 
individual attributes or personal relations (Ross Poole, Morality and Modernity (London: Routledge, 1991), 
21). While Kant saw man as the telos of nature, Charles Darwin made it problematic to claim a unique 
status of man compared to other creatures. Contra the rationalism of Kantianism and utilitarianism, Freud 
exposed the irrational and unconscious forces often directing our conduct. And Nietzsche claimed that 
“God is dead” and that man has no access to an absolute and universal standard for life and thought. 
The following century saw a rethinking of what ethics was and its foundations. According to B. F. 
Skinner man could be viewed to a large extent like Pavlov’s dogs, conditioned by external stimuli. Ethical 
conduct could therefore be manipulated by external factors (Leslie Stevenson, Syv teorier om menneskets 
natur, trans. Trond Berg Eriksen (Oslo: Cappelens, 1994), 141, 147). According to Richard Rorty “God is 
dead” results in “man is dead,” man as a constant and universal essence. The individual is therefore free to 
define and create him- or herself. But as the language the individual needs in this self-constitution is 
borrowed from the social domain, ethics and morals is for him contingent as a social construct (Jan-Olav 
Henriksen, Grobunn for moral – om å være moralsk subjekt i en postmoderne kultur (Kristiansand S.: 
Høyskoleforlaget, 1997), 116, 119). 
With John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas we see a revised rationalism as an attempt to again ground 
ethics in something universal. Rawls draws upon the idea of a social contract from thinkers like Locke, 
Hobbes, and Rousseau. He uses this idea in a thought experiment (Poole, Morality and Modernity, 76). By 
imagining an original standpoint where our concrete setting is abstracted away, and we only know how a 
society functions, and that we do not know our actual role in this society, Rawls claims we could agree to 
two fundamental principles: (1) The principle of equal liberty for all, and (2) the principle that differences 
in a society shall be based upon all having equal access to the good, and that the differences shall serve the 
common good. Habermas took the concept of ‘Lebenswelt’ (‘Life-world’) from Husserl, and developed the 
idea that through intersubjective communication it is possible to arrive at a universal ethics, norms and 
values all participants in the discourse can agree upon. 
According to Nietzsche the only ethics possible after the death of God, the death of universalism, 
was the Aristotelian ethics of virtue. Two thinkers that have developed a more Aristotelian ethics are 
Alaister MacIntyre and Charles Taylor. Taylor’s thinking is hermeneutical. Man is what man interprets 
himself to be. But in this self-interpretation the individual receives norms and values from tradition. 
Through a discourse with this ‘received meaning,’ the ‘sources of the self’ as he calls them, the individual 
sets forth ‘strong evaluations’ in a hierarchy of norms and values. For him identity and morals are therefore 
closely connected (Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, 3). While MacIntyre is 
critical of what he saw as a historical irresponsibility in Nietzsche, he seems to accept the claim that the 
only possible ethics now is an Aristotelian (Alaister MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics: A History of 
Moral Philosophy from the Homeric Age to the Twentieth Century (London: Routledge, 1998), 225). 
MacIntryre saw virtues like wisdom and judgement as aids the individual could use to supersede received 
cultural norms. While Taylor, MacIntyre, and Poole all see the tradition and culture an individual 
participates in as sources for ethics and morals, the latter two seem to give the individual’s context a more 




one objectify the other, it is not that simple at the same time to take him and what he says 
serious.”23 As Skjervheim, we can therefore distinguish between the spectator and 
participator. Objectivism strives towards a spectator role in relation to the other. We can 
try to take the spectator’s stance in regards to the biblical text and its author(s). Or we can 
acknowledge that our person, our subject, is already involved. Such a concession is that 
of the participant. 
The quest for objectivity is typically coupled with a quest for system, but what 
possibilities are there for a system if it needs to be seen in the text itself, and not 
constructed by way of abstractions? Still, the history of scholarship on the HB seems to 
demonstrate that the biblical text cannot simply and easily be reduced to one main theme 
or idea or reconstructed as an Eucledian system. It defies idealizations, disembodiment, 
and a timeless realm. Over the years, it has proven wonderfully resistant to reductionisms 
and systematization.24 David Aaron argues that theology requires a certain degree of 
                                               
Martin Heidegger also sought for other sources of morals than the universal. He tried to revitalize 
a pre-platonic understanding of man, where ethics was not understood as a human product but something 
received from what man (Dasein) belongs to (Martin Heidegger, Brev om humanismen, trans. Eivind 
Tjønneland (Oslo: Cappelens, 2003), 46). Emmanuel Lévinas was influenced by Heidegger, but argued that 
ethics does not find its grounds in what man belongs to, but rather what man is separate from, what is 
different from us. The Other is something that always escapes my oikos, my eye and ear. The Other is 
encountered as an absence. As the Other constitutes the original difference, and thus precedes all reflection, 
Lévinas called ethics a ‘first philosophy.’ Cf. my Kenneth Bergland, “Den andre i det samme” (Cand. phil. 
thesis, University of Oslo, 2003). 
23 Skjervheim, Deltakar og tilskodar, 74. My translation.  
24 Many have suggested different concepts or unifying principles for the HB. The covenant 
(Walther Eichrodt), holiness of God (E. Sellin), God as Lord (Ludwig Köhler), election of Israel (Hans 
Wildberger), rulership of God (Horst Seebass), kingdom of God (Günther Klein), YHWH as the God of 
Israel and Israel as the people of YHWH (Rudolf Smend), the dual concept of the rule of God and 
communion between God and man (Georg Fohrer), righteousness and justice (Rolf Knierim), righteousness 
(Walter Dietrich), the first commandment (W. H. Schmidt and Walther Zimmerli), Deuteronomy (S. 
Herrmann), and simply God (Th. C. Vriezen, the late Gerhard von Rad, and Gerhard Hasel) (cf. Hasel, Old 
Testament Theology, 139–71). And these are not all. Richard Davidson has identified at least 50 different 




systematization not present in the natural language of the Bible. Thus he can formulate 
himself in the provocative statement: “there is no theology that is biblical.”25 Theology, 
taken as a primary commitment to a tradition, confession, or system of thought, and not a 
commitment to the biblical text itself, and the one claiming to address us through it, can 
be criticized as not being truly biblical. 
                                               
3 and The Theological Center of Scripture,” in Christ, Salvation, and the Eschaton: Essays in Honor of 
Hans K. LaRondelle, eds. Daniel Heinz, Jiří Moskala and Peter M. van Bemmelen (Berrien Springs, MI: 
Old Testament Department, Seventh-day Adventist Theological Seminary, Andrews University, 2009), 5–
9). Here he also suggests a seven-faceted center of Scripture. Having summarized the various claims to 
what a center in the HB might be, Gerhard Hasel writes: “Those to whom we have referred so far primarily 
agree on the matter that a single Scriptural concept, theme, motif, or idea can be made into a center which 
can serve as an organizing principle for a sort of systematic structure of an OT theology. This is done on 
the basis of an unspoken presupposition which has its roots in philosophical premises going back to 
scholastic theology of medieval times. It appears that the doing of OT theology is at this point in the grip of 
a philosophical-speculative presupposition which claims that the multiform and multiplex OT materials in 
all their rich manifoldness will fit into and can be systematically ordered and arranged by means of a 
center.     . . . It is evident that even the most carefully worked out single center or formula will prove itself 
finally to be one-sided, inadequate, and insufficient, if not outrightly erroneous, and therefore will lead to 
misconceptions” (Hasel, Old Testament Theology, 154–55. Cf. also pp. 139–71). For other 
problematizations of reducing the OT to a central concept see Kornelis H. Miskotte, When the Gods are 
Silent, trans. John W. Doberstein (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 119; Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament 
Theology (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1965), 362–63; James Barr, The Concept of Biblical Theology: An Old 
Testament Perspective (London: SCM Press, 1999), 605–7. Hasel rightly claimed that the event-centered 
and word-centered HB—and I would add with its focus on choice, action, and life—cannot be reduced to a 
single concept (Hasel, Old Testament Theology, 158). There is an overflow in the text which is not grasped 
by concepts or a system. Hasel might touch upon a central nerve when he says that the only one that unites 
the HB is YHWH himself (Hasel, Old Testament Theology, 168–71. Of course, a question is if we could 
say that YHWH is even the center in a book like Esther where he is nowhere mentioned, even if he may be 
implied?). And let us here spare ourselves from using the dull words ‘theological’ or ‘theocentric,’ even for 
the sake of “convenience,” as they leave the impression that we are again dealing with a systematism. In 
the text we are invited to encounter YHWH speaking to us, without hiding behind any fig leaves or trees. 
And we are called to, we must, respond with our life. Biblical and systematic theology, apologetics and 
orthodoxy, are not flawed in themselves, but if any become the dominant reading of the text, it becomes 
faithless to the primary intent of the text. For further discussions on the role of systematization in biblical 
theology see Westermann, Elements of Old Testament Theology, 24; Jon Levenson, “Why Jews are not 
Interested in Biblical Theology,” in Judaic Perspectives on Ancient Israel, eds. Jacob Neusner, Baruch A. 
Levine and Ernest S. Frerichs (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987), 281–307; Hasel, Old Testament Theology; 
Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language, 259; Barr, The Concept of Biblical Theology: An Old Testament 
Perspective; Ben C. Ollenburger, Old Testament Theology: Flowering and Future, SBTS 1 (Winona Lake, 
IN: Eisenbrauns, 2004); Dalit Rom-Shiloni, “Hebrew Bible Theology: a Jewish Descriptive Approach,” 
The Journal of Religion 96, no. 2 (2016): 165–84. 




The text is grounded in life, and it might be at the cost of life itself that we try to 
build our neat systems.26 We must therefore always begin at the beginning, with the text 
as it is given to us, and the forms of life it initiates us into. Wittgenstein wrote: “It is so 
difficult to find the beginning. Or, better: it is difficult to begin at the beginning. And not 
try to go further back.”27 
 
                                               
26 I find myself resonating with an existentialist approach to the HB as Maurice Friedman explains 
existentialism: “It is true that ‘religion has always been existentialist,’ as Walter Kaufmann puts it, but this 
is only a half truth and is confusing if taken as a whole one. Religion has never been simply a detached 
observation of reality for its own sake. Rather it has always been a way of life, a way of man. It has always 
stood in need, therefore, of existential verification in the lived life of men. On the other hand, through the 
dual need of expressing religious reality and of handing it down, religion has inevitably produced many 
manifestations which have led in very opposite directions from man’s concrete existence. Religion is 
neither an objective philosophy nor a subjective experience. It is lived reality which is ontologically prior to 
its expression in creed, ritual, and group. At the same time, it is inseparable from these expressions and 
cannot be distilled out and objectified in itself. . . . It is understandable, therefore, that the life of every 
religion depends not only upon its continuation but upon those men within it who will bring it back to the 
concrete reality from which it began—often through relating to the traditional forms in such a way that they 
point back to the lived religious life rather than lead away from it, sometimes through breaking through 
these forms to new central experiences and the new forms that arise from them. In this dialectic those who 
insist on the incessant return to the lived religious life and on the superior reality of the religious meeting 
with reality over any formulations concerning the nature of religious reality may properly be called 
existentialist” (Marurice Friedman, ed., The Worlds of Existentialism: A Critical Reader (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Peess, 1964), 6–7). He elaborates: “‘Existentialism’ is not a philosophy but a mood 
embracing a number of disparate philosophies; the differences among them are more basic than the temper 
which unites them. This temper can best be described as a reaction against the static, the abstract, the purely 
rational, the merely irrational, in favour of the dynamic and the concrete, personal involvement and 
‘engagement,’ action, choice, and commitment, the distinction between ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic’ 
existence, and the actual situation of the existential subject as the starting point of thought. Beyond this the 
so-called existentialists divide according to their views on such matters as phenomenological analysis, the 
existential subject, the intersubjective relation between selves, religion, and the implications of 
existentialism for psychotherapy” (Friedman, Worlds of Existentialism, 3–4. Cf. also p. 5). He continues: 
“It is in this emphasis upon the existential subject that the crucial distinction is found between 
existentialism and the various brands of empiricism, positivism, and instrumentalism that also emphasize 
the particular, the concrete, and the here and now. For these latter the particular is still seen from without, 
from the standpoint of the detached observer, rather than from within, from the standpoint of lived life. . . . 
Nietzsche recognizes that life must be lived from within—from the standpoint of the person or the self. 
This does not mean introversion or subjectivism, but it does mean that there is a crucial and inescapable 
distinction between authentic and inauthentic existence” (Friedman, Worlds of Existentialism, 9). 






ָוָחי ָדםָאֱאֹלִהים ֶאת־הָ  רּבֵ י־ְידַ ּכִ  ּוָרִאינ הּזֶ הַ  ֹוםּיהַ    
“We have seen this day that God may speak  
with man, and man still live” (Deut 5:24). 
 
ἐγώ εἰμι ἡ ὁδὸς καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια καὶ ἡ ζωή 
“I am the way, and the truth,  
and the life” (Joh 14:6). 
All the major books in this study have one feature in common; they claim to be a 
record of YHWH’s speech(es) mediated by a prophet.28 Even when the books open as the 
prophet’s words to the people (e.g. Deut 1:1; Isa 1:1), the following content is 
nevertheless presented as YHWH’s mediated words.29 It is possible that YHWH is 
                                               
28 According to Jan Joosten the prophetic expression ֹּכה ָאַמר ְיהָוה, “thus says the LORD,” should 
be understood as performative when “followed by the adverbial phrase ‘unto you’ (2 Chr 20:15), or when 
the oracle explicitly addresses the hearer in the second person (see, e.g., 2 Kgs 9:3),” but non-performative 
when specified by “a phrase like ‘unto me’ (Isa 18:4; 31:4; Jer 17:19), showing that the prophet is relating a 
personal experience that occurred earlier.” But the pronouncement comes “with full force only in the 
presence of the intended addressee (see, e.g., 2 Sam 24:12)” (Joosten, The Verbal System of Biblical 
Hebrew, 204). Bruce Waltke and M. O’Connor write that the other prophetic phrase used for divine speech, 
 ”,declaration(?) of YHWH”), is “almost always used as a closing formula in the prophets“) ְנֻאם־ְיהָוה
“almost always with yhwh” even though “the closure may be slight” (Waltke and O'Connor, Biblical 
Hebrew Syntax, 681 (40.2.3a)). But according to Oliver Glanz, studying the language of Jeremiah,  ֻם־ְנא
 rather “seem to function as macro-syntactical markers emphasizing that YHWH is still speaking and ְיהָוה
holds the 1pPos” (Glanz, Participant-Reference Shifts in the Book of Jeremiah, 244). The messenger 
formula in the Bible resemble the introduction of prophetic speech in Mari, Eshnunna, and Assyria (Claus 
Westermann, Basic Forms of Prophetic Speech, trans. Hugh Clayton White (Cambridge: Lutterworth, 
1991), 103–104). Cf. Marjo C. A. Korpel and Johannes C. de Moor, The Silent God (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 
178, 181 for further references on the similarity in the messenger formula between HB and ANE. Cf. 
Stackert, Rewriting the Torah, 2. 
In the books in this study the noun ֱאֶמת tends to be used in the sense of someone or something that 
can be trusted, in a strongly relational sense, rather than the more abstract ‘truth’. There are also several 
passages that use the word more in the sense of ‘honesty’ and ‘sincerity’ (Gen 24:27, 48–49; 32:11; 42:16; 
47:29; Exod 18:21; 34:6; Deut 13:15; 17:4; 22:20; 2 Kgs 20:19; Isa 10:20; 16:5; 38:3, 18-19; 39:8; 42:3; 
43:9; 48:1; 59:14-15; 61:8; Jer 2:21; 4:2; 9:4; 10:10; 14:13; 23:28; 26:15; 28:9; 32:41; 33:6; 42:5; Ezek 
18:8-9). The word ֱאֶמת does not appear to be prominent in Torah, and among the studied books only Isaiah 
and Jeremiah have some frequency of the word. 
29 The statement ִּדּבֶ ר מֹ ׁשֶ ה ֶאל־ּבְ ֵני יִ ׂשְ ָרֵאל ּכְ ֹכל אֲ ׁשֶ ר צִ ּוָ ה ְיהָוה ֹאתֹו ֲאֵלֶהם (“Moses spoke to the sons of 
Israel in accordance with all the commandments YHWH [gave him] for them”) in Deut 1:3 makes clear 
that even if the following is couched in the words of Moses, it was originally commanded by YHWH. 
Further, the same point is made by  ְִיהָוה ֱאֹלָהי ִניּוַ צִ  רׁשֶ אֲ ּכַ  ִטיםְׁשּפָ מִ ּו יםּקִ ֶאְתֶכם חֻ  יּתִ דְ ּמַ ְרֵאה ל  (“See, I have taught 
them rules and judgments, as YHWH my God commanded me”) in 4:5. They are presented as YHWH’s 




presented in the HB as speaking more often than the representation of other deities in the 
ANE world.30 It is also possible that divine speech was proclaimed more openly by 
prophets in ancient Israelite society than in comparable cultures.31 
Despite similarities with ANE literature, the Hebrew prophets show a polemical 
rhetoric against gods other than YHWH and those crafting their images (e.g. Isa 44:12–
20; Jer 10:14–16; 51:17–19; Hab 2:18–19). For them YHWH could choose to be silent,32 
                                               
(“This is the instruction—the rules and judgements—that YHWH your God instructed [me] to teach you”), 
tells us that Moses was not simply instructed to teach the people instructions, but that he was also given the 
concrete instructions he was to communicate. Cf. Deut 6:25; 10:13. 
Claus Westermann writes: “The second part of the canon, the Prophets, has as its actual subject 
matter the occurrence of the word of God . . . . But it is not only this part of the canon that deals with the 
word of God; on the contrary, the word of God in various forms belongs to everything the Old Testament 
says about God” (Westermann, Elements of Old Testament Theology, 15). 
30 Cf. Korpel and Moor, The Silent God, 224. On p. 227 they also claim that in no other ANE 
culture “a singular ‘prophet’ like Moses arose – or was framed” or “nowhere so many prophecies of doom 
were recorded as in Israel.” However, they find that prophetic criticism of the king and oracles of doom 
was not unique to the HB. In the HB YHWH famously speaks everything into existence (Gen 1). Similarly, 
in the New Kingdom Egyptian scribes saw silence as dominating the primordial earth, until the Sun-god 
Amun-Re “opened speech from within the stillness” (as quoted in Korpel and Moor, The Silent God, 231): 
He opened speech from within the stillness: 
And he opened each eye, letting it see; 
He began sounds while the world was silent – 
And his unchallenged victory-shout encircled the earth. 
Cf. Susan Tower Hollis, ed., Hymns, Prayers, and Songs: An Anthology of Ancient Egyptian Lyric Poetry 
(vol. 8 of SBL-Writings from the Ancient World; Atlanta: Scholar Press, 1995), 76. In the HB and Egypt we 
therefore find the idea that the world was created by divine words, while in other ANE cultures the idea 
seems to be more that the gods formed the world out of matter. On the lack of divine speech in Babylonia, 
and how they there resorted to divinely inscribed/written phenomena in nature instead, through omens and 
astrology, see Van De Mieroop, Philosophy before the Greeks, 90–91. 
For general discussions of prophecy in the ANE see Simo Parpola, Assyrian Prophecies, State 
Archives of Assyria 9 (Helsinki: Helsinki University Press, 1997); Robert P. Gordon and Hans Barstad, 
"Thus Speaks Ishtar of Arbela": Prophecy in Israel, Assyria, and Egypt in the Neo-Assyrian Period 
(Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2013); Kitchen, On the Reliability of the Old Testament, 383–95; John 
Kaltner and Louis Stulman, eds., Inspired Speech: Prophecy in the Ancient Near East Essays in Honour of 
Herbert B. Huffmon (New York: T&T Clark, 2008); Korpel and Moor, The Silent God, 168n. 
31 Cf. Alan Lenzi, Secrecy and the Gods: Secret Knowledge in Ancient Mesopotamia and Biblical 
Israel SAAS (Helsinki: University of Helsinki, 2008), 221; Korpel and Moor, The Silent God, 204. 
32 André Neher in The Exile of the Word argues that it is not God’s silence per se that is the 
problem in the HB, but his silence in interpreting events. He leaves that open to us. He writes: “Like Job, 
Aaron would be less disturbed in his human reactions by the mystery of death than by the interpretations 




in contrast to the gods who were silent because they did not exist.33 In defiance of the 
gods, they claimed the exclusivity of YHWH (e.g. Isa 45:5; 46:5, 9–10). They upheld the 
difference by themselves being the person through which the silent YHWH becomes 
audible.34 
The biblical authors seem to describe divine and human speech in analogous 
terms. Moshe Greenberg wrote “that the biblical narrators all portrayed speech between 
man and God on the analogy of speech between humans. Such a procedure accords 
perfectly with the personal conception of God in the Scriptures; the only analogy 
available for intercourse with him was the human-personal.”35 A text like Exod 33:11a 
                                               
precisely illustrates in a remarkable manner, namely, that the silence of God in the event is less painful than 
His silence in the interpretation, and that men can accept that God keeps silent but not that other men 
should speak in His place” (André Neher, The Exile of the Word: From the Silence of the Bible to the 
Silence of Auschwitz, trans. David Maisel (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1981), 35). 
In the preceding chapters we have studied passages where YHWH interprets text, his own words. While it 
is true that YHWH interprets both events and texts in the HB, Neher seems to be correct in pointing out that 
the most painful silence is when he is silent and does not give an interpretation of tragic events. According 
to Korpel and de Moor in the ANE the divinity could be silent because of offenses, awe/fear, 
forbearance/prudence, incapacity, sleep or of incomprehensible reasons (Korpel and Moor, The Silent God, 
277 ). 
33 Kornelis Miskotte: “When the gods are dumb, when the ‘godhead’ is silent, this is ultimately not 
so much because they have been put to silence, but rather because their eternal silence has been exposed as 
their most essential, their ‘mystical’ characteristic” (Miskotte, When the Gods are Silent, 11). Cf. also p. 51. 
He continues to ask whether we as moderners have “heard the prophets if one has not heard that they are 
witnesses of the Word, which a priori and a limine breaks through the spell of nihilism” (Miskotte, When 
the Gods are Silent, 19). 
34 Cf. Heschel, The Prophets, 22, 25; Korpel and Moor, The Silent God, 191–2. 
35 Moshe Greenberg, Biblical Prose Prayer: As a Window to the Popular Religion of Ancient 
Israel (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1983), 36. Korpel and de Moor describe the analogy as 
a metaphor: “If people state that God ‘keeps silent’ they presuppose that normal audible or written 
communication between God and human beings is possible. . . . It is important, however, to realize that the 
concept of a speaking God belongs to the domain of metaphorical religious language. To be more specific, 
phrases like these originate from the common idea that God can be described analogous to a human being. 
Anthropomorphic concepts of God dominate all God-talk from ancient times until today, even though the 
inadequacy of this ‘humanizing’ of God is generally admitted” (Korpel and Moor, The Silent God, 59–60). 
Cf. p. 65). Korpel and de Moor seem to be inclined to their metaphorical reading of divine speech because 
they see the divine realm as “a totally different reality” (Korpel and Moor, The Silent God, 59–60). For 




seems to support seeing it as analogous events:  ְוִדֶּבר ְיהָוה ֶאל־ֹמֶׁשה ָּפִנים ֶאל־ָּפִנים ַּכֲאֶׁשר
 For YHWH spoke face to face with Moses, as a man speaks to his“) ְיַדֵּבר ִאיׁש ֶאל־ֵרֵעהּו
fellow”). The ַּכֲאֶׁשר (lit. “like as”) here seems to indicate an analogical event rather than 
an analogical metaphor. The analogy comes subsequent to the symmetry of the events, it 
does not establish the similarity through a metaphor based on inter-human 
communication. Human speech is not used to conceptualize divine speech, but the 
passages stresses the similarity between events of divine and human speech.36 
For the biblical authors the event of divine speech seems to be a given, analogous 
to the phenomena of human speech. It seems possible to speak of divine speech for the 
biblical authors in terms of Wittgenstein’s ‘certainty’; what they do not doubt. According 
to Wittgenstein everything can be doubted, but not at the same time. We need to be 
certain of something in order to question something else. He wrote:  
“Doubt comes after belief.”37 
                                               
though they spoke about the divine in human metaphorical language” (Korpel and Moor, The Silent God, 
276). Cf. Marjo C. A. Korpel, A Rift in the Clouds: Ugaritic and Hebrew Descriptions of the Divine 
(Münster: UGARIT-Verlag, 1990). But it is a question whether it is not more precise to understand the 
authors in the HB as seeing divine speech as an analogical event, rather than an analogical metaphor, with 
human speech. 
36 The episode of the boy Samuel interchanging the voice of YHWH with that of Eli in 1 Sam 3 
also seem to support the contention that the events of divine and human speech were experienced as 
analogous. Cf. Korpel and Moor, The Silent God, 150. It seems to be a progression in the theophany as 1 
Sam 3:10 adds ַוָּיבֹא ְיהָוה ַוִּיְתַיַּצב ַוִּיְקָרא ְכַפַעם־ְּבַפַעם ְׁשמּוֵאל ְׁשמּוֵאל (“And YHWH came and stood and called as 
before: ‘Samuel! Samuel!’”). A question is how we should understand the ְיהָוה ְוֶטֶרם  ּוְׁשמּוֵאל ֶטֶרם ָיַדע ֶאת־
 And Samuel had not yet experienced YHWH, and the word of YHWH had not yet“) ִיָּגֶלה ֵאָליו ְּדַבר־ְיהָוה
been revealed before”) in 1 Sam 3:7? The remark appears to be added in order to explain the reason for 
Samuel’s confusion of the voice of YHWH and Eli (cf. Henry Preserved Smith, A Critical and Exegetical 
Commentary on the Books of Samuel, ICC (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1899), 26). The point here is 
that for the young Samuel YHWH’s speech sounded identical to Eli’s. Ralph Klien writes: “In 2:12 the 
same words are used about Eli’s sons. For them not to know Yahweh meant they did not acknowledge 
Yahweh as Lord, or they did not obey him, or they had no relationship to him. None of these seems 
relevant for the situation of Samuel” (Ralph W. Klein, 1 Samuel, WBC 10 (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 
2008), 32). 




 “For whenever we test anything, we are already presupposing something that is not 
tested.”38 
“We could doubt every single one of these facts, but we could not doubt them all.”39  
 “The questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some 
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.”40  
“I really want to say that a language-game is only possible if one trusts something (I 
did not say ‘can trust something’)”.41 
The point here is not to argue that the words recounted in the HB are de facto YHWH’s 
words, but to reflect on how biblical authors and ourselves speak about YHWH speaking. 
According to Wittgenstein certainty is learned by practicing language-games that 
presuppose them. For the biblical authors divine speech is a given, an event, analogical to 
the experience of human discourse. It is therefore not a conceptualization that makes 
divine speech accessible to man, but the event of divine speech itself results in a certainty 
about having actually been addressed by YHWH. This is why they can speak of God 
speaking without any embarrassment or ad hoc explanations. Similarly, they can speak of 
God’s body without any further excuse.42 
                                               
of truth, meaning and goodness, not as a disinterested spectator, but as a participant in the struggle between 
doubt and faith” (Shakespear, Kierkegaard, Language and the Reality of God, 61). 
38 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 24e. 
39 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 30e. 
40 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 44e. Italics belongs to the author himself. 
41 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 66e. 
42 Quoting Calvin, Nicholas Wolterstorff writes: “Calvin, in a passage contrasting Scripture with 
God’s revelation in creation, says that this ‘is a special gift, where God, to instruct the church, not merely 
uses mute teachers but also opens his own most hallowed lips’ (Institutes I, vi, I). Though the language is 
of course metaphorical, clearly Calvin is expressing the view we have been exploring, viz., that Scripture is 
a medium of divine discourse” (Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 282). Italics are mine. A little earlier 
Wolterstorff  has taken it as intuitively obvious that God does not have a body, so that he finds it sufficient 
simply to state: “I take it as beyond doubt that the human writers were speaking metaphorically when they 
spoke of the eyes and ears and limbs of God” (Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 211). While Kornelis 
Miskotte was critical of the negative interpretations among certain theologians of the anthropomorphic 




Ludwig Wittgenstein further pointed out the futility of arguing about “what sits 
deep in a man,” objecting to suggestions like “I can see that this is the word of God 
because. . .” or “I feel that this cannot be the word of God, because (surely God would 
never . . . etc.).”43 He wrote: “‘You can’t hear God speak to someone else, you can hear 
him only if you are being addressed’.—That is a grammatical remark.”44 Wittgenstein’s 
statement, “This is a grammatical remark,” should probably be understood in relation to 
                                               
Silent, 173). In contrast to Wolterstorff who seems to object on intuitive grounds, Miskotte tries to found 
the argument exegetically: “We cannot say that God ʻhas’ a face, eyes, hands; this is prevented by the 
Name – not because seeing, hearing, and touching would be beneath his dignity, but rather because this 
ʻhaving’ (as well as ʻbeing’) is an assertion that conflicts with the Second Commandment, ʻYou shall not 
make yourself a graven image, or any likeness. . . ’” (Miskotte, When the Gods are Silent, 132). But while 
the Second Commandment forbids humans to create any image of God, does it forbid God to have a body? 
Miskotte’s textual reference can hardly be said to support his argument. 
This line of thinking has deep roots in the history of ideas. Philo rejected the idea that God had 
emotions or a body (Philo, “On the Unchangeableness of God,” in The Works of Philo: Complete and 
Unabridged [Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1993], 162 [XI.52]). Augustine also found it repugnant to 
understand the bodily descriptions of God literally, as if God was limited to a body. He writes addressing 
God: “I thought it shameful to believe you to have the shape of the human figure, and to be limited by the 
bodily lines of our limbs” (Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick [Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1992], 85. Cf. p. 94). Maimonides felt a similar need to free God of any bodily attachment. He 
argues from the philosophic assumption that since God does not need to prolong or improve his existence, 
neither has he a need of a body (Moses Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed, trans. Shlomo Pines 
[Chicago: The Chicago University Press, 1963], I,46 [101]). While one could ask what function such 
philosophic speculations as these should have, and if it is not be better counsel to keep one’s silence (cf. 
Prov 17:28) (Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 27, 189 (7)), the main question here is of 
course what the biblical passages themselves communicate on this point? With them we do not find the 
same embarrassment to speak of God’s body. Cf. Benjamin D. Sommer, The Bodies of God and the World 
of Ancient Israel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
43 As referred by Wittgenstein’s close friend and editor Rush Rhees in Rhees, Rush Rhees on 
Religion and Philosophy, 307–8. Rhees is here writing a response to M. O’C. Drury, who had told him that 
Wittgenstein replied very sternly “You musn’t pick and choose just what you want in that way” to Drury’s 
remark that he found offensive the episode of the bears devouring the boys who taunted Elisha. The 
specific exchange between Drury and Wittgenstein is published in M. O'C. Drury, “Conversations with 
Wittgenstein,” in Recollections of Wittgenstein, ed. Rush Rhees (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 
169–70. A question is if Wittgenstein here himself confronted “what sits deep” in Drury, or just a 
superficial remark he saw it as appropriate to rebuke. 
44  Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Berkley: University of California 
Press, 1967), 124e (§717). Barr wrote that the biblical theology movement had been primarily occupied 
with questions like “‘How can human speech be used as the vehicle of divine communication?’ or ‘How 
can the Bible, which is a body of literature or tradition composed entirely in human language, be 
expounded or interpreted as the Word of God?’” (Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language, 276). As he 




his thoughts about language-games. Divine speech is a language-game and has its own 
grammar as all languages do. Ingrained in the divine speech grammar is this exclusive 
first person stance for the addressee. Statements like “I can see that this is the word of 
God” or “I feel that this cannot be the word of God” are not objective statements like 
“this is (not) a chair.” They can only be taken as objective statements in confusion. It 
does therefore not make sense to ground them objectively with a “because,” as 
Wittgenstein pointed out. Hearing God speak is a personal encounter. What is perceived 
as divine speech, whatever form the phenomena may take, can only be perceived as such 
in the first person. In this sense, not even the prophet can hear God’s words for us. He or 
she can only recount what God spoke to him or her. And hearing this record as divine 
speech—past or present—thus depends on personal appropriation. 
Rush Rhees elaborates on these thoughts: 
‘Because that was the voice of God, I cannot doubt that the Scriptures are the word of 
God.’ Again one might want to ask, ‘Why not?’ . . . . Is not the point rather that in 
knowing the voice as the voice of God, I knew the Scriptures as the word of God? ‘It 
is from God’ would mean the same in both cases. I might say, ‘If I had not had that 
experience, I should never have recognized the divinity of the Scriptures.’ But what I 
recognize is not something quite apart from what I had in that experience. It is not 
like, ‘If I had not met him, I should never have known who wrote the book.’ The 
divinity of the Scriptures is not an ‘objective fact’ like that. Once again: what do I 
recognize, when I recognize the divinity of Scriptures? And what sort of recognition 
is it? It is not finding out something about them – like discovering the date when they 
were written down. It is to live by them. If I say, ‘This is the word of God’, that is a 
confession of faith.45 
As I understand Rhees’ point, he is saying that when someone will confess “This is the 
word of God” it is not based on objective facts. It is a recognition of “the voice as the 
                                               
45 Rhees, Rush Rhees on Religion and Philosophy, 12. Cf. p. 37. We can also ask how this relates 
to a person who recognizes something as God’s words and still decides to turn his or her back against 




voice of God.” It is not that such a faith-statement needs to go counter to objective facts, 
even if it is not the same as a statement about objective facts. Rather, it is a different type 
of statement. A faith statement cannot be reduced to an objective statement, and an 
objective statement cannot be said to be a faith statement.46 
This differentiation is significant as it relates to how we understand divine speech 
in the HB. Claus Westermann points out the difference in how the modern historian 
under the ideal of secular objectivity approaches the word of God in the HB compared to 
how the prophets themselves perceived this word of God: 
The word of God does not exist for modern historical understanding because it cannot 
be historically documented. The modern historian must place the prophet’s subjective 
consciousness, the consciousness which believes it has heard the word of God, in the 
place of the word coming to the prophet from God. But with that the historian 
changes the meaning of ‘word’ in the Old Testament. He is able to adapt the 
phenomenon of the word of God encountered in the Old Testament to his own 
historical understanding only by understanding it differently than the text intends.47 
                                               
46 “Given the existence of religious statements within an already existing religion (i.e. religious 
practices and concerns), you may in many cases be able to find a correlation of such statements with 
statements about physical things and worldly affairs; and you may think such correlations are very 
interesting. But this does not show that religious language and religious practices are or ever could be a 
regular substitute for secular practices. As though you had found a way of translating from one (dishonest) 
language into another (honest) one. If that were so, then it should be possible to make the translation the 
other way. It should be possible to translate any worldly concerns into a form of religious devotion. That 
never is done, and it cannot be done” (Rhees, Rush Rhees on Religion and Philosophy, 119–20. Italics 
original). 
47 Westermann, Elements of Old Testament Theology, 16. And further: “The Old Testament knows 
nothing of an abstracted, objectified word of God, and that is why the word of God in the Old Testament 
cannot become a doctrine. It is also the reason none of these functions can be absolutized apart from the 
others. This absolutizing takes place not only when in the Jewish understanding the Law becomes the 
dominant word of God. It is also the case in Christian theology when the Old Testament as a whole is 
understood from the perspective of the concept of Law and in contrast to the New Testament” 
(Westermann, Elements of Old Testament Theology, 24). See also pp. 22–24. Seizo Sekine asks “whether 
scholarship has drifted toward non-essential, intellectual games of batting around indeterminable 
hypotheses concerning historical theses and antitheses. The essential task of hermeneutical scholarship is to 
deepen our reading of the text, and scholarship that contributes nothing to this has lost its way. Perhaps the 
current state of Western research exposes the dead-end of historical research methods that tend to run in 
circles while bouncing around such theses” (Seizo Sekine, Philosophical Interpretations of the Old 
Testament, eds. John Barton, Reinhard G. Kratz and Markus Witte. trans. J. Randall Short and Judy 




In other words, there is no neutral ground of reading the biblical text. An ‘objective’ 
reading does not leave the phenomena untouched. It is already a commitment. 
Westermann further highlights this difference between how the prophet understood God’s 
words and the way modern theology relates to it by continuing:  
However, modern theology also understand the ‘word of God’ to a large extent 
differently than the Old Testament intends, namely, on the basis of its content. 
According to that understanding, the word of God is what God has said. As such it 
can be found as given and becomes accessible to objective reflection. This separates 
the word of God from the process of its occurrence and puts it at one’s disposal.48 
As such there is a tendency to relate to the HB as ideas and concepts rather than as 
communication.49 
For Wittgenstein “the question is not one of explaining a language-game by 
means of our experiences, but of noting a language-game,”50 and to “look on the 
language-game as the primary thing.”51 We need to “accept the everyday language-
                                               
authority as ethical foundation, and how he can be read as utilizing the principle of sola Scriptura at the 
same time as he laid the foundation of the historical-critical method see Baruch Spinoza, "Theological-
Political Treatise," in Spinoza: Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002). Cf. J. Samuel Preus, Spionza 
and the Irrelevance of Biblical Authority (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1–33, 154–202. 
For further discussions on YHWH speaking in human language, more favorable to a critical approach, see 
Jacob Weingreen, “ִּדְּבָרה תֹוָרה ִּכְלׁשֹון ְּבֵני־ָאָדם,” in Interpreting the Hebrew Bible: Essays in Honour of E. I. 
J. Rosenthal, eds. John Emerton and Stefan C. Reif (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 267–
75; Bernard M. Levinson, “The Human Voice in Divine Revelation: The Problem of Authority in Biblical 
Law,” in Innovations in Religious Traditions, eds. M. A. Williams, C. Cox and M. S. Jaffee, RelSoc  
(Berlin: de Gruyter, 1992), 35–71; Frank Polak, “The Messenger of God and the Dialectic of Revelation,” 
in A Light of Jacob: Studies in the Bible and the Dead Sea Scrolls in Memory of Jacob Licht, eds. Yair 
Hoffman and Frank Polak (Jerusalem: The Bialik Institute, 1997), 14–30; Sonnet, The Book within the 
Book, 110; Watts, Reading Law, 93; Carasik, Theologies of the Mind, 11; Jassen, Scripture and Law, 22. 6. 
48 Westermann, Elements of Old Testament Theology, 16. 
49 Cf. the previous footnote referring to the different ways in which the center of the HB has been 
defined. 
50 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 167 (655). 




game.”52 Malcolm elaborates: 
In secular life, when something distressing occurs and there is a demand for 
explanations of why it happened – at some stage someone may say: ‘It is pointless to 
continue seeking for an explanation. We are faced with a fact which we must accept. 
That’s how it is!’ The words, ‘It is God’s will’, have many religious connotations: but 
they also have a logical force similar to ‘That’s how it is!’ Both expressions tell us to 
stop asking ‘Why?’ and instead to accept a fact!53  
The question occurs as to how this would apply to the language-game between God and 
the prophet, and the language-game we participate in when reading the prophetic texts? 
We tend to want to ground the God-prophet language-game metaphysically and 
ontologically.54 But is the phenomena of YHWH’s speech a given that objective research 
(to the extent such a thing exists) can verify or falsify? Wittgenstein argues that the given 
is not divine speech as such, but ‘forms of life’: “And to imagine a language means to 
imagine a form of life.”55 And again: “What has to be accepted, the given, is—so one 
                                               
52 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 200. Malcolm comments: “You make a study of a 
particular language-game. Then you can say to someone: ‘Look at it! That’s how it is! Don’t ask why, but 
take it as a fact, without explanation!’ We need ‘to accept the everyday language game’ (PI, p. 200)” 
(Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View? (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), 
86). 
53 Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View?, 86. Cf. Tim Labron, Wittgenstein's 
Religious Point of View (London: Continuum, 2006), 3. 
54 For a critique of Wittgenstein’s analogy between language and games, see Rush Rhees, 
Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Discourse, ed. D. Z. Phillips. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 116––29. 
55 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 8e (§19). And again: “Philosophy is not laid down in 
sentences but in language” (Ludwig Wittgenstein, “Sections 86–93 (pp. 405–35) of the so-called “Big 
Typescript”, ed. Heikki Nyman, trans. C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue,” Synthese 87, no. 1 (1991): 16).  
Labron writes: “We do not start with a single independent proposition and then build our system; rather, we 
start with a system of propositions.” Patterson: “Language emerges through the multiple paths of life, not 
from logical syntax” (Labron, Wittgenstein's Religious Point of View, 29). Cf. Labron, Wittgenstein's 
Religious Point of View, 35). And again: “To think of a conceptual framework is to think of a language, but 
for Wittgenstein, to think of a language is to think of some activity” (Sue Patterson, Word, Words and 
World: How Wittgensteinian Perspective on Metaphor-Making Reveals the Theo-logic of Reality (Oxford: 




could say—forms of life.”56 It means that only to the extent we participate in the forms of 
life outlined by the prophets will the language-game of the biblical passages make sense 
to us. Only then can we read the words as intended, and not alter the meaning of the 
words in order to accommodate an objectivist detached approach. Kierkegaard wrote that 
truth in order to be truth needs to become a life: 
Thus Christ is the truth in the sense that to be the truth is the only true explanation of 
what truth is. Therefore one can ask an apostle, one can ask a Christian, ‘What is 
truth?’ and in answer to the question the apostle and this Christian will point to Christ 
and say: Look at him, learn from him, he was the truth. This means that truth in the 
sense in which Christ is the truth is not a sum of statements, not a definition, etc., but 
a life. . . . only then do I in truth know the truth, when it becomes a life in me.57 
Jean Zurcher claims that it is only as the text becomes life that we really comprehend it: 
“Bible truth only makes sense to the extent in which it is lived. . . . Truth is really known 
only when it becomes inner life.”58 Or, to phrase it in Wittgensteinian terms, if we desire 
                                               
56 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 226e. Labron writes: “We can only understand 
logical grammar through our use of language, and we can only understand religion through worship. . . . 
What becomes important in Wittgenstein’s later understanding of language is the form of life for language 
in contrast to a rule-governed logical form” (Labron, Wittgenstein's Religious Point of View, 31). A further 
study could be an analysis of Wittgenstein’s discussion of “a form of life” and “rule-governed logical 
form” and the rules or instructions of Torah as it relates to a Torah “form of life”. Cf. Dennis M. Patterson, 
ed., Wittgenstein and Legal Theory (New Perspectives on Law, Culture, and Society; eds. Robert W. 
Gordon and Margaret Jane Radin; Boulder: Westview Press, 1992); Dennis M. Patterson, ed., Wittgenstein 
and Law (Philosophers and Law; ed. Tom Campbell; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004). 
57 Søren Kierkegaard, Practice in Christianity, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, 
Kierkegaard's Writings (Prineton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 205–6. On the emphasis upon doing 
the instructions in Torah see Carasik, Theologies of the Mind, 183, 194–95. 
58 Jean Zurcher, “Existentialism: A Survey and Assessment,” n.p. [Cited 14 July 2014]. Online: 
https://adventistbiblicalresearch.org/sites/default/files/pdf/existentialism_0.pdf. Cf. Labron, Wittgenstein's 
Religious Point of View, 111–12; Paul Morris, “The Embodied Text: Covenant and Torah,” Religion 20 
(1990): 84. Oswald Chambers put it even more succinctly. He writes that spiritual sight is not so much 
about thinking right, as obeying right: “Simplicity is the secret of seeing things clearly. A saint does not 
think clearly for a long while, but a saint ought to see clearly without any difficulty. You cannot think a 
spiritual muddle clear, you have to obey it clear. In intellectual matters you can think things out, but in 
spiritual matters you will think yourself into cotton wool. If there is something upon which God has put His 
pressure, obey in that matter, bring your imagination into captivity to the obedience of Christ with regard to 
it and everything will become as clear as daylight. The reasoning capacity comes afterwards, but we never 




to say “I can see that this is the word of God”, we have to participate in a form of life 
where the language-game knows the voice of God as a certainty. 
The Life 
 
 ַהַחִּיים ְוַהָּמֶות ָנַתִּתי ְלָפֶניָך ַהְּבָרָכה ְוַהְּקָלָלה 
  ּוָבַחְרָּת ַּבַחִּיים ְלַמַען ִּתְחֶיה ַאָּתה ְוַזְרֶעָך׃
 ְלַאֲהָבה ֶאת־ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֶהיָך ִלְׁשֹמַע ְּבֹקלֹו 
 ּוְלָדְבָקה־בֹו ִּכי הּוא ַחֶּייָך
 “I have set before you life and death, blessing and curse.  
Choose life, so that you and your offspring may live,  
by loving YHWH your God, by hearing his voice,  
and by clinging to him—for he is your life”  
(Deut 30:20; cf. 32:47). 
Since the Enlightenment a split has been assumed between word and world 
resulting in a quest for a language that could bridge the two.59 According to Patterson, 
Wittgenstein’s language-game is exactly what reunites language and world: “Since our 
primary contact with reality is in our activities, where there is an interweaving and 
association of linguistic and nonlinguistic contact in language-world, it is there that new 
discoveries about the nature of reality are made and find their way to articulation.”60 And 
again: “Language and world are inextricably intervowen in the practices of living.”61 
                                               
Chambers, “My Utmost for His Highest,” in The Complete Works of Oswald Chambers (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Discovery House Publishers, 2000), 823 (September 14)). 
59 Shakespear, Kierkegaard, Language and the Reality of God, 28. Cf. Patterson, Word, Words 
and World, 3. 
60 Patterson, Word, Words and World, 111. 
61 Patterson, Word, Words and World, 32. Cf. 11, 14–15, 19, 227. Instead of his former view 
seeing this link as consisting in “the human ability to receive and articulate sense-date,” it became in his 
later thinking “instead human ability to access the physical world through our use of (activities involving) 
it” (Patterson, Word, Words and World, 18). Critiquing his own former atomistic view of language 
Wittgenstein wrote: “It makes no sense at all to speak absolutely of the ‘simple parts of a chair’” 





For Wittgenstein it is our acting, or involvement with the world through verbal 
and non-verbal language-games that constitutes forms of life.62 According to him forms 
of life are basic, allowing for a foundationalism where self-evidence is not found in logic 
and sense-evidence, but in a form of life.63 Patterson summarizes the significance of this 
for theology: “It is through participation in the relating activity of God (in God’s 
language-games) that humans are able to transcend their local forms of life and begin to 
glimpse the pattern of the whole.”64 
Both Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein could be said to place themselves between the 
realist and anti-realist views, or rather both seem to challenge the realist/anti-realist 
dichotomy by challenging the subject-object and the world-language dichotomies.65  
                                               
62 Patterson, Word, Words and World, 13. 
63 Patterson, Word, Words and World, 173. 
64 Patterson, Word, Words and World, 220. Wittgenstein wrote: “If a lion could talk, we could not 
understand him” (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 223). Patterson nuances Wittgenstein’s 
statement: “It may indeed be possible to evaluate one form of life from the perspective of another because, 
as is obvious, there is overlap of concepts and activities between forms of life” (Patterson, Word, Words 
and World, 166). The obvious example here, which also would question the absoluteness of Wittgenstein’s 
statement is Balaam’s donkey in Num 22:28–30. 
65 Shakespear defines the realist and anti-realist positions as follows: “If you interpret language 
about God in a realist way, it means that you believe that the reality of God is independent of that language. 
In other words, God’s reality is ‘objective’. It does not depend upon human experience or concepts. 
However metaphorical or analogical it may be, language about God refers to and is constrained by the 
objective truth of God. It does not create or project that truth out of ‘subjective’ human ideals, values or 
feelings. 
Conversely, an anti-realist sees language about God as an expression of human ideals and needs. 
We do not know or need to know if that language has any objective referent. This is not necessarily 
intended to be a devaluation of language about God. A religious anti-realist claims that religion does not 
provide us with information about realities that exist prior to us. The function of religion is expressive. It is 
a means of articulating a way of life and a set of values. Within this picture, language about God provides a 
focus for our notions of the ultimate good in human life” (Shakespear, Kierkegaard, Language and the 
Reality of God, 2). 
Patterson on Wittgenstein challenging the subject-object dichotomy: “Another theological 
implication of an abandonment of the realist-idealist distinction is the loss of the traditional subjective-
objective dichotomy. If, in a language-game theology, the realist anti-realist dichotomy is not observed, the 
reality of God cannot be simply either objective or subjective because this reality, in encompassing all other 




Patterson summarizes it succinctly: “Realists just as much as idealists fail to acknowledge 
that das leben is ‘the given.’”66 
A word and a statement can therefore not be said to have an autonomous and 
atomistic meaning. Meaning instead becomes interlinked to context and practice. After 
the publication of James Barr’s The Semantics of Biblical Language in 1961 biblical 
scholars have downplayed the etymology of individual words and rather emphasized the 
                                               
191). Kierkegaard, on his side, “is making claims about the nature of God and the ultimate value of created 
life which do not function as subjective fictions. However, in changing the emphasis in dogmatics from a 
static metaphysics to communication, Kierkegaard is fundamentally challenging metaphysical realist 
assumptions about the role and justification of religious language. The practical emphasis of such a 
dogmatics makes propositional doctrinal correctness of little value, because such beliefs must serve 
religious practice, and not the other way round” (Shakespear, Kierkegaard, Language and the Reality of 
God, 197). While Kierkegaard can be interpreted as an anti-realist, the problem with this interpretation “is 
that it fails to recognize that the passion of infinity . . .  opens the self out of its inclosed ‘subjectivity’” 
(Shakespear, Kierkegaard, Language and the Reality of God, 167). And further: “If, for Kierkegaard, form 
and content in general are inseparably locked together, then the same may be said of his view of religious 
language. The how of religious language and communication cannot be subtracted from the what. Religious 
communication is neither contentless rhetoric nor a direct statement of objective truth. 
If this is the case, then the ambiguity of Kierkegaard’s position in relation to realism and anti-
realism becomes more understandable. Kierkegaard does not fit easily into either category. In fact, we will 
see how Kierkegaard occupies a third position, somewhere between the two, which we will call ethical 
realism. From anti-realism, he might draw the point that religious faith is not a matter of knowing, of 
conceptual cognition. There is no direct or immediate access to God, and faith takes the form of a 
subjective passion. God is not knowable outside of the forms of life to which faith commits itself in 
passionate interest and striving. 
However, from realism he would adopt the argument that religious faith cannot be reduced 
without remainder to an expression of human ideals. Language about God still opens us to an otherness 
which we cannot eliminate or dispose of at will. There is a real constraint operating on our formulation of 
appropriate practical responses to the religious calling. 
To hold such positions together might suggest a dubious philosophical sleight of hand. In fact, 
although we have said that Kierkegaard occupies a middle position between realism and anti-realism, this 
does not do justice to the radical nature of his authorship. It is not that Kierkegaard just mixes together a bit 
of objectivity and a bit of subjectivity to produce the right notion of faith. Rather, he places the boundaries 
between subjective and objective in dispute, without effacing the difference between them” (Shakespear, 
Kierkegaard, Language and the Reality of God, 22–23). 
For further discussions on Kierkegaard’s challenge to the realist anti-realist dichotomy cf. 
Shakespear, Kierkegaard, Language and the Reality of God, 6, 11, 24, 54–55, 82, 165, 178, 180, 219, 221. 
Shakespear also points out similarities between the realist and anti-realist positions (Shakespear, 
Kierkegaard, Language and the Reality of God, 8–9). 
66 Patterson, Word, Words and World, 187–88. Cf. Fergus Kerr, Theology after Wittgenstein 




relation between words and their use in the immediate context to recover the meaning of 
a passage. He wrote that “the test of explanations of words is by their contexts.”67 This 
stress on actual usage resonates with Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language: 
“Philosophers very often talk about investigating, analysing, the meaning of words. But 
let’s not forget that a word hasn’t got a meaning given to it, as it were, by a power 
independent of us, so that there could be a kind of scientific investigation into what the 
word really means. A word has the meaning someone has given to it.”68 Meaning comes 
down to a question of usage and practice. The question is not simply what a word means, 
but how it means—or what the one using it means by how he or she uses it. Wittgenstein 
wrote: 
What I actually want to say is that here too it is not a matter of the words one uses or 
of what one is thinking when using them, but rather of the difference they make at 
various points in life. How do I know that two people mean the same when both say 
they believe in God? And one can say just the same thing about the Trinity. Theology 
which insists on the use of certain words and phrases and bans others, makes nothing 
clearer (Karl Barth). It, so to speak, fumbles around with words, because it wants to 
say something and doesn’t know how to express it. Practices give words their 
meaning.69 
And in reflecting on 1 Cor 13:1–3 Kierkegaard wrote: 
There is no word in the human language, not a single one, not the most sacred, about 
which we are able to say: “If a man uses this word it unconditionally proves that he 
has love.” On the contrary, it is always true that a word used by one man can assure 
us that he has love, and an absolutely contrary word used by another can assure us 
that he loves just as much; it is true that a word can assure us that love dwells in the 
                                               
67 Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language, 113. Cf. A. P. Martinich and David Sosa, The 
Philosophy of Language (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 359–61. 
68 Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the 'Philosophical 
Investigations' (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969), 27–28. 
69 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on Colour, trans. Linda L. McAlister and Margarete Schättle 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 59e (§317). Wittgenstein: “. . . it is our acting, which lies 




heart of the one who uttered it, and not in another who nevertheless used the same 
word. 
  There is no act, not a single one, not the best, about which we unconditionally 
dare to say: “He who does this proves unconditionally that he loves.” It depends on 
how he shows his love. There are, we know, deeds which in a special sense are called 
acts of charity. But truly, because one gives alms, because one visits the widow and 
clothes the naked, one’s love is not thereby proved or even recognizable. . . . And yet 
it is certain that love must be known by its fruits.70 
No word, no act proves, in itself, that there is love in it. So while seeing our reading as 
disclosed in our life, it nevertheless needs to be stressed that no word or act, not even a 
form of life, carries a guarantee or certainty in and of itself. No form of word, act, or life 
disclose unequivocally what really is in the heart, and still God cannot dwell in the heart 
without it manifesting itself in word, act, and one’s form of life. In the reverse, one 
cannot reject God in one’s heart without disclosing it somehow in word, act, and form of 
life. 
Reflecting on biblical prose prayer, Moshe Greenberg sums up this prophetic 
thrust as follows: “No wording of an appeal can persuade, when the one to be persuaded 
mistrusts the appellant.”71 And: 
This vehement, unconditional repudiation of the whole of Israel’s established worship 
has several premises: first, that in all its forms, worship is, like prayer, a social 
transaction between persons, with no magical virtue or intrinsic efficacy. It is rather a 
gesture of submission and like all gestures a formality whose meaning depends 
ultimately on the total moral evaluation the recipient makes of the one who gestures; 
for the recipient to esteem the gesturer there must be some moral identification 
between them. . . . For worship to find favour in God’s eyes, the worshiper must 
identify himself with (‘know’ in the biblical idiom; e.g., Jer. 22:15f.) God in the one 
way possible for man—by imitating his  
                                               
70 Søren Kierkegaard, Works of Love, trans. David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson 
(Princeton, NJ,: Princeton University Press, 1946), 11–12. Cf. Søren Kierkegaard, Kjerlighedens 
Gjerninger, Samlede Værker (København: Gyldendals Bogklubber, 1962), 18–20. Cf. Ellen G. White, 
Steps to Christ (Boise, Idaho: Pacific Press, 1892), 58–59. 




moral conduct (compare also Hos. 4:1f. and Jer. 9:23).72 
In the previous chapters, we have seen the prophets repeat Torah with variation. 
We have seen indications of close reading that go beyond a literalistic approach, finding 
indicators and trajectories that invite an expansionistic reading. This ‘beyond’ seems to 
reflect a hermeneutic of love, a reading in excess, a desire to go all the way with YHWH 
as he indicates in his instructions. Maybe we should read Deut 6:5 as follows: “And you 
shall love YHWH your God with all your heart and with all your person and will all your 
excess” ( ָךְבָכל־ְמֹאדֶ ּו ָךׁשְ ְבָכל־ַנפְ ּו ָכל־ְלָבְבָךּבְ ֵאת ְיהָוה ֱאֹלֶהיָך  ּתָ ַהבְ ָאוְ  ). A hermeneutic of love is a 
commitment to go as far as possible while rooted in a close reading of Torah and 
simultaneously following indications and trajectories that take us beyond literalistic 
boundaries. The words of Torah, received as intended, cannot be separated from a form 
of life. Torah is not seen as an end but a beginning, an invitation into a covenantal form 
of life with YHWH. It is not to be read as an exhaustive description of this life, but as 
instructions for how to go about living this life. By taking the posture of a spectator, 
instead of a participant in this form of life, we can remain detached but not without 
necessarily altering the usage the words were intended for. Since the passages do not 
intend to leave any neutral space for the reader,  
                                               
72 Greenberg, Biblical Prose Prayer, 55–56. B. Gemser uncovers the same tendency by 
investigating the rîb-pattern in the HB, the idea of the prophet calling the people to God’s legal procedure 
against them. But there is also amazing grace in this rîb-pattern as it “reveals the undogmatic, unsystematic 
way of thinking, in religious matters, of the Old Testament. All is ultimately left to, lies in the hands of, the 
Supreme Judge and Ruler, whose judgment is righteous, but unpredictable, and inscrutable for human 
understanding, whose ways are not ours. He is a person, not a system or an order. But this implies that there 
is an appeal to Him, even an irrational, undeserved, unjustifiable appeal to his heart, his compassion, his 




however we read the text, it is a “commitment at risk.”73 
Michael Fishbane wrote: “The cultural archive must become a living voice, and 
the written formulations must become direct address; one’s life and the life-world 
presented in the text must coincide in a dynamic way.”74 When the biblical words come 
across as foreign and dead without meaning; when we experience ourselves as exiled 
from the biblical world, it may not be another theory we need, but, rather, a form of life 
where the Bible’s words speak to us as a living voice.75
                                               
73 Steiner, Real Presences, 8. 
74 Fishbane, Sacred Attunement, 63. 
75 Wittgenstein wrote: “What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their 
everyday use” (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 48 (§116)). And Labron: “Wittgenstein’s later 
conception of philosophy was shown to be ‘therapeutic’ for the problem of philosophical idols by 
demonstrating that ordinary language reveals meaning in the language-games. Meaning is not explained 
through metaphysical connections or by positing foundational realms, but is shown in the form of life. In a 
similar manner, God is not found or explained by deduction from metaphysical inquiry, presented as a 
particular object, or a theoretical abstraction in Hebraic thought. Instead, God is shown through the 
Israelites’ history and practices, that is, their form of life” (Labron, Wittgenstein's Religious Point of View, 
153). And Holmer: “For there is a way that one comes to believe so that a religious form of life ensues” 
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